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Abstract 
 
An explicit starting point for this research is to give a voice to the 
experiences of the victims of safety crime. The accounts of such 
victims are missing from the criminal justice arena and academia. 
This research will attempt, in part, to fill the gap in the following 
ways.  
 
First, the longstanding separation between safety crime and ‘real’ 
or ‘traditional’ crime is both reflected and institutionalised 
through state responses to the offences committed by corporations. 
This research offers a critical analysis of the social, legal and 
political obstacles that victims of safety crime face. 
 
Second, the effect of this process on secondary victims
1
 is 
examined. The deaths of their loved ones are, in the first instance, 
framed as ‘accidental’. The families are an obstacle to the 
corporations, as they seek to hide or manipulate the truth in the 
pursuit of their innocence. This is enabled by legal and political 
processes, which make justice an almost impossible achievement. 
The thoughts of the families and the long-term impact this has on 
their lives is explored in detail. 
 
The final part of this research is focused on the aims, nature and 
success of the various groups created in response to the reaction of 
the criminal justice system following a corporate killing. The 
visibility of the corporate accountability movement, mounted from 
the late 1980s against the victimisation of workers, raises 
questions for future research. It concludes with a discussion of 
how this situation has altered and the potential site for change in 
the future. 
 
Safety crime in the UK and worldwide, is a regular occurrence, yet 
popularly and politically, safety crimes are comparatively 
                                                          
1
 As is the nature of a corporate killing, it is the families of the victim who experience official and unofficial 
responses. 
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invisible. Through the experiences of secondary victims, who are 
neither represented nor treated as real victims, this thesis offers an 
original contribution to the understanding of how this happens, the 
effects and the response.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Interests and aims 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the topic of this research. 
The main research aims and initial questions of each chapter will 
be outlined.  
 
There is a lack of academic research into the experiences of those 
bereaved by safety crime. There has been no research published 
(to the best of my knowledge) which details the actual response of 
the criminal justice system in the UK to a safety crime and how 
that impacts on bereaved families. Following a safety crime, it is 
the loved ones of the victim who deal with bereavement, and all 
that this entails, as well as an official response that, this research 
will argue, is designed to either minimise or deny them of their 
victimhood.  
 
To attend to this gap, this research will trace the experiences of the 
families of victims of safety crime as they are processed through 
each stage of the criminal justice system. This is a process that 
enables corporations to maintain their innocence and ensures 
justice is almost impossible, which causes long-term pain to such 
secondary victims. Their experiences of the police, Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) and the legal system will be sought in 
order to collect in-depth qualitative data. 
 
In addition, this research will examine the origins, nature and aims 
of the corporate accountability movement that began at the end of 
the 1980s. Various groups were created in response to the criminal 
justice system by secondary victims and are a site of struggle for 
change. Each group that formed part of this movement has been 
described by their members in a plethora of ways. For example, 
the members of one group covered in this research, Disaster 
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Action, described it as an “organisation” (Eyre and Dix, 2014: 11), 
a charity and a “special kind of family” (ibid: 14). It was created 
out of a combination of “family and support groups” (ibid: 12), 
“self-help support and action groups” (ibid: 19), “trusts” (ibid: 27), 
“associations” (ibid: 28) and “action groups” (ibid: 20). For 
consistency, I have chosen to focus on groups who share the goal 
of supporting and working to alter the representation and treatment 
of the victims of corporate and safety crimes. Each group chosen 
was highly visible in the corporate accountability movement. 
 
By combining experiences of how secondary victims of safety 
crime are dealt with, and respond to, the criminal justice system, 
this research provides a unique attempt to excavate subjugated 
knowledges and experiences. Their experiences are present in 
academia but remain as part of a small proportion of 
criminological literature. It is crucial that this changes, as one 
bereaved mother asked, “how do you get your voice heard when 
no one will let you (1)
2?” It is the responsibility of academic 
research to document how she and others are silenced, the effects 
of this and whether this can be challenged collectively. 
 
As a link to contextualise why this research was undertaken 
(Okely and Callaway cited in Punch, 1998) it is easy to locate and 
recall where my interest in safety crime began. As part of a 
module called ‘Introducing Criminology’, one lecture on white 
collar and corporate crime explored the death of Sidney Rouse as 
documented in David Bergman’s book, Deaths at Work (1991). In 
1988 Sidney Rouse was digging a trench prior to the installation of 
a gas main under a pavement (ibid.). The obvious risk of hitting 
pre-installed electric cables was negated by the checking of a 
‘ways’ and ‘mains’ map. However, the ganger supervising Sidney 
Rouse’s work had only been given the ‘ways’ map (ibid). In good 
faith, Sidney Rouse worked until his spade struck an underground 
electric cable. The subsequent electric shock subjected him to 
suffer 80% burns. Sidney Rouse was taken to hospital where he 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix 6 - 8 
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died after a week, his sister reflected, “The worst thing about it 
was to see him in hospital for over a week. He was in a terrible 
condition” (ibid: 7). Following his death, an inquest returned a 
verdict of ‘accidental death’, the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) decided not to prosecute the corporation for manslaughter 
and the HSE also decided not to prosecute for health and safety 
offences (ibid.). Bergman evaluated that these decisions were 
taken as a result of “a defective and ineffectual inquest”, due to 
“an entrenched and arbitrary bias” and because of “a lack of 
political will to enforce legislation” (ibid: 8). Consequently, 
Sidney Rouse’s sister did not see any justice in the months and 
years after her brother’s death. 
 
As an undergraduate, I was shocked at the Sidney Rouse’s 
unnecessary death and the frivolousness with which it was treated. 
I thought of my father and partner who worked hard in similar 
work and how I had assumed they were protected, but after that 
hour long lecture, I knew they were not. No matter how I tried to 
reconcile it, I was unable to view what happened to Sidney Rouse 
as an accident. It was one introductory lecture in a series that 
semester and whilst most of my peers chose to return essays based 
on serial murder, I focused on corporate and safety crime. 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, I was penalised for writing more than 
10% over the required word count on the essay I returned on the 
topic. 
 
The aims of this research originate from questions that have 
perplexed me since that introductory lecture; what is complicated 
about convicting corporations that is simple when convicting 
individuals? Why is it not instantly recognisable as a crime? Why 
are criminologists largely preoccupied with such a narrow 
definition of crime to the exclusion of safety crime? Who is 
guiding whom? Why, when I asked solicitors which section of law 
I could work for that prosecuted corporations for criminality was I 
greeted with a puzzled look when there is an area of law dedicated 
to helping corporations? My interest did not originate with trying 
to find fault in the state or to join a ‘moral crusade’ (Shaprio, 
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1983) but out of curiosity, to find answers to questions I had not 
realised were questions prior to that introductory lecture. 
 
The context of the social movement 
Some of those questions had been taken up by a number of groups 
from the late 1980s. These groups were created in response to both 
public disasters, such as the sinking of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise and deaths of individuals at work, such as Sidney 
Rouse. Their significance will be contextualised below. 
 
In what Eyre and Dix (2014) referred to as a ‘decade of disaster’, 
the 1980s saw a number of tragedies, which included the Bradford 
fire, the Lockerbie air disaster and the sinking of the Marchioness. 
The amount of fatalities, the traumatic nature of the deaths, the 
testimonies of the victims and the plight of the families all meant 
such disasters were prominent in the media. The widespread use of 
dramatic images of the Hillsborough football stadium crush and 
the wreckage of Pan Am 103 spread across Lockerbie meant such 
disasters became part of public consciousness. In the aftermath, 
the families of those who died and the survivors found themselves 
facing problems “thrown up by...mismanagement” (ibid: 19). In 
response, groups such as SciSafe, the Derbyshire Families 
Association and Herald Families Association were created (ibid.). 
Groups representing the victims of disasters highlighted the lack 
of justice in each of their cases. 
 
Unlike in public disasters, the loved ones of those killed at work 
were and still tend to be, isolated families. In the 1980s individuals 
fought their own cases, seemingly as ‘one offs’’ with the 
exception of disasters such as Piper Alpha and Bhopal. Just as the 
families of victims of disasters share a common bond, so do the 
families of people killed at work. They are disadvantaged because 
they are fragmented across time and spread geographically and in 
order to reach others in similar situations, such individuals need 
representation. In the early 1990s, groups active in the area of 
worker safety began to mobilise, groups that included the London 
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Hazards centre, the Construction Safety Campaign (CSC) and the 
Centre for Corporate Accountability (CCA).  
 
In 1994 David Bergman wrote, “Health and safety campaigners 
have for many years argued that the criminal justice system has 
failed to treat deaths and injuries at work – unlike deaths in almost 
any other setting – as the possible outcome of serious crimes” 
(1994: 3). By the early 1990s, there was a wealth of evidence 
available which pointed to the inadequacy of the law in dealing 
with workplace deaths. This began to be highlighted by the 
aforementioned groups. For example, in 1994 the Hazards 
Campaign reported that whilst over 200 people had been convicted 
of manslaughter in an average year, only one person had ever been 
found guilty of manslaughter following a death in the workplace 
(ibid.).  
 
Along with the publication of statistics in the 1980s and 1990s, 
details of individual cases began to gain a degree of visibility. A 
notable example is the case of Paul Elvin who was fatally 
electrocuted when an aluminium pole he was carrying touched 
overhead cables at Euston Station. In 1995, his mother, Ann Elvin 
published Invisible Crime, which she describes as “The true life 
story of a mother’s fight against the government’s cover-up of 
workplace manslaughter” (1995: 3). She documents how for six 
years, her and her family fought for justice because her son was 
“murdered legally” (ibid: 5). Ann Elvin’s aim in publishing 
Invisible Crime was to “give [her son] the right to truth” and the 
hope that “other families fight back” (ibid.). The book includes the 
details of the case, copies of the original relevant documents and 
information for families to use to fight their cases.  
 
When a number of groups were established by those bereaved 
following a violent death in the mid-1990s, Rock (1998) noted it 
represented “the beginnings of a new social movement and a new 
identity” (1998: x). Similarly, a movement calling for the 
accountability of corporations began to gather pace in the late 
1980s, thanks to the efforts of the families, the workers and 
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representatives of some of the groups mentioned above. It was in 
1988 that the term, ‘corporate manslaughter’ was first used in the 
Guardian newspaper, reflecting a growing public awareness of the 
crime (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). 
 
The uncovering of crimes committed by corporations and state 
agencies has continued up to the present day. For example, it is 
pertinent that throughout the duration of this research, the full 
scale of injustice suffered by the families and individuals 
associated with the Hillsborough stadium disaster has come to the 
fore publicly. After a long campaign of more than one group, high 
profile fundraising, academic publishing and activism, the truth 
was finally recognised publicly in a reopened inquest in 2016. Phil 
Scraton’s book (first published in 1999), Hillsborough, the Truth, 
sums up how the aftermath of Hillsborough starkly demonstrates 
how: “the ‘law’ fails to provide appropriate means of discovery 
and redress for those who suffer through institutionalised neglect 
and personal negligence” (Scraton, 2009: 17). Scraton dedicates 
the book to the bereaved families and survivors writing:  
 
…it was your determination that persuaded the 
Government to appoint the Hillsborough Independent 
Panel and facilitate the disclosure of all documents 
held by relevant organisations involved…your 
continuing struggle for justice in the face of adversity 
and desolation (2016: 10).  
 
 
As in the case of Hillsborough, there is no doubt that groups 
created to support and campaign for change can have a real impact 
on the status quo. This research will examine the groups that 
mobilised in response to corporate killing as part of the 
longstanding effort to have safety crime recognised since the 
1980s and 1990s.  
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Recognising safety crime in Criminology 
Safety crime originates from an attempt to categorise different 
types of corporate crime, categories which are usually based on 
the type of law that should deal with the offence and the nature of 
the victim involved (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). In Corporate 
Crime Slapper and Tombs note four sub-categories of corporate 
crime. This research focuses on the second category, crime that 
arises out of “the employment relationship…crimes against 
employees…by employers” (ibid: 45). In outlining this sub-
category, Slapper and Tombs cite the work of Carson (1980, 
1982), Bergman (1991, 1993, 1994), Pearce (1990b; Pearce and 
Tombs, 1993, 1997), Slapper (1993), Wells (1995) and Box 
(1983), all of whom use characteristics of what they term “health 
and safety crime” (Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 46).  
 
In 2007, Tombs and Whyte wrote Safety Crime, dedicated to the 
subject of the “violations of law by employers that either do, or 
have the potential to, cause sudden death or injury as a result of 
work-related activities” (Tombs and Whyte, 2007: 1). This they 
defined as safety crime, cementing the importance of the sub-
category, refining two features. Firstly, the authors emphasise the 
‘safety’ rather than the ‘health and safety’ element identified in 
Corporate Crime in 1999. Tombs and Whyte reason this is 
because the victims of safety crimes are “immediately apparent”, 
for example, when a worker is killed in a factory as a result of 
their employer violating the law. This is in contrast to many 
victims of health crimes who are created over a long period of 
time, for example the latency period of mesothelioma caused by 
exposure to asbestos is 20 to 50 years (The Mesothelioma Center, 
2017), which “makes the burden of proof a difficult one for 
victims” (Tombs and Whyte, 2007: 4). This complicates both the 
enforcement of health crime and its measurement, and although 
the authors note it is still as socially important as safety crime, to 
study it requires a different approach, certainly from the study of 
safety crime (ibid.). Secondly, using the Health and Safety at 
Work Act (HASAW 1974), Tombs and Whyte extend the remit of 
safety crime to include members of the public who are affected by 
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the “decisions and omissions” of companies as well as direct 
employees (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). This covers many more 
victims, such as those associated with ‘disasters’, for example, the 
members of the public killed in the Lockerbie air disaster.  
 
 
The principle aim of this research is to document the ways in 
which safety crimes are rendered invisible and to highlight the 
effect of this process on the families when they lose a loved one 
following a safety crime. The study of victims is crucial for 
criminological research and analysis, Rock argues:  
 
Criminal encounters should be treated as the centre of 
evolving webs of actors and audiences, actions and 
reactions, relations and meanings, that can fan out to 
affect the worlds and lives of people around them. 
Only then would it be possible to begin charting the 
larger social and psychological significance of crime 
(Rock, 1994: 8). 
 
In the experiences of safety crime in this research, the victims 
have died, which makes Rock’s call pertinent. When referring to 
victims, this research will examine safety crime through the 
experiences of surviving family members, not the victim per se.  
 
How safety crime is rendered invisible will be explored 
throughout this research in terms of social, legal and political 
obstacles. These strands have been chosen to reflect the position of 
safety crime as a social construction that “owes more to legal, 
social and political…modes of thought and balances of power than 
to any features of the events themselves” (Tombs, 1993: 332). It is 
a suitable categorisation to examine the process of invisibility, 
moving from the death of the victim to the response of the families 
after the legal procedure has ended. 
 
As cases such as Ann Elvin have demonstrated so clearly, 
following a safety crime, families are denied the right to find out 
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the truth about why and how their loved one died. By documenting 
how the families are denied the truth they desperately need, this 
research seeks to answer key research questions, which are as 
follows: 
 
1. What social, legal and political obstacles does safety crime face 
that prevent it from becoming defined and treated as a crime? 
2. How are the victims and families of victims of safety crime 
treated by law and key institutions of the criminal justice 
system including the police, inquest, Health and Safety 
Executive, Crown Prosecution Service? 
3. What effect does this have on the families of victims? 
4. Under what circumstances do families of victims seek to 
develop more general campaigns, with what aims, and with 
what degrees of success? 
 
Chapter summary 
In order to answer the questions posed above, the research will be 
organised as follows: 
 
Chapter One will provide a literature review on safety crimes via 
the historical origins of white collar and then corporate crime. 
Starting with a discussion of the emergence of white collar crime, 
it will move to focus on the development of corporate crime where 
the role of the corporation became explicit and included crimes as 
well as omissions of legitimate, formal, organisations (Pearce and 
Tombs, 1998). This research will narrow its range further to focus 
on the effects of safety crime, a sub-section of corporate crime, 
where employers have made omissions such as not keeping 
employees safe by failing to train them adequately or failed to 
prioritise health and safety in the face of the available evidence 
(Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Tombs and Whyte, 2007).  
 
In accordance with the first strand, socially, safety crime is costly 
and prevalent, but there has been little consideration paid to the 
victims. Part of this is due to the success of deflecting the 
existence of the number of victims that already exist, removing 
them from mainstream law and order and denying them legitimate 
victim status. This process will be explored, detailing work that 
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has been carried out to illuminate the extent of corporate and 
safety crime. There will then be an examination of the inclusion 
and exclusion of it as a subject in academia. A lack of victims also 
implies a lack of offenders. How corporations have deflected 
criminal status, including who has the power to define this, will be 
reviewed. 
 
To examine the legal obstacles a safety crime, a sub-section of 
Chapter One will look at the law that governs corporations. It will 
attempt to show that whilst it exists, the law is designed not to 
work (Punch, 2009), since many corporations that are charged, are 
acquitted. The reasons for this are discussed, followed by a review 
of The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
(2007). 
 
The main response of the state to the threat of, or following a 
safety crime, is regulation. In a climate where “elf and safety” is 
laughed at and seen as ridiculous (Jones, 2014), the origins of such 
regulation will be outlined. The context and development of the 
HSE will be detailed beginning with the Factory Acts. Key events 
such as the Robens Report will be noted together with the impetus 
for the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974). The relevant 
developments of the law will be examined.  
 
The law that controls and prohibits corporations has matured at a 
much slower rate than those which protect it. Punch (2009: 52) 
concluded that although we assume laws are created to convict, 
laws such as those purported to control corporations are never 
intended to be “enforced or are unenforceable”. As Bergman 
(1991) noted, from 1982 to 1991 one director was charged with 
manslaughter in spite of 4217 deaths during the same period. The 
statistics have changed since 1991, details of how and the extent to 
whether this has improved will also be discussed. 
 
With every victim of safety crime, there is a family of that victim. 
Critical victimologists focus on the construction of the victim, 
which is where this research is to be placed. The hierarchy of 
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victimisation will also be explored in Chapter One through the 
concept of the ideal victim before going on to focus on the state as 
a perpetrator of harm to the families of victims of corporate and 
safety crime. The ‘ideal’ victim (Christie, 1986) who is deserving 
of support is unrepresentative of victims in general, yet policy and 
services continue to perpetuate this myth and prioritise the 
treatment of this stereotypical victim, ignoring the reality.  
 
The final strand examines the political obstacles. In the final part 
of Chapter One, this is explored with a discussion of who is most 
affected by safety crime and how individuals have reacted by 
creating or joining groups to support others and campaign for 
change. Together, these groups create a social movement that pose 
a challenge to the dominant discourse and, in similar ways to the 
feminist movement, seek to change social policy. Research that 
has examined the impact of such a social movement on the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007) will 
be detailed.  
 
Prior to the original research, Chapter Two explores research 
methodology. Issues with researching crimes of the powerful will 
be detailed, moving on to researching corporate and safety crime 
before narrowing to victims of safety crimes. Such research is a 
sensitive topic. The considerations of this will be explored. 
Epistemology and ontology will be discussed followed by details 
of the qualitative research methods used. Sampling techniques and 
ethical issues will also be discussed in this chapter, ending with 
personal reflections of the research process on a sensitive topic.  
This precedes the research itself in the two chapters which follow. 
 
The research and original data is split across two chapters, 
Chapters Three and Four, which will repeat the strands identified 
and explored in Chapter One. 
 
Chapter Three will focus on the way the families of the victims of 
corporate and safety crime are treated including an examination of 
the social and legal obstacles they face. There has been a lack of 
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research carried out on the reactions of victims to corporate crime 
(Stitt and Giacopassi, 1993). Using testimony gathered from 
families themselves, it will highlight how they are treated by 
official state agencies. This chapter will show how the families 
need for the truth is complicated, concealed and manipulated by 
state institutions, including the police, the HSE and the courts. The 
dominant oppressive social structure and the institutions that 
represent and act on behalf of the state will be critically explored 
(Harvey, 1990). This visibility of the victims of safety crime is 
counter to the construction of acceptable reality and because of 
this, the victims suffer, unnecessarily (ibid.; Scraton and 
Chadwick, 1991). It will evidence how the families are 
encouraged to see the death of their loved one as an ‘accident’ 
rather than criminal and how this suppression ensures justice is 
never delivered by the legal system. The narrative of ‘accident’ for 
example, leads the police to treat the immediate victim, not as a 
victim of a crime but as victim of misfortune. The police 
consequently fail to investigate, which disadvantages the stages 
that follow (the court and HSE investigation).  
 
By highlighting this inequity, this chapter will document the 
power imbalance that occurs between the families and the 
corporation. A typical sign of this is the families are often unable 
to pay for legal representation whereas the corporations can afford 
to pay for multiple solicitors. The truth is obscured by the 
corporations and the families are almost powerless to resist. 
Denying and suppressing the truth is dependent upon the success 
with which the corporations and their legal representatives can 
find fault with the victim themselves. The way this is achieved de-
humanises the victims in their absence and after their death. The 
victim is constructed as a culpable victim; a victim who is at fault 
for their own death and partially blameworthy. Regardless of the 
differences between the deaths, or the apparent strength of some 
cases, the entire process works to incapacitate justice and silence 
the families of the victim. What happens when the families 
attempt to counter this will be explored. By documenting the 
experiences of the families, this research analyses how the law 
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operates to provide many opportunities for the corporation to 
protect itself at a personal cost to the families.   
 
Chapter Four will examine the final strand, the political obstacles. 
The families are silenced and are refused acknowledgement in the 
criminal justice process, which has long-term effects. Each family 
discussed in this research had their own informed ideas about what 
would have constituted justice. Their thoughts are detailed before 
moving on to look at how many families strive for justice through 
joining or creating groups with others. The methods they used to 
achieve this will be explored. This part of the chapter will build on 
testimonies from those who did so to propel their own cases 
further, as well as those who created and joined groups to support 
other families. Further, this chapter will include a discussion of the 
success of the various groups, judged firstly by the individuals 
involved and secondly, by any recent changes in law. It will 
examine the role and worth of such counter resistance when 
corporations and state agencies seek to preserve their status at the 
expense of both individuals and any social movement.  
 
A discussion combining the previous four chapters will be offered 
in Chapter Five. This revisits the original research aims to 
consider how the invisibility of safety crime and its victims is 
achieved in spite of the mounting evidence that corporations 
commit criminal harm affecting many people. It is in the 
experiences of the families that the consequences of denying the 
existence and legitimacy of safety crime are demonstrated. The 
analysis of the original data will show how their suffering is 
tangible and that it changes their lives irrevocably. This chapter 
will argue that harm could be avoided or at least lessened, were 
the victims and the secondary victims acknowledged or treated 
humanely. Here, an argument will be constructed that combines 
the strands identified in the literature review to discuss the 
question of invisibility. The final part of this chapter will include 
an examination of whether any changes are likely as the nature of 
the corporation continues to grow in power and influence. This 
analysis will be used to determine the obstacles to, and prospects 
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for, a more just treatment of the victims of safety crime in the 
future. 
 
The conclusion will summarise the findings of each chapter, 
paying particular attention to the social, legal and political 
obstacles that are faced following a safety crime. This chapter will 
ascertain how this research could add to existing literature and 
note areas for future study. 
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Chapter One 
 
Revealing the victims of safety crimes 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with exploring the existing literature 
associated with white collar, corporate and safety crime. The 
issues raised will be explored in three strands; through the 
social, legal and political obstacles faced following a safety 
crime. Of course, these are simply one way to organise the 
material and, in reality there may be considerable overlap 
between the categories, which mutually reinforce each other.  
 
The theme of this chapter is the invisibility and legitimacy of 
victims, combining two core and related strands. Firstly, the 
subject of safety crimes will be traced to its origins including an 
analysis of the development of the law. Secondly, the subject of 
the victim will be approached, particularly in relation to the 
contribution of critical victimology, before the two are 
combined in a discussion on the victims of safety crime; those 
people who are the principal focus of this research. 
 
Situating the victims of safety crimes 
The entire focus of this thesis arose from the exasperation I felt 
after reading one small handout which detailed “The case of 
Sidney Rouse” (Bergman, 1991). It appeared agonisingly 
obvious what had led up to Sidney Rouse’s death yet even in 
the absence of the necessity for a complicated ‘manhunt’, no 
person or corporation was held to account. It struck me that, as 
a consequence of this inaction, everyone who worked, 
especially manual workers, were more at risk than I had thought 
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them to be. Why had I assumed everyone was safe and being 
protected? How was it possible that they were not? This chapter 
uses the existing literature to attempt to understand why the 
offences such as those committed against Sidney Rouse are not 
treated as crimes and why people are seemingly unconcerned 
that they are not.  
 
Criminology, defined by the state 
There has been a collective failure of criminologists to 
challenge political definitions of real crimes and legitimate 
victims. Thus “continued neglect or indifference” by social 
scientists towards victims “also may play a part in denying 
legitimacy to them and their suffering” (Shover et al, 1994: 96). 
Criminology has largely ignored the victims of the powerful 
and instead it has historically focused on the “problem of 
crime” as represented by those people who are imprisoned and 
regularly in contact with the police (Muncie and McLaughlin, 
2001). It has “cast its gaze ‘downwards’…thus, the vast 
majority of criminal justice is uncritical” (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003: 9). For example, the questions that have been asked (or 
are not asked) by self-report and victimization surveys “do not 
start off asking the most important question of all: ‘what is 
serious crime?’ Instead they take serious crime as a pre- and 
state-defined phenomenon” (Box, 1983: 6) rather than 
exploring that “definitions of serious crime are essentially 
ideological constructs” (ibid: 13).  
 
The propensity to accept state definitions of crime meant that 
up to the 1970s, criminology had largely omitted “significant 
areas of social and political life that had a direct bearing on the 
nature of, and response to, criminal and deviant behaviour” 
failing to include, “important political and cultural processes, 
including the question of the state” (Coleman et al, 2009: 1). 
Criminological explanations preferred to explain crime by 
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focusing on pathological reasons that located fault in the 
individual. This became the “favourite explanatory imagery of 
mainstream positivistic criminology” (Box, 1983: 4). 
 
Those criminologists interested in looking at offenders that are 
not state-defined, were largely absent for a large part of the 
twentieth century, which Geis and Goff explained was as a 
result of the: 
 
conservative tinge of the political climate [and] the 
priorities of sociology [that] went through a period in 
which highly quantitative, supposedly value-free 
empirical investigation was prized (Geis and Goff, 
1983: xxx).  
 
This continued into “the 1960s and early 1970s when the stars 
of interactionism and phenomenology were in the ascendant” 
and  “practitioners of traditional criminology…seemed 
obsessed with discovering why powerlessness, in one of its 
many guises, produced so much serious crime” (Box, 1983: 4,-
x). What was crime and who was criminal was accepted as 
scientific fact, unchallenged. 
 
Whilst Hirschi and Gottfredson claim “no topic in criminology 
can be discussed without the spectre of white-collar crime 
hanging over it” (1987: 949) it is still the case that crimes 
committed by the state receive little critical analysis in 
criminology which has focused on “homicide, rape, burglary, 
robbery…Criminology, for its part has remained distinctly 
disinterested in the topic” (Hillyard, 2003: 201). An illustration 
of this is that:  
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most ‘Introduction to Criminology’ textbooks feature 
a chapter on how corporate crime, state crime and 
human rights abuse are under-researched, to then just 
go back to talking about drug-addicts and violent 
teenagers (Krause cited in Tombs, 2015: 66).  
 
The lack of inclusion of state crimes in widely used 
criminological texts has implications for many undergraduates 
who consequently believe “state crime does not exist” 
(Hillyard, 2003: 206) or is of little importance. A number of 
academics seek to redress the imbalance and insist “There are 
alternatives. The raison d’etre of critical research is precisely to 
establish such alternatives” (ibid: 272, emphasis in original). 
Critical research should be concerned with making known what 
has been made invisible. Referring back to victims, it should: 
 
explore the relationship between patterns of 
victimisation and broader questions of social structure 
and power, by exploring, in more depth than do 
positivist or radical victimologies, the interconnected 
links between social class, gender, race and crime 
(Davies et al cited in Croall 2010: 16).  
 
The section of critical criminology relevant for this research 
places the state at the centre of its analysis aligning with those 
academics who are interested in:  
 
materialist, Marxist-based interpretation of power, 
and by extension, the processes of criminalization and 
control emanating from the state and its institutions 
(Coleman et al, 2009: 1).  
 
The consequent analysis does not accept national institutions, 
instead it questions definitions of the state as well as the role it 
plays or purports not to play. Indeed, there is “the need to grasp 
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the reorganization – as opposed to the relative disappearance – 
of it and its institutions” (ibid: 13, emphasis in original). 
 
The state managed version of the ‘crime problem’ is used to 
create “policies of deceit” deliberately ignoring that which is 
most damaging to “British society” (Walters, 2003: 211). As a 
counter to such priorities of the state, critical criminologists, 
who place the state at the centre of their analysis and evidence 
that: 
 
Government penal policy and judicial sentencing 
practices do not emerge out of a vacuum; rather they 
both reflect changing patterns of social relationships, 
particularly between the powerful and their sub-
ordinates (Box 1983: 207).  
 
This entails rejecting “government research agendas that 
ignore… crimes committed by the…wealthy in society” and 
refuses to endorse “policies that aim to regulate the already 
over-regulated in society” (Walters, 2003: 209). The state is 
always at the centre of the study of crimes of the powerful, 
analysing both the state’s relationship with the least powerful 
whilst also dissecting “the relationship between state and 
capital” (Tombs and Whyte, 2009: 115). Snider (2003) 
develops this and argues for an academic commentary that 
challenges the existing order and tries to appear in the policy 
decisions that are, or are not, made.  
 
Studying crimes of the powerful is a commitment to creating 
change and to use the platform that academics have set to 
challenge inequalities between the powerful and the powerless. 
An important part of the work of critical criminologists is 
dedicated to “recognising the nature of particular 
struggles/moments” using the “voice granted to academics” to 
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engage in “interventions” in order to challenge accepted 
definitions of crime (Hillyard, 2003: 272).  
 
Similarly, Tombs (1992) and Tombs and Whyte (2003) call for 
academics to use the position they have (in classrooms and 
workplaces) to call for change. They take inspiration for 
confronting the crimes of the powerful from the position 
occupied by feminist criminologists. Feminists were 
revolutionary in challenging dominant discourses from the 
1970s, when they engaged in social change with a “desire to 
strive for so-called objective and neutral knowledge” (Smart 
cited in Ballinger, 2016: 12).  
 
The inclusion of alternative definitions of crime into 
undergraduate courses has expanded the literature dedicated to 
the study of crimes of the powerful. Nonetheless, it continues to 
be overlooked by criminology as a discipline. Ruggiero (2015: 
132) claims it is neglected because ignoring it “contribute[s] to 
the reproduction of the power structure in society”. Tombs and 
Whyte state this: 
 
represents a gaping hole within mainstream 
criminology. It is a gaping hole which can be justified 
neither theoretically nor empirically (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003: 267). 
 
When criminology fails to research crimes of the powerful, they 
unintentionally reveal their bias in favour of the powerful 
(ibid.).  
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Rather than being recognised as part of a valuable movement 
seeking to redress a shortcoming of criminology, Pearce 
emphasises there is:  
 
[a] disturbing aspect of current academic 
practice…that differing but rigorous interpretations of 
the nature of the social world and of theories and 
theorists are often simply ignored, at times crudely 
parodied, or simply, and contemptuously, dismissed 
(2003: xi, emphasis in original).  
 
In short, crimes of the powerful are not a mainstream concern of 
criminology and those who choose to focus on it as a topic face 
being “ignored…footnoted and passed over” (ibid.: xii).  
 
However, the concerns of the crimes of the powerful have been 
taken up by a number of criminologists who have attempted to 
redress the imbalance. These will be detailed below, moving 
from the 1970s to the present time. 
 
Studying crimes of the powerful  
As indicated earlier in this chapter, criminology has been 
preoccupied with conventional definitions of what is crime, 
although alternatives to traditional criminology have developed 
in the past 60 years. The National Deviancy Conference (NDC) 
in 1968 led to the publication of a variety of seminal texts that 
“developed the critical themes…identified by those 
participating” (Coleman et al, 2009: 1). These texts set a new 
agenda and posed questions on the construction of deviance. 
Questions which include who is deviant? Who has the power to 
make such constructions? Who benefits? A number of those 
texts will be summarised in the paragraphs that follow. 
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In 1976, Frank Pearce published a Marxist analysis, Crimes of 
the Powerful. In it, he challenges assumptions that criminals are 
only those people who are processed by the police and found in 
prisons. In The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison, 
Jeffrey Reiman (first published in 1979) disputes 
representations of who is defined as criminal by traditional 
criminology. He proposes that the criminal justice system 
reflects crime via a ‘carnival mirror’, fighting enough crime but 
never eliminating it in order to legitimate the current social 
order and detract the focus from wealth inequalities. Tombs and 
Whyte consider that:  
 
Both Reiman and Pearce showed how, in different 
ways, the state projects through the law, an imaginary 
order in which ‘crime’ is invariably something that is 
the responsibility of the poor (2003: 104).  
 
With a focus on the state Hall et al published Policing the 
Crisis (1978). The authors draw attention to the “contradictory 
relationship between the state, law and capital” and propose 
ideas of an “anti-statist strategy” (Coleman et al, 2009).  
 
In the following decade, Steven Box explicitly focused on 
crimes of the powerful that had been largely invisible from 
criminology, the criminal justice system and the courts with the 
publication of Power, Crime and Mystification in 1983. Box 
claims the attention of criminological study should be on 
“understanding most serious crimes…located in power, not 
weakness, privilege, not disadvantage, wealth, not poverty”. On 
the final page, he calls for change and concludes, “We have for 
too long ignored crimes of the powerful, allowed the poor to be 
imprisoned scapegoats, and encouraged criminal justice 
personnel to act subversively” (1983: 223).  
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Whilst crimes of the powerful as one topic were largely 
neglected until the publication of Tombs and Whyte’s edited 
volume, Unmasking the Crimes of the Powerful, there was a 
significant development of subjects which consistently stated 
“there is more to crime and criminals than the state reveals” 
(Box, 1983: 15). Integral to this, this includes the study of white 
collar, corporate and safety crime. 
 
White collar crime 
Whilst Morris “pointed the finger at the ‘criminals of the 
upperworld’” and “Writers in other disciplines…were aware of 
the depredations of the powerful” it was Edwin Sutherland who 
“brought these general views together in a single package” 
(Geis and Goff, 1983: xxxi). In an address to the American 
Sociological Society in 1939, Sutherland, “altered the study of 
crime throughout the world in fundamental ways” (ibid: ix).  
 
Both Sutherland and Cressey recognise that many 
criminologists are satisfied with identifying social problems 
such as poverty as the cause of crime permitting them to 
suggest solutions to crime which do not challenge either the 
“social order” or involve “hurting anyone’s feelings” 
(Sutherland and Cressey cited in Melossi, 2008: 138). Such 
criminologists avoid the scorn and derision by peers that Pearce 
(2003) referred to. However, theorists who rely upon crime as 
related to poverty are now, “only able to do so by remaining 
essentially silent on the white-collar crime issue” Hirschi and 
Gottfredson, 1987: 950).  
 
Sutherland urges criminology to look upwards through the 
socio-economic classes in search of corporate offenders. He 
conceptualises white collar crime, defining it as “a crime 
committed by an individual in his [sic] occupation” (Sutherland, 
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1983: 7). Revolutionarily claiming that theories prior to the 
definition of white collar crime were based on evidence from a 
“biased sample of all criminal acts” (ibid: 6). In White Collar 
Crime (1949) Sutherland rejects many other criminological 
theories in the belief that “social and personal pathologies are 
not an adequate explanation of criminal behaviour” (1983: 5). 
The most important factor is the “social and interpersonal 
relations…associated sometimes with poverty and sometimes 
with wealth, and sometimes with both” (ibid: 7).  
 
Pertinent for this research, Sutherland observes: 
 
The white collar criminal does not conceive of 
himself as a criminal because he is not dealt with 
under the same official procedures as other criminals 
and because, due to his class status, he does not 
engage in intimate personal association with those 
who define themselves as criminals (ibid., 1983: 
231). 
 
Sutherland’s legacy expanded the scope and study of 
criminology in ways that can never be reversed and following 
his work, a number of academics applied the notion of white 
collar crime. These include Clinard (1952), Cressey (1953), 
Newman (1953), Nader (1965) and Geis (1967) (cited in Snider, 
2003). Although ground breaking at the time, it was not until 
the 1970s, during an economic recession and mass 
unemployment that consideration of white-collar crime 
resurfaced (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, Clinard and Yeager (1980) updated Sutherland’s 
research. And in the 1970s The National Institute of Justice at 
Yale University were awarded grants which “became known as 
the ‘Yale Studies in White-Collar Crime’”, although Snider 
noted the studies carried out looked at corporate crime (Snider, 
2003: 57).  
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By the end of 1990s, almost fifty years after Sutherland’s 
presidential address at the sociological conference, the study of 
white collar crime had become, irrevocably, a part of 
criminological literature. Out of this, corporate crime emerged 
as a distinct category.  
 
Corporate crime 
The distinction between white collar and corporate crime has 
furthered the endeavour of critical criminology in its critique of 
the existing law and highlighted its inadequacies (Slapper and 
Tombs, 1999). Corporate crime itself “developed out of 
Sutherland’s original claim and its allied conceptual 
ambiguities” (Snider, 2003: 51) when he referred to an 
“offender active in the corporate world” (Melossi, 2008: 139). 
Different from white collar crime, the study of corporate crime 
makes the role of the corporation in the crime explicit, moving 
away from the examination of the role of the individual. 
Whereas aspects of white collar crime such as occupational 
crime focuses on that which “victimize business”, Snider argues 
that corporate crime is “a much more counter-hegemonic 
concept” because it refers to “illegal acts done by business to 
benefit business, committed with the intention of increasing 
profit levels” (2003: 52).  
 
Corporate crime was described by Michalowski and Kramer in 
the US in 1990 as involving the challenging of “powerful 
political and economic interests” (Michalowski and Kramer 
cited in Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 37; Tombs and Whyte, 2015). 
Corporate crime includes crimes as well as omissions made by 
legitimate, formal organisations (Pearce and Tombs, 1998). The 
most suitable definition for the purposes of this research defines 
corporate crimes as:  
Illegal acts or omissions, punishable by the State 
under administrative, civil or criminal law, which are 
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the result of deliberate decision making or culpable 
negligence within a legitimate formal organisation 
(Pearce and Tombs, 1998: 107-110).  
 
This definition includes all of the corporations registered in the 
UK under the Companies Act and discounts those corporations 
created with the intention of breaking the law. It also includes 
those who can and are punished by regulatory means, which 
Sutherland recognised (Tombs, 2005). This is relevant to the 
cases in this research. 
 
In attempting to explain corporate crime, theories used to 
analyse traditional crime have been applied, theories such as 
Merton’s strain theory and Durkheim’s theory of anomie. Box 
(1983) uses the aforementioned theories to explain that when 
corporations are unable to maximise profit using legal means 
they are more likely to employ illegal means. As “a goal-
seeking entity”, the corporation is “inherently criminogenic” 
because it exists in an “unpredictable environment” where 
“opportunities for goal achievement are sometimes limited and 
constrained” (ibid: 35). Contrary to those living in poverty, 
those with wealth, experience “release from moral and social 
binds” (ibid: 40). The risk of committing crime is higher at 
times of recession and when competition increases, for 
example, as detailed in Clinard and Yeager’s (1980) study when 
corporations ‘innovated’ to increase profit margins. 
Corporations are well placed to hide their criminality in layers 
of structure (Croall, 2016). 
 
Hirschi and Gottfredson (1987) drew similarities between the 
common and the corporate criminal maintaining a general 
theory of crime is possible because all crime is a “way of some 
people satisfying their desire to maximise pleasure and 
minimise pain” (cited in Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 115). 
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Choosing not to look at offenders, they start by looking at the 
criminal act itself (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1987). For them, 
fraud is “in the pursuit of self-interest” and requires “less effort” 
at a rapid rate” (ibid: 959). Slapper and Tombs (1999) accept 
this statement but criticise Hirschi and Gottfredson (1987) for 
not conceptualising the process which leads to a corporate 
crime. 
 
Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralization have 
also been applied to corporate crime and focus on “how good 
people come to do bad things” (Slapper and Tombs, 1999:118 
emphasis in original). They argue that employees of 
corporations can act illegally when they can justify and 
neutralise their behaviour. Punch highlighted that a corporation 
may not “fully consciously take a decision that would directly 
lead to the avoidable death and suffering of multiple victims” 
but that:  
 
the decision is cloaked in a risk analysis that 
calculates the negative side-effects of 
activity…completed within ‘normal’ and mostly legal 
business practice, however reprehensible and 
unethical some commentators may find it (Punch, 
2000: 251). 
 
An example of this is in the well-known Ford Pinto case. Dowie 
(1977) details how leading up to the sale of the Pinto, Ford was 
facing strong competition, which forced the reduction of 
production time and did not allow for modifications to be made. 
Even after Ford engineers identified the fault which led to 500 
deaths, it has been claimed the deaths were caused by the failure 
of a coordinator to recall the defective cars because his 
“personal ethics were subordinated to the clinical decision-
making processes of the company” (Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 
121).  
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Continuing to look at business practices, in 1996 Punch 
examined “the social and moral dilemmas faced by managers at 
their work within organisations” and why they turn to breaking 
the law (1996: 3). Punch showed “the discrepancy between the 
popular image of business as a highly respectable activity…and 
what can happen behind the scenes” (cited in Tweedale, 2003: 
71) focusing on the “structural and cultural determinants” 
which lead managers to break the law and cause death and 
injury. He evaluates that “many incidents of corporate deviance 
are complex and intricate events that are difficult to unravel in 
terms of direct responsibility and blame” (Punch, 2000: 253).  
 
Using an interactionist approach, Nelken (2012) describes 
‘de/non-labelling’ that happens to corporations because unlike 
the poor, they have the power to resist the deviant label. Firstly 
through the way their activities are labelled as less serious, 
secondly in their ability to pay for representation in court and 
finally how the criminal justice system agencies are reticent to 
investigate and prosecute. Nelken points to “the necessity to 
draw both on structural and interpretive approaches in order to 
provide a convincing account of the emergence and 
implementation of the law” (Nelken cited in Slapper and 
Tombs, 1999: 125). In analysing the creation and 
implementation of the Factory Acts, Carson (1974) supports 
that corporations do not get labelled and avoid their activities 
being considered as criminal, what he describes as a “peculiarly 
systematic form of ‘non-labelling’ at the operational level” 
(Carson, 1974: 386). 
 
Research carried out into corporate crime has revealed such 
criminals are not vastly different from more traditional 
criminals. They are recidivists and their crimes are serious and 
widespread (Clinard and Yaegar, 1980; Braithwaite, 1984). 
They commit crime for their own interests when they have the 
opportunity and cannot exert self-control (Gottfredson and 
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Hirschi, 1990). Corporate criminals are devastated when they 
are treated like traditional criminals because they consider their 
actions are simply part of usual business conduct (Geis cited in 
Gobert and Punch, 2003). Corporate criminals are rarely 
identified publicly however, as corporations do not see 
themselves as criminal and are able to deflect legal 
criminalisation and successfully resist the label of ‘criminal’ 
because mainstream representations of what crime rarely 
focuses on their activities (Gobert and Punch, 2003). 
 
For Sutherland, differential association explains the criminal 
behaviour of corporate criminals as “learned in association with 
those who define such criminal behaviour favourably and in 
isolation from those who define it unfavourably” (Sutherland, 
1983: 240). Crime is committed when the favourable definitions 
outweigh the unfavourable. Differential association theory is 
criticised as difficult to use to predict crime as it requires 
knowing the “most minute details of [the offender’s] life-
history”, although this is a criticism which could be levelled at 
many other types of social research (Melossi, 2008: 141).  
 
Commentators who build upon Sutherland include Young 
(1971), Box (1971), Cohen (1972), Mathiesen (1974) and 
Fitzgerald and Sim (1979), all of whom draw upon Marxism “to 
place the state as an analytical entity on the agenda of critical 
criminology” (cited in Coleman et al, 2009: 1). Similarly, 
Reiman develops a “Marxist ‘response’ to Sutherland’s critique 
of the class-based nature of criminal justice” (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003: 104).  
 
For writers such as these, theories other than Marxism fail to 
understand the phenomenon because:  
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to understand…is to seek to understand capitalist 
economies, and…how it is that fundamental class 
inequalities are reproduced by law and by politics 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 3).  
 
Box (1983) claims the public are socialised to see crime 
through the eyes of the state, rather than fears based on reality. 
He notes the public find it easier to understand traditional crime 
rather than the seemingly small thefts that occur every day in 
business (for example, comparing theft to price fixing). This is 
caused by the structure of capitalism where “a prioritization of 
profit leads to chronic levels of corruption” (ibid: 63). The 
importance of placing the economy at the centre of such 
analysis can be seen in arguments which were made by the oil 
industry when it insisted the industry itself should be governed 
by the Department for Energy rather than the HSE (Carson, 
1982). Individuals within the oil industry asserted the HSE were 
not fit to govern them because the industry was so different and 
because of the great needs of the UK economy, “justification 
which asserted by implication that the economic centrality of oil 
could be accorded greater prominence within a separately 
administered regime for safety” (ibid: 210). The requirements 
of the economy took priority over the obligation to safeguard 
the workers. 
 
There is not only a distance put between the law breaking and 
the offender (which has major implications that are detailed 
further in chapter four) but also a social distance (Punch, 2009). 
Any deviancy is perpetuated for the good of the business, which 
makes the perpetrators honest within the structure of a capitalist 
society that encourages the pursuit of competition and the 
rationalization of deviancy (ibid.). In part, this is based on the 
class and age of corporate offenders and their ability to 
disassociate themselves from the criminal act (ibid.). Distance 
is purposively put between breaking the law and the offender, 
both literally and metaphorically, in what Punch refers to as a 
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‘cognitive dissonance’ (ibid: 29). The high incidence of 
corporate crime may do little to change this reality. Gobert and 
Punch (2003: iv) note that the public are not “overly bothered” 
about corporate crime, even though factually, its effects are 
larger than that of street crime. Such perceptions impact upon 
those working in agencies, for example, the police, are hesitant 
to view employers as potential criminals (Alvesalo and Whyte, 
2007). 
 
In 1999, Slapper and Tombs published Corporate Crime, which 
legitimised and cemented the importance, necessity and 
existence of corporate crime. They chart the scale, costs and 
consequences of corporate crime, explain why it exists and the 
response of the state. As well as an academic text, it is an 
“attempt to engage on both practice (policy-making) and 
political levels” (Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 21). In it, the 
authors map the different types of corporate crime, identifying 
the four most frequently used sub-categories of corporate 
crimes, financial, offences against consumers, crimes against 
employees and environmental offences. This research is 
concerned with the third category, crimes against employers 
where employers have not kept employees safe by failing to 
train them adequately or failing to prioritise health and safety in 
the face of available evidence (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). This 
is specifically referred to as safety crime. 
 
Safety crime 
As defined by Tombs and Whyte, (2007: 1) safety crime is 
similarly defined as corporate crime affecting workers and 
members of the public, it is, “violations of law by employers 
that either do, or have the potential to, cause sudden death or 
injury as a result of work-related activities”. Safety crimes may 
be violations of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 or 
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those “beyond that proscribed by criminal law [and] that which 
has been processed through the legal system” (ibid: 3).  
 
A number of high profile disasters are included in this 
definition of safety crime. Cases such as Piper Alpha where 
regulations were ignored or flouted, leading to the deaths of 167 
people (Tombs, 1993). In Carson’s 1982 examination of safety 
crime, he details the economic context which led to the 
expansion of the oil industry. He examines how corporations 
resist regulation and how the law responded to a number of 
deaths on the rigs in the race for oil in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Carson locates the “personal troubles endured” by workers in 
the context of “global forces” related to national interests 
(Carson, 1982: 296).  He asks readers to “share a little of the 
shame” he felt about the other price paid by workers in the 
pursuit of oil. Importantly for this research, he detailed the 
context and its effects on the workers: 
 
with its chronicle of offshore workers greeting 
official casualty statistics with bitter laughter, of 
injured employees remaining uncompensated, not to 
mention unemployed, and of drilling companies even 
declining to suspend work when someone was killed 
(Carson, 1982: 47). 
 
Negligence by corporations also kills members of the public. 
188 members of the public and workers died in the sinking of 
the Herald of Free Enterprise off the coast of Zeebrugge. 
(Wells, 2001). In the Paddington rail crash, 31 passengers were 
killed, one of many rail crashes in the 1990s that Wolmar  
concluded was due to managers’ “appalling lack of concern 
about safety…treating recommendations of inquiries as if they 
were irrelevant” in a “culture of almost venal ineptitude and 
perhaps even deliberate dishonesty” (ibid.: 143). 
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Whilst the immediate aftermath feature survivor accounts, there 
is a relative lack of voices heard from those not killed in 
disasters but individuals who are killed at work. These victims 
form a huge proportion of those affected by safety crime. 
Hazards (2017) estimate between 1,174 individuals were killed 
between 2015/2016. However, the testimonies of such victims 
are rarely researched or included in official accounts and the 
majority of the victims of safety crimes do not make headline, 
national news.  
 
Many victims of safety crime are unaware of their potential 
victimisation or even that such a crime exists (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2007). Part of the project of safety crimes has been to 
examine how it has been rendered invisible and remains outside 
the study of traditional criminology and criminal justice. 
Researchers of safety crime have shown it does exist and 
further, that it is prevalent and harmful (Tombs and Whyte, 
2010). There is a break in the literature for the accounts of these 
victims, gathered through the experiences of families of safety 
crime victims, which this research seeks to redress. 25 years 
ago after a review of pre-existing literature Croall (1992) called 
for more research both into its causes and effects and why 
official agencies treated white collar crime differently to 
conventional crime. This research, is, in part, an answer to that 
plea.  
 
Navigating the criticisms 
Part of that which prevents safety crime being accepted within 
traditional criminology are claims that it is not a legitimate area 
of study (Meier cited in Slapper and Tombs, 1996). Any 
academic argument that seeks to represent safety crime as real 
crime must first defend its position against dominant 
representations of what crime includes, including many of the 
arguments outlined previously in this chapter. Many academics 
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have mounted such a defence and continue to do so. These 
contestations must be acknowledged too, as arguments which 
add to its comparative invisibility. Since safety crime is a 
relatively recent concept, the criticisms have been levelled at 
white collar and corporate crime. Although such criticisms can 
also, retrospectively, be levelled at safety crime as a sub section 
of corporate crime. 
 
Notable contestations of Sutherland’s inclusion of white collar 
crime include Tappan (1977) who criticise the term and its 
existence for not truly studying crime, sidestepping the 
definition itself and disagreeing that it is in actual fact, a breach 
of a legal norm. According to Tappan, whether an act is 
criminal or not is dependent upon the decision of a constituted 
authority, the said authority has duly named the norms with 
“rigour and precision” and speaks to the interests of the 
community (1977: 279).  Tappan argues crime can only be 
defined by that authority in order to avoid ‘value judgements’ 
(1977: 281). He brands the conduct of those who focus on 
alternative definitions of crime as dangerous, warning against 
the use of law, as some white collar crime is economically 
beneficial and attempts at deterrence are ineffective. 
 
Arguments continue as to whether white collar crime should be 
included in a criminological analysis, “whether it should 
include activities which are ‘lawful’ but ‘awful’ (Passas, 2005). 
Sutherland himself (1983) provides a defence as to why white 
collar crime should be included in the study of criminology. He 
reasons that criminology already relies on those not dealt with 
strictly by the criminal justice system, for example, researchers 
use agencies other than the criminal courts to research crime 
and interview the unprosecuted in self-report studies. 
Sutherland recognises: 
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that a large number of offences that could be 
punished in law were not in fact punished – they went 
undetected or, if detected, were not acted upon or, if 
acted upon, were then subject to forms of 
enforcement action different from normal criminal 
processing…he defined an offence in terms of what 
was punishable, rather than those that had actually 
been punished, by law (Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 132, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Whilst the study of corporate crime can be a move away from 
studying exclusively what is deemed to be criminal by the 
courts and beyond established boundaries of what is crime and 
criminology, focusing only on conventional crime leads to a 
distorted view of the world. This is neither reflective of the 
truth, nor rational (Hillyard et al, 2003). The criminal justice 
system portrays itself as unbiased and since it appears to remain 
static through every change in government, it can pass as 
“politically independent” (Lacey et al cited in Ballinger, 2016: 
2). Relying purely upon the law to define the limits of 
criminological study severely limits its scope and turns 
lawmakers into definers of crime with no recognition of space 
between crime and the law. It suggests that law is unchanging 
and a finished product, rather than a social construct and whilst 
Croal argues “definitions of harm may be too wide…the 
criminal law is inadequate a base for inclusion” (2010: 6).  
 
Shapiro (1983) agrees with Tappan (1977) branding Marshall, 
Clinard and Yeager, Edelhertz and Overcasr and Ermann and 
Lundman as “Corporate Crime Crusaders” (Shapiro, 1983: 
304). She states that definitions of crime should not make value 
judgements and since all conduct cannot be criminal that which 
is, must be defined by the law. While some acts might be 
harmful, it does not necessarily follow that they are criminal.  
Consequently, Shapiro criticises research into corporate crime 
for being a moral crusade, focusing on harms rather than law 
and forfeiting sociological good sense.  
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In response to ongoing criticism, Pemberton suggests taking a 
social harm approach as a “means to escape the ‘conceptual 
straitjacket’ imposed by the concept of crime” (2008: 73). In 
Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously (2004), Hillyard 
et al cemented social harm as an approach which criticises 
“criminological reasoning” as being “used to bolster states, 
providing rationales for the extensions of state activities in the 
name of a more effective criminal justice” (Hillyard and Tombs, 
2008: 21). Whether radical or critical, “the very fact of 
engaging in criminology…legitimise some object of ‘crime’” 
(ibid: 23). The concept of organizational deviance is proposed 
as another alternative. Stressing that “…many commercial 
activities which are not legally ‘crimes’ are nonetheless 
regarded, by widely respected organizations, as harmful and as 
issues worthy of investigation or requiring stronger legislation” 
(Green and Ward et al cited in ibid).  
 
The position of this research is that it is inadequate to use the 
law as a basis of all criminological study as the law is an 
interpretation of experts, judges and solicitors; entirely 
agreeable decisions are not reached and inconsistencies remain 
within the circle and subculture of experts (Snider, 2003). The 
law is not based on calls from the public, indeed there is no 
evidence that the legal system reflects the importance the public 
attach to crimes (Almond, 2009b). It is also pertinent that, 
“Accountability is minimal and research into judicial practices 
almost non-existent in this country” (Lees, 1996: 249). 
Exaggerated in the absence of checks and balances, the criminal 
justice system does not reflect the reality of crime but has a part 
in creating the reality (Reiman, 1998).  
 
Further, what is and is not criminal is a construct of social, 
cultural and historical situations. Wells (2001) argues that 
crimes have to be discovered because they are a construction of 
behaviour that already exists, crime is: 
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a problematic category used routinely to describe a 
set of behaviours that, beyond a central core, are 
highly contested. Legal definition alone cannot 
adequately recognise the historical development, 
social relationships, practices, ideologies, and 
interests that determine what, at any given moment, is 
designated criminal (Zedner cited in Aas, 2008: 22). 
 
Wells (2001) argues that labelling certain crimes as less 
important and therefore unworthy of examination on the 
premise of how they are responded to is, “historically and 
culturally contingent” (ibid.: 7). The absence of debate about 
corporations, their power and responsibility “tells us more about 
ourselves as human beings and citizens, with our fears and 
insecurities, than it does about criminal law” (ibid.: 168). Since 
the “law remains the most generally accepted standard by which 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are judged” (Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 18), 
this research argues for an “inclusive definition which allows an 
analysis of law and its enforcement” (Croall, 1992: 9), 
integrating the state into every analysis.  
 
The enquiry of this research agrees with Carson that the 
criminal justice system should be open to public debate and if: 
 
saying this consigns me to the company of those 
whose criminology was once castigated for being 
based on a ‘mindless and atheoretical moral 
indignation’, I can only say that I hope there will 
always be room for some moral outrage in 
criminology and sociology alike (Carson, 1982: 301). 
 
By examining “bourgeois legal categories” (Slapper and 
Tombs, 1999: 19) the inherent bias of the law in favour of the 
corporation can be studied and compared against the rights of 
the victims and the consequences they are forced to endure. To 
that end, the following section will look at the development of 
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the existing law which relates to safety crime before linking 
safety crime to critical victimology. 
 
Invisibility: social, legal and political obstacles 
 
The response of the law to safety
3
 crime 
In 1999, in Corporate Crime, and Slapper and Tombs conclude:  
 
invisibility is sustained by the lack of attempts within 
criminological theory to account for its incidence; and 
this in turn allows inadequate conceptions…of 
appropriate and feasible modes of regulation and 
sanction to remain relatively unchallenged (Slapper 
and Tombs, 1999: 227).  
 
Slapper and Tombs highlight the “social processes which 
contribute to…under-reporting” and that “the costs of corporate 
crimes exceed those associated with street crimes” (ibid.: 68, 
79). Data is not simply a social construction, what is not 
counted is as important as what is counted (Tombs, 1999). 
Quantitative data on the deaths and injuries caused by safety 
crime has been historically difficult to find, which Box (1983) 
acknowledges is a difficult task. Efforts have continued to 
accurately represent the harm of safety crime
4
. 
 
Whilst statistics on crime are published in the media and 
utilised politically to demonstrate the success and failure of 
governments, those relating to safety crime are rarely debated or 
published with comparable interest. Under the Reporting of 
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
                                                          
3
 From this point, the term safety crime will be used where appropriate, even when previous studies themselves 
may have referred to corporate crime. 
4
 see Hazards, http://www.hazards.org/index.htm  
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(RIDDOR 1995), employers have a legal duty to report deaths 
and injuries, which are recorded, collected and published by the 
HSE annually. The HSE have claimed this data is ‘virtually 
complete’ (HSC, cited in Slapper and Tombs, 1999: 68). Tombs 
and Whyte (2007) however note this claim was questioned 
officially by the Robens Committee, a government committee 
created to review Health and Safety at Work (Robens, 1972: 
135).  
 
In 2012/13, the HSE reported there were 148 deaths in Great 
Britain. This official figure is a small proportion of the figure 
taken from data that excludes: workers killed at sea; in work-
related road traffic incidents; suicides as a result of work-related 
stress; deaths of merchant seafarers and members of the public 
killed by a work activity (Hazards, 2015). Hazards, an 
independent magazine took the above into account and 
calculated the real number of deaths lies between 1,027 and 
1,474 (ibid.).  
 
It is difficult for safety crimes to move away from being 
branded an ‘accident’ akin to random “acts of God” (Wells, 
2001; Bittle and Snider, 2006). Much research in this area has 
confirmed that the state only encourages this in its daily 
response (and non-response) to corporate criminality (Bergman, 
1994). The day to day response of the state can be seen in the 
administration of the laws that affects corporations, which is 
very different from than those which affects individuals. While: 
 
a reconfigured law and order agenda has been central 
to the generation of successive moral panics around 
the behaviour of the powerless, the failure to mitigate 
the harms generated by relatively powerful social 
actors such as corporations can be characterized as an 
exercise in the creation of un-panics (Davis cited in 
Coleman et al, 2009: 6, emphasis in original).  
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The way the law responds is an important statement of what is 
considered immoral by society. It is the only line of defence for 
the majority of victims who look to it to deliver justice. When 
the criminal prosecution halted after Hillsborough, the families 
were unable to take their case any further due to the expense 
involved, “It was impossible for families to take a private 
prosecution. An intolerable weight was placed on the generic 
inquest” (Scraton, 2009: 144, my italics). 
 
Those who have money are better placed to mount a private 
prosecution and similarly, wealthy people can avoid detection 
and prosecution as part of corporations in ways that poor people 
cannot (Reiman, 1998). Rather than prosecution, safety crimes 
have been dealt with publicly after the event via inquiries. As 
Snider (2003) states, rather than seeking to apportion blame, the 
aims of the inquiries are to establish truths, what went wrong 
and how to avoid a repeat of the event in the future often 
focusing on science. Consequently, criminal corporations avoid 
blame and condemnation and benefit from laws that are vague 
and confused (Box, 1983). 
 
Perpetrators of safety crime benefit from a measure of ‘social 
capital’ (Punch, 2009: 51) since the judges are unused to facing 
people who they have more in common with. Consequently 
they are more likely to bestow ‘light’ punishment upon those 
accused. Sutherland (1983) compares this historically to 
medieval society when the most powerful secured immunity 
due to the ‘benefit of clergy’. Those in the criminal justice 
system admire and respect members of corporations and are 
unlikely to see them as criminals (Punch, 2009). Box 
emphasises that not only are corporate criminals able to evade 
condemnation, they are enabled to “condemn the 
condemner…law has no place in business” (1983: 56). When 
those involved in the courts are informed with the perception 
that offences committed are not really crimes, it affects 
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subsequent sentencing decisions (Croall, 1992). Tombs and 
Whyte (2009) agree that corporations have been morally 
elevated to a position where they can define their own status. 
As Box observes, “the greatest opportunity lies in [the ability of 
corporations] to prevent their actions from becoming subject to 
criminal sanctions in the first place” (1983: 59).  
 
Corporations are not arrested by the same agencies, their crimes 
are not counted by the Home Office and they are not treated in 
the same ways as conventional criminals. These are crimes that 
have avoided being associated with clear criminal liability and 
instead are categorised as offences that are based on the 
breaking of regulations, irrespective of the nature of the deaths 
or the circumstances that led up to the deaths (Gunningham and 
Johnstone; Wells cited in Almond, 2009b). Much of this 
classification is determined by the state. Academic research 
explores how the state is not an obstacle to safety crime, but 
facilitates it. 
 
This context and intent has been examined by a number of 
scholars as part of the reason why corporations are able to 
remove themselves from the crime (Almond, 2009b). In the 
Challenger disaster, the pursuit of success was prioritised over 
awareness of the risks being taken (Vandivier cited in Erman 
and Lundman, 2002). As one employee stated, “we’re just 
drawing some curves and what happens to them after they leave 
here, well, we’re not responsible for that” (ibid.). Not 
perceiving safety crime as real crime, further encourages 
corporations to commit crime in the pursuit of success. Risk 
taking is encouraged in return for large gains, and there is an 
irrational sense of optimism that leads to dangerous and fatal 
decisions (Gobert and Punch, 2003). A punitive response must 
exist to counter the profit-making aims of corporations rather 
than excusing safety crime as being the result of a few, errant 
individuals (Pearce and Tombs, 1990).  
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A punitive response has never been realised. The history of the 
official legal response to safety crime is important in the 
discussion of its invisibility. This will be explored in the 
following sub-section.  
 
The role of the state 
Through a variety of political, legal and ideological processes – 
processes which are always ongoing, requiring a great deal of 
state work – corporations have been, and are, more or less 
empowered within states in ways that allow them to cause 
large-scale social harms with relative impunity (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015: 93, emphasis in original). 
 
Michalowski and Kramer contend that safety crime “can be 
initiated and facilitated by states” (cited in Tombs and Whyte, 
2003: 110, emphasis in original). Similarly, McCullagh agreed 
“it would appear that the law is an ally of corporate power” 
(McCullagh, 2016: 103). Safety crime is seen “as essentially 
tangential and marginal by-products of generally socially 
responsible, law-abiding entities” (Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 2-
3) rather than committed by criminals. 
 
This is reflected in the types of laws that are created each 
decade. What is defined as serious is of interest to those who 
make a profit and gain from the ‘controlling’ of crime (Tombs 
and Hillyard, 2000; Hall, et al, 1978). Nothing is static, each 
government in England and Wales has highlighted different 
problems and focused on strengthening existing laws or 
creating new ones, some of which are created easily and 
quickly. What is criminal is ever changing, for example, every 
year between 1997 and 2008, Labour created 3,600 new 
criminal offences and 44 Parliamentary Acts (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2010). One was related to safety crime. 
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The creation of effective laws to prohibit and sanction acts of 
safety crime is not forthcoming, whether in name or action. 
This continues to create large gaps between the numbers of 
people killed by corporations and the numbers of families who 
see those corporations punished in court. These families are 
people who are greatly affected by that loss. It should be clear 
that for many criminologists, the lack of legal response does not 
mean safety crime does not exist, or that it is unsuitable for 
study. It does mean that the law and the construction of the 
victim is a crucial part of how safety crime is rendered 
invisible, which the following section will examine. 
 
Is the law designed not to work? 
Whatever the state does by way of provision of 
services and economic intervention has to run the 
gauntlet of the economic imperatives dictated by the 
requirements of the system – and what emerges as a 
result is always very battered (Miliband cited in 
Carson, 1982: 212). 
 
If the numbers of convictions are an indicator of the usefulness 
of a law, the common law corporate manslaughter law was 
certainly inadequate. Between 1965 and 2003, there were five 
prosecutions and two convictions under the offence compared 
to the 20,000 deaths at work in the same period (Tombs, 1993; 
2003). The existence of the law is not an obstacle to all 
perpetrators of safety crime: 
 
Law is like a cobweb: it’s made for flies and the 
smaller kind of insects, so to speak, but lets the 
bumblebee break through. When technicalities of the 
law stood in my way, I have always been able to 
brush them aside as easy as anything (Daniel Drew 
cited in Sutherland, 1983: 57). 
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Law is conservative and laws specific to corporations is historic 
and inept at responding to the complex corporations that operate 
today (Punch, 2009). Law governing corporations has not 
innovated at the same rate as the corporations have (Clinard and 
Yaegar, 2011). Punch calls the law ‘lex imperfecta’; designed 
not to work (2009: 66, emphasis in original). Prosecutions are 
avoided, investigations are cursory or are prolonged and the 
eventual punishments are woeful (ibid.). Corporate 
manslaughter was first seen in a British court in 1965 [in R v. 
Northern Strip Mining Construction Company] but not again 
until 1991 in DPP v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  
 
In response to the fact that not even one death at work was 
referred to the police between 1974 and 1990, despite an 
estimated 9,050 deaths at work, Slapper (1999) explored the 
reasons why cases of people killed at work were not being 
prosecuted for manslaughter. After examining 40 cases, Slapper 
found that 38 had no more than a routine inquiry by the police. 
Coroners too, took a limited view of deaths at work, 38 out of 
40 returned either ‘accidental’ or ‘death by misadventure’ 
verdicts (ibid.: 98). Slapper concluded that of these, 32 had the 
potential to be adversarial, potential that was never realised. 
 
If the activities of the criminal justice system reflect the 
incidence of crime, it should be supposed that corporate 
manslaughter did not take place between 1974 and 1990. 
However, academic research demonstrates that safety crime 
exists and that it is widespread. Further than this, perpetrators of 
safety crimes are not vastly different from perpetrators of 
traditional crime. The principal difference is the way the law 
responds (or fails to respond) to a death caused by a 
corporation. This response is built into the creation of the law 
that relates to corporations. 
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The corporation became recognised as a legal person after the 
East of India resolution in 1641 and as they increased in size 
following the industrial revolution. From the nineteenth century 
onwards, corporations were able to cause more damage to 
person and persons (Stone cited in Wells, 2009; Wells, 2009; 
Glasbeek, 2009). To ensure financial recompense via 
compensation for victims, a corporation could be held 
vicariously or criminally liable by the civil courts, receiving so 
called ‘damages’ (Slapper 1999; Gobert 2008).   
 
The development of case law relating to corporations is 
comparatively recent, historically the criminal law has been 
focused upon individuals. Whereas the law regarding the legal 
nature of corporations to enable them to carry out business 
transactions is well established, but the application of law to 
control them requires continued justification (Glasbeek, 2009).  
 
In order for the state to prove an offence has taken place it has 
to establish “that the offending conduct involved an individual 
who intended to engage in it” (ibid.: 125, emphasis in original). 
Individuals have the required intent and ability to commit crime 
with their own mind and by their own hands, what is called 
mens rea (‘guilty mind’). Malice and recklessness are based on 
the notion of the autonomous individual taking a conscious 
decision and when mens rea is absent, gross negligence or 
recklessness remain (Punch, 2009). A corporation does not have 
a will, guilty or otherwise and so therefore, it cannot be guilty 
of a crime (Slapper, 1993). Since corporations do not speak as a 
whole and do not give consent or make commands, 
prosecutions of corporations struggle to succeed (Wells, 2009).  
 
In order to prosecute corporations, the prosecution has to 
establish vicarious liability. This requires a larger test and as is 
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the way of case law, the English legal system developed its 
response through various verdicts, which began, notably in a 
“trio of cases” in 1944; DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors 
Ltd, R v ICR Haulage Ltd and Moore v Bresler Ltd (Slapper, 
1993: 52). Slapper (ibid.) details how three cases in the post-
war period affected the law creating the foundations for the 
difficulties experienced using laws when attempting to convict 
corporations for manslaughter in the 1990s. They established 
the ‘doctrine of identification’, a type of vicarious liability that 
held that a corporation could be found guilty by using the mens 
rea (‘controlling mind’) of certain employees to ascertain the 
mens rea of the corporation (Gobert, 2008). It was contested as 
to who the employees who constituted the ‘controlling mind’ 
should be (ibid.: 55). 
 
In 1972, (Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass), Lord Reid 
perceived the ‘controlling mind’ should be a person who is in 
control of the company and not responsible to anyone else for 
their conduct. After the Nattrass case, this was interpreted as 
unsuitable for application to all managers as not every manager 
is created equal, and not all have enough influence to be a 
‘controlling mind’. The focus should instead be on those who 
exercise power in the corporation, which can be traced via a 
paper trail of documents and memos and included the board of 
directors (Gobert, 2008). This became known as the 
‘controlling officer’ test (Slapper, 1999: 55). As a result of the 
search for appropriate mens rea, this meant that the larger the 
corporation, the less likely anyone would be held criminally 
responsible by a court (Gobert, 2008), a precedent that is yet to 
be resolved. Any secondary victim seeking justice after the 
death of their loved one at work would have unknowingly 
entered a criminal justice process that was almost impossible to 
navigate successfully. (Many would argue this is unchanged.) 
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Up to the 1980s, the issue of safety crime had lain dormant to a 
large extent. This was a consequence of big business where 
Margaret Thatcher’s ‘individualism’ ruled, buoyed by the thirst 
for economic wealth, the start of the privatisation of public 
services whilst simultaneously rolling back the welfare state 
and reducing the power of the unions. Thatcher and a New 
Right influenced Conservative government, reformed crime 
control policy and located safety as the responsibility of 
individuals alongside sustained de-regulation (Sim, 2000). A 
number of high profile tragedies in the 1980s and 1990s 
grabbed the public’s attention. As well as viewing the 
devastation of the immediate aftermath, the public were made 
aware that no person or corporation was held accountable for 
any of the hundreds of deaths that occurred across the various 
tragedies during this relatively short period of time. Public 
awareness was raised, in part, by the various groups created by 
survivors and family members of those who died that emerged 
from the high profile tragedies. One of the most high profile 
cases was the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987. 
 
After 193 passengers were killed when the Herald of Free 
Enterprise sank off the coast of Zeebrugge, the Sheen Inquiry 
(1987) that pre-dated any legal response, summed up that the 
practices of the owners were “infected with the disease of 
sloppiness” (Report of the Court, cited in Slapper and Tombs, 
1999: 151). Fault across Townsend Thoresen (which became 
Peninsular and Oriental, P&O) was clearly identified and in a 
preliminary ruling the court accepted that corporate homicide 
could be proven (Slapper and Tombs, 1999).  In the court case, 
the prosecution used the ‘doctrine of identification’ and 
attempted to prove a ‘controlling officer’ was guilty of 
manslaughter in order to convict the corporation (Slapper, 1999: 
55). As the Sheen Inquiry concluded, it was the faults of many 
in the corporation that ultimately led the Herald of Free 
Enterprise to sink. The prosecution attempted to combine the 
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mistakes of the employees to prove that P&O was guilty of 
reckless manslaughter (Wells, 2001). 
 
This was referred to as the ‘aggregation principle’, which 
attempted to establish the required mens rea to combine the 
actions and guilt of those identified. However, Lord Justice 
Bingham, (as he was to become) dispensed with the 
‘aggregation principle’ and the existence of the corporate mind. 
He stated that “A case against a personal defendant cannot be 
fortified by evidence against another defendant” (R v. HM 
Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 
10 at17). Consequently, the Department for Public Prosecution 
(DPP) dismissed its charges against the remaining individuals 
(Slapper and Tombs, 1999). By rejecting the ‘aggregation 
principle’, Lord Bingham foretold that few corporations in the 
future would ever make it to court (Tombs and Whyte, 2007).   
 
Wells (2001) states Lord Justice Turner made the wrong 
decision at the time for the following reasons. Firstly, he did not 
allow all of the witnesses to take the stand and side-lined 
evidence which contradicted that more than one person could 
have the foresight to realise the risks of sailing with the doors 
open (the test for 'objective recklessness'). Lord Justice Turner 
based this on the foresight of a member of the public rather than 
the defendant. The jury was not permitted to decide whether the 
risk was reckless based on the available evidence (ibid.). 
Secondly, the judgement on whether Townsend Thoresen were 
a prudent company was based on the interviews of employees 
(past and present), which Wells (ibid.) likens to judging the 
morality of a person charged with robbery via witness 
statements from the perpetrator’s family and friends. Lord 
Justice Turner concluded the risk could not be said to be 
‘obvious’ as the Herald of Free Enterprise had sailed without 
tragedy for seven years previously. As is the nature of safety 
crime, offenders are able to present the offence as a ‘one off’ 
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(Croall, 1992). Wells (2001) compares this to the analogy of a 
child who survives crossing a road without looking and 
therefore they continue to take the risk because they were not 
run over the first time. Whilst no person or body was held to 
account, this case was a significant step in the 
acknowledgement that a corporation could be guilty of 
manslaughter (Slapper, 1999). 
 
Wells highlights why so many corporate manslaughter cases in 
the 1980s and 1990s failed: 
 
if there is one lesson from the P&O and other 
corporate killing sagas, it is that corporate defendants 
are highly motivated and well-placed to exploit the 
metaphysical gap between 'the company' and its 
members (2001: 126). 
 
This gap can be manipulated to make finding fault very 
complicated, requiring a high burden of proof. After the 
Hatfield rail crash in 2000 which killed four people, an 
investigator working to pursue a manslaughter charge against 
executives in charge at the time said there was a need to find a 
letter that stated “do not repair this track, we can’t afford it, 
yours sincerely, the Fat Controller” (Wolmar, 2001: 156).  
 
Hatfield was one of many high profile rail crashes in the 1990s, 
which highlighted the inadequacy of the law. In the Southall rail 
crash the prosecution sought to argue that one director did not 
need to be implicated and that the liability of the company 
could be proven through their management policies. This line of 
argument failed when the judge rejected it outright, reaffirming 
the narrow identification principle that a corporation could only 
be prosecuted via the guilt of a single human being (Wells, 
2001). 
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Wells concludes that any law relating to corporate manslaughter 
is to “be treated as an important historic species, to be preserved 
in their embryonic form, never allowed to develop a bite” (ibid.: 
113). The law exists to prosecute corporations in a written 
sense; it can be referred to but it is rarely used to prosecute. 
Tombs and Whyte (2007) highlight the discrepancy in the law 
as in 2006 and 2007, seven manslaughter prosecutions were 
brought against corporate bodies under charges of gross 
negligence manslaughter compared to 564 work-related 
fatalities in the same period (Almond, 2009). The law has 
barely ever reached the Appeal Courts to be tested, which is 
important since, as Wells (2001) describes, the law is subjective 
and corporations are not held morally to account, along with 
children under ten years of age, the insane and animals.  
 
In spite of very public failures to prosecute and subsequent 
condemnation, the law continued to find corporations innocent. 
There were only two successful manslaughter convictions in the 
UK between 1989 and 1999 (Pearce and Snider, 1995). Punch 
sums up: “It is criminal how often the system fails to deliver 
justice” (2009: 53). The law fails and the absence of conviction 
leads to further rewards for perpetrators. Gobert and Punch 
(2003) illustrate how the Chairman of the Roy Bowles 
Transport Company was awarded an Excellent Order of the 
British Empire award (OBE) for services to the Road Haulage 
Association. Despite the fact his company had been found to 
have been involved in systematic rule breaking which had led to 
an employee falling asleep at the wheel killing two people on 
the M25.  
 
The 1990s saw a political and public response to such high 
profile safety crimes. Bittle notes that:  
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a well-publicised corporate disaster was followed by 
pressures on government to introduce new legislation 
to hold corporations and/or corporate executives to 
account for their wrongdoing (2013: 46).  
 
Safety crimes were highlighted by New Labour when they were 
seeking and then trying to maintain, power.  Following the 
Ladbroke Grove train crash which killed 31 people in 1999, 
John Prescott visited the Paddington site and promised an 
inquiry would take place to “get the bottom of everything that 
happened” (Tran and Pulham, 1999). He also met with victims 
groups, such as The Marchioness Campaign Group where he 
promised to launch an inquiry (Wolmar, 2001; Tombs and 
Snell, 2011). But his promises were not automatically sustained, 
as Snider states, “cultural permission to proactively scrutinise 
the practices of dominant economic actors is short lived 
following corporate disasters” (2009: 27). The Marchioness 
campaign had proof of Prescott’s claims, which they later 
challenged him with, perhaps leading to the launch of the 
inquiry in 2000. 
 
The law that permitted immunity for corporate criminals is 
strengthened with each act of non-enforcement. As mentioned 
previously, cases such as Paddington, Southall and the 
Ladbroke Grove train crashes, together with the sinking of the 
Marchioness and the near collapse of Piper Alpha Platform, 
highlighted publicly the inadequacy of the law from the 1990s. 
People began to take notice of the gap between wrongdoing and 
the failure of the law. In that sense, criminality failed to be 
concealed (Wells, 2001). At the same time, other Western 
countries were experiencing similar discontent that corporations 
were escaping legal redress (Bittle, 2013).  
 
In 1994, the Law Commission produced a consultative paper, 
followed by a report in 1996 on an involuntary manslaughter 
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law that detailed a new offence of corporate killing. In 1997, 
Home Secretary Jack Straw promised a law that would provide 
for conviction of directors of companies where it was claimed 
that individuals had lost their lives as a result of dreadful 
negligence by the company as a whole. Consultation by the 
Home Office in 2000 stated the new offence, named the 
Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007), 
would be designed to secure more convictions reflecting the 
seriousness of the offence. Labour made the proposed Act part 
of their 2001 manifesto and after much consultation, it became 
law in 2007.  
 
Does the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
(2007) reflect the seriousness of the offence? 
The intention of the legislation was to make it easier to 
prosecute larger companies than had been the case in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Tombs, 2013). For this to happen, the fault had to be 
located in the failure of how a corporation managed its business 
thereby, dispensing with the ‘identification principle’ (Gobert, 
2008). The new offence dropped the use of the identification 
doctrine and replaced it with a ‘management failure’ model that 
relates blame to the actions of senior managers.  
 
The offence is aimed at work-related fatalities, which is 
reflected “by the high threshold of liability inherent in the 
requirement that death occur as a result of a gross breach of 
care” (Almond, 2009b: 158). The Act established a senior 
management test where “a substantial element of the 
management failure must be at a senior management level” 
(Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007: 
15). The sentencing guidelines that emerged on February 2010 
reneged on those detailed in the 2007 draft as they dropped the 
proposal to link the level of fine with the turnover of the 
convicted company. Instead the level of fine was established 
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according to the ‘seriousness of the offence’ and factors 
contributing to this such as how far the injury could have been 
predicted and how common the breaches were.  
 
The Law Commission and Home Office did not provide any 
evidence for the conclusions that led to the Act. They were said 
to be influenced by various interest groups, which led Almond 
(2009b: 148) to describe the new offence as a “penal populist” 
measure rather than one that was going to succeed. Similarly, 
the Act is described as:  
 
full of dead ends, controversies, broken promises and 
governments succumbing to the siren voices of the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Institute of 
Directors, and other employers and their 
organisations (Tombs, 2013: 2/3). 
 
The new law made the conviction of directors impossible: 
 
An individual cannot be guilty of aiding, abetting, 
counselling or procuring the commission of an 
offence of corporate manslaughter…an individual 
cannot be guilty of aiding, counselling or procuring, 
or being part in, the commission of an offence of 
corporate homicide (Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007: 15). 
 
Any person wanting to convict an individual manager or 
director must use the old common law (Tombs and Whyte, 
2007). As a piece of legislation, the Act: 
 
steers a path between the government’s symbolic 
need to do something about “companies that kill” 
whilst not unduly harming business interests: a 
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juxtaposition that points to a “deeper set of tensions” 
regarding legal attempts to control corporate 
behaviour (Almond cited in Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 
154). 
 
The Government’s own Regulatory Impact Assessment project 
predicted the Act “will not generate more than 10 to 13 
successful prosecutions per annum” (Field and Jones cited in 
Doyle and McGrath, 2016: 158). 
 
Hadjikprianou notes: 
 
The cases filed so far involved companies that did not 
have complex management structures and thus their 
convictions or acquittals cannot be used as a case 
study on the Act’s effectiveness…it has been argued 
the outcomes of those cases would probably have 
been the same even under the ‘”identification 
doctrine” (2016: 46-47). 
 
The cases that have reached the courts thus far have not tested 
the law for its intentions and it remains symbolic (Omerod and 
Taylor, 2008; Tombs, 2013).  
 
The new law was actually utilised by the defence in one recent 
case. The legal team representing the corporation appealed to 
the court to drop the corporate manslaughter charge lodged 
against the directors following negotiations where it was agreed 
that in return, the corporation would plead guilty to a charge of 
corporate manslaughter under the 2007 Act. Tombs (ibid.: 7) 
refers to this as “bait” and that “one form of liability is being 
exchanged for another.” The people involved, who were once 
opposed to a corporate manslaughter law by way of argument 
that corporations are fictional bodies unable to have a state of 
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mind and therefore be prosecuted, are now empowered to do the 
opposite. The recent judgement argues that directors and 
managers should not be punished in favour of prosecution of 
the corporation (Glasbeek, 2009). 
 
In publicly finding corporations innocent of wrongdoing, 
treating safety crimes as different from other crimes has been 
purposeful and effective. Wells says this has “[At] its base a 
class assumption about the types of person who commit crimes 
of violence reinforced by a proposition that legislative offences 
are ‘different’ from ‘real’ crime” (2001: 118). It is a failure of 
the legal system to contribute to a meaningful public dialogue 
about corporate wrongdoing (Almond and Colover, 2010). 
Equally scathing, Glasbeek notes: 
 
The irony is that the liberal-democratic polity prides 
itself on its adherence to the rule of law and on the 
care it takes with the application of criminal law – to 
ensure even-handed treatment and, thereby, the 
legitimacy of the system. But it still tolerates this 
apparent privileging of the corporate sectors. […] 
(2009: 125). 
 
Instead, corporations continue to be dealt with overwhelmingly 
by regulatory agencies and governed by regulation that began at 
the time of industrialisation. Its origins and subsequent 
development will be detailed in the following sub-section. 
 
Does Health and Safety law adequately detect and prosecute 
criminals? 
Health and safety is often referred to in the media with the now 
popular phrase, ‘health and safety gone mad’. Such a view is 
pervasive both through various forms of media and 
contemporary political rhetoric, and in a common sense that is 
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temporary and full of contradictions (Carson, 1974, 1979, 
1981). The perception of health and safety as ‘bothersome’, 
related to ‘red tape’ and in direct opposition to 
entrepreneurialism insidiously supports the continual reduction 
of regulation (James et al, 2012). This further aids the 
invisibility of safety crime and increases the consequences for 
the secondary victims. 
 
Under the guise of reform that repeats the same measure, 
governments have almost consistently found reason to reduce 
regulation. From the language to the sanctions given to them, it 
is divisive that regulatory enforcement agencies were/are not in 
the “business of catching criminals” (Carson, 1974: 138). The 
law should not interfere “with the pursuit of legitimate business 
goals” (Croall, 1992: 67). 
 
The entire nature of regulatory bodies and regulations has 
successfully diverted safety crime away from any connection 
with mainstream criminal justice and the negative associations 
with criminality (Croall, 2003). The term itself “business 
regulation” stands outside of criminal law and “crime control” 
(Croall, 1992: 143). Regulation is the most significant part of 
the law, and the privileging of safety crime, occurs in relation to 
regulation. Whilst regulatory responses do not show the same 
moral disapproval that comes with police investigations 
(Hawkins and Thomas, 1984), regulation reveals social order; 
what it permits, what it prohibits (Pearce and Tombs, 1989). 
Too much regulation damages certain interests and too little, 
threatens the legitimacy of the state (Barnett cited in Pearce and 
Tombs, 1994: 435).  
 
As demonstrated in the previous section, criminal law has been 
largely evaded by corporations who have caused injury and 
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death, and instead its breaches are dealt with by regulation. 
Moreover, in the practice of enforcement, the most common 
finding of studies of regulatory enforcement is that a co-
operative regulatory approach is dominant: regulators seek to 
enforce through persuasion – they advise, educate, and bargain, 
negotiate and reach compromise with the regulated (see Pearce 
and Tombs, 1998: 223-246). The ways in which the corporation 
is able to be subject to such regulatory approaches was 
developed through a number of measures taken in history that 
began with the 1833 Factories Act. 
 
Carson details the development of the laws and legislation 
relating to health and safety. He documents how the large 
factory owners were motivated to introduce legislation to 
control the smaller companies who were perceived to be 
contributing to over-production and thereby reducing their 
profits. Well established and large factory owners considered 
the smaller firms as exploiting the lack of regulation and laws 
and making profits from poor working conditions (Croall, 
1992). Reformers who took on this issue called for the option of 
punishment, including imprisonment, to be included. This was 
resisted when a line was drawn between the stereotypical 
criminal and gentlemen factory owners:  
 
does the Inspector suppose that it is no punishment to 
a man, we will say nothing of a gentleman of 
education in society equal to himself, to be dragged 
into a court of justice, tried and condemned, and to 
have his name entered on a register of convicts? (Parl 
Papers cited in ibid.: 131).  
 
Carson (1974) notes the battle that was fought to decide whose 
view should be endorsed, became symbolic the moment a 
Commission was set up to clear the names of the factory 
owners. It was agreed that inspectors should continue to 
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communicate with the factory owners to make the law more 
acceptable, this is the legacy that led to the enforcement agency 
being unconcerned with the search and conviction of criminals 
and instead with consultation (ibid.). Punishment should be 
“employed only against wilful and obstinate offenders” and 
“with regret” (Carson, 1970: 396). The early factory legislation 
failed because the criminal justice system was seen by all who 
could utilise it, as an inappropriate measure for the harms 
committed by factory owners (Carson cited in Wells, 2001). 
Instead ‘bargaining’ was introduced as a legitimate tool to be 
used between the factory owners and trade unions, all 
“distasteful connotations…[were] neutralised (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2010; Carson, 1974: 137). Here a relationship was 
cemented between the government and corporations, which 
only strengthened in the decades that followed. Carson noted in 
1982 that, “’Our companies’ was the constantly repeated phrase 
used by one senior Department of Energy official when 
referring to the offshore oil industry” (1982: 175).  
 
Pearce and Tombs (1996: 435) refer to a ‘corporate liberal 
discourse’ that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Progress was focused on the short-term; that accidents should 
be accepted as inevitable in times of progress, only mediated 
with compensation. Risk assessments were created in the 1960s 
for the use of chemical companies in order to secure insurance. 
They were soon co-opted by corporations in response to issues 
of health and safety (Keltz cited in Tombs, 1995). Regulation 
via risk assessment allows corporations to show they are 
competent and know what is required of them when they agree 
to regulation, once again treating the employees as sources of 
risk (Pearce and Tombs, 1989; Tombs 1995).  
 
The Robens Report (1972) set out statutory duties for 
employees and employers, rendering them both liable as well as 
reducing the importance of criminal law in favour of regulatory 
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measures. Compiling a criminal case against corporations took 
time and it was considered that this time would be better spent 
by inspectors in consulting with employers on how they could 
better comply with regulation (Tombs and Whyte, 2010). The 
premise of the recommendations of Robens was that accidents 
at work were the result of the apathy of the employees and not 
recklessness (Wells, 2001).  
 
Tombs (1991) explores the notion of the ‘accident prone’ victim 
describing it as a myth that enables the employer to claim there 
is nothing they can do to prevent accidents. It is “a functional 
misrepresentation of the causes and nature of such accidents” 
(Tombs, 1991: 72, emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the 
narrative of worker apathy was accepted officially and Robens 
recommended that the government focus on safety awareness 
and accident prevention, diverting the potential causes away 
from the responsibility of employers (ibid.). The 
recommendations of the Robens report were consolidated into 
the Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAW), enacted in 1974.  
 
HASAW (1974) is a criminal statute, which includes criminal 
offences for criminal infringements of the law that lead to 
potential injury, danger and death; safety violations are crimes 
whether or not they result in death and injury (Tombs, 1993). 
The HSE was created out of this in 1975 to report to the Health 
and Safety Commission (HSC), created in 1974 (and disbanded 
in 2008).  
 
Following HASAW (1974), there was a “vicious cycle of non-
enforcement” where the HSE could not maintain the self-
regulation that had been recommended (Tombs 1990: 335). 
Prior to HASAW in 1970, there were 300,000 factory 
inspections (Nichols and Armstrong cited in Tombs and Whyte, 
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2013b) but in 1975 there were 481,000 ‘visits’ by HSE agencies 
(Dawson et al, cited in ibid) reflecting a reduction in the 
operation and scrutiny of corporations under the HSE.  
 
De-regulation has been the aim of every successive government 
and has only been slowed by European Union legislation 
(Tombs, 1995). This has meant that the regulatory body created 
to deal with safety crime has been unable to respond effectively.  
 
In the first half of the 1980s the HSE was “virtually 
emasculated” by Robens’ self-regulation (Tombs, 2000: 193). 
In the second half of the 1980s, public disasters led to new 
demands for regulation and the HSE had an increase in funding, 
which on reflection may have been a symbolic, political 
measure (ibid.). The Conservatives cut health and safety 
enforcement by 25% in 1996, which Monbiot (2000) links to a 
20% increase of recorded deaths the following year. Even as a 
party created out of trade unions, Labour continued to stress 
they were also no threat to business interests (Miliband, 1973) 
and continued to paralyse the HSE. In 2000, Revitalising Health 
and Safety, was published, a shift to a “market-based” system of 
regulation, where the costs and benefits were weighed up to 
justify a lessening of enforcement (Tombs and Whyte, 2010: 
30).  The Labour government continued to make reductions in 
spite of the results of the House of Commons Work and 
Pensions Select Committee Inquiry published in 2004, which 
recommended that additional resources should be utilised to 
double the number of inspectors in the HSE.  
 
The following year, the Cabinet Office published Less is More: 
Reducing Burdens, Improving Outcomes, again explicitly citing 
regulation as an excessive affliction. This report proposed that 
new regulation should only be introduced in exchange for 
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regulation that already existed (ibid.). It was extended to be 
‘One in, One Out’ – in 2013 (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills cited in James et al, 2012: 5). As a 
government agency, the HSE accepted each reform proposal, 
including that they should negotiate with corporations and use 
prosecution as a last resort. Evidence suggests they preferred to 
use negotiation over prosecution as in the nine years between 
1996 and 2005, 86 directors were convicted of health and safety 
offences, only 11 were jailed (Tombs and Whyte, 2010). 
 
With fewer inspections, and no minimum requirements, the 
HSE was criticised in The Better Regulation Executive and 
National Audit Office report (BRE/NAO) in 2008 for not 
targeting inspections (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). When the 
Coalition formed in 2010, the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, 
continued to press an anti-regulation, pro-business agenda and 
promised to take “radical steps…against red tape” (Horton, 
2010). It was announced that within the following five years, 
HSE funding would fall by 35% (Tombs, 2016).  
 
In the same year as the Coalition came to power, Lord Young 
was appointed for the review, Common Sense, Common Safety. 
Moving seamlessly between health and safety to compensation, 
the review sought to find evidence for the ‘compensation 
culture’ but was forced to conclude:  
 
The problem of the compensation culture prevalent in 
society today, is, however, one of perception rather 
than reality (cited in James et al, 2012: 19).  
 
Employment Minister Chris Grayling continued to attack the 
health and safety culture, claiming it was ‘stifling growth’, and 
proposed a reduction in inspections by 65,000 and a reduction 
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in proactive inspections by one third (DWP, 2011). In 2011, 
Grayling invited people to submit their views over five months 
on existing health and safety law in the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ 
(Health and Safety Executive, 2011). This was repeated in 2012 
when the public were invited to suggest what regulation should 
be changed, abolished or extended (Tombs, 2016).  
 
In 2011, the Lofstedt Review examined whether regulation 
could be reduced or tailored for small corporations. It 
concluded that regulation does not require major change and 
supported the current regime of HASAW (1974), stating 
regulation has positively reduced the harm caused at work since 
its creation (ibid.). The report was utilised to reduce regulation 
further and supported the concept of ‘low-risk’ that James et al, 
(2012) stated would have a real effect creating victims by 
increasing the risk and numbers of deaths, injury and illness at 
work.  
 
Historically then, the state appears reticent to refuse the needs 
of corporations and profit, and tries instead to attract its 
influence, investment and confidence (Snider, 1993). 
Regulation stifles growth, as can be seen when the oil industry 
when they were “Anxious to be fettered by nothing more than 
its own technological limits, the offshore oil industry sees 
statutory safety controls in general, and harmonization in 
particular, as impeding its spontaneous progress” (Carson, 
1982: 203). The clash between regulation and advancement 
continues to be justified. In 2011 Prime Minister David 
Cameron took opportunities to bemoan health and safety and 
continue the ideological assault on the need to regulate and the 
legitimacy of regulators. He linked ‘broken society’ and human 
rights to “the obsession with health and safety that has eroded 
people’s willingness to act according to common sense” 
(Cameron, 2011). He weighed up regulation with the 
effectiveness of business as being diametrically opposed and 
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urged the HSE to arbitrarily cut regulations by half (James et al, 
2012).  
 
Cameron perpetuated a myth on health and safety at 
Conservative Party conference in Manchester, attempting to 
combine humour with imperialism, “Britannia did not rule the 
waves with arm-bands on” and citing it as a reason children 
were not getting work experience (Cameron, 2011b). Cameron 
called his party to action in 2012, "This coalition has a clear 
new year's resolution: to kill off the health and safety culture for 
good” (Tombs, 2016: 123). As the Deputy Prime Minister, Nick 
Clegg agreed:  
 
For too long new laws have taken away your 
freedom, interfered in everyday life and made it 
difficult for businesses to get on (Prime Minister’s 
Office ibid.: 124).  
 
The government continue to favour a ‘risk based’ approach, 
reassuring that higher risk businesses will continue to be 
monitored, in return for reduced inspections elsewhere (Tombs 
and Whyte, 2013). The result is that the average workplace 
should expect an inspection less than once every 38 years 
(James et al, 2012). A corporation needs only to pretend to 
cooperate with inspectors and regulation, in what McBarnett 
and Whelan refer to as ‘creative compliance’ (cited in Gobert 
and Punch, 2003: 17). Many do so successfully, for example, 
Union Carbide’s slogan prior to the 1980s was ‘Production at a 
cost: safety at any cost’ (Pearce and Tombs, 1993). 
 
Irrespective of party allegiances, governments have continued 
to reduce the scope and effectiveness of the HSE (Tombs, 
2016). It has been largely accepted that free enterprise is good 
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and should not be attacked by the state or controlled with 
regulation – an ideological assault. If it is good for business, it 
is good for society and the state should withdraw (Michalowski 
and Kramer cited in Tombs and Whyte, 2003; see also Tombs 
and Whyte, 2009). Seen as a threat to business, regulation of 
any kind breaks the relationship between the state and the 
markets (Gordon et al, 2004). Regulation is an opportunity to 
avoid or minimise injury and death, but only within the limits of 
capitalism (Tombs and Pearce, 1989). Regulation is not to be 
eradicated but it must be minimized to near paralysis. Instead 
corporations are congratulated on even poor safety records, as 
Carson noted at a “commercially organized seminar” in the oil 
industry “when members were told that the offshore safety 
record was not a good one” it was not the corporation who rose 
to defend this allegation” but the government safety body who 
emphasised the industry “come further in seven years than any 
other comparable one has in three times that time’” (Carson, 
1982: 176). 
 
Any success of regulation is hollow, the fines are relatively low 
in relation to profit the corporations make. The ‘record’ fines 
work to “…strengthen [capital’s] legitimacy through the 
symbolic effects of an apparently class-neutral law and its 
enforcement” (Tombs, 1995: 354).  For example, Balfour 
Beatty were fined £150,000 for the death of Michael 
Mungovan, which pales in comparison to their turnover of £2 
billion in the first six months of 2004 (Monbiot, 2005). By 
holding corporations to account for breaking regulatory codes 
under HASAW 1974, the fines are paltry, what Slapper (1993) 
compares to the equivalent of a parking fine levied at an 
average member of the public.  
 
Corporations are being prosecuted less and for fewer offences. 
The past 30 years have seen many changes to regulation and the 
HSE, which are unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future 
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(James et al, 2012). Prosecutions have reduced from 1999/2000 
to 2011/2012, falling by 54% where convictions have reduced 
by 52% (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). The regulators created to 
control risk-taking and law-breaking are unable to be effective. 
The HSE are now incapable of preventing major incidents, as 
shown by their track record, which has meant that businesses 
are not discouraged from taking risks that lead to the loss of life 
and injury for thousands of workers (Gobert and Punch, 2003). 
 
The tension between regulation and policing aids this 
invisibility (Tombs, 2003). The HSE do not have the funds or 
ability to enforce the laws that do exist and so are pushed to rely 
on encouraging compliance rather than demanding it (Monbiot, 
2004). Any consultation that precedes less regulation excludes 
those directly affected; the workers. For example, unions were 
not consulted prior to the Lofstedt Review (DWP, 2011). In 
contrast both the Chamber of Commerce and a right wing think 
tank were also consulted whose interests were openly in the free 
market (James et al, 2012). The views of the workers are 
therefore side-lined yet they are the individuals who are 
affected by the emasculation of the HSE and following a 
corporate killing, it is their families who suffer. 
 
In Blood in the Bank, Slapper (1999) concludes 24 out of 40 
deaths featured in his research were the result of the pressures 
of making profit, not ignorance but unwillingness or inability to 
pay the costs to ensure the work was safe. The HSE themselves 
say that between 70% to 85% of workplace deaths are 
preventable, compared to less than 20% that result in 
prosecution for health and safety offences (Slapper and Tombs, 
1999). In an environment of de-regulation and reduced 
legitimacy of the HSE, the number of unsafe workplaces will 
only increase. 
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The government’s desire for economic wealth at any cost is at 
odds with care for the employees and leads to cost calculations 
(Carson (1974, 1981). This can be seen in cost calculations, for 
example, on the railways. A safety system (ATP) was proposed 
in the 1990s but rejected on the basis it would cost £10.9 
million per life to install and was subsequently dismissed by the 
Transport Secretary who said it would only prevent 3% of 
fatalities (Wolmar, 2001). Such cost calculations are subjective, 
despite being held up as scientific and actuarial. Statistics can 
underestimate the benefits and exaggerate the costs, using the 
previously example, Hall recalculated that a third of lives would 
have been saved had ATP been implemented (cited in ibid).  
 
Formal enforcement action is rare, and overwhelmingly 
involves the imposition of notices of varying severity. 
Prosecution is a ‘last resort’, and is seen as a failure within the 
enforcement agencies themselves (Hawkins, 2002). Almond 
relates this to the level of wrong and harm, i.e. the case must be 
seen as winnable (Hawkins cited in Almond, 2009b). The effect 
of this general modus operandi on the part of regulators is to 
prevent the vast majority of corporate offending ever being 
recognized, recorded or treated as crime – and if there is no 
crime, there can be no victim of crime (Tombs, 1999). Yet 
victims exist, victims who have been harmed by the loss of their 
loved one as a result of safety crime and then by their 
invisibility. The following section will draw together safety 
crime with the victim and draw comparisons between the 
victims of safety crime and the other invisible victims. 
 
How is the victim constructed? 
Critical criminologists have argued that “criminology has 
enjoyed an intimate relationship with the powerful” determined 
by “its failure to analyse the notion of crime…handed down by 
the state” (Foucault; Cohen; Garland cited in Hillyard and 
76 
 
Tombs, 2008: 15). They assert that the state and the power it 
wields is central to any critical criminological analysis. Here the 
state colludes with corporations and as a perpetrator. Similarly 
as an analysis of patriarchal power, feminists challenge the 
power of the state as inbuilt into the criminal justice system and 
raise awareness of offences which were primarily related to 
females, such as domestic violence and rape. Lees refers to the 
way “male norms are institutionalized at every stage of the 
criminal justice system” (1996: xx). This is important because 
the consequences are for women who find themselves in court 
seeking justice; here they lack a “voice” and are “overlooked in 
the assumed ‘rationality’ and ‘objectivity’ of the [court] 
proceedings” (ibid.).  
 
Feminism criticises the law for neither reflecting nor upholding 
the rights of females. The courts do not try to be patriarchal in 
minutiae actions, but patriarchy is woven into the “structure of 
rape law” so that “the more objective they are in procedure the 
more effectively patriarchal they are” (Tosh cited in Ballinger, 
2016: 24). The procedure is presented as the best there is, 
couched in historical importance and run with expert 
knowledge. Agents of the criminal justice process can pursue a 
discriminatory procedure simply by obeying the rules. The law 
creates a narrative and is a “process of constructing masculinist 
official discourse…the voices which fall outside official 
discourse are disqualified and silenced” (Ballinger, 2016: 23). 
Victims may be able to offer their account of what happened in 
a courtroom, they might be heard, however by the time they 
come to speak it is through the lens of the [patriarchal] law 
(ibid, 2016). Theoretically, victims of safety crime have been 
compared to such experiences of victims of domestic violence 
in the 1970s as uncovered and revealed by feminists (Shover et 
al, 1974). 
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The construction of the victim  
Who is considered a victim “cannot be taken for granted”, ideas 
about victims are “optional, discretionary and not innately 
given” (Whyte, 2007: 446). Who is awarded victim status has 
changed throughout the last century and prior to the late 
nineteenth century, the victim as a discrete category did not 
exist at all (Walklate, 1989). As a starting point for the 
examination of the construction of the victim and always with 
one eye to safety crime, it is perhaps appropriate to trace the 
victim back to the time of the Factory Acts of 1819 and 1864 
and to the time when the role of the state had progressed to 
become ‘interventionist’ (Tombs, 1995). Images of vulnerable 
children as victims of business malpractice were used by those 
seeking to reform the system, which led to better working 
conditions for workers (ibid.). Kearon and Godfrey (2007) note 
this was an attempt to reassert moral and normative frameworks 
within industrialisation and out of this moral enterprise, the 
ideal offender and the ideal victim emerged, a concept which is 
crucial for this chapter (Hendler cited in Walklate, 2007). 
Victims were recognised as a necessary part of the criminal 
justice system but they were not to be protected or humiliated. 
Proposals were increasingly introduced post WWII in the name 
of the victim, which recognised this negotiation (Sanders and 
Young, 2000, Davies et al, 2005).  A clear link was, and 
continues to be drawn between crime and a reduction in 
morality that governments have attempted to redress (Whyte, 
2007). 
 
With an interpretation of post WWII ideology on the welfare 
state, the status of the victim continued to gain in prominence. 
Mendelsohn introduced the term victimology in 1940, rooted in 
a functionalist view of society (ibid; Kearon and Godfrey, 2007; 
Whyte, 2007). Mendelsohn considers that a victim may not be 
wholly innocent, which fitted with the aims of the government 
as they drew out the ‘deserving’ victim for whom the state will 
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intervene (cited in Williams, 1999). Notably, this can be seen in 
compensation schemes and comparisons drawn between the 
deserving and the undeserving poor (Williams, 1999;  Mawby 
and Walklate, 1994). It created a categorisation of who is a 
victim, choosing to focus exclusively on the victims of unlawful 
violence to the exclusion of a plethora of others, for example, 
victims who have served a prison sentence are not entitled to 
receive full compensation from the government (ibid.; Tombs 
and Williams, 2007). In the eyes of the state, ex-offenders are 
not ideal victims and are less deserving of compensation than 
those who are unconvicted, and thus clear lines are drawn 
between the two. 
 
The opportunity offered by victim surveys introduced into 
Britain in the 1970s and 1980s to counter many taken for 
granted assumptions about who is a victim, failed to fully 
realise their potential. Victim surveys were widely “criticised 
for a somewhat narrow focus on interpersonal violence and 
property crimes such as theft, burglary and robbery” (Croall, 
2010: 169). In addition, the omission of certain types of crime 
from the focus of victimisation surveys, as with official 
statistics, leads to the exclusion of certain victims from public 
and political debate. For example, the results of surveys were 
not used politically to try to protect those revealed as most at 
risk; the young, male, economically disadvantaged offender 
(Green 2007). Green (2007) notes this was possible by the 
hiding of abuse within children’s homes and domestically, 
misrepresenting the realities of crime. Instead, the ‘vulnerable’ 
victim (and the threat of being a victim) continues to be utilised 
politically in calls for punitive penal measures to take from the 
offender (ibid.). In this, the victim survey is restricted to 
examining a small proportion of victims, continuing to hide 
certain inequalities prevalent in society (Croall, 2010: 178). The 
‘ideal’ victim continues to be “connected to the construction of 
a generally accepted or consensus view of how the criminal 
justice system should respond to crime” (Whyte, 2007: 447). 
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Irrespective of who the true victims are, the ‘ideal’ victim is the 
victim who “attract[s] public and media attention and 
sympathy” (ibid.). 
 
Critical victimology opened up the debate to include victims 
who were not state defined, such as victims of the police, war, 
prisons and state violence (Mawby and Walklate, 1994). By 
many, the state was seen as an unsuitable starting point for 
defining who is and is not a victim with a recognition that the 
state needs to distract attention away from its own violent, 
sanctioned violence so it can continue to be the purveyors of 
increased law and order to restore moral order (Sim, 2004). As 
with the move away from a positivist approach, this analysis is 
not without its opposition. It is criticised for ignoring the plight 
of conventional victims along with the influences of gender, 
race and age and for simplistically reading of the law and social 
class (Sumner, 1994). Whilst approaches such as new realism 
answer this criticism and challenge issues such as intra class 
and racial crime, Walklate agrees with Sim et al (1987) that the 
left realist faith in the political process without also looking at 
social regulation and control, is problematic.     
 
Relying on the state to define crime and trusting the outcomes 
of the criminal justice system to define who is a victim means 
many victims are excluded. Of particular relevance to this 
research, in the 1960s and 1970s, feminists called for more 
examination of female victims, which were largely missing 
from the male dominated criminological agenda; to “name that 
which had gone without a name” (Mawby and Walklate, 1994: 
10). As an alternative discourse, feminism tackles myths about 
rape and raises awareness of the political significance of rape 
(Lees, 1996). In the second half of the twentieth century, the 
criminal justice system was revealed not only as unreflective of 
the victims that were being created but also as being a 
perpetrator and causing additional pain to females (Shapland 
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1985). By highlighting the experiences of the female victim in 
the criminal justice system, feminists demonstrate how 
woefully inadequate the process can be at recognising certain 
crimes and in the delivery of justice (Davies et al, 1995).  
 
The experiences of female victims are not reflected in official 
statistics, fewer than 7% of rapes recorded by the police in 
England and Wales result in a conviction (Temkin et al, 2016). 
With the use of victimisation surveys, writers were better able 
to qualify what they had long suspected, that rape was in fact a 
regular occurrence and that the perpetrator was more likely to 
be men known to the victims rather than a stereotypical “fiend” 
(Davies et al, 1995: xii). How the criminal justice system 
avoided representing these truths is examined in Lees’ 1996 
research, which shows how the criminal justice system relies 
upon various rape myths in its interpretation of the truth. (These 
myths include the failure to resist, that sex offenders are 
different from ordinary people, kissing as consent and rape is an 
easy allegation to make (Tempkin et al, 2016.)) The success of 
cases in court is dependent not upon the act itself, but how the 
event is framed within the criminal justice system. The uses of 
rape myths used by defence barristers in court undermine the 
credibility of the complainant, deny victimhood and crucially, 
“make her appear unworthy of the protection of the law” (ibid.:  
2).  Lees comments:  
 
The image of the law is one of impartiality, 
objectivity, rationality and neutrality. Traditionally, 
the law is supposed to treat all who come before the 
courts equally, regardless of class, race, sex or creed. 
This is far from the case (1996: 130). 
 
The truth is not something static, presented and dissected by the 
neutral agents of the court determined to hone in on the facts. 
Instead its inept response to cases of rape, blocks justice, 
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damages and creates future victims. Victims of rape are 
disadvantaged due to the nature of offence committed against 
them and the defence counsel has: 
 
at his fingertips a history of misogynist thinking to 
draw on about women’s mendacity, 
untrustworthiness, spitefulness, impurity, 
provocation, wildness, unpredictability, irrationality 
and general unreliability…the idea that all women are 
‘whores’ who cannot really be raped as they want it 
anyway (ibid.: 261-262). 
 
Victims of rape do not measure up against the ‘ideal’ victim and 
numerous cases fail at the court, if they ever reach that stage. 
Much progress has been made and changes in the law have 
occurred as a direct result of academics and groups involved in 
campaigning and the raising of awareness. Previously, some 
examples of rape (notably, marital rape) were viewed separately 
to other types of rape. Lees’ (1996) book categorised rape into 
two sub sections, choosing to prioritise the study of rape by 
strangers, acquaintances and ex partners over rape committed 
by husbands or cohabitees. Though this was justified by the 
authors on the grounds of other recent and pre-existing research 
which covered inter-marital rape, the categorisation itself would 
be unlikely to be repeated twenty years later. Those at the 
‘coalface’, for example members of campaigning groups, may 
recognise such discrepancies as Lees notes that in response to 
her decision not to study rape within relationships “Rape Crisis 
centres were critical…and failed to understand our need to limit 
the scope of the research” (ibid.: 8). This demonstrates how 
choices about what is studied and what is not studied changes 
over time in accordance with our own preconceptions about 
what is really a crime and the categorisations that are made. 
This is never fixed or complete. 
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In summary, the law may present itself as neutral, but it 
operates based on a number of assumptions about who is and is 
not a victim. Victimhood is developed through “a process of 
publicly validated construction” (Winter, 2002: 179), which 
involves communicating with others, flexible meanings and 
transitions; in short, it is a moral career (Sykes, 1992). Whether 
an event is perceived as criminal and how it navigates through 
the criminal justice system has major implications for 
victimhood.  Critical victimology has highlighted the need for 
the state not to take centre stage in defining who and who is not 
a victim, led by feminists in their demands for justice for female 
victims and for them to be seen and treated as genuine victims. 
 
How do the victims of safety crime compare to the ‘ideal 
victim’? 
Whilst crime happens and victims are created every day, up to 
now this chapter has argued that although these occurrences are 
worthy of study, there is an alternative victim who has been 
rendered invisible. People like Sidney Rouse are invisible both 
from the Victims Charter and victims’ movements (Mawby and 
Walklate, 1994), which is important because it exacerbates their 
suffering in similar ways to that of rape victims. Fattah argues 
the fate of victims of safety crime is “sadder” than “victims of 
conventional crime” because “they lack any means of redress 
and usually have no recourse against the perpetrators of the 
abuse” (Fattah cited in Levi and Pithouse, 1992: 230). This 
section will draw together victimology with criminology for an 
examination of how the victims of safety crime are invisible 
and who they are likely to be. 
 
When examining who is and who is not a legitimate victim, the 
concept of Christie’s (1986) ‘ideal victim’ is useful. Christie 
(ibid) outlines an ideal victim as weak (sick, old, young), 
carrying out a respectable activity where they are devoid of any 
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blame and attacked by an evil perpetrator who is unknown to 
them. The ideal victim would attempt to defend themselves 
before being overpowered. They are able to claim the status as 
an ideal victim, afraid of being victimised and have not 
deliberately put themselves at risk (ibid.). This is summed up as 
a ‘little old lady’ who is fearfully walking the street in the 
daytime after caring for her mother when she is randomly 
attacked by someone who is a stranger to her. She is 
overpowered, though she resisted. As an elderly member of 
society, this victim is in a position where their case will be 
heard and will not threaten dominant interests. Few real victims 
measure up to the ideal victim, including the victim of safety 
crime. 
 
Firstly, the victim of safety crime is not often weak in a 
traditional sense of the word – they are often of working age 
and below retirement.  However, on the second point, as wage 
earners and workers, they are carrying out a respectable 
activity, one which is expected and applauded. Secondly, the 
offender is not often an individual and in the sense that Christie 
(1986) was writing, they are not big nor viewed traditionally as 
bad. Thirdly, the offender is known to the victim and further, 
the victim has signed a contract to be in a relationship with the 
offender as an employee. The victim may or may not have 
resisted the crime, but indirectly, it is unlikely that at the time of 
the crime, the perpetrator will have been face to face with the 
victim. Related to the final points of Christie’s (ibid.) ‘ideal’ 
victim, a victim of safety crime is not powerful enough to state 
their case as a victim, it is unlikely they would have been 
frightened of victimisation on a daily basis and finally, 
widespread recognition of their status as a victim would be a 
challenge to dominant interests. The following section 
examines the victim of safety crime in more detail using both 
Christie’s (1986) ‘ideal’ victim with Croall’s (2016) 
recommendation that the processes of victimisation should be 
explored through links between social factors.  
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The victims of safety crime are comparatively less powerful in 
terms of social class. They tend to be working class where the 
lowest paid workers are the most exploited (Whyte, 2007). 
Within the working class, those aligned to a union are 
statistically safer, a concern when at the time of writing, unions 
cover less than 20% of Britain (Ewing et al, 2016) and the 
casualization of labour is increasing. Workers who are 
subcontracted and those on zero hour contracts have increased 
risk of becoming victims of safety crime due to their “relatively 
subordinate economic position” (Whyte, 2007: 455). The 
corporations themselves are under pressure to deliver and know 
unless the workers meet the requirements of the contract, they 
will lose profit, as one worker put it:  
 
’Well, I’ve got pressures; I’ve got to get these jobs 
done. If your company won’t do it, we’ll soon get 
another company to do it’…And you have got fairly 
experienced men in these positions, but their 
professional judgement is far too often, I think, 
clouded by the commercial pressures (Carson, 1982: 
76). 
 
Victims are, “more likely to work in smaller rather than larger 
workplaces, or to be self-employed or on short- or fixed-term 
contracts, to be non-unionised, and receiving low levels of pay” 
(Tombs, 1999: 91). Victimisation is, “known to reflect wider 
social inequalities, with the poor and least powerful being more 
severely affected” (Croall, 2016: 71) so that “the impact of 
some, if not most, white-collar crime falls most severely on the 
poorest” (ibid: 71/70). This is true of the secondary victims who 
are likely to match the social class of the person killed. 
 
With regards to minority ethnic groups, migrant workers are 
more likely to be exploited (Croall, 2016) and lower employees 
are more likely to be seriously and fatally injured (Tombs and 
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Whyte cited in Croall, 2010). One exception to this is with 
regard to financial crime when the rich are more at risk due to 
the need for money to invest in the first place (Croall, 2016). 
Here, the more affluent are more likely to be informed about the 
dangers of risky investments or products and employ 
independent financial advisors who spread their risks and are 
less likely to buy cheap and dangerous goods. As consumers, it 
is the more affluent who are able to resist the location of 
dangerous chemical plants or industries and can move away if 
they are unhappy. “In short, they are protected by their 
economic, political and cultural capital” (Croall cited in Croall, 
2010: 12). Whereas the “least affluent have fewer choices, less 
information and are less able to ‘shop around’ for higher quality 
goods and services” (ibid.). The same can be said of workers 
who rely upon a steady wage and are either living in or on the 
edge of poverty. However, hazardous chemical and waste plants 
are situated closer to black and minority ethnic communities 
and have a disproportionate effect on those inhabitants (Lynch 
et al; Pellow; Pinderhughes cited in Croall, 2010). 
 
Related to age, victims of safety crime are more vulnerable 
when they are older to food poisoning, aggressive sales and 
commercial crime (Croall, 2007). When they are younger they 
are at risk of being harmed by toys, as students at the hands of 
landlords and in the misleading practices of mobile phone 
companies (ibid.). In these instances they could be described as 
‘weak’ in the manner of Christie’s ‘ideal’ victim, however 
research has not focused on the experiences of victims of safety 
crime in relation to age, who by definition are at working age 
and therefore tend not to be either very old or very young. 
 
Examining gender and victimisation, Szockyj and Frank (1996) 
highlight how women are in a lower status than men and 
experience secondary victimisation at the hands of a patriarchal 
political system that does not help them; “In a society in which 
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opportunities and expectations are differentiated by gender, it is 
only to be expected that the distribution and nature of 
victimisation are gendered as well” (1996: 11). They examine 
women as producers and reproducers and conclude that women 
are more vulnerable as consumers conforming to beauty norms 
and as mothers and as second class employees. In one example 
and an interaction between gender and class, the Dalkon Shield, 
marketed as a contraceptive, killed 33 women and following 
doubts on its safety, sales were shifted to developing countries 
(Mintz cited in Whyte, 2007). Perhaps again linked to class, 
women are also less likely to be members of unions (Szockyj 
and Frank, 1996). Croall (2007) illustrates how women are also 
victimised through the function of their socially ascribed 
characteristics and structural location within patriarchal 
societies. In their position as wives and mothers rather than 
workers, historically, women are less likely to be victims of 
safety crime. More men are affected by safety crime because of 
their dominance in manufacturing occupations (Tombs and 
Whyte cited in Croall, 2010). Following the death of a worker 
however, it is the females who are most likely to suffer the short 
and long term effects of a sudden death when the breadwinner 
and father is removed. It is generally females who are tasked 
with navigating and securing victimhood as secondary victims 
of safety crime, a role which has been unexamined within 
academic research. 
 
The experience of victims of safety crime is further exacerbated 
by the nature of the victimisation as the victim has to realise 
they are a victim (or their families do), that it was not a random 
act and be in a position to search for evidence of this from the 
corporation itself (Szockyi and Frank, 1996). The nature of the 
corporation as a perpetrator takes us to the next two categories.  
 
Victims of safety crime have been seen as fully aware of the 
risks entailed in certain jobs, that in exchange for higher pay, 
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they accepted potentially grave circumstances. Carson found 
this in his research when a Texan oil rig superintendent told 
him: “the offshore worker is paid his money and can take his 
chance” (1982: 76). This fed into the “emergence of a 
stereotype of the offshore worker as someone who…recklessly 
embraces immense hardships and incalculable risks in the 
pursuit of quick rewards” (ibid.: 45).  
 
By agreeing to take more money, ‘danger’ money, the risks are 
minimised and further, this appears to automatically presume 
they are the type of person to take additional and potentially 
fatal, risks. In Carson’s research, a senior department official 
remarked: “We are talking about the type of lads who chase 
money…a certain type of labour which hasn’t shown itself in 
the past to be very careful about how to do things” (ibid.: 45). 
Carson noted that this was supported by other regular 
contributors in the industry who claimed that:  
 
‘fatigue, cold, hunger and, not surprisingly, boredom 
are major factors contributing to the accident 
rate’…This rather leisurely image of the bored 
worker whose attention momentarily wanders, to his 
own or others’ subsequent detriment, is not quite in 
line with the impression of the offshore work 
situation gained in the course of this research…On 
the contrary, the picture painted was one of hard, long 
and continuous labour” (ibid.: 72). 
 
The perpetrator may be big as corporations grow in size and 
scope. The fragmentation in the way labour is organised, 
diffuses responsibility and means that identifying a single 
offender is problematic (Croall, 2016). The potential offender is 
not seen as ‘bad’ but as a respectable business person who is 
known to the victim, which can lead to the blame being 
redirected at victims (Rock, 1998).  Rather than being vilified 
as potentially criminal, successful business people are 
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(increasingly) idolised in the press; courted as self-made and 
aspirational, they are far removed from the anti-social, 
unemployed, gang members, drug addicts associated with 
criminality (ITV, 2012). Instead, the victims are easily blamed 
(Croall, 1992) and the ‘therapy’ culture that pervades Western 
society means the general public scrutinise personal 
characteristics of the victims and offenders. This in turn diverts 
attention away from pre-existing social and economic injustices 
(Spalek 2006). This also fits with the positivist approach of 
analysing how the victim caused their own victimisation, highly 
useful for the perpetrators of safety crime who are also in a 
position to conceal and manipulate the scene of death (Whyte, 
2007). 
 
Victims of safety crime may not protect themselves against a 
perpetrator, as in Christie’s conception of the ‘ideal’ victim 
(1986). Parallels can be drawn with rape victims who are 
expected to struggle, ignoring that women “are socialised 
against aggressive behaviour” (Lees, 1996: xvi). Workers are 
structurally in an inferior position and by entering into a 
contract, they are employed to carry out duties on behalf of the 
corporation. They are rarely able to negotiate how, where they 
work or how much they are paid (Whyte, 2007). The EU 
described the relationship as one of subservience (Ewing et al, 
2016) where only membership to collective organisations such 
as trade unions offers any chance to alter the working contract. 
Richard Walker was aware of the dangers he faced as a diver in 
the North Sea on an oil rig as this extract from his diary entry 
made on the day of his death testifies, “Poor topside 
management. Guys here are nuts…and dear God I want out” 
(Glasgow Herald cited in Carson, 1982: 296). This diary entry 
was made on the day of his death when he was suffocated 490 
feet under water, his body recovered after eighteen hours. In his 
diary, he endeavoured to secure different employment because:  
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It leaves my stomach twitching…Oh God, please help 
me to exercise my talent and will to pull out of it. I 
don’t even know if I’m gonna get out of here alive. I 
never know” (ibid.).  
 
It is clear that Richard Walker was desperate to move 
employment and in spite of fearing death, he did not walk away 
from the job. Should he be blamed for voluntarily walking into 
his own death? Related again to female victims as illegitimate, 
“As Faludi (1991) points out, women [the victims] are blamed 
for the very problems they face” (Lees, 1996: 94). 
 
When the victim is dead and physically unable to make their 
own case, the accounts that remain are “constructed for a 
purpose…to diminish the defendant’s culpability and inflating 
that of the victim to blur moral differences” (Rock 1994:25). 
Any victim, who has died, may be blamed for their death 
(Rock, 1998) and be de-humanised as much as possible in the 
court. After their death, their needs are neglected. The numbers 
of those affected have not been collected or counted accurately 
and instead a discourse is encouraged which makes the issue of 
health and safety a joke and causes additional problems for the 
families of those affected when a loved one is killed at work 
(Slapper and Tombs, 1999). The accident prone victim is 
blamed for their own demise, their actions are scrutinised 
against what we are all told we know about deaths at work; that 
it is not criminal and should not be treated as such (Tombs, 
1991). If health and safety is over cautious and a national joke, 
any person who dies at work must have been flouting the rules. 
In the same way we know that women cry rape against innocent 
men, so any rape victim must first be viewed as a potential liar. 
 
Similarly, victims of safety crime face a larger offender pitted 
as authority, which they are taught not to question from an early 
age (Bowles and Gintis, 1999). In many cases of safety crime, 
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for example, a death from being crushed or a fall from a height 
or an explosion, victims do not have the chance to defend 
themselves from a perpetrator. As workers, they are vulnerable 
to the demands of the employer as felt keenly in the production 
of oil in the 1970s and 1980s when demand was high, “…it 
costs a lot of money to operate an oil or production platform, so 
there is pressure all the way down the line” (Carson, 1982: 74). 
In the case of safety crime, it would be more appropriate to find 
out whether employees doubted the safety of their workplace 
and changed their behaviour or took measures to leave, similar 
to that of victims who refrain from walking alone or install 
burglar alarms. The preoccupation with crime as a single event 
obscures the nature of corporate offending that can only be 
explained in context.  
 
The victim of safety crime faces a multitude of barriers that 
block their ability to claim the status of ideal victim (Christie, 
1986). Offending and victimisation is part of a process rather 
than a single event (Croall, 2016).  Following a safety crime, 
“[The victim must] overcome…[the presumption] that the 
injury is a just a random happenstance…in order to be treated as 
a crime victim” Szockyj and Frank, 1996: 8). Walklate (1989) 
recognises that in respect of safety crime, the success of 
framing incidents such as Piper Alpha as a ‘disaster’ and 
beyond control encourages a failure to point out criminal 
activity as a factor, which affects the subsequent handling of 
events. Referring back to Lees’ research, the courts: 
 
often present issues only from…the defendant’s 
standpoint, which is then treated as the only 
objective, rational position to hold…the complainant 
is scapegoated as a ‘slut’ or as unrealisable, and her 
account of what happened is rarely reported, while 
the defendant’s version is often given as 
incontrovertible fact…men are often represented as 
the true victims of false allegations (Lees, 1996: 93). 
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Being denied victimhood as a status leads victims out of the 
criminal justice process, families of victims have been 
persuaded that ‘accidents happen’ and consequently go on to 
settle for compensation. For example, it is estimated that 5,000 
people were killed immediately in Bhopal in 1984 and 8,000 
people have been affected and 80,000 in the years that followed 
(Pearce and Tombs, 1989). Nevertheless, only 3,329 victims 
were officially recognised and considered fit for compensation 
(Pearce and Tombs, 2012).  
 
The victim of safety crime requires identification of a corporate 
offender, which is not an ideal offender and in doing so, is a 
threat to other important interests (Christie, 1986). There is a 
gulf between the power of an employee and employer, with an 
inherent conflict between the two (Ewing et al, 2016). In cases 
when the victim dies, they have no rights whilst the powerful 
perpetrator may be protected by the criminal justice process 
(Rock, 1998). This imbalance of power is most palpable in the 
globalisation of work where corporations relocate production to 
take advantage of migrant workers (Croall, 2010). The 
perpetrator, the corporation, benefits from having a clean 
criminal record and are already in the favourable position of 
being seen as making a positive contribution to society just by 
way of being in business. Once again drawing similarities with 
Lees’ observation in the case of rape: 
 
For a man, his occupation and lack of previous 
criminal record are the two main factors deemed to be 
relevant. Quite apart from the personal bias of 
individual judges, then, sexist assumptions are 
already built into the way the rules of evidence on 
character and credibility are interpreted and applied in 
court (Lees, 1996: 130). 
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Whyte (2007) states it makes sense that safety victims are 
hidden because seeing them would problematize crime as a 
result of declining moral standards; they are unknown because 
they are not counted. However the reverse is not true as 
businesses are encouraged to be seen as victims, for example, 
the Home Office regularly organises a Commercial 
Victimisation Survey alongside the British Crime Survey 
(Shury cited in Whyte, 2007). An attack on business is hailed as 
an attack on the whole community, victims together. Perhaps 
indicating business has become part of the ‘victimised state’, 
which Sim (2004) notes is over-represented in comparison to 
the victimisation of the most powerless and disadvantaged 
members of society.  
 
Finally, being killed at work is statistically more likely than 
being killed at the hands of a common murderer, but no 
surveys, similar to those carried out by Left Realists, have been 
completed into the fear of safety crime. This makes it difficult 
to say with any certainty whether victims are afraid of being 
victimised. We are only to fear traditional crime committed by 
traditional criminals.  
 
Comparison to the ‘ideal victim’ goes some way to explain why 
victims of safety crime are viewed as undeserving of the weight 
of the law. The construction of victimhood is important because 
only the ‘ideal’ victim is of use to those who seek to define how 
the criminal justice system should respond to crime, affecting 
policy change (Miers, 2000). There is a longstanding separation 
between safety crime and ‘real’ or ‘conventional’ crime is both 
reflected and institutionalised through state responses to 
corporate offending, excluding its victims from consideration or 
treatment as real victims of real crime. Most obviously, this 
separation is signalled in the fact that offences committed by 
corporations are subject to regulation (not policing) by a diverse 
range of state and quasi-state agencies. Whilst the sanctions 
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exist, they are very rarely able to be utilised by the court and 
whilst the following comments were taken from Lees’ work on 
rape, they could be applied to safety crime: 
 
The availability of such harsh penalties provides the 
illusion that the judiciary has taken appropriate action 
to control rapists, although in practice the maximum 
penalties are almost never used (Lees, 1996: 240). 
 
Similarly, Croall notes that offences committed in a corporate 
culture are accepted in pursuit of legitimate organisational goals 
such as efficiency (2010). 
 
In Greer’s (2007) hierarchy of victims, the victims of safety 
crime rate poorly as they comparatively do not lead to a change 
in policy or attract the attention of the media. There are some 
safety crimes that have featured in the press although they tend 
to be the more sensational cases and not typical of the deaths 
that occur weekly and routinely across Britain and the world 
(Shover et al, 1974). The media favour a simplistic reading of 
offender and victim that fits with the’ ideal’ victim. Safety 
crimes present as more complicated, slow to resolve and with a 
dissatisfactory outcome in terms of delivering justice (ibid.). 
 
Since victimhood is a moral career (Sykes, 1992) and requires 
recognition by the criminal justice system in order to attain 
justice, the need for research to make victims visible is crucial 
(Croall, 2016). If victimhood is dependent upon social, legal 
and political conditions (McGarry and Walklate, 2015), 
academic research can help to change yet research on the 
victims of safety crime has remained very much a minority 
interest among criminologists, despite significant contributions 
in the field of victimology since the 1970s onwards (Szockyi 
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and Frank, 1996). As a subject, Rock highlights that it has 
ignored what does “not bear the names of crime, criminals and 
criminal justice” (1994: 7), whilst Young notes that safety 
victims “remain in the shadows, backstage, glimpsed only out 
the corner of the eye” (2002: 138). Exposure is important can 
produce change, as demonstrated by the way corporations hide 
tax avoidance schemes (Neville and Treanor cited in Croall, 
2016). As McGurrin and Friedrichs argue, exposing the harms 
and expanding the conceptualization of crime victims by 
constructing harmful activities as “criminal” can play a part in 
combating them (cited in Croall, 2016). Part of this has been 
exposing the experiences of victims of safety crimes.  
 
What are the experiences of invisible victims? 
Unsurprisingly, studies of corporate and safety crime 
victimisation, then, frequently refer to the associated traumatic 
and enduring psychological effects associated with the denial of 
victimhood (Friedrichs, 1996). In particular, Spalek (1999, 
2001) documents the ways in which victims of white collar and 
corporate crimes have been affected. Those researched were 
victims of financial crime. Spalek (2006) identifies five ways 
that being a victim impacts on a person, which is detailed 
below.   
 
Firstly, psychological effects happen as a result of the victim 
experiencing a criminal harm that violates social norms, it can 
lead to self-doubt, and a questioning of previously ‘normal’ 
behaviour, and leading to self-blame.  These factors can affect 
confidence and lead to a search for meaning from the event. The 
more a victim blames themselves, the more they may find it 
difficult to adjust to relationships (Wyatt et al cited in Spalek, 
2006). Secondly, emotionally, a victim can fear repeat 
victimisation, which causes stress as this as the past is 
reimagined; leading to physical stresses such as high blood 
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pressure and insomnia. Victims can become more isolated and 
the lack of support can compound frustration and hopelessness. 
Thirdly, a victim’s behaviour might change including how they 
act and live in everyday life, for example, avoiding areas or 
using alcohol to cope.  Fourthly, the victim could take their own 
life or attempt to hurt the offender.  Finally, financially victims 
are responsible for the cost of going to court. The factors above 
also affect their ability to return to work. These factors detailed 
may be exacerbated by stresses that the victim was already 
experiencing (such as poverty), the event itself (how severe it 
was) and lastly, the long-term effects the victims are left to 
bear. Spalek (ibid.) points to how in reference to white collar 
crime, research has focused on the social, psychological and 
financial costs rather than the general human impact.  
 
In the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) case, 
many victims thought their pensions were safe and had their 
expectations shattered (ibid.) their trust betrayed (Croall, 2016). 
In their study of female victims of corporate crime, Rynbrandt 
and Kramer (2001) state there is an “extreme power 
differential” between victims of corporate crime and “giant 
corporation[s]” which “immediately places the woman in a 
vulnerable legal, economic, and social position” (2001: 171). In 
the Maxwell case too, victims were tired of campaigning and 
felt a sense of powerlessness as they were pitted against a “far 
bigger criminal” (Spalek, 1999: 226). The size of corporations 
is crucial in the increasing prevalence of corporate crime and 
they are becoming ever larger and feature more frequently in 
our everyday lives, from sponsoring schools to providing funds 
for political parties (Tombs and Whyte, 2015).    
 
The position of the victim compared to the perpetrator was 
detailed in Scraton’s (2009) work with the survivors and 
families of victims of Hillsborough. Scraton (ibid.) illustrated 
the consequences of not being a conventional victim and how 
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this affects the response of the state agencies. The victims and 
survivors of Hillsborough were denied their victimhood, 
blamed and even harmed by the state and its agencies. Scraton 
(ibid.) details how a mother of one of the victims of 
Hillsborough was prevented from touching her loved one: 
 
Whatever she had done, however much she had 
pleaded, access would have been denied. The 
decision was immovable, indefensible…[the mother 
was] left to carry the burden of that denial and a deep 
sense of guilt that she should have done more to 
challenge those who had discretionary power to make 
arbitrary, ad hoc decisions, to change minds narrowed 
by professional convenience and personal 
intransigence (ibid: 114). 
 
Contact with such agencies cannot be avoided yet being treated 
poorly and the serious consequences of this all have to be borne 
by the individual. Tombs and Whyte state that “in almost every 
major case of corporate crime corporations escape liability for 
the burden of social costs: costs that always fall on the most 
vulnerable” (2015: 15).  It is the “poor and powerless” that are 
“most vulnerable to exploitation and victimization” from white 
collar and corporate crime, just as they are in conventional 
crimes (Croall, 1992: 169).  
 
With reference to health and safety crime research Spalek 
(2006) acknowledges that such secondary victimisation is often 
greater.  It stands outside of progress made regarding the needs 
of victims in the criminal justice system because they are 
excluded in discussions of what a victim needs. This is in spite 
of the many similarities between the two. The findings of 
corporate crime victimisation have referred to a double 
victimisation – that is, from the offence and then from their 
treatment by the ‘official response’ (Shover et al, 1994: 94). 
Thus, in their study of the long-term consequences of 
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victimisation to the collapse of a loan company, Shover et al 
conclude that: 
 
victims with the most extensive contact with the 
official system for redress of injury often emerge 
from the experience more disillusioned and more 
disheartened than when they began (ibid.: 95).   
 
Such official responses deemed ultimately unfair and unjust, 
amount to an official denial of their status as victims and 
families of victims of crime (ibid.). There is no such thing as a 
typical victim response (Williams, 1999). The criminal justice 
system can worsen experiences, passing victims from one 
organisation to another (Button et al cited in Croall, 2015) 
rather than being careful about the treatment of families and 
loved ones of victims. 
 
Secondary victimisation can range from the life changing 
effects of deaths and injuries, the loss of jobs and economic 
security to the amounts of time spent attempting to remedy a 
variety of losses. It can be indirect, families of those who die 
clearly suffer immeasurably, businesses close and suffer from a 
loss of trust, “The accumulated effect can be considerable” 
(South 1998 cited in Croall, 2010). 
 
Developments have been made that have taken a friendlier 
approach to victims; once victimhood is established, a victim is 
a victim and is approached as equal to any other, able to access 
the services required as an active citizen who needs to solve 
their problems (Spalek, 2006). As Spalek (ibid.) states, there 
has been an increase in the visibility of the victims of safety 
crime, from large scale cases such as Zeebrugge and Bhopal.  
Cases in the US and the UK have shown how corporations can 
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cause physical and financial damage. Further, the growing 
accounts of the experiences of victims demonstrate that 
corporations “encourage, tolerate or engage in illegality” 
(Gobert and Punch, 2003: 8). Chapter three seeks to add to this 
research.  
 
The criminal justice system has presented itself as neutral whilst 
at the same time, acting in many ways which hold the 
corporation as far superior to the needs of victims of safety 
crime, irrespective of the harm it continues to cause (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015). Ballinger describes the important process and 
necessity of unearthing “knowledge from ‘below’…to 
reconstruct new configurations of ‘truth’ which allow hitherto 
silenced groups to speak for themselves” (2016: 2). A large part 
of this has been carried out by groups created by survivors and 
secondary victims. The following section will examine safety 
crime and social movements.  
 
How do some secondary victims respond to their experiences? 
Secondary victims have mobilised collectively to redress this 
imbalance and victim movements have successfully altered the 
political agenda in the past. Social movements are important in 
the project of feminism, which inevitably, is a “political 
practice” (Faith cited in Ballinger: 2016: 3). Feminists have 
encouraged social movements as part of a political project to 
listen to the voices of victims who have been neglected in the 
past. In doing so it is inclusive and provides a platform so that 
“voices of the powerless…can be heard” (Ballinger, 2016: 12).  
Movements have influenced policies and politics whereby 
politicians fight for their vote, leading to increased rhetoric 
(Sanders and Young, 2000). 
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At a time when recorded crime grew exponentially between 
1950 and the 1990s, feminism revealed the abuse inflicted upon 
women and children and victim surveys revealed the reality of 
victims of rape, sexual assault and domestic violence (Davies et 
al, 1995). Women’s groups “began to question the low social 
status of women and to demand changes in opportunities 
available to, and discrimination suffered” (Smart, 2013: 26). 
Whilst the aims of the challenge are unfinished, feminists have 
been and are still successful in challenging the dominant 
discourse which has directly helped victims. By identifying and 
documenting the experiences of women, feminists have altered 
the experiences of women. Standpoint feminism challenged 
“dominant knowledge” and created “new knowledge in its 
place” (Smart cited in Ballinger, 2003: 221). It developed 
“overtly partisan standpoint positions in order to present 
critiques of, and engage with, patriarchal power structures” 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 270).  
 
In the mid-1970s, the US saw the creation of victim assistance 
and rape crisis projects, which attempted to alter previous 
secondary victimisation (Roberts and Corcoran, 2001). The first 
refuge for victims of domestic violence was established in 1972 
by Erin Pizzey followed by rape crisis centres (Davies et al, 
1995). By 1988, 40 rape crisis centres existed (Zedner, 2002). 
In the 1970s and 1980s, “The judicial treatment of rape 
[underwent] some changes…mainly in response to the 
campaigning of groups such as the Rights of Women, the 
Women’s Aid Federation, Women Against Rape and Rape 
Crisis groups” (Lees, 1996: xiv). The 1988 Criminal Justice Act 
ensured the anonymity of rape victims, in response to the 
campaigning of women’s groups (Davies et al, 1995). However, 
whilst projects such as Victim Support, a community based 
service that relied upon volunteers garnered support throughout 
the Conservative government as an example of ‘active 
citizenship’ with self-help (Mawby and Walklate, 1994), other 
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victim movements, such as Rape Crisis continued to be starved 
of funding (Williams, 1999).  
 
Nevertheless, governments are now in a position where there is 
an expectation they should consult with victim groups that exist 
before enacting legislation (Williams, 1999). Whilst the focus 
may be on groups that align with the interests of ‘ideal’ victims 
who support the political agenda, other visible groups are 
nonetheless part of demands for social justice and a potential 
for change (ibid.). A number of victims of safety crime have 
joined or created such groups as a response to their experiences 
of victimisation. This will be described in the next section and 
in chapter four. 
 
Neither victims nor suspects/defendants have any 
significant leverage on the agencies and officials 
about what should happen, when, and to whom…[the 
criminal justice system] will continue to represent a 
site of struggle and conflict (Sanders and Young, 
2000: 757). 
 
Many victims realise they are not as central to the process as 
they had imagined they would be. Walklate (1989) reiterated 
Christie’s (1977) observation that the law has taken matters 
away from the individuals and further, has stopped those 
affected by crimes from responding in constructive and 
potentially imaginative ways. Secondary victims and in the case 
of those family members referenced in this research, have no 
role in proceedings unless they are called as witnesses, which is 
highly unlikely (Rock, 1998). The effects of safety crime are 
largely felt by individuals who are isolated, “their effects are 
very localised” (Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 35). In response, 
victims and the families of victims have responded in ways that 
are unspecified or required by official agencies, they have 
mobilised collectively. 
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Disaffected and disenfranchised from the criminal justice 
process, some families of victims, join or create groups to 
demonstrate their struggle and try to find ways to make their 
experiences more intelligible to others uninvolved (Rock, 
1998). Pressure groups emerge when social groups feel under 
represented by the mainstream (Goodey, 2005).  Diani (1992) 
explained there are four characteristics of what a social 
movement is, relevant to this research.  
 
Firstly, they consist of networks of informal interaction, 
secondly, they have shared beliefs and solidarity, thirdly, they 
take collective action on conflictual issues and finally, they take 
action that is “outside of the institutional sphere and the routine 
procedures of social life” (ibid: 7). Ultimately, social 
movements arise when, “members of excluded groups mobilise 
(or threaten to) to seek recognition and influence” (Williams, 
1999: 129). This has become easier now that “Mail, the 
telephone, cars, airplanes, and now email and the Internet can 
sustain these ties” (Wellman and Haythornthwaite, 2008: 32). 
 
As victims come together, a bond is forged through their shared 
experiences as they collectively object to the way they have 
been treated by official agencies (Williams, 1999). In response, 
they seek to make their struggles known, “Visibility is a central 
resource for social movements and a central component for the 
successful construction of a social problem” (Jenness cited in 
Williams, 1999: 130). Victim movements are a threat to the 
political agenda as victims connect to each other and point to 
“broader social systems of inequality” (Spalek, 2006: 132). 
Victim movements have taken on causes that are defined as 
criminal but have not been enforced or treated as such.  With 
little support in government-led policy, they are supported by 
other groups and aim to challenge official pictures in favour of 
fundamental change (Elias, 1993).   
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In the case of safety crime that this research is concerned with, 
the inequalities continue and victims have to face the 
government and other powerful forces that have an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. Corporations can influence the 
government, repeal laws and oppose proposals for new laws 
(Box cited in Croall, 1992). This can be seen in the way the 
Corporate Manslaughter Bill was weakened by the corporate 
lobbying of businesses (Whyte, 2007). Wells states that such 
groups can “force the state's agenda, threaten legitimacy, and 
arouse and channel dissent” (2001: 3). It remains the job of the 
victims to raise the visibility of victims of safety crime and 
Whyte (2007) points to various groups as a key factor in forcing 
safety crime onto the political agenda in the 1990s.  
 
In the political context in the 1990s that continued to promise a 
new law to deal with a number of high profile disasters, David 
Bergman published a number of texts that were part of a 
movement for corporate accountability (Bergman, 1991, 1994, 
2000). In conjunction with the London Hazards Centre, Inquest 
and The Workers’ Educational Association, Bergman published 
Deaths at work: Accidents of Corporate crime. The booklet 
focused on immediate and violent deaths at work: “to propose 
changes in police and HSE policy, criminal and health and 
safety law, and the operation of coroners court” (Bergman, 
1991: 6). It was part of a movement that demanded change, 
which led Bergman to create the Centre for Corporate 
Accountability (CCA), detailed in chapter four. 
 
The debate social movements such as the CCA were involved 
in, were a time when there “was a genuine possibility to 
pierce…the de facto veil” (Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 175). 
Groups which were created, such as Families Against Corporate 
Killing (FACK), which call for justice for victims of corporate 
and safety crime, stay “outside the ideological terrain of the 
state and at the same time” engage “on the terrain of the policy 
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world or within the current political system” (ibid.: 179). Such 
groups:  
 
provide us with often incontrovertible evidence that 
idealism does not necessarily constrain the 
effectiveness or political impact of counter-
hegemonic struggle (Coleman et al, 2009: 17).  
 
The corporate accountability movement was instrumental in the 
creation of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act (2007). The various groups which made up this 
movement represented the victims, lobbying regularly, for 
example, calling for sentencing guidelines to remain the same 
as those detailed in the 2007 draft (Tombs, 2013). They were 
one set of voices against the pull of the corporations who also 
consulted with the government and ultimately affected the 
scope and potential effectiveness of the act. They stood “firmly 
and unapologetically in opposition to the state’s criminal justice 
agenda” (Tombs and Whyte, 2015: 179).  
 
Whyte highlights “This issue can’t be silenced when the victims 
exist” (2007: 200). Academic literature has not explored the 
way these groups operate, including their common aims, 
methods of resistance and levels of success. The work in 
chapter four seeks to fill, in part at least, this gap.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This research is concerned with a sub-section of crimes of the 
powerful. It does not seek to be value neutral but to affect the 
dominant criminological discourse that primarily focuses on 
conventional crime. Any researcher, who chooses to engage 
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with or “expose” (Hillyard, 2003: 272) crimes of the powerful, 
must challenge the requirement of “value neutrality” because 
part of their work involves “developing “organic” relationships” 
with groups that oppose the state (ibid: 272). It takes inspiration 
from the manner in which standpoint feminism challenged 
“patriarchal power structures” in the 1970s (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003: 270). It is part of a body of work that is not part of the 
reproduction of power in society, preferring instead to establish 
alternatives.  
 
Developed from Sutherland’s unmasking of the white collar 
criminal in the first half of the twentieth century, it explores 
safety crime as a “counter-hegemonic concept” (Snider, 2003: 
52). As a term it is contested as a breach of a legal norm, only 
defined as criminal by authorities if it is to avoid making value 
judgements (Tappan, 1977; Shaprio, 1983). Safety crime should 
be included within criminology if the space between crime and 
what is law is recognised. Laws are a construction of behaviour 
and a reflection of ideologies and interests at any one time 
(Wells, 2001; Zedner cited in Aas, 2008).  
 
Researchers highlight the volume of harms that have been 
inflicted upon individuals as a result of “violations of law by 
employers… [or] as a result of work-related activities” (Tombs 
and Whyte, 2007: 00). Criminologists demonstrate that such 
crimes are widespread and harmful, yet this is not reflected in 
the criminal justice process where the criminalisation of 
corporations is avoided. 
 
This chapter provided details taken from existing literature of 
how criminalisation of corporations is rejected, both in public 
perception and in the nature of safety crime. For example, there 
is a large distance put between the victim and the perpetrator 
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and corporate killing is easily defined as accidental. This is 
supported by the state who respond to corporate criminality 
with weak laws and emasculated regulation.  
 
Safety crimes remain relatively invisible. A body of work 
suggests how this is enabled by the criminal justice system, 
where such crimes are recorded as something other than what 
they are, for example, at the inquest, many deaths are 
inaccurately recorded as ‘accidental’ (Slapper, 1999). 
Corporations are able to avoid the label of being criminal, 
through the eyes of the law and the general public where deaths 
at work are almost automatically perceived as an accident 
(Wells, 2001). Such offenders enjoy a “structural advantage 
which enables them to avoid prosecution, conviction or severe 
sentences (Croall, 1992: 125). The process of how this is 
achieved at a micro level has not been explored. The wide-
reaching consequences of this have been touched upon in 
academic literature but have yet to be detailed on a case by case 
basis. Both will be detailed in chapter three. 
 
Corporations avoid being labelled criminal through the actions 
of the state who have created laws that rarely prosecute and 
seem “designed not to work” (Punch, 2009: 66). The 
corporation has developed and mutated into a form where 
responsibility is dispersed, which is magnified with the 
increasing use of sub-contracts. In contrast, legal responses 
have not adapted and continue to offer woeful sanctions. The 
common law of corporate manslaughter only rarely overcomes 
the barrier of establishing the mens rea of a corporation. High 
profile cases such as the Herald of Free Enterprise led to a 
number of individuals publicly criticising the inadequacy and 
impossibility of the law. The creation of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007) attempted to 
make it easier to prosecute larger companies (Tombs, 2013). 
This law does not appear to be too dissimilar from the common 
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law in its ability to punish corporations. It still remains untested 
on large corporations. Concerns have been expressed that it has 
been used to minimise levels of liability (Tombs, 2013). Doyle 
and McGrath note that Gobert writing in 2008:  
 
intimated that the symbolic significance of the 2007 
Act may ‘ultimately transcend its methodological 
deficiencies’ and that the primary value of the Act 
may very well lie in the very fact of its existence 
(2016: 164). 
 
It should be clear that regulation is a lesser punishment for 
corporations who commit crime, yet it remains the job of 
regulation to punish the corporation, which in the UK requires 
the involvement of the HSE. The development of regulation is 
rooted firmly in consultation, bargaining and acceptable laws 
(Carson, 1979). Governments have almost continually reduced 
the power of the HSE through regular cuts to funding and 
unremitting reviews into its effectiveness and usefulness 
(Tombs, 2000). The only consistent political response to HSE 
and the crimes that it answers to is to de-regulate. The HSE are 
now incapable of preventing major incidents and are forced to 
seek compliance rather than demand it (Gobert and Punch, 
2003). This has serious consequences for the numbers of 
victims of safety crime that are created.  
 
The HSE have limited resources to tackle the threat of safety 
crimes and in their ability to secure justice through health and 
safety prosecutions. This has consequences for the families of 
victims who turn to regulation to deliver justice after common 
law has failed. The ways regulation has been shaped historically 
and the manner in which the HSE has been affected by 
government ideology which continually seeks to de-regulate, is 
well established. The experiences of the families who have been 
in contact with the HSE, the effects on them and their thoughts 
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on what constitutes justice have yet to be detailed in academic 
literature. This will be explored in chapter three. 
 
The desire of criminal justice agencies to treat safety crime as 
an accident impacts upon victims and the families of victims. 
They are denied legitimate victim status as the context of their 
victimisation does not fit with the ideal victim (Whyte, 2007; 
Christie, 1986). Whilst the ideal victim is utilised by 
governments in their desire for crime control (Garland, 2001), 
the safety crime victim is pushed to become invisible. This 
leads to psychological, emotional, physical and financial harm 
(Spalek, 2006). Denied by official processes, the state becomes 
a perpetrator, causing secondary victimisation, leaving the 
victims to bear the social costs (Shapland, 1984; Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015). The short and long-term effect on families of 
safety crime has not been explored.  
 
This research focuses on the more mundane nature of safety 
crime victimisation rather than the atypical criminal incidents 
that have been featured in previous research (Shover et al, 
1994). In comparison to media interest when members of the 
public are killed, these victims have not attracted much 
publicity (Hutter and Lloyd cited in Croall, 1992). This will be 
achieved through an examination of how victims and secondary 
victims are treated by the law and the key institutions of the 
criminal justice system (the police, HSE, CPS and Coronial 
system). Their experiences of the social, legal and political 
obstacles they faced will be detailed in chapter three and four.  
 
Victims who are disillusioned and harmed by their experiences 
of the criminal justice process have attempted to change the 
process for future victims. Many victims and families of victims 
join with others and mobilise to form group who seek to be 
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recognised and enact change (Williams, 1999). For victims of 
safety crime, such groups became active in the 1990s and 
influenced the introduction of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act (2007). This research continues to 
build on the existence of the victim as evidence that the issue of 
safety crime cannot be silenced (Whyte, 2007). To the best of 
my knowledge, their impact in the “counter-hegemonic 
struggle” has never been explored (Coleman et al, 2009: 17). 
This will be detailed in chapter four. The following chapter, 
chapter two, will explore how the research was undertaken and 
the reasons for the choice of methods.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter starts by discussing the issues that are raised by 
researchers who choose to study crimes of the powerful making a 
case for the importance of breaking with traditional criminology in 
order to challenge unequal power relations. Associated problems 
of funding and publishing are explored before the subject matter 
will narrow to examine concerns in researching safety crime.  
 
There are limited opportunities to research corporations. Pre-
existing research which has navigated around such limits are 
outlined. To that end, two main studies are explored in further 
detail (Spalek, 2007, 1999; Matthews et al, 2011). The aims of the 
research are identified, highlighting one fundamental difference 
between this research and those findings that already exist; that 
this is a study of those victims whose experiences are rarely 
publicised.  
 
Rationales for methodological decisions are evaluated in terms of 
validity and reliability. The unique nature of the research matter 
requires an additional section on details of the issues faced when 
researching victims of safety crime and facing sensitive subjects. 
This chapter ends with consideration of contemporary issues that 
may negatively affect future research into safety crime. 
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Researching the crimes of the powerful 
 
It is fitting with the conclusions made in Chapter One that 
researching the powerful receives only “token recognition” in 
criminology (Pearce, 2003: 4). A decision to research the powerful 
is “A commitment not to take the claims of the powerful at face 
value…to subject them to scrutiny” (ibid: xi, emphasis in 
original). If “the aim of social research should be to change society 
for the better” (Henn et al cited in Harding 2013: 11) research has 
a responsibility to challenge powerful groups rather than 
reproduce unequal power relations. The exclusion of research into 
the issue has meant so-called radical political agendas have been 
side-lined (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). Critical approaches then 
have a duty to look at the alternatives (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). 
 
When attempting to look at the alternatives and to research the 
powerful as opposed to the powerless, there are unique problems 
experienced by researchers. Research that focuses on crimes of the 
powerful is a relatively small area so there is little for researchers 
to base their own research and choice of methods on (Pearce, 
2003). The decision to study crimes committed by those who have 
control and power over others automatically entail a number of 
specific difficulties. These principally include context and 
especially who, or what is being studied (Snider, 2003). 
 
Granting access to carry out research can be problematic for 
researchers wishing to study the powerful. In order to challenge 
dominant discourses, the knowledge utilised by institutions and 
experts must first be scrutinised, which is a difficult task (Scraton 
and Chadwick, 1991). When “criminology casts its gaze 
downwards” (Tombs and Whyte, 2007) it focuses on those who 
are in a position of powerlessness and part of a ‘captive audience’. 
Groups such as prisoners may participate in research in order to be 
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viewed favourably by those in charge, have the time and can be 
easily located. In contrast, those in power are not primed to be 
researched, rather the opposite, they have something to lose and 
are suspicious and defensive with the added ability to block the 
efforts of researchers. As Tombs and Whyte write:  
 
it might be argued that one of the key features and 
effects of power is the ability to operate beyond 
public scrutiny and thus accountability (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003: 4, emphasis in original). 
 
The courtesy that researchers are encouraged to have towards 
individuals they investigate has been extended to organisations. 
Indeed, the study of corporations has its own guidelines, adapted 
from those that are designed to protect the wellbeing of 
individuals. For example, the British Society of Criminology 
encourages researchers to be ‘sympathetic’ (Sim, 2003: 244). 
There is little guidance on how to respond to a corporation when it 
is the focus of wrongdoing and deserves little compassion (ibid.). 
 
An alternative method of researching power is to focus on those 
whom it affects. The wielding of power impacts upon some groups 
more than others and academic research can be one method 
marginalised groups use to respond to such threats (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003). Researching the powerful by examining those that 
it harms is a simpler process in terms of practicality and still has 
much potential for revealing and challenging the changing nature 
of hegemony (ibid.).  
 
It is true that in essence, no one can tell a researcher what to 
research and what to leave alone (Punch, 1998). However, this 
ignores the factors that inform research decisions, for example, the 
implications on future careers, issues of funding and who will use 
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the research. This is pertinent when funding for studying the 
crimes of the powerful is scarce (Snider, 2003). 
 
As mentioned previously, criminologists have tended to focus on a 
certain type of crime that chimes with common-sense notions, 
although it is difficult to disentangle who is influencing whom. 
Historically, areas of law breaking have been ignored by 
criminologists, who have in turn colluded with the state (Carson, 
1974). Tombs and Whyte illustrated how in journal articles 
between 1991 to 2000, just 3% were focused on corporate crime. 
This relationship is unlikely to change in the future as university 
based research is increasingly sponsored by private businesses and 
leads to consultancy. Neither of these sits comfortably with 
research aims of crimes of the powerful and notably, safety crime 
(Slapper and Tombs, 1999).  Researchers interested in safety 
crime are forced to turn to trade unions and campaign groups to 
engage with, and work towards “a more just and humane social 
order” (Tombs and Whyte, 2002: 232). 
 
Punch (1996) indicates that as a lecturer in a business school he 
was only able to “smuggle” some topics into more acceptable 
courses on Public Policy And Business Ethics and the 
Management of Crisis. He emphasises that only as an 'independent 
scholar' did he pursue his self-interest of corporate crime, police 
corruption and organisational deviance. The increasing cost of 
university, the need to repay debt and earn money quickly will 
lessen the opportunities for subjects such as safety crime to be 
researched (Tombs and Whyte, 2005). 
 
Even when the difficulties of researching the powerful have been 
overcome and research has been carried out, there remains a 
further difficulty experienced by those attempting to research 
crimes of the powerful. Those who seek to publish their research 
have to do so within a structure that is unfavourable to 
highlighting the crimes of corporations. The consequences of this 
are that the research may never be published or that which is 
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published, may be altered. This was even the experience of Edwin 
Sutherland in 1949.  
 
Sutherland experienced difficulties both from a publisher, when he 
was a sociology editor, and from the university that employed him. 
After producing a manuscript on white collar crime, his publisher, 
Dryden Press, insisted Sutherland remove the names of 
corporations he had described as criminal because they had not 
been convicted and they feared being held liable for damages 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2003). Indiana University similarly 
encouraged the removal of the names of the corporations. 
Sutherland believed this was due to fears the university had of 
harming business connections (Sutherland, 1983). He agreed to the 
removal of the names in the initial copy in 1949, the names were 
reinstated 30 years after his death in the 1983 edition. Similarly, 
Braithwaite also had to respond to possible libel following his 
research into pharmaceutical companies in 1985 (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003). The way such research is censored and doctored 
prior to publication is testimony to the nature of power.  
 
As with any other research that has advantages and disadvantages, 
the difficulties outlined above could be viewed as simply part of 
the consideration when choosing to research crimes of the 
powerful. Such unique disadvantages could inform a researcher’s 
decision to instead focus on another topic. Choosing to avoid 
rather than negate those difficulties in favour of more acceptable 
or easier research is an acknowledgement of the pre-existing 
power structures. The choice to study power structures and the 
inequality that results has been approached previously by theorists 
within the sociological tradition.  
 
Feminists have taken up similar challenges in the past and 
revealed inequality that otherwise may have lain dormant 
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(Walklate, 2007). Such researchers recognised that what is held as 
common knowledge exists within, and maintains, power 
structures. It is crucial that this common knowledge is interrogated 
(Harding, 1991). It is arguably important to challenge those who 
perpetuate safety crime and question the structures that facilitate it 
in order to scrutinise the powerful and present alternatives to the 
dominant discourse. 
 
Researching corporate crime 
Once the decision has been made to carry out research that 
attempts to challenge dominant discourses including safety crime, 
it is necessary to explore and discuss how this can be done. There 
are challenges, but rather than simply choosing another subject, 
the challenges can be overcome with a research plan or 
methodology (Almond, 2008). Methods for researching safety 
crime are underdeveloped worldwide and so, many of the 
problems connected to it remain unresolved (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003). 
 
Tombs and Whyte (2007) highlight two main difficulties 
researchers of safety crime have experienced. Firstly, there is a 
lack of statistics available on the scope and nature of safety crime. 
Secondly, the creation of a large quantitative data base is 
expensive to collate and relies upon extensive funding. It is 
entirely predictable that corporations will resist research that seeks 
to uncover wrongdoing, complicating access (Noaks and Wincup, 
2004). A way that researchers have navigated such difficulties has 
been the tendency to study corporations through case studies of 
well-known, publicised safety crimes or those involving large 
financial loss or with many victims (Tombs and Whyte, 2007).  
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According to Tombs and Whyte case studies can provide 
comprehension of a wide range of safety crimes, which when 
combined demonstrate the large scope of offending whilst 
producing a number of themes from which “tentative 
generalisations can be generated” (2007: 8). Although historically 
utilised by those researching safety crime, case studies do rely 
upon some secondary sources, which “raises issues of reliability” 
(ibid: 9). Those sources, in this research, largely originate from 
those involved in the groups studied, such as Families Against 
Corporate Killing. This does not make the data impartial or 
neutral. However, without observing such groups, which would 
still be considered subjective, there are few alternative ways of 
finding out about organisations. The continued study of safety 
crime owes much to the body of work that highlights the scale of 
corporate offending and utilises case studies, specific examples 
will follow. 
 
Punch’s work includes a number of case studies. He asserts:  
 
Individual cases need to be placed in a situational context that 
does justice to the range of interrelated variables involved. This 
means we have to a certain extent to rely on detailed studies 
(Punch, 2000: 253). 
 
He explores a number of high profile cases in his 1996 book, 
including the contraceptive Dalkon Shield, Barings Bank and Ford 
Pinto (Punch, 1996). Punch uses case studies for interpretation 
from themes he identifies but also places them “in a context that 
raises the industrial and social setting” in order to “provoke 
discussion and stimulate thought” (1996: 84). The themes are 
reinterpreted in successive chapters, which make it an 
organic/ongoing discussion, ultimately permitting conclusions 
which cut across macro and micro explanations.  
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Bittle and Snider (2006) also utilise the case study to examine the 
collapse of the Westray mine in Nova Scotia, linking this case to 
the development of law and regulation. Slapper examines 40 cases 
of deaths at work between 1992 and 1994, which he follows up 
with fieldwork that involved attending 18 inquests. Interviews 
took place with personnel involved in the process that enabled him 
to make judgements on whether the case should have progressed 
as a manslaughter offence (Slapper, 1999). Spalek (1999, 2006, 
2007) and Matthews et al (2011) utilise qualitative interviews, 
which will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter.  
 
Researching safety crime 
Safety crime research has focused upon its existence and 
prevalence. Recent safety crime research has used official data in 
combination with case studies. For example, Tombs and Whyte 
(2007) look at the following case studies; cases in UK 
construction, the gas leak at Union Carbide in Bhopal, India, the 
capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Piper Alpha 
explosion, the death of Simon Jones, a gas explosion in Larkhall, 
Scotland and the case of the cockle pickers at Morecambe Bay. 
From here, they identified common themes and highlight key 
issues (which include, sub-contract, power, regulatory processes, 
aggressive management and the welfare state). Tombs and Whyte 
(2007) use press reports, related academic publications and 
statistics that are available as a matter of public record. They note: 
 
the sources we draw in constructing our cases, and 
indeed which we use more generally…are not 
primarily criminological, indeed criminological 
sources are often in little evidence here. Studying 
safety crime means moving well beyond criminology, 
drawing upon literature in business, management and 
organisational studies, economics, history, political 
economy, politics and sociology (ibid.: 8). 
 
117 
 
Leading directly out of this research, came the decision to explore 
the experiences of the victims of safety crime.  
 
Researching victims of safety crime 
Governments have found it increasingly impossible to ignore the 
voices of victims, which Rock (1998) states has led to changes for 
subsequent users of the criminal justice system. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the likelihood of governments recognising victims 
depends upon whether their existence supports the intentions of 
the state. What the state chooses to represent should not lead 
decisions made by critical victimology, which should instead, 
question what is real (Walklate, 2007).  
 
Positivist victimology has limited its scope to ‘conventional 
crime’, examining the incident rather than the process and by 
focusing on “street crime” to the detriment of studying crime that 
happens “behind closed doors” (Mawby and Walklate, 2002: 9). In 
the search for victim characteristics and victimizing events and 
desire to maintain “objectivity and value freedom” the work of 
feminists “has largely been marginalized by victimology” (ibid: 
10). Held in high regard by policy makers, according to Mawby 
and Walklate (2002) positivist victimology has developed the 
study of victimology in the following ways. Firstly, the term 
victim is rarely debated but determined by suffering and/or legal 
response. Secondly, being a victim is static and not understood as 
possibly refuted, survived or resisted. Thirdly and finally, sudden 
and unpredictable social change is not discussed. This makes 
positivist victimology relatively easy to research as the victim is 
obvious, state defined and it is only the act precipitating the 
victimising event that needs to be scrutinised.  
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Radical victimology rejects positivist approaches, turning instead 
to structural factors, questioning the role of the state in the 
construction of the victim. Left Realists utilised the crime survey 
to illuminate who is victim, largely redundant for researchers of 
economic crime as much victimisation is “indirect and diffuse” 
(Croall, 2010). Less straightforward to research, radical 
victimology has been criticised as lacking a body of significant 
empirical data and therefore not moving away from positivism, 
failing to create a logical research agenda (Walklate, 2007). In 
opposition to positivist victimology and attempting to overcome 
the criticisms of radical victimology, critical research attempts to 
understand and change practice. Thus it is connected with the aims 
of this research (Walklate 1989, Mayall et al 1999).  
 
Critical victimology is committed to researching hidden processes, 
which “problematizes both the law and the role of the state” and 
calls for “imaginative, comparative and longitudinal studies” 
(Mawby and Walklate, 2002:20). It goes into “more depth 
than…positivist or radical victimologies” and examines “the 
interconnected links between social class, gender, race and crime 
(Davies et al cited in Croall, 2010: 10). As a discipline, it 
examines the development of victims’ movements and why they 
may or may not have succeeded (ibid.). 
 
This research utilises both critical victimology and research on 
corporate and safety crime, two areas that have rarely been studied 
together in the wide scope of criminology (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003). In 1999, Spalek interviewed 25 individuals who were 
“adversely affected” by the Maxwell scandal. Again, in 2007, 
Spalek interviewed 16 customers of Farepak to explore the impact 
of the collapse to challenge the regulatory principle that customers 
can avoid their own victimisation. This research on corporate and 
safety crimes continues in the same nature as Spalek’s as one 
crucial source of data is the experiences of the victims. More 
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specifically, the focus is on the bereaved following a “work-
related death or where members of the public have died where the 
circumstances raise questions about the working practises of an 
organisation” (CCA, 2007).  
 
Matthews et al studied the “impact of traumatic work-related 
death (TWD) on victims’ families” in Australia (2011: 5). In order 
to examine the financial, social, and health consequences, they 
also used in-depth semi-structured interviews using an interview 
schedule but with no set questions.  
 
The question initially posed was based upon existing literature that 
had provoked initial interest: why is safety crime not recognised as 
a crime? Why are victims denied justice? During the research 
process, this question developed, but these aims remained, whilst 
endeavouring to make the research interesting, relevant, feasible, 
ethical, concise and possible to answer (Harding, 2013).  
 
The nature of corporations in a social, legal and political context is 
examined through the experiences of victims, or specifically the 
families of victims of safety crime who have died. By being 
principally focused on the victim, this research examines the 
effects of the theories and policies on the people who become 
intertwined in this process (Williams, 1999). It highlights that 
victims of safety crime do exist, that their experiences are real: 
 
Balancing the lived experiences of people and the 
immediacy of daily interaction with the often less-
visible structural arrangements – the political, 
economic and ideological management of social 
worlds (Scraton and Chadwick, 1985: 165). 
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It is a study of the underdog to highlight the suffering of 
individuals affected by a powerful offender (Gouldner, 1973). This 
is an academic concern for victims of safety crime and in doing so, 
is inherently a relationship with the activists whom it focuses on; 
the two are difficult to separate (Fattah, 1986).   
 
Contrary to the majority of the cases identified in safety crime 
research (see Punch, 1996; Slapper and Tombs, 1999; Tombs and 
Whyte, 2007; Spalek 1999; 2007), the focus of this research is on 
the individuals and the families of victims of safety crime. It 
focuses on those individuals who are part of the “mundane and 
routine” safety crimes, those who are barely visible (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2007: 10). This is in similar ways to those researched in 
the work of Slapper (1999) and Matthews et al (2011). It aims to 
provide further evidence of the consequences of the crimes 
committed by corporations on the individuals who live on after 
their loved one has died (Tombs and Whyte, 2003). This relies 
upon data which is sufficiently in-depth to uncover and convey the 
emotions of the families. The documenting of these emotions are 
important for the last two aims of the research, as it was partly the 
upset and anger that was to fuel the creation and membership of 
support and campaigning groups. As mentioned previously, the 
main method used to research these groups will be case studies.  
 
The decision to research the experience of the families of the 
victims of safety crime is a way to negotiate the problems of 
observing corporate criminality whilst acknowledging but 
navigating debates over their legitimacy. This research originated 
out of a desire to seek answers to seemingly indefensible 
contradictions evident within policy making and practise and 
therefore requires a specific framework.  
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Ontology, epistemology, politics and a critical framework 
  
This research has already set out its aims as being a critical inquiry 
that questions commonly held beliefs and assumptions as a 
challenge to dominant assumptions (Gray, 2013). The facts that 
this research seeks to uncover are connected to “the ideology and 
the self-interest of dominant groups” (ibid.: 27). It is critical 
epistemology in that the results are made whilst keeping in mind 
“underlying structures and mechanisms” (Blaikie, 2004). 
 
As discussed earlier, there are similarities between this research 
and feminist epistemology that seeks to access “deeper reality” the 
families have “through their deep experiences (of oppression) and 
through their feelings and emotions” (Gray, 2013: 27). As in the 
case of feminism, Cain’s epistemological strategy is pertinent here 
to deconstruct the official discourse and to uncover the truth from 
an alternative standpoint (cited in Ballinger, 2011). First, the 
dominant discourse of the state is deconstructed. Secondly, the 
new truth is developed from the perspective of minority groups, 
which Ballinger argues is better suited to non-traditional research 
as it does not strive to be independent. Finally, conceptualising 
takes place in the gap between the “official discourse and the 
newly generated subjugated knowledge” (Cain cited in Ballinger: 
2011: 12). In tackling power, standpoint feminism detects similar 
experiences that those researched share (Comack cited in ibid.). 
The purpose of this is to “create social and legal changes that 
eradicate structural power inequalities between men and women” 
(Cain cited in ibid.: 13). 
 
As Punch noted, everything is political (Punch, 1998). Indeed, it is 
difficult to avoid being political as the very nature of critical 
research questions social relations and power (Harvey, 1990). This 
research takes a critical approach from an epistemological 
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perspective where knowledge and critique are linked (ibid.). 
Adopting an openly partisan position is likely to be at its most 
effective when developed as part of a social movement:   
 
Research that has a high degree of organic quality – 
research that retains a connection to real movements 
and struggles – is likely to be more effective in 
challenging power, and in producing an accurate 
alternative world view (Tombs and Whyte, 2002: 
231). 
 
The challenging of dominant discourses is best achieved through 
working with others. As Sim notes:  
 
Gramsci attempted to develop a social theory and 
political strategy that was alliance-led, where 
personal and political links were forged between 
progressive social movements and cultural forces so 
that the ‘common sense’ that governed the perception 
and understanding of social issues was replaced with 
an alternative, hegemonic ‘good sense’ (Sim, 2003: 
255). 
It is important that research that seeks to challenge dominant 
discourses, rather than being overly concerned and therefore 
paralysed, by the right way to discover knowledge. As Harding 
notes: 
 
Worse of all, the sciences’ commitment to social 
neutrality disarmed the scientifically productive 
potential of politically engaged research on behalf of 
oppressed groups and, more generally, the culturally 
important projects of all but the dominant Western, 
bourgeois, white-supremacist, androcentric, 
heteronormative culture (Harding, 2004: 5).  
 
Rather than being disarmed, critical social research is: 
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close and detailed because it aims to show how 
oppressive social structures are legitimated and 
reproduced in specific practices (Harvey, 1990: 210). 
 
Contextually, it aims to examine how what is going on at the 
abstract level affects the families and the victims (ibid.). The 
location and existence of power flexed in the institutions shows 
itself in the results below and the way the families are affected 
(Mills cited in ibid.: 57). 
 
In keeping with the critical tradition, it aims to contribute to 
existing theory and to try to explain the experience of the families 
of victims of safety crime that are absent (Blaikie, 2004). It seeks 
to ask, “whose interests are served by [ideological forms]?” 
(Harvey, 1990: 210). The results of the research should add to 
illuminating the ways a corporation escapes examination and the 
consequences of such social harm (Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  
 
This research is located within the framework of critical 
criminology because it tries to inform what is seen as real (Harvey, 
1990). It challenges ‘truths’ whilst acknowledging the context 
within which safety crime occurs and the boundaries it operates 
within (Scraton and Chadwick, 1991). This research sets out to 
illuminate the: 
 
structural contradictions that are inherent within the 
social arrangements and relations of the new dawn of 
economic expansionism (ibid: 169).  
 
This involves an interrogation of the data, in this case, data 
recovered from the accounts of secondary victims, whilst also 
locating what happened to the families in terms of their social and 
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political contexts (Harvey, 1990). The methods and methodology 
chosen in order to do this will be discussed in the following 
subsection.  
 
Methodology and choice of methods 
 
The relationship between methodology and method has been 
challenged by feminism in its questioning of victimology. It has 
asked how we can claim to know about the world but also who is 
permitted to have knowledge and what that knowledge looks like 
(Walklate, 2007: 320).  
 
This research is concerned with the nature of the victimization – 
the process – and the individual experience (Walklate, 1989). This 
requires an approach that is able to find deeper and complex 
meaning in the accounts of victims. In this research, the victims 
have been killed and because they were at work and not in a 
disaster, there are no survivors to interview. Therefore the focus is 
on those who were affected, the families of the victim, those who 
had lost their ‘loved one’. As secondary victims, they are the main 
participants and the focus of this research. 
 
In asking people who are bereaved and have experienced 
additional trauma to share their experiences, my position as a 
researcher is almost one of inferiority and a reciprocal relationship 
at least. It would be highly inappropriate to present myself as a 
detached observer, ignorant of emotions expressed and 
unconcerned about their experiences. This research requires an 
emotional connection, remaining distant and objective is unethical. 
It is argued by feminists that doing so would adversely affect how 
successful the research is, the interviews must: 
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…have all the warmth and personality exchange of a 
conversation with the clarity and guidelines of 
scientific searching (Goode and Hatt cited in Oakley, 
1981: 33). 
 
In this way, the researcher is not neutral and does not attempt to 
keep a distance, perhaps ignoring the “paradigm” of interview 
values “objectivity, detachment, hierarchy and ‘science’” (ibid.: 
38). As an interviewer, a researcher, I am borrowing and taking 
the time of family members and requesting they recall painful 
memories for essentially academic research, the results of which 
the majority will never see. Since the desire for this research 
comes directly from the experiences of those interviewed and in 
response to their suspected poor treatment, which I am gravely 
concerned about, it is unrealistic and misplaced for me to claim 
neutrality was highly important or something I attempted to 
maintain. This was replaced with the need to listen, understand, 
draw out, and to voice their experiences. Being impartial and 
detached was never an aim nor a requirement I placed on my 
behaviour. I did not attempt to be ‘professional’ nor assume the 
role of a friend. It was my intention to listen and assume enough 
confidence so that the family members would not try to censor 
difficult memories. The fact I was not impartial and therefore 
genuinely interested was conveyed. Nothing, beyond the sterile 
nature of the interview, was false.  
 
Qualitative research methods were utilised throughout this 
research as it is concerned with individual experiences – thoughts, 
feelings and consequences – which would be difficult to capture 
and give depth to without an open line of communication. This is 
appropriate to many critical criminological research methods, and 
has its advantages as well as its difficulties that require careful 
consideration.   
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Qualitative research methods are suitable to this research as it 
seeks to understand the experiences of people in their everyday 
lives and being empathetic to the interviewees (Gray, 2013; 
Blaikie 2004). Information was required about historic events and 
by a process of elimination, qualitative research methods are the 
only way to do this.  The interview needed to allow for a discovery 
of meanings (Noaks and Wincup, 2004). The study of such human 
behaviour, thoughts and feelings in context and looking at how 
people behave, think and feel is best understood if, as a researcher, 
I am at least partially aware of the participant’s world (Gillham, 
2000).               
                  
An interpretive approach was unavoidable to show the complexity 
involved in the interviews (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). It was 
important to uncover the nature of the social institutions and social 
structures that delivered pain to the participants and also the 
meaning they attached to this (Blaikie, 2004). Whilst comment 
may be made on the wider meaning, the power to describe harm 
experienced should be handed to the families. In examining 
structure and power, such qualitative research may harm dominant 
interests but this is ‘inevitable’ (Baez cited in Davies, 2008: 178). 
There are a set of processes that the research aimed to illuminate 
and for that reason, observation would be an inadequate method. 
Social constructions cannot be observed directly where behaviour 
is normalised (Blaikie, 2004). 
 
The decision to use qualitative research methods was informed by 
a need to give voice to the emotion and consequences of 
victimisation. It suited previous personal experience due to my 
occupation which at that time involved encouraging people to be 
honest and open about their past painful experiences, and share 
their anxieties about the future. Interviewing matched my 
capabilities and skills (Blaikie, 2004). General research questions 
were as follows: 
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1. What social, legal and political obstacles does safety crime face 
that prevent it from becoming defined and treated as a crime? 
2. How are the victims and families of victims of safety crime 
treated by law and key institutions of the criminal justice 
system including an examination of the police, inquest, Health 
and Safety Executive, Crown Prosecution Service? 
3. What effect does this have on the families of victims? 
4. Under what circumstances do families of victims seek to 
develop more general campaigns, with what aims, and with 
what degree of success? 
 
Although these were the research questions, it was during the 
research process that meanings of such concepts were acquired 
and refined (Blumer cited in Blaikie, 2004).  
 
In order to reach conclusions to the above research questions, the 
methods chosen included semi-structured interviews and case 
studies. These will be examined in turn whilst considering 
questions of validity and reliability. 
 
Interviews 
In order to speak to victims of safety and corporate crime, Spalek 
and King, Matthews et al and Spalek interviewed individuals, 
which were then recorded and transcribed (Spalek and King, 2007; 
Matthews et al 2011; Spalek, 1999). These were useful and 
suitable models for this research. 
 
Initially, a pilot study was carried out in 2008 on six family 
members to test the aims of the research, the appropriateness of 
the interview schedule and to gauge the practicality of the 
methods, for example, the duration of the interviews. Ethical 
concerns were also tested, including whether the questions were 
not too distressing or intrusive. The aim of these interviews was to 
access the various experiences of victims of safety crimes. The 
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piloting process led to a number of alterations. Firstly, adjustments 
were made to the schedule, including a question that asked the 
families ‘what would have constituted justice for them?’ This was 
in response to the detailed knowledge they had gained from their 
own experiences. Secondly, I purchased a modern dictaphone after 
the one used in the first ever interview failed after thirty minutes. 
Thirdly, it was clear the interviews were going to take more time 
than anticipated, which increased the time required to carry out 
and transcribe each interview. Finally, the pilot interviews also 
changed the original aims and led to the addition of considerations 
about support and campaign groups. This was as a result of many 
family members who referred to such groups when asked how 
they responded to their experiences. The aims expanded to 
uncover information about the formation, aims and relative 
successes of various groups mobilized following a safety crime. 
 
To build on the pilot, five further interviews with family members 
were carried out in 2010, four of which were chosen because of 
their active involvement with social movements. In addition to the 
eleven bereaved family members who were interviewed face to 
face, four individuals were interviewed remotely in 2015. These 
were chosen to boost the information about campaign groups. The 
first person was a key solicitor who played a prominent part in 
cases of corporate manslaughter and directly helped one family 
member featured in this research. The second and third 
interviewees were both involved in the Centre for Corporate 
Accountability (CCA) and were able to provide much needed 
depth. As mentioned previously, the CCA had been operational at 
the start of this research and I had not foreseen at that time neither 
the fact this research would involve social movements, nor that it 
would close. The final person was questioned because of their 
continued role in a key support group. Again, unknowingly, they 
were questioned towards the end of the existence of that group. 
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The first six who were interviewed face to face were initially 
identified through the CCA, who acted as an intermediary. When 
informed about the nature of the research, the centre agreed to 
identify a number of families who they considered would be 
suitable, i.e. able and willing to discuss their experiences.  This 
was a practical issue but also overcame personal concerns I had 
about opening people up to the death of their loved one being 
considered a crime, which they may not have been aware of. The 
selection therefore was in no way random and does not claim to be 
representative. The seventh interview was chosen as a result of 
‘snowball’ sampling. 
 
Clearly such a small sample raises significant issues of 
generalizability and representativeness. Firstly, it should be 
emphasised that in one obvious sense, in fact, these families were 
not representative – they had in the first place been clients of the 
CCA (all cases were closed at the time of contact). They were 
selected by case workers at the CCA on the basis of their 
appreciation that they would be the least affected by a request to 
recount their experience. In this, these families may have been a 
sample who had come out of the process least victimised and most 
able to reflect upon it. These families had help in the form of an 
open and operational CCA, which they accessed. It has become 
very obvious that these victims were further ahead than many 
created at the time and certainly since. Secondly as the interviews 
unfolded, it became clear that even across these limited set of 
cases, common themes emerged between the interviews and 
perhaps most crucially, the stories and experiences elicited echoed 
the key themes referred to in the small amount of pre-existing 
research (Slapper, 1999; Tombs and Whyte, 2007; Matthews et al, 
2011). This leads to doubt whether what has been accessed was 
one set of rather anomalous experiences.  
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As the pilot uncovered, the interviews took longer than expected, 
which then reduced the number of interviews I, as a self-funded, 
part-time student could carry out compared to my initial plan. On 
that note, as this research was self-funded, the time taken to plan, 
write, meet with supervisors, research and transcribe all came at a 
cost, both financially and in terms of time. During this research I 
reduced the hours I worked to provide much needed flexibility in 
the week, which also reduced the money available to pay the fees 
and fund travel. From the start to the finish of the thesis, my father 
and grandparents died, I got married, had two children, was 
promoted, bought a house to renovate and moved jobs entirely. 
Each time, this took hours and days and weeks away from the 
research. After having a family and in order to finish this research, 
I had to rely heavily on the goodwill of family members, notably 
my partner who spent many of his weekends off work with our 
children and without me. Asking for additional help, only felt 
really possible when the deadline became a matter of urgency and 
I felt I had no option.   
 
Given such constraints I decided it was better to permit the 
interviews to be longer and in-depth, rather than increase the 
number of them. Two more interviewees were considered but it 
was decided they were unnecessary as a number of themes had 
emerged that were being repeated by each family member. Due to 
the period of time the research took, I felt it was important to 
ensure the deaths occurred at the time of the CCA and prior to the 
implementation and remit of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act (2007). Whilst I did not want the sample 
to be purely based in my local county (in fact, none of them were), 
the wide geographical nature of the interviews complicated the 
practicalities of repeating many more. Travelling long distances 
using my own finances was not simple. For example, on one 
occasion, whilst travelling to one interviewee, the gear box on the 
van gave up quite suddenly and it was only luck that the 
roundabout was close to an airport so my partner and I were able 
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to ‘coast’ straight into a car hire business. The van was later 
collected for scrap! This was neither a cheap nor relaxing 
experience at seven months pregnant, prior to an interview of 
bereaved parents. 
 
The interviews lasted between two and four hours and ended 
naturally, usually when the participants decided they had finished. 
There were many occasions when vital information was given 
after the interview had formally ended, i.e. when the dictaphone 
had been switched off. In those instances, I quickly made notes. 
All of the interviews were recorded, with notes and transcribed in 
full afterwards. This was a long process as the shortest interview 
(with a family member) was 100 minutes and the longest was 213 
minutes. The average interview length was 180 minutes. 
 
There are several issues of validity and reliability associated with 
semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were used 
to elicit a wide range of information that focused on specific areas 
but sought to not limit the data to pre-defined boundaries. (See 
appendix 4.) Semi structured interviews were chosen as they are 
most suitable for research that seeks to be led by the interviewees, 
collecting detailed, rather than vast amounts of information. 
Hennink et al notes that interviews are suitable when covering 
sensitive issues as they allow an examination of the context, reveal 
emotions and find the meanings people attach to their experiences 
(cited in Harding, 2013: 62). As a goal to “see the world through 
someone else’s eyes” face to face interviews were preferable over 
non-contact interviews even if this lent itself to bias and personal 
effects for the interviewer (Hennink et al cited in ibid.: 62). 
 
When undertaking research, Spalek (2006) states consideration 
should be paid to the biases present to avoid what we already 
have, which is a summary of the process of victimisation and not 
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how being a victim is actually experienced. Spalek (ibid.) 
encourages researchers to reflect on their own positions in order to 
be as subjective as possible to avoid the suppression or 
reproduction of dominant racial and cultural discourses. Open 
ended data gathering through the eliciting of biographies with a 
narrative approach should encourage the revealing of meaning to 
events and avoid variables that depend upon the skill of the 
interviewer. These include tiredness, poor concentration, poorly 
worded questions or unknowingly hitting on sensitivities (Hollway 
and Jefferson, 2000). 
 
These considerations were taken into account for this research. In 
a similar way that ‘elite’ interviewing is conducted with someone 
in a position of authority, the same could be said of the 
interviewees in this project (Gillham, 2000). Whilst not in a 
position of authority, upon reflection it became increasingly 
evident that the family members were capable of giving answers 
with insight and had a unique grasp of the subject matter. This 
became clear as the interviews took place and for that reason, the 
interviews became less and less structured. This enabled the 
interviewee to have more control and to best convey their own 
perspective (Noaks and Wincup, 2004). For example, it was often 
the case that the interviews could begin with the question, “tell me 
about your experience, starting with the moment the police first 
contacted you.” Prompts were still necessary for consistency and 
often the family members asked, “where was I?”, but generally, as 
Gillham noted, the family members knew more about the topic 
and were able to structure their own knowledge and create the 
narrative (chronologically) as Spalek (2006) recommended. It was 
common for participants to divert onto other subjects, particularly 
to share memories of their loved ones, which I did not interrupt or 
cut short.  
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Building a rapport with family members for semi-structured 
interviews was crucial for the validity of the data. A rapport was 
developed through the CCA, a telephone conversation and then in 
person (Leavy and Hesse-Biber, 2011). For example, time was 
given to settling into the homes of the participants and general 
‘chit chat’ rather than launching as quickly as possible into the 
interviews. As a female, then in my twenties, I tried to take a 
minimal role in the interview and simply listened making as few 
prompts as possible rather than having a two way conversation 
(Hennink et al, 2011). It was difficult not to agree or show 
(appropriate) exasperation at times, this was not purposively 
suppressed in the desire to be natural as opposed to being cold and 
contrived. Some attempt was made to connect naturally with the 
interviewee to minimise any inequality that might have been felt 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). The family member being 
interviewed should not have to feel their account had to be 
sanitised to protect the researcher or become preoccupied with 
their welfare, over their own. It was not easy to manage emotions 
when the people involved were clearly upset (Dickson-Swift et al, 
2009) but it was important to remain an attached observer rather 
than a participant. I felt strongly that the interview was their 
experience and little focus should be anywhere else.   
 
Other considerations were made for the interviews that had not 
been considered during the initial design. For example, in one 
interview, I purposefully hid my pregnancy to minimise any 
considerations the participant may have had to my wellbeing and 
because I had some knowledge of her own experience. Had she 
noticed, I would not have lied, but felt it was something that did 
not need to be drawn attention to and was able to conceal. During 
two of the interviews, hiding my pregnancy was impossible as I 
was heavily pregnant. Whilst it was discussed by each family 
member in a natural manner and appeared not to affect the 
immediate emotions expressed, it should be noted the participants 
may have considered I should be protected and altered their own 
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behaviour. It is true, upon reflection, that these interviews were 
less ‘emotional’ than the rest.  
 
Case studies 
The second part of the data collection utilised case studies. The 
case studies in this research are on campaign groups and required:  
 
a level of visibility that most safety crimes, mundane 
and routine as these are, simply never achieve 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2007: 10).  
 
However, the main difference between this research and pre-
existing research lies in the way the case studies will be used. Case 
studies were used to examine the nature of resistance to dominant 
ideology, in addition to a discussion of context. 
 
As mentioned previously, there was some overlap between the 
family members who were interviewed for their personal 
experience and for their membership of a support or campaign 
group. The fact the interviews were so open led many of the 
family members to talk about their desire to ‘do more’. It became 
apparent that it was a consequence of the nature of their 
victimisation that victims were compelled to ‘do something’ at the 
end of the process.  
 
‘Social movements’ lie between crowds and 
organisations or institutions…are reasonably 
organised collectivities, fairly long lasting and stable, 
with emerging rules and traditions, and with an 
indefinite and shifting membership (Blaikie, 2004: 
189)  
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It was considered that case studies were the best way to research 
and represent them. The support and campaign groups were 
selected on the basis of the ones that were mentioned by the initial 
interviewees and those that were well publicised and related to 
safety crime (of which there are not many to choose from). 
 
The case studies were created using online resources, semi-
structured interviews, questionnaires, documents and in one case, 
a book that two members of one support and campaign group had 
recently published. A further four individuals were interviewed for 
their connections to groups, one by Skype, one by phone and two 
through questionnaires, which they completed because of their 
own time constraints. Four case studies were created as a result of 
mixed methods including an examination of relevant documents, 
internet sources and a recently published book.  
 
Case studies were revived as a method in the 1980s (Blaikie, 
2004). They are about making connections and observing events, 
whilst thinking about them in ways that contribute to the overall 
theory (King and Wincup, 2007). They offer in-depth information 
about a small subject matter and in the case of this research, were 
subject specific. Case studies are criticised for not being useful for 
generalisation and can take time to create using multiple sources 
(Gray, 2013).  
 
Much of the additional information on the support and campaign 
groups came from web pages created by the groups for use to 
publicise their campaigns. During the progress of this research, the 
CCA closed and it naturally came under examination. Before the 
centre closed, information was saved from their webpage as well 
as documents, such as newsletters, that went on to inform the 
research. These were treated in the same manner as printed 
documents as far as the nature of this research, since they 
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contributed to both understanding of and a method of researching 
resistance.  
 
Multiple sources were used to approach the case studies from 
multiple angles to verify the data (Yin cited in Gray, 2013). For 
example, web resources were used with documents, newspaper 
reports and supported with the interviews of members of social 
movements. Information was sought under strict categories that 
could be replicated by another researcher. They had far stricter 
guidelines than the semi structured interviews that preceded them, 
which added to reliability. Although case studies do not lend 
themselves to generalisation, this is irrelevant for this research, 
which is more focused upon insight and complexity (Blaikie, 
2000). 
 
Whilst face to face interviews are preferable, four individuals were 
interviewed remotely due to practicalities and because they were 
adding to pre-existing information and filling in gaps that had been 
identified. Whilst telephone interviews can be too focused on the 
aims and were time limited, the Skype interview proved more 
informal and an appropriate medium between face to face 
interviews than telephone interviews (Harding, 2013). Telephone 
interviews can be more formal whilst also minimising non-verbal 
feedback.  This was more suitable in this case, as it did not involve 
interviewing a bereaved family member, but a solicitor.  
 
Approach to data analysis 
When dealing with large amounts of data gathered through 
interviews and case studies the researcher needs to take a central 
role in collecting, examining and dealing with large amounts of 
data from interviews and case studies, carefully selecting which 
parts to use. The researcher then has to decide how to combine 
that with relevant theory (Finlay and Gough, 2003). It requires that 
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they make connections between the information they gather and 
related theory to uncover the ‘truth’ (King and Wincup, 2007). 
Undeniably, what is selected and how it is used is individual to the 
researcher leading to the potential for a charge of confirmation 
bias so the aims must be transparent and the findings defensible. 
 
It was pre-determined that no interpretation should take place at 
the time of the interview to avoid inserting researcher bias into 
subsequent questions and to avoid a loss of focus in listening 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). Interpretation was done afterwards 
and sometime afterwards with a view that critical social research 
should be reported as “a story with a plot” (Harvey, 1990: 211). 
The views of the social researchers will inevitably affect the 
language used in its interpretation and selection, based upon their 
knowledge, experience and expectations (Blaikie, 2004).  
 
Each interview was transcribed in full to avoid any element of 
interpretation or the removal of the words of interviewees 
(Harding, 2013). It was important that nothing was missed and that 
the entire transcripts should stand without any initial 
interpretation. This meant the data could be used in a number of 
ways and re-read to check context, which happened many times. 
Thematic analysis was used for “identifying, analysing, and 
reporting patterns within the data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 6). 
 
 A number of themes were placed under the main topics after 
many readings of the transcriptions alongside the literature 
(Gillham, 2000).  A theme was identified as something that was 
significant in the data and also related to the original questions 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006) although these did co-depend on each 
other. For example, whilst the original research questions were not 
changed, different elements were emphasised. It is part of critical 
138 
 
social research that begins describing the abstract before moving 
towards the specific (Harvey, 1990). It was true that: 
 
Sometimes issues don’t ‘jump out’ at you until 
someone says something particularly vehemently or 
articulately. However, this does not mean that it isn’t 
present in earlier transcripts. Once sensitized, you 
may be surprised to find how many other instances 
you can find (Barbour cited in Gray, 2009: 216). 
 
As a cross over with the interviews I carried out as part of my job 
at the time of the interviews, I highlighted occasions when the 
family members became upset. This was useful upon reflection as 
it emphasised what really mattered to them, which could not be 
second guessed.  
 
Similarities as well as difference were identified, which tended to 
be in relation to the reactions of official agencies, such as the 
police (Harding, 2013). As themes were discovered, it was 
considered that any contradictions should be highlighted in the 
research and not determined by personal preconceptions (Harvey, 
1990). It may have helped that I did not have prior experience of 
this as an area and what I had expected to see was more sanitised 
than what I actually saw.  
 
As mentioned previously, similarities were identified as the 
interviews progressed, which led the analysis. It was important 
that the need for similarities did not override the truth in the 
transcripts, the “verbal accounts” (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 18). 
The proposed themes were re-worked, or re-named to best 
represent the transcriptions. 
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Part of the research that was constantly revised was the aim to 
“…weld theory and data together in an ongoing culmative search 
for the truth” (Giddens cited in Bottoms, 2007: 83) and in 
attempting to link the statements made by the interviewees to 
relevant ideas within existing corporate crime literature (Blaikie, 
2004). Whilst it is true that “…it is impossible to produce any data 
without the researcher having an influence” (ibid: 187) there was 
an attempt to remain aware of bias and efforts to minimise this 
selection. However this has not eliminated personal thoughts and 
feelings that come with being a researcher as Maher observed: 
 
My own subjectivity has influenced the collection of 
these data, as well as the analysis and the concepts 
used to frame them. The account that emerges is 
necessarily partial and incomplete (1997: 228).  
 
The ethics of conducting such critical research questions will be 
detailed in the following section. 
 
Ethics 
Ethics have become a central and necessary consideration of any 
research in the past fifty years. Research ethics entail “ontological, 
epistemological and theoretical assumptions” (Payne cited in 
Gray, 2013: 68). It has become a standard part of university 
research that researchers are now required to submit a research 
proposal for ethical approval (ibid 2013). Miles and Huberman 
(cited in Harding, 2013) identified ethical issues for qualitative 
researchers, whether the project is worthy, benefits and costs, 
informed consent, honesty and truth, privacy, anonymity, how the 
results and conclusions are used. Gray (2013) outlines four 
considerations for ethics which will be considered in turn.  
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Firstly, harm could not be avoided but could be minimised. No 
greater harm should come to the interviewees (Hollway and 
Jefferson, 2000). The implications of this were considered early on 
in the research, prior to the interview. For example, care was paid, 
where possible, not to schedule the interviews on dates such as the 
anniversary of the victim’s death. The subject matter itself was 
bound to be emotive in that it asked each family member to return 
to a time before their loved one had died, to the death and the 
months that followed. Regardless of whether this was a matter the 
family members regularly recollected or not, was one associated 
with unpleasant memories and painful emotions.  
 
It would be dangerous to make assumptions about the nature of the 
grief, for example to suggest that family members who had lost 
loved ones many years ago may feel more confident with the 
subject matter than one who had lost someone relatively recently. 
How ‘emotional’ the participants became, could not be predicated 
or ‘designed out’. In situations where participants became visibly 
emotional, it was only possible to witness this without any attempt 
to alleviate this pain, but rather, not worsen it (Lee, 1993). It 
would be inaccurate to anticipate the victims need to be 
‘protected’ as they may have welcomed a chance to give their own 
accounts and have a voice (Davis, 2008; Cook and Bosley, 1995). 
Prior to the pilot study I spoke with key support workers who had 
much experience of working with victims.  
 
Key support workers spoke of families not wishing to be perceived 
as ‘weak’ and it was decided the initial letters would not ask 
explicitly, i.e. each person may want support throughout the 
interview, yet made it clear they were to do only what they were 
comfortable with. This was also emphasised in a phone call made 
prior to the actual interview and each interviewee made very 
individual decisions about whether they wanted support or not. 
Many family members already had techniques for dealing with 
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upset, such as deferring to the other person in the room. For 
example, during one interview one person intimated for her 
husband to explain about the formal identification process at the 
hospital, clearly negating a subject she found difficult to approach. 
Another interviewee wanted the interview to take place only when 
her children had left the house and made small talk until that 
happened. 
 
The aim of every interview was to foster a private, confidential 
and non-condemnatory attitude to create a ‘framework of trust’ 
(Lee, 1993: 98). The research required participants to recall 
memories that were often painful and encouraged the sharing of 
unresolved issues (such as the nature of justice). The women’s 
movement highlighted “scholarship” should emphasise 
“identification, trust, empathy and non-exploitative relationships” 
(Punch, 1998: 169). Those taking part in research are seen as 
partners rather than subjects (ibid.). Personal information was 
shared during the interviews to a relevant contextual degree, rather 
than remaining strictly depersonalised (Legard et al cited in 
Harding 2013). The majority of interviews took place in the homes 
of the family members, taking into account that it can be 
comforting to talk about a harrowing event in a safe place 
(Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). All of the interviews took place in 
a private room. Researcher risk was reduced by meeting with 
people already known to others who were familiar with the field 
and oftentimes, my partner was nearby (though not in the house). 
On the occasions when I travelled alone, contact was made with a 
family member at the start and end of the interview, which was 
pre-arranged. 
 
Secondly, Gray (2013) details the importance of informed consent 
as an ethical consideration. The consent was open and transparent 
based on the presumption that individuals can rationally appreciate 
and articulate the wider social and class contexts they are placed 
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within and do not need to be shielded from the purpose of the 
research (Frisch and Watts, 1980).  
 
Consent was sought by the CCA when they made initial contact 
with the families to enquire whether they would be willing to 
participate. It was then repeated in a letter to formalise the 
interview, by phone when I rang to arrange the interview and just 
prior to the interview (appendix 1).  
 
Consent is important but the extent to which this can be sought 
fully is questionable as many of the victims are far removed from 
academia and can never know how far their words will reach or 
how they will be used (Murray, 2003).  However, research has 
shown that participants are often able to place their experiences 
within a wider structure and have a unique understanding of where 
they sit within social and class contexts (Frisch and Watts, 1980). 
The critical element of the research was not hidden from the 
family members and was explained but it is unlikely this will 
negate the potential implications of undertaking critical social 
research.  
 
Thirdly, I sought to respect the privacy of the individuals by 
emphasising the family members could withdraw their consent at 
any time, including once the interview had ended. Anonymity was 
ensured and the recording materials were stored appropriately. 
This was important with regards to the companies studied. Their 
names were removed from the research with the names of the 
family members. It may be true that some people could be 
identified because their particular cases have received more 
publicity. A description of events, places and people could lead to 
“deductive disclosure” (Lee, 1993: 186). This fact could not be 
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altered without changing the detail of their comments and requires 
existing knowledge of the topic as a whole.  
 
In some of these cases, it can be assumed that the individuals are 
not concerned with anonymity and would forgo theirs to reveal the 
identity of the corporation associated with their loved one’s death. 
For example, there was never any self-censorship or questions 
asked by the family members about whether the names of the 
corporations would later be removed. Some saw the interviews 
they gave as part of opposition to the injustice they suffered, a 
chance to put across their point of view.  
 
However, the assurance that names would be removed and the 
content made as anonymous had already been assured in the ethics 
application to the university, perhaps a reflection that ethics has 
become more about protecting the identity of the researcher and 
the reputation of the university rather than those that are 
researched. It is true that it would be foolhardy and potentially 
litigious to include the names of the corporations involved, which 
would jeopardise the intentions of this research. By the nature of 
the research, the corporations in this research are unpunished and 
therefore, innocent. 
 
Finally, for Gray’s (2013) considerations for ethics, deception was 
avoided. The participants were clearly told how their comments 
would be used, verbally on more than one occasion prior to the 
interview and in writing, on the consent form, which was in a 
university ethics panel approved format and which participants 
were asked to read and sign. 
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Issues with researching victims of safety crime and sensitive 
subjects 
 
In this research, the victims of safety crime are examined through 
the experiences of their families. Every case studied in this 
research shared a common experience that the victim had died, 
either at work or as a member of the public in a context which 
raised questions about the working practices of an organisation 
(CCA, 2007). In the absence of the victim, it was the people who 
loved them, principally their family members that sought the truth 
and had to bear witness to the criminal justice process. Their 
experiences are the concern of this research. 
 
The difficulties and uniqueness of speaking with people bereaved 
and the circumstances that followed that bereavement is discussed 
in the ethics section. What follows is a discussion of personal 
considerations when dealing with sensitive issues. 
 
The researching of sensitive subjects makes large demands on 
researchers that requires, “…skill, tenacity and imagination if they 
are to successfully confront the problems and issues which arise” 
(Lee, 1993: 210). As mentioned previously, this research began 
out of a personal interest and concern for those who suffer sudden 
bereavement as a result of safety crime, so there was a level of 
attachment prior to the initial contact. This is quite contrary to the 
positivist concept of keeping a distance and maintaining neutrality. 
Emotions need not be “the anathema to academic research” 
(Dickson-Swift et al, 2009: 63). Maher (1997) argues there are 
technical but also personal effects on the researcher of sensitive 
issues that extend beyond the immediacy of the contact. In relation 
to this, relevant issues will be discussed. 
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Firstly, conducting research can impact on the researcher’s 
relationships with family and friends Maher (ibid.). It was noted 
that one such consequence included an inability to complain or to 
be patient with those that ferociously bemoaned the lack of 
‘injustice’ of insignificant events. On occasion, this could come 
across as uncaring or apathetic to the concerns of family and 
friends who often expressed “everything is going wrong that could 
go wrong” based on a snapped washing line.  
 
Secondly, in terms of leaving the interviewees behind to return to 
‘normal’ life (ibid.), the recording of the initial interviews were 
harrowing at times and often left a feeling of ‘numbness’. This 
could largely be dealt with, with a period of quiet that often 
followed (for example, a car journey home or an overnight stay in 
a hotel) but in one instance, the interview was followed by a 
significant event with a close friend. This event should have 
evoked positive emotions, but instead, was a strange, detached 
experience. This echoes that noted by Dickson-Swift et al, (2000: 
13) as a “disconnection from family and friends”. Upon reflection, 
it was preferable for the interviews to be carried out away from 
‘normal’ life. The meeting with families was suited to those 
occasions when interviewing took place across the country and 
when nights were spent away from home. 
 
Thirdly, impacts to psychological and physical health were notable 
in the ongoing analysis (Maher, 1997). Returning to the data 
surprisingly revealed I had forgotten much of the detail of the 
cases. Unexpectedly, the re-reading of it evoked real emotion and 
sadness, which was difficult for anyone to understand as I was the 
only person at that point that had read the research. This was 
exacerbated, as during the recent analysis, one of the interviewees 
died prematurely. Re-reading her insightful interview, I repeatedly 
thought about the injustice of what had happened to her son, her 
family and her, personally.  
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Hall reports that the most upsetting work was analysing the after 
effects of rape, physical, emotional and material (Lees, 1996: 3). I 
felt great unease moving between reading and analysing the words 
of people in pain, recalling the wonderfully fond memories of their 
loved one and then being with my own children and doing general 
tasks, after the ‘sitters’ had gone home. This was more pronounced 
than doing the actual research, where emotion had been expected. 
The subsequent personal questioning of the unpredictability and 
unjust nature of life led to paranoia, anxiety, physical symptoms 
and hospital appointments. Mirroring the consequences of emotion 
work reported by researchers “…difficulty sleeping, anxiety, 
gastro-intestinal upsets” (Dickson-Swift et al, 2009: 11). After 
spending a significant amount of time with the interviewees and 
then becoming re-acquainted via the transcriptions in order to 
become immersed in the data, it was impossible to “keep the social 
world at arm’s length” (Blaikie, 2004: 136). 
 
These symptoms may have happened without my experiences as a 
researcher; in the very least however, the feelings would not have 
been as strong. The memories that the family members shared 
with me, about the nature of their loved one’s death, but also about 
their personalities and the emotions of their memories, altered my 
life in ways I had not anticipated. Greater knowledge means a 
greater understanding of the world and its workings (Harvey, 
1990). This might be enlightening, but not always comforting. 
 
The emotions I felt when I re-read their interviews have added to 
my understanding of the events they had been thrown into. This 
does not mean I can speak for their needs or on their behalf. It 
does mean I am motivated to document their experiences as a 
testimony and a counter to commonly held assumptions about 
deaths at work. There is a responsibility to put these views across 
accurately and testify to their experiences. For some families, I 
was keenly aware that participating in the research was important. 
In one case, a bereaved wife expressed: 
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I think part of the justice thing was also about talking 
to you, for me about doing what I think [he] would 
have thought was right (7). 
 
Ultimately, the connection I felt with the families may have aided 
the ‘safe’ nature of the interview where I attempted to openly 
encourage the families to talk about their loved one without shame 
or embarrassment. As noted: 
 
the naturalistic researcher is not a detached ‘scientist’ 
but a participant observer who acknowledges (and 
looks out for) their role in what they discover 
(Gillham, 2000: 7). 
 
As in feminist research, reciprocity is important, as the researcher 
and the researched should both gain from each other (McNamara 
cited in Gray, 2013). The generosity that I was shown throughout 
the interviews was poignant. Generosity in allowing me to bear 
witness to their grief as well as inviting me into their homes, 
offering tea and Yorkshire parkin, a Sunday roast and a bed for the 
night. Self-disclosure was considered and navigated by respecting 
the parameters of the interview whilst also being human (Dickson-
Swift et al, 2009). Being invited into another person’s home, and 
discussing personal issues, is not the basis of a friendship but 
neither is it a formal meeting. The most difficult part of disclosure 
was not sharing with the families the similarities between the cases 
as they arose, as a form of validation for the families who had 
thought they were isolated. Through the families’ willingness to 
revisit the time their loved one died and in recalling what for 
many, was the worst time in their lives, I have been able to 
understand the consequences of safety crime victimisation in 
detail. This research and its insights wholly depend upon them. To 
quote:  
 
148 
 
[The] intellectual’s error consists in believing that one 
can know without understanding and even more 
without feeling and being impassioned (Gramsci cited 
in Sim, 2003: 254).  
 
After listening to the families and seeing part of the devastation 
their experiences had caused, it only supported and encouraged the 
motivation I held beforehand. 
 
Additional issues 
Research into safety crime can be said to be subjugated too due to 
issues of lack of funding, which requires working for free as well 
as problems of accessing the families of victims who are often 
rendered invisible. For example, accessing victims of safety crime 
in the future could be far more complicated and potentially risky 
since the closure of the CCA. Austerity measures increasingly 
limit the freedom university researchers have to examine that 
which is deemed to have low market value (Tombs and Whyte, 
2003). It is perhaps rare that this research was not preoccupied 
with such issues or with the concern of gaining future research 
because it was self-funded and as a by-product of that, completed 
on a part-time basis. It was started purely out of a personal 
interest. 
In response to the low probability of securing a funding grant, the 
decision was made to reduce my full-time job to part-time and 
start studying part-time. The decision as to where to study was 
made purely on the basis of where the expert in safety crime was, 
which necessitated long distance study. 
 
The decision to self-fund, whilst freeing, was also exacerbated by 
the nature of the participants, who lived between Glasgow and 
Weymouth. Most of the interviews required a stay overnight 
before or after the interview. The families that contributed to the 
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research were chosen not for their locality to me, but because of 
their suitability to the research and via the CCA, which operated 
across the UK. It did however make the research more costly on a 
personal level, which may have put off or will put off other 
researchers in the future. A one off grant from the university eased 
two interviews when expenses were paid. Travelling across the 
UK and speaking to the families was one of the most interesting 
aspects of the research and part of the whole experience. 
 
The intention of this research was to evidence the effects that 
impact on individuals and families of people who have been killed 
as a result of a safety crime. They should not be invisible because 
this increases their suffering unnecessarily. In terms of how it 
could be used is difficult to judge, but as far as the need for 
publication, it is my intention to present the results to the people it 
affects. For example, to organisations such as Hazards or other 
related organisations, this is an “interventionist consideration” 
(Sim, 2003: 245), perhaps unique to traditional criminology and 
concerns of those on funded studentships, seeking full-time work 
in an academic institution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The use of semi-structured interviews and case histories were 
selected as suitable methods for this research. Semi-structured 
interviews were the best way to give emotion and to enable the 
detailing of the experiences of the families. This process became 
less structured as the research progressed, which gave the experts 
chance to open up and share their thoughts. This was also the most 
valid way to gather data and create themes following full 
transcription of the interviews. Case studies were chosen for the 
second, modified part of the research. In order to examine the 
corporate accountability movement, case studies were considered 
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the best way to observe and document the history and nature of a 
number of influential groups. Ethical and practical issues were 
discussed, linked to the sample size and representativeness. 
Further details were examined that are unique to research of 
families of safety crime victims as well as potential problems of 
publishing, censorship and funding. The challenges included 
dealing with sensitive data and carrying out the interviews to 
accurately reflect the experiences of the families and to ‘give them 
a voice’.  
 
The following two chapters will present the data. Chapter Three 
will highlight the experiences of the families using their own 
testimonies as witnesses to the state response to safety crime and 
subsequent social and legal obstacles. Chapter Four will continue 
with testimonies from families and people relevant to the various 
campaign groups and data from the case studies to examine the 
political response to safety crime. It will examine how the families 
who created or joined support and campaign groups impacted 
upon the obstacles outlined in Chapter Three. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Obstacles faced following a safety crime: Social and Legal 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Chapter One reviewed the literature to show the recognition of 
safety crime as a distinct sub-category of criminology. Chapter 
One established that victims of safety crime are far from ideal 
victims for the criminal justice system, they are instead, 
problematic.  
 
Through the responses of the various agencies, the victims of 
safety crimes are constructed to be culpable victims and the 
corporations
5
 avoid being defined as criminal. The process of 
construction will be detailed in the following sub-sections starting 
with the way potential cases of safety crime are suppressed as they 
approach and progress through the criminal justice system. 
 
As soon as the victim died, an official process began for all of the 
families in which they were processed by various state agencies. 
For all of them, this began when the police knocked on their door. 
From here, they went on to be processed by the coronial system, 
the criminal justice system and the HSE. The families had little 
choice in who they came into contact with, when and how they 
were treated. For many of the families, each of the officials 
involved began to construct their loved one as culpable, 
blameworthy for their own death. The individuals and even the 
                                                          
5
 It is difficult to know the structure of each alleged perpetrator in the cases and therefore, whether it holds the 
status of being a corporation or not. There is at least one large corporation examined in this research, but for the 
sake of consistency, the term ‘company’ will be used in the following chapters to refer to the employers, 
businesses and charities concerned, unless directly quoted from the original data. 
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personalities involved influenced each case, the nature of which 
will be exemplified in the following sub-sections. 
 
Suppression: the police 
 
The police were the first agency all of the families came into 
contact with. This was because it is standard procedure for the 
police to inform the next of kin when a person has died. Following 
a suspected safety crime, the police have the authority and rights 
to secure the scene of the death, a duty to collect the evidence and 
to take statements from witnesses. These statements are part of 
building a case to present to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
or to pass to the HSE. For some families, the police were present 
throughout legal proceedings and a number of families were 
assigned a Family Liaison Officer (FLO). The extent to which the 
police carried out these roles, varied. Out of the 11 cases, six were 
not investigated by the police. One was not investigated until a 
complaint had been made (appendix 7). The role of the police will 
be detailed in the following sub-section. 
 
Police response 
The truth was the first and the last thing most of the families 
referred to, they waited patiently to know the truth about the 
events that killed their loved one. The scene of the death was 
crucial to establishing this. However, many of the experiences of 
the families illustrated how the scenes of deaths were not treated 
as potential crime scenes but instead, approached as accidents.  
 
In the majority of the cases, families were told by the police that 
they were passing the case over to the HSE, after they had 
established there had been no ‘foul play’, that there had been 
nothing to suggest criminality was involved: 
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I said ‘who’s collecting the evidence?’ And he said, 
‘what do you mean?’ And I said, ‘well are CID 
[Criminal Investigation Department] involved?’ He 
said, ‘they’ve had a look’, [I said] ‘had a look?!’ [The 
police officer said] ‘Well they’ve been down to the 
scene,’ I said ‘what did they do at the scene?’ And 
then he just changed the subject.  He said, ‘we don’t 
believe there’s been foul play’ (2). 
 
In one of the cases, the father of the victim recognised the police 
were concluding their investigation too soon and without good 
reason. He expressed the view that he was being ignored and 
although he tried to ask questions to find out more and to change 
the situation, his pleas were disregarded:  
 
The police said they didn’t believe there was any foul 
play, they hadn’t given me any evidence to say 
otherwise and that police officer just ignored me on 
the phone.  It was as though, ‘what do you want me 
for?’ (3). 
 
The opportunity for the cases to be defined as criminal lay 
principally with the police who often gave the impression that the 
deaths were random and not a matter for the police. In the 
following case, the FLO assured the partner of the victim that the 
questions she had were unnecessary: 
 
She [the FLO] was at great pains to tell me that she 
didn’t think anything criminal had happened, she told 
me on one of the phone calls, because I kept asking 
questions…she said to me “listen I absolutely know 
that nothing criminal happened, this is just an 
unfortunate accident” (4). 
 
In the following case, the police broke the news of the ‘accident’ 
to the family and had no further contact: 
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The police came to see us and told us he’d had a bad 
accident, they took us to the hospital where he was, 
but from that day on we never saw the police again, 
we’d no comeback they never got back in touch with 
us, [and] we’d no help (1). 
 
The police quickly passed the cases over to the HSE in 73% of the 
cases. One of the families recognised the police should not have 
done this and that in doing so, they had ignored protocol: 
 
He [the police officer]…said, “Oh it’s a Health & 
Safety thing, nothing to do with us”. Now that was 
wrong, the protocol for the consultation between the 
HSE, the police and CPS had actually come into 
operation the day before. So they should have known 
about it and they should have called in the CID 
immediately, but they didn’t (5). 
 
The mother in the following case detailed how even though the 
police officers had realised her son’s death was a crime, they 
failed to act as such: 
 
They called for a Scenes of Crime Officer [SOCO], 
so they did know it was a crime…but then they didn’t 
read it like a crime because they had no idea who was 
there. They didn’t seal off the area. They didn’t even 
stop people getting on & off the boat (5). 
 
The families asked questions of the police, such as why evidence 
had not been gathered and why statements had not been taken 
from witnesses. Some were met with “a total wall of silence” (5). 
The police made it clear to the father of a victim that witnesses 
were unnecessary “because it was an industrial accident”, the 
father replied to the police officer that it was “irrelevant” but was 
powerless to control or conduct the investigation himself (3). 
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In the few cases where evidence was gathered, this happened 
months after the death, which placed limitations on what could be 
ascertained, which the mother of the victim recognised: 
 
we had one health and safety inspector plus two CID 
people, trying to unravel this….[the] first CID 
interview [six weeks after my son’s death], [and the] 
first CID interview when anyone [was] present the 
day [my son] was killed was…12 weeks after the 
event. [The director] wasn’t interviewed until 16 ½ 
weeks after [my son] was killed. Once CID was 
involved they conducted the job well, but lapse of 
time allowed inaccuracies and hindsight. [The 
director] and other witnesses had the opportunity to 
discuss what had happened (5).  
 
For the following family, the police investigation was launched 
immediately. Doing so at this stage of the process made a huge 
difference to the future success of the case: 
 
The contact with the police was brilliant. We were 
given a FLO the day the accident happened who is 
still a family friend. He helped us with everything, 
any questions we needed to know, any part of the 
investigation with the HSE because it was the HSE’s 
field, it’s not really the police’s field. The police 
backed up the forensic evidence and stuff like that. 
They did an investigation. They sealed off the area as 
well as a crime scene (6). 
 
The police had the ability to define how the person had died. The 
death of one husband was initially counted as a road traffic 
accident (RTA). Had it not been for the actions of the victim’s 
wife, it would have remained that way: 
 
I had a letter from [the] city council, the HSE, and in 
the letter he told me the police had filed the paper and 
they treated it as a Road Traffic Accident (RTA) (4). 
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The wife of the victim pushed the case forward, altering the 
trajectory of the case and the way it was subsequently viewed and 
crucially, the response of the police: 
 
My father is an ex police inspector and he said, “right 
we’re going to write to the deputy chief 
constable”…we composed a letter and said, “there’s 
no way this was an RTA you should now instigate an 
investigation, a corporate manslaughter investigation 
bearing in mind all this evidence, [previous] 
incidents” and so we sent the letter off and within a 
day or two…a team of police officers were put on the 
case to look into charges of corporate manslaughter 
(4). 
 
This led to a visible police presence and resources: 
 
They had an inspector and a team of about three or 
four officers investigating…over the months they had 
to take witness statements, they had to interview 
various members of staff, staff in head office...they 
request[ed] documents, stacks of documents, well it 
went on for nearly two years…it was immense really 
(4). 
 
This was a stark contrast to the immediate investigation, which 
according to the wife, “was basically 2 minutes…” (4).  
 
As seen above, in approaching the deaths at work as ‘accidents’, 
the police failed to treat the victims as legitimate. The tendency to 
frame the deaths as random misfortune and the subsequent lack of 
investigation, stifled the opportunity for the cases to proceed. The 
manner in which the rights of the families were suppressed will be 
illustrated in the following sub sections.  
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Hidden rights 
In a situation alien to the families, they relied upon knowledge 
from the police and official agencies, they were their only guide. 
Many families were unaware of the rights they had and by the time 
they were made aware, it was too late to act. This was at a time 
when they were very vulnerable as explained by the mother of one 
victim in the following case who was denied access to her son’s 
body: 
 
I couldn’t eat anything until he was found…I couldn’t 
lay him out, none of us could say our farewells and 
it’s had a devastating effect to this day…you’ve got 
people in authority all taking advantage of your 
vulnerability and your emotional state so I didn’t 
appreciate it when I found out what I could have 
done… [I was] never told I could (7). 
 
This reoccurred throughout the families experiences, many 
members chastised themselves in hindsight: 
 
After the post mortem he [the police officer] said we 
could see him again…again we could only view [my 
son] through glass…I don’t know why didn’t I stand 
there and say, “I need to see him properly” (8).   
 
Even when they did have rights, this was not explained to families 
by the agencies, which ultimately led many of the families to feel 
responsible.  
 
In the months that followed the death of their loved one, 
information continued to be provided reluctantly to the families, 
which provoked suspicion and further pain: 
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it was a ‘them and us situation’…questions weren’t 
being answered, and the more…you’re not getting 
open and honest communication, your little molehill 
grows into a very big mountain, very quickly (7).  
 
The families needed the official agencies to carry out their jobs 
fully at an extremely difficult time in their lives, but many 
discovered to their cost, that this did not happen. The rights they 
had were blocked, for example, the families were not aware they 
could have their own medical representative at the inquest and 
were not informed or found out too late to use this right. The needs 
of the families were disregarded, the right existed, but only on 
paper, useless to the people who needed it in what were to become 
life changing moments. The ways the families were disregarded 
was often combined with a lack of empathy, which had an adverse 
effect, as will be demonstrated in the next sub-section. 
 
The families were in an inferior position to the agencies they came 
into contact with, they did not know the procedure and were at 
their most vulnerable. There were many occasions when those 
bereaved were treated disrespectfully by the agencies, which 
caused them unnecessary pain. In the following cases, families 
expressed their anger and frustration at the way the police dealt 
with them. Firstly, a number of the families were upset about the 
way they were informed their loved one had died: 
 
The police who came to us were brutal…it was late at 
night; they had taken twelve hours to get the news to 
us. They were just so callous (5). 
 
One mother had regularly contacted the police station for news of 
her son whom she feared was dead. On one of those occasions, 
still unaware her son had died, she was invited into the police 
station to speak to a police officer who: 
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started asking me questions. What [my son’s] name 
was, where he was born, what his date of birth was, 
what colour his hair was, his eyes, his height, had he 
got any distinguishing marks or scars? All these 
things he didn’t explain to me at all. I’m of the 
generation that you just answer, if [the police officer 
had] said ‘jump’, I would have said, ‘how high?’ I 
respect them and the last question he asked me was, 
‘what funeral directors are you going to use?’ That’s 
how I found out my son was dead… if I hadn’t had 
my daughters I would have jumped into the Thames 
(7). 
 
In the following quote, a wife of the victim was visited by two 
police officers in the early hours of the morning. They informed 
her that her husband had died but said they could not leave until 
they had told her how he had died. She was fearful about what she 
was going to be told at over eight months pregnant and with two 
young children sleeping upstairs, she requested the police tell her 
friend. As they waited for her friend to arrive she recalled the 
police officer was: 
 
in the house going, looking round saying “so who 
likes Graham Greene then?” I was like, “they are [my 
husband’s] books” and he was “well, so he likes 
Graham Greene then?” I don’t want to talk about 
Graham Greene at the moment, thank you. He was 
[saying], “I’ve got to tell you what happened”. I was 
saying, “I don’t want you to tell me, all I know is that 
he is dead”... Every time he [kept] going “I’ve got to 
tell you,” I was screaming. “Don’t tell me, don’t tell 
me” and he was going “Ok, I won’t tell you, I won’t 
tell you”, and then he [would repeat] “but you really 
need to know” (9). 
 
The police had a huge impact upon the families in the long-term 
when they did not show empathy, especially in the immediate 
aftermath of the loved one’s death. In the previous case, the 
woman was “petrified…the police were going to come to my 
house”, she moved house soon after: 
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that was one of the reasons I had to move out of the 
house because that night is just imprinted in my brain, 
how awful it was. I’m not saying that a nicer police 
officer could have made it a nice night because it was 
an awful night regardless...[but] I had all sorts in my 
head that needn’t have been (9). 
 
The families respected the police and did not expect to be treated 
poorly as relatives of victims nor as members of the public, but for 
some, this continued after the initial meeting: 
 
[the] Liaison Officer rang, my sister was with me, and 
I asked when I could have [the body of my son] 
back…and she said, (I don’t think she realised that 
the phone was on the loud speaker)…she said, 
“doesn’t she realise there’s nothing left to bring 
home?” That’s the last time we heard from her, she 
never, ever contacted us again (10). 
 
In one case, the FLO chose to act as a liaison for the company who 
employed her partner, in ways that would be unimaginable for a 
traditional suspect: 
 
She kept phoning and asking things of the firm for 
me…she asked if the boss in the driving agency could 
come and visit me…there was a couple of phone calls 
asking me if representatives of the firm could come to 
the funeral…I said no (11). 
 
Not viewing the family member as a victim or the employer as a 
potential offender, the FLO continued to contact the partner of the 
man who had died for example, requesting that she returned 
material that belonged to the company, “…and it became a wee 
tussle, [the company] were obviously phoning her” (11). The 
reluctance to place the company under suspicion was set against 
the willingness of the police to doubt the innocence of the victim. 
This will be detailed in the following sub-section. 
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Implicating the victim 
The police often returned to the families and posed questions that 
that the victim might have caused his own death. This led to the 
families feeling they were under suspicion and to defend their 
loved one: 
 
The police came a week later and started to ask 
questions about [my son]…“Did he drink? What was 
his family life like? And it sounded as though they 
wanted to lay the blame at [his and his colleague’s] 
door. I said there were problems with [my son’s] 
relationship but he wouldn’t have done anything as he 
had a child and he worshipped his daughter and yes, 
he liked a pint but he wasn’t a big drinker (10). 
 
A procedure continued to be followed that implicated the victims, 
supposing they had either committed suicide or had acted in 
dangerous ways that might have led to their own deaths. In the 
following case the victim had been killed entering a car park in a 
queue of traffic. It had been established that the car in front of his 
car had not been able to reach 10 miles per hour at the time of the 
incident. The police still pursued a line of enquiry that blamed the 
victim: 
 
our car was taken away for examination to make sure 
there were no mechanical faults on our car and I can 
always remembering the police man asking me if my 
husband was a boy racer, trying to apportion the 
blame to him. I said “no and I’ll tell you this you’ll 
find nothing wrong with our car either” because my 
husband always kept his car in tip top shape he 
always had the MOT… police look at things from all 
angles really, they think of the easy way out (4). 
 
The wife in the following case was questioned about her 
husband’s mental health as she was waiting for her friend to arrive 
to be told about how her husband had died. This line of 
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questioning led her to think he had committed suicide, which was 
contrary to the evidence the police had at that point. The police 
officer asked: 
 
“Did he have mental health problems?’ [I asked], 
“What, did he kill himself?” He was going, “No, no, 
he didn’t kill himself but I have to ask you these 
questions”. I just think that was so inappropriate now 
that we know how he died; there was no need for me 
to have been asked these questions (9). 
 
As seen in the previous sub-section, the families of the victims 
were largely treated as though they were not victims of a crime but 
of bad luck. For the majority of the families, this was decided by 
the police at the scene of the death. The fact the victim was killed 
at work, informed decisions about the necessity of an investigation 
and was repeated when they first met and questioned the families. 
This placed the victim under suspicion and began a process to 
establish a narrative of ‘accident’ which only made it more likely 
the death of the victim would be viewed similarly at the next 
stage: the inquest. 
 
Suppression: the inquest 
 
As a standard process to determine the cause of death following a 
sudden or unexpected death, the families placed much hope on this 
process. They were desperate for the truth and expected to hear the 
truth at the inquest and to have it heard publicly and in front of a 
jury.  
 
Two of the families did not have an inquest because their cases 
proceeded straight to court to hear charges for corporate 
manslaughter. However, for the majority of families, this was the 
only process that attempted to establish the facts about how and 
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why their loved one died. Out of the 11 cases, three did not have 
an inquest (appendix 6). One family member was warned they 
were told not to expect to hear the truth, “A number of times, at 
the meeting here, the inquest, [the HSE Inspector warned us] 
you’ll never get [to hear] what you want to hear” (3).  
 
As this next sub-section will show, for the majority of the families, 
they did not get the truth. 63% of the cases that had an inquest, 
returned a verdict of ‘accidental death’, one was ‘narrative’ and 
two were judged as ‘unlawful killing’. The families left the 
process feeling distraught as the truth was suppressed and 
manipulated. There are various ways this was achieved at the 
inquest. The first way was through continued delay, as the next 
sub section will show.  
 
Delay 
Delay was a common experience of the families, for example, 
some waited a long time to find out their loved one had died. 
Another family had to wait for a month before they could have a 
funeral or find out where their son died: 
 
We had him cremated and it wasn’t until a week after 
the funeral when we went to collect his ashes from 
the Crematorium that we found out which firm had 
killed him (5). 
 
The families had to wait a long time before the actual inquest. The 
shortest time was seven months (1) and the longest was four years 
(4), the average waiting time was approximately two years and 
three months (Appendix 6).  
 
In the majority of cases, nothing was classed as urgent, there was 
no race for justice. As discussed previously, there were delays 
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with the investigation, if one took place at all. As a consequence, 
interested parties who were present when the person had died 
refused to make statements, which permitted a partial account of 
the truth. The following account from an ex-partner showed 
understanding to those people who refused to give statements after 
time had passed: 
 
You can understand to a certain extent, we’re three 
years down the line if you’d have got statements off 
these men should I say that week or the week after, I 
think for [my ex-partner’s] sake…they would have 
actually signed certain statements, but three months, 
eighteen months down the line even, you’re not going 
to get [them], [the employer] pays a decent wage…all 
those blokes have got families…[my ex-partner is] 
not coming back, they’re three years down the line 
they don’t want to jeopardize their jobs (2). 
 
Even when faced with a police investigation, members of the 
company refused to answer questions and official documents went 
missing. In the following quote, a wife of a victim expressed her 
confusion at how the companies were “able to get away with this”: 
 
it was frustrating it took so long and also that these 
companies…they have stalling tactics, the police ask 
them for certain documents and it will take them two 
months to get them…they can’t find them or certain 
things have been shredded, ‘oh we can’t find those’ 
and…they interviewed people under PACE [the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act] and they declined 
to answer questions…so as not to incriminate 
themselves (4). 
 
In one case, friends of the wife and victim refused to appear at the 
inquest as witnesses because they said they were scared the 
company involved would enact revenge on their families. 
Understandably, this hurt the wife: 
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My solicitor contacted all the people that were there 
[when my husband died] and they all refused to speak 
to her and they are all my friends and [my husband’s] 
friends. I found that one of the most difficult things 
[crying]. So I couldn’t go to the inquest because I 
knew that they were trying to shaft me, I felt…trying 
to stop the truth from coming out (9). 
 
Such protracted delays did not prioritise the families who were 
often forgotten. For example, many had the inquest thrust upon 
them at late notice, in the following case, after four years of being 
on ‘standby’ the wife of the victim: 
 
suddenly had a phone call…from the coroner’s clerk 
and he rang me on a Monday morning…he said “I’m 
very sorry…Can you get to the coroner’s court in four 
hours’ time for the preliminary hearing? I forgot to 
tell you it’s being held this afternoon” and I said, 
“how could you forget? I’m the most important 
person in this case”…he had the cheek, bloody cheek 
[to ask], “have you got legal representation?” I said, 
“I’ve been waiting for your phone call and that was 
going to be my first question, do I need legal 
representation?”…there’s no way you can get a 
solicitor in four hours (4). 
This happened in another case when the families were given a 
fortnight’s notice after ringing for more information. Her lawyer 
had not been told and she had not been told anything about the 
process.  
 
Due to the lack of notice in the previous case, the wife of the 
victim had no option but to represent herself against a wealthy 
company who had been given prior notice of the inquest and 
arrived at the coroners court fully prepared. Whilst she was aware 
of the power imbalance, this did not deter her: 
 
I had to sit in the front there, next to this top London 
barrister, me having no legal experience at all, none at 
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all, I don’t think they’d even experienced this before 
…It made me laugh in a way…I think I came as a 
shock to them…I think they were expecting some 
nervous widow who couldn’t compose herself but 
then it was four years on and anger will fuel you on, 
even after all that time you think you’re not going to 
let them get away with it (4). 
 
The delays were the first part of the process, once at the inquest, 
with or without representation, the families expected the facts to 
be uncovered and were shocked by the quality of the evidence that 
was heard and the way their loved one was treated after death. The 
way the truth was selected was part of the suppression of the truth. 
This will be detailed in the next sub-section. 
 
The selection of evidence 
Once at the inquest, the families expected to hear evidence and 
facts, which would give them the answers they needed. This did 
not happen for the majority of the families. The purpose of the 
inquest was to establish facts and not to apportion blame. The 
families were frustrated they were told not to seek responsibility, 
“[we were told] this was not the court to do it, but where is it?” 
(3). 
 
Who was considered “expert” was vitally important in the 
construction and suppression of the truth at the inquest. Those 
classed as professional witnesses was questioned by the families. 
In the following case, the professional witness called by the 
company had been a colleague of the victim. In the two years 
between the victim’s death and the inquest, he had been promoted. 
The father of the victim considered, “…it’s obvious to me he 
wasn’t an expert [but] the inquest officers class him as an expert” 
(3). As an ‘expert’, he made claims about the victim’s actions 
prior to his death, which frustrated the father: 
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I was surprised that he was allowed to be a 
professional witness, he said “there’s nothing you can 
tell me about driving, I’ve been driving 20 years”.  
He said “I’ve tried the scenario and I can’t understand 
it…I’ve even tried to do it the way [the victim] did it, 
he was never trained that way” (3). 
 
The father could not understand how the coroner held the 
experience of the lorry driver in defence as equal to the evidence 
the HSE presented as prosecution. He was clear he believed there 
was no parity between the two.  
 
Other families expressed surprise and confusion that people who 
made unsubstantiated claims were unchallenged at the inquest: 
 
This is the thing you get the feeling that people are 
allowed to lie all the way through…there were no 
consequences [when they lied] (2). 
 
In one case, the HSE had a phone call from an anonymous 
individual. They informed them the company who employed the 
victim had ignored advice that would have made the job safer 
because it would take up more time and therefore, increase the 
costs. This was contrary to what the boss of the company said on 
the stand at the inquest: 
  
I’d been speaking to [the victim] a few weeks before, 
and I’d told him, “…take your time on this job, it 
doesn’t matter about money” (2). 
 
The ex-partner was incredulous the employer went unchallenged 
in the court as she knew he had a reputation on the site: 
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have you ever known a boss to stand there and say 
that?...you can hear everyone…smirking as he’s 
saying it… Jesus that was why the ‘Bull’ [the 
employer’s nickname on site] was there, he’d be there 
shouting and moaning and groaning (2). 
 
The representation of the employer was not heard at the inquest, 
instead, he was able to claim the victim had worked in an unsafe 
way in the past: 
 
his boss turned round and said…he’d seen [my ex-
partner] do something a week before that wasn’t 
safe…[that he’d] had to call him up on it but he didn’t 
say what it was (2). 
 
There was no official evidence of this reprimand, yet it was heard 
in the court.  
 
Limited time was a factor that came up as a potential cause of 
death of another victim, but was similarly refuted by the employer. 
This line of enquiry was not pursued: 
 
There was a mechanic who…said he had…been told 
not to fix certain parts of the tail lift [the part of the 
lorry that killed the victim] because it meant the 
lorries would be off the road for weeks but all the 
managers came on [the witness stand] and said they 
knew nothing about that (11). 
 
The most common type of evidence that was presented to the court 
was paper based, for example risk assessments. These were often 
collected months after the incident, which the families considered 
were open to manipulation. When such information appeared to 
have been changed, the families were shocked this was permitted 
and when it was presented, went unchallenged: 
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there’s a massive, massive question whether there 
was any training [as] some of the documents went 
missing, there has been ongoing argument about 
when defects are repaired. The mechanic will sign the 
particular defect the day before, there was ticks 
against them and both the mechanics have said they 
don’t use ticks…they’re both in different colour and 
you don’t need to be an expert [to see] they’re both in 
different handwriting so it looks as though, after the 
event somebody has panicked and went to the paper 
and ticked them but that can’t even be mentioned [in 
court] (11). 
 
In the delay between the death of the victims and the inquests, 
individuals representing the companies changed their version of 
events. The families were stunned that they heard ‘new’ evidence 
at the inquest and could not understand how this was permitted: 
 
she signed a full statement [immediately after the 
victim’s death] saying exactly what had 
happened…The police had signed it, she signed it but 
then she stood up in court and said “no that was 
wrong, I didn’t say that.”…the Coroner let her off 
because she was old, which to me made it a lot worse 
for us (1). 
 
This was repeated in another case when the family were surprised 
the coroner used statements taken by the police rather than those 
taken by the HSE (8). In another case, similar sentiments were 
expressed: 
 
we even had people lying in court under oath, they 
knew damn well they were lying, so did the police 
and so did the HSE. They’d been questioned under 
PACE, they’d been interviewed and when this person 
started giving evidence they all looked at each other 
and said, “well she didn’t say that [before]” (4). 
 
170 
 
The families had waited years for the inquest and expected to find 
out the truth about how and why their loved one had died. Most 
found the process frustrating and upsetting as they had to bear 
witness (in silence) as the truth was intentionally complicated in a 
public court. The court was not a source of comfort but a site of 
more pain and confusion for the families. Consolation for two 
families came from members of the jury. One mother took comfort 
in a letter (quoted below) that was sent to her from one of the 
jurors after the inquest had ended: 
 
I feel you are right this to me was an accident waiting 
to happen and why the coroner did not pick up on this 
is beyond me…Myself and the rest of the jury felt the 
old lady was too scared and felt she would be 
blamed…At the inquest nobody can apportion blame 
on anybody else but in my eyes the poor condition of 
the balcony rail has been the major factor in the death 
of [your son]…I hope by telling my view to you it 
will help you a little with the pain of your loss (1). 
 
This had a huge effect on the mother who kept the letter and had 
tried in vain to find the jury member to write a ‘thank you’ note. 
Here she received small validation that was denied to her in the 
inquest. Similarly, the family in the next case noticed members of 
the jury were upset when they returned the verdict of accidental 
death:  
 
two of them cried actually because all they could do 
was give a verdict of accidental death, nothing else 
because they didn’t have enough evidence to prove 
the other way, they were directed by him [the 
coroner], by the inquest officer, [it had to be either] 
accidental death through operator error or poor 
maintenance (3). 
 
This was significant to the family and authenticated their own 
thoughts in ways that had been suppressed by the court. The 
direction of the coroner had a large impact at the inquests, from 
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the ability to withhold verdicts or in the treatment of the family. 
One family concluded the inquest court was, “…a show, 12 just 
men” (7). The coroner had ultimate power in the court and the 
families recognised the implications of this. This will be discussed 
in the next sub-section. 
 
 
The role of the coroner  
The coroner became an important part in the quest for the truth, 
but for many families, left a lasting harmful impression. The 
majority of families did not see the coroner as protecting their 
interests or as neutral. Instead the coroners were guided by their 
preconceptions that what had happened to their loved one was an 
accident. The fact that the coroner led the jury prior to the verdict, 
left the families puzzled as to the function of the jury: 
 
I just wished [the coroner] made a decision, [had] 
given us the option [of an unlawful killing verdict] 
rather than saying we can’t have the option…the jury 
didn’t really get the choice…I don’t understand why 
there’s a jury there because the guy virtually tells 
them what they’ve got to bring back (3).  
 
The summing up was crucial as the coroner had the last word in 
the case and directed the jury. The importance of this was 
mentioned in the following case where the family had hoped the 
jury would be able to make their own minds up. The family felt 
the final judgement was not made by the jury but by the coroner, 
as in his summing up he said the loved one’s death “was more or 
less an accident” (5). 
 
In the only case to secure an unlawful killing verdict, the coroner 
did not sum up, which surprised the wife of the victim who 
reflected that perhaps this was because the coroner was “newly 
appointed” (4). The wife of the victim in this case held a positive 
view of the coroner and felt validated by her. For example, she 
considered that for one witness, “the coroner knew [a witness] was 
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lying”, requesting a new witness the following day that discredited 
the testimony of the previous witness. This was a unique 
experience in terms of the cases researched.  
 
The family in another case felt alienated by the coroner and saw 
the ‘accidental death’ verdict as a ‘win’ for the coroner and the 
company, against them: 
 
The fact that [the employer] lied, which the coroner 
more of less said ‘well, she’s an old lady, we’ll skip 
that’…And also to say that they were saying it was an 
accident caused by [my son] …at end of the day, the 
coroner won, didn’t he? (1). 
 
The family felt the coroner protected the employer, for example, 
they were told not to speak to her and throughout the inquest, the 
attitude of the coroner: 
 
was ‘why are you being nasty to this poor lady who’s 
witnessed this accident?’…he was all for that 
woman…’Well she’s infirm’ she was in a wheelchair 
[for the inquest] all his sympathies were with the 
woman (1). 
 
This was common and another mother felt she had to pit herself 
against the coroner (9). This was after many encounters with the 
same coroner who had affected the families of victims in many 
ways, yet was still permitted to lead inquests. One of the ways the 
families had been hurt by the coroner was because unnecessary 
post mortems had been authorised: 
 
nine out of ten times invasive post mortems take 
place on the deceased, when, quite frankly, an 
external examination or just an MRI scan will show 
exactly what’s gone wrong…And that hurt a lot of 
people because we found that out, sort of 18 months 
later that they cut [the victims’] hands off (9). 
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 She challenged the coroner who responded without thought to the 
families as victims who were bereaved, vulnerable or with rights:  
 
I said [to the Coroner], “You had musicians in there, 
artists, people who were creative, to cut their hands 
off you just don’t understand”, he said, “I don’t 
understand your obsession to see a dead body” (9). 
 
Many of the families did not realise that they needed 
representation at the inquest. The majority of the families relied 
upon legal aid for representation. In one case, the family were 
fortunate to be represented for free through contact with a charity. 
However, the barrister did not successfully counter the coroner 
and the family reflected he controlled her unduly: 
 
I don’t know whether the barrister was learning the 
trade or whether she’d just passed her exams but the 
coroner was horrible to her, wasn’t he?  Like you say, 
it wasn’t criminal and every question she asked it was 
like, “you can’t do that, you can’t ask that, can you 
re-phrase that”…he was like a judge (1). 
 
Expecting that their needs, and the needs of the victim, would be 
represented or at least protected in the court, many families left the 
process bereft. One partner concluded, “Who represents the person 
who died?  Nobody does, absolutely nobody” (6).  
 
The coroner had a huge impact on each of the cases and through 
the process of the court, the families left without answers and 
feeling worse than when they entered. Their hope for the truth and 
public acknowledgement of their loved ones had ended and the 
truth had not been uncovered or heard publicly, but suppressed 
through delay, the selection of the truth and the direction of the 
coroner. For some families, this was the only court they entered. 
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For a minority, the cases of their loved ones went to the crown 
court. Their experiences echoed those detailed above. This will be 
explored in the next sub-section.  
 
Suppression: the crown court 
   
A minority of families reached court where the employers either 
faced corporate manslaughter charges or were prosecuted for 
health and safety offences. 36% of the 11 families brought charges 
of manslaughter against the companies to court. Of those, all but 
one case ended in acquittal. That director was convicted of 
corporate manslaughter before the charge was overturned upon 
appeal (Appendix 7).  
 
By the time the families reached any formal court, they were 
highly informed about what had happened before and after their 
loved one had died. In the crown court, the families hoped for 
justice, punishment of the offender and that this judgement would 
mean another family would never go through what they were 
going through. This research will demonstrate the gulf between 
these expectations and the reality and how, as in the inquest, the 
truth was complicated and suppressed. 
 
Achieving justice does not depend upon one state agency and the 
families were not in a position to propel the case forward as 
interested individuals. Instead they relied upon state employed 
individuals to build their cases. For the families who had lost 
loved ones as a result of a safety crime, the cases which had been 
built were disabled and the truth was suppressed. There were a 
number of factors that meant justice was almost an impossibility to 
achieve. This will be explored in the following sections. 
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The problem of evidence 
Cases were developed some time before they reached court; the 
suppression detailed in the previous chapter affected the 
possibility of justice at the stage that followed. Families assumed 
the various agencies were doing everything they could. It was too 
late when many found out this was not happening. The mother of 
the victim in the following case reflected that if she:  
 
could turn back the clock…I wouldn’t have put so 
much faith into the Justice System…I wouldn’t have 
sat back, my sons used to say, “Mam you need a 
solicitor”…and I would say, “no the CPS, the police 
are fighting for [my son].” I put all my faith in our 
Justice System and that was so ignorant of me (10). 
 
The mother put her trust, unknowingly into the CPS, she imagined 
the state had stepped in and was passionately representing her son. 
Similarly, one family reflected they were fortunate to even get the 
case to court because: 
 
statements weren’t taken, evidence wasn’t kept, 
measurements weren’t taken and still we managed to 
get it through into court (8). 
 
Crucially, this was not because the evidence did not exist that was 
to be pivotal at court, but because it had not been collected. One 
family had benefitted from a full police investigation, but 
recognised the importance of evidence in court, “It is a big hurdle 
as well if you haven’t got the evidence”. However they walked 
straight into another hurdle:  
 
[The Judge asked] “Why is this case before me? It 
was an accident at work.” It was only the HSE who 
176 
 
said it wasn’t an accident at work. It took two weeks 
to switch that judge’s mind set from “this man 
shouldn’t be before me” to “he’s guilty of 
manslaughter”. (11). 
 
In the previous sub-section, a unique case was detailed, unique in 
this research because it ended with an unlawful killing verdict at 
the inquest. Such a verdict should have given the case a greater 
chance at court, however it did not: 
 
when you have an unlawful killing verdict the 
coroner redirects the police and the CPS to look at the 
evidence again and even then they [the CPS] still 
came back and said ‘lack of evidence’…that took 
another two months…this is nearly five years after 
my husband’s death (4). 
 
The CPS explained they were unwilling to prosecute because of 
lack of evidence. The wife of the victim in this case asked for it to 
be put into a court room to let the jury decide even accepting: 
 
you probably wouldn’t have got [the corporation] on 
corporate manslaughter because it’s too difficult to 
prove, you’ve got to prove the controlling 
mind…you’d never get that because [the head of the 
corporation] is not even based [in England] (4). 
 
The wife in this case recognised the limitation of the law but still 
wanted her husband’s case to be given a chance in the court. 
Unable to do any more, the wife sent the CPS a letter telling them 
“they were useless” and should be disbanded (4).   
 
For those who made it to crown court, there were similarities 
expressed between the judge in the crown court and the judge at 
177 
 
the inquest. One family expressed that they were surprised by the 
way the evidence was evaluated: 
 
the court case was a bit of a rollercoaster ride because 
the judge didn’t seem to take any interest in all these 
expert witnesses coming up from the HSE…after 
listening to all the testimonies of these expert 
witnesses…he [the judge] went to his [local] garage 
which he called a “roughty, toughty garage”. [What 
they said at his garage] meant more to him than the 
stuff he’d learnt from the HSE. That, I found strange 
(11). 
 
For another family, witnesses had been assured they would not be 
prosecuted even if the information they provided made it clear 
they had failed the victim: 
 
[My son’s] own employer, who was brought as a 
witness, (and we didn’t know this until after the court 
case), was given immunity from prosecution, so was 
another company who was involved…In the trial it 
came out…under the Health and Safety at Work Act, 
they hadn’t done their job (10). 
 
Information about why the employers were immune from 
prosecution was withheld from the family, “We don’t know 
why…and we can’t find out” (10). 
 
In the case above, the family expressed similar sentiments to 
another family. They knew the case was going to collapse early 
on, “we knew the whole truth wasn’t going to come out” (10). 
This was in spite of indications that her son’s death was not as 
random and unpredictable as an accident: 
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They [my son and his colleague]…stopped the job 
and asked the managers if they needed breathing 
apparatus, were the vapours toxic? Two of the 
managers said they would email…the suppliers of the 
chemicals.  
 
The Crown Prosecutor…in his opening speech said 
that an email had been found in a drawer and that two 
of the managers had received this email that told them 
to stop what [my son and colleague] were 
doing…because there was a great possibility of a fire 
and explosion. They ignored the email and put it in a 
drawer and sent [my son and colleague] back into the 
chimney (10).  
 
After her son and his colleague returned to the chimney and 
resumed work, it exploded and they were both killed. The 
employer was found ‘not guilty’ of corporate manslaughter, which 
led the mother of the victim to conclude, “The trial was a farce”. 
Further detail of how this case ended in a verdict of ‘not guilty’ 
will be detailed later in this chapter. 
 
As evidenced in the previous sub-section, at the coroners court, the 
accused were able to change their statements. This occurred in the 
crown court too as illustrated in the following case. The manager 
had told the family personally what had happened in the days 
following the incident, including at the hospital and at their son’s 
funeral but had later changed his mind: 
 
the Manager…changed his plea. [He said] that he 
wasn’t involved at all, [that my son] had done it on 
his own. When [my son was alive and] we were at the 
hospital, he told us he was helping…him…but he 
decided to change his plea [at court] (6).  
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All of this information was new to the father, who was surprised, 
“he…change[d] his statement after he had taken legal advice. It 
just seemed ludicrous” (11).   
 
In the time between the death of the victim and court cases, the 
suspects who had given statements changed their pleas. For many, 
the impact of the delays detailed in the previous sub-section meant 
many had not been asked to give statements for some time after 
the death had taken place. This had a real effect in the court, for 
example, in the following the case, the police took two months to 
take statements: 
 
In the meantime he [the owner of the corporation] had 
been able to talk to the people who were there…and 
that the captain’s testimony altered [between] when 
he gave it to the police to when he gave it in court. 
I’m not being slanderous or anything but I am saying 
that there is the awful possibility that people were 
persuaded to alter what they were saying because 
they hadn’t been interviewed on time (8).  
 
The way the police officers approached the scenes reflected their 
assumption a crime had not taken place. When called to one scene, 
the police sent a probationary police officer. Because they were 
under the impression they were investigating an accident, it was 
deemed unnecessary to caution the witnesses prior to taking any 
statements. At the initial court case, the judge agreed this was 
acceptable as: 
 
at the time there was no need to caution because he 
[the manager] hadn’t committed any crimes as far as 
they were concerned (6). 
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This case was unique in those researched, as the jury returned a 
guilty verdict and the manager was given a nine-month sentence 
for manslaughter. The case had overcome all of the obstacles 
many families of safety crime experience. But the lack of caution 
given prior to the taking of key statements was to impact on the 
case in the coming months.  
 
After the manager had served less than three months in prison, the 
family received a letter from the police informing them the case 
was back in court, at the Court of Appeal. They were told they had 
nothing to worry about because, “…it was only one item that was 
under scrutiny”. However, when they sat in the appeal court the 
judges reviewed the entire case: 
 
They said that the fireman who had…interviewed [the 
manager] and [got the] same story [as] the 
police…should have given a caution [too]…Even the 
Chief Inspector from Sussex Police…said…”that’s 
nonsense” [because] the fireman does not have the 
Power of Arrest so they wouldn’t need to caution 
anybody. They only needed to find out what caused 
the accident (11). 
 
This was treated as irrelevant by the judge at the Court of Appeal: 
 
This judge was adamant that the fireman should have 
realised that and he threw the case out on the grounds 
[that] the police hadn’t cautioned them at the hospital 
and the fireman hadn’t cautioned him [either]. Our 
barrister asked for a re-trial they just said, 
“No”…There was no jury, just these three judges. 
They turned to [the manager] and said, “You can 
leave with your reputation intact” (11). 
 
The family left the court in shock, unable to change the outcome. 
They were forced to accept the judgement and to see the manager 
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released and further, officially cleared of all charges. This had a 
lasting impact on the family who had seen justice delivered only to 
witness it being dismissed. 
 
Most of the cases attempted to show they had taken a duty of care 
for the victim through conducting risk assessments. In one case, 
the risk assessment: 
 
suddenly went amiss, nobody had found it.…when 
Health and Safety spoke to people on the job [they] 
said, “yes not to worry”, they had all the things but 
when they went up to pick up the others…there was 
no risk assessment…Apparently, the solicitor that 
came here that day…he said, “It’s the first thing that 
goes missing on every job and there’s nothing you 
can do about it, it’s missing” (2). 
 
Employers were regularly questioned about risk assessments in the 
court. In the absence of the victim, the court sought proof from 
signatures and ‘ticks’ on forms, which families found problems 
with, just as they had in the coroners’ courts. In the following 
case, the 18-year old victim had been on a college placement: 
 
He [the safety officer at the college that approved the 
garage as a placement] produced Risk Assessment 
and Method Statements that [my son] had apparently 
read and signed. However, when we looked at the 
signature, it was not [my son’s] signature. My 
wife…had [his] Provisional Driving Licence…she 
put it next to it and it was totally different (11).  
 
The family took this to the police but they were told the court was 
not the right time and place to raise their suspicions:  
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we showed it to the police but apparently he was 
acting as a witness for the prosecution so there was 
nothing they could do until after the court case. Then 
we were supposed to go and see him and quiz him 
about the forgery but that never happened (11). 
 
The process provided many opportunities for failure and the 
families often walked away without the chance of justice. They 
found themselves relatively powerless to counter the suppression 
of the facts. Some families mentioned that had they had access to 
money, they could have pushed their cases further, detailed in the 
following sub section.  
 
The problem of money 
One family referred to the ‘money factor’, which was echoed in 
many other interviews. As they navigated a very difficult situation, 
the families found money was required to ease the process. This 
was at a time when many of the families had lost the main 
breadwinner and they had had to pay out for unexpected funeral 
costs: 
 
Well, it is because [my ex-partner] never left 
anything, he didn’t have any insurance, he didn’t 
have his own flat and between us we had to pay for 
the funeral, it’s a stupid thing, the kids are his 
dependents and unless you’re on a government grant, 
you can’t claim anything to pay for it (2). 
 
A small number of families received compensation from the 
government. One of the few people who received compensation in 
a civil claim reflected other individuals thought the money should 
be used to fund the court case: 
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but why should you? That money is for our future, 
we’ve lost the main breadwinner in the house, there’s 
no money coming in the door. That money [is] 
supposed to supplement the money you would have 
had coming in and there’s no way I could have got 
that money back…no way, it’s gone (4). 
 
Money was important to the cases as it served two purposes. 
Firstly, it helped the process in court, from representation to 
accessing court documents, (both of which the employer could 
afford.) More than one family expressed they had no experience of 
dealing with solicitors, other than selling and buying houses. 
Faced with the loss of a loved one and upcoming court date, they 
had to find legal representation. There were a minority of families 
who had assistance from unions: 
 
Because of Unison, they wanted to get a 
manslaughter verdict…I guess a lot of people 
wouldn’t be able to afford to…I’m lucky that I’ve got 
somebody funding me (4). 
Other families did not have that opportunity and even if they were 
granted access to legal aid (which many were not), they put their 
financial future at risk: 
 
Even if you get legal aid, if you lost…the legal aid 
have to take back whatever assets you’ve got, so you 
could lose your home…even today on a legal aid 
form…you need a magnifying glass, it’s not 
highlighted (9). 
 
Some families were told they needed a barrister to represent their 
interests at the court, both the crown and the coroners court. The 
costs were high: 
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so if I had hired a barrister to represent me at the 
inquest…that would’ve cost me £30,000, now why 
should I, as an innocent party here as a widow, have 
to pay £30,000 to get an unlawful killing verdict on 
my husband’s death?...my husband didn’t ask to be 
killed that day (4). 
 
Families believed that even those paid to officially represent the 
victim and their interests were not thought about either, one 
mother summed up: 
 
[solicitors and barristers] used our tears and our 
broken hearts and it’s made them money.  They will 
utilise your tears and heartache because it makes 
some money (9).  
 
A father of a victim recognised the legal teams would profit and 
compared that to the compensation he received from the 
government after his young son was killed: 
Whatever [compensation] you get, the lawyers are 
going to get five times more. That is what really 
pissed me off…people say, ‘human life is cheap’, but 
it is not until you find out that your son is worth 
£3,500…you can’t even get a good second-hand car 
for that. £3,500 was the cost to bury him….if I had 
had my time over, I wouldn’t have bothered with the 
compensation. We were told it would affect the 
company getting insurance…[this is irrelevant 
because] it is under new management (11). 
 
As can be seen from the above, money was needed for the families 
to secure justice. Even if they were eligible for legal aid, had 
assistance from the unions or found the money themselves, this 
was not the end of the need for money.  
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The court process required money for certificates and transcripts, 
which was an additional cost the families had to bear, from £3.50 
for death certificates (3), to thousands of pounds for transcripts 
(7). 
 
After the death of her son, one mother reflected that she had spent 
thousands of pounds trying to build her own case: 
 
Over 20 years I’ve spent over £300,000, through 
research…the cost of going to courts and obviously 
the courts start at 9.30am…travelling at peak [times] 
up and down through the years, and paying for 
solicitors, I mean a consultation with a barrister is 
£10,000 (9). 
 
Secondly, money was also needed when the families were refused 
justice from the state agencies, as funds were necessary if they 
wanted to take the case forward via a judicial review or private 
prosecution. At the end of the formal process, families were struck 
by the injustice of the process and looked into whether they could 
do more, but money also led that decision: 
 
at the end you feel as though you’ve dotted and 
crossed all the t’s and the i’s but…you just felt there 
was nothing else you could do [unless] the money is 
there, it’s a money factor again (2). 
 
One family felt disappointed by the HSE and paid a private 
solicitor £250 an hour to enquire as to how to appeal their decision 
not to prosecute. The solicitor informed the family that to take it 
further they would have to go to a judicial review and take the 
HSE to court. No one could tell them how much that would cost 
and they were told that to challenge the decision would be 
financially “foolhardy” (1). This was in stark contrast to one case 
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when, upon hearing the unlawful killing verdict, the company 
made it clear they were going for a judicial review and distributed 
leaflets they had prepared: 
 
[the corporation] had prepared a statement to give to 
the press as they were leaving the courtroom saying 
that they were going to go for a judicial review…they 
handed one of the leaflets [to me] (4). 
 
Whereas families knew they would have to find the money for a 
judicial review from somewhere, for example, re-mortgaging their 
house, the wife of the victim in this case reflected that it would be 
easier for large companies. In her case the company was large and 
she reflected that they could “just put an extra penny on the beans” 
(4) in order to challenge the coroner’s verdict. 
 
Those affected by relatively small, less profitable companies still 
felt they were financially disadvantaged. Even those companies 
had more assets than the families and were in a better position 
financially to affect justice: 
 
You get the feeling that people think these 
subcontractors are these little firms, [the head of the 
company had] spent £2 million on a property in 
Barbados, he’s got a big farm…and he races grey 
hounds…he’s got a farm in Ireland plus he owned 
several houses round [the local area] (2). 
 
The law allows for a private prosecution on paper but again, this 
relies upon the wealth of the families, and required far more than 
they could risk financially: 
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A Private Prosecution was enormously expensive. I 
know from [another case] that when they wanted to 
bring a Private Prosecution…some years before [my 
son] was killed, that they were quoted £250,000 to get 
as far as the first Magistrates’ Hearing (8). 
 
The ability to achieve justice and combat the suppression of 
evidence relied upon money, which frustrated the families and 
consequently left them paralysed to challenge any judgements. 
They were bewildered and angry and more than one family 
expressed how they left the process with no faith in the criminal 
justice system and viewed it as a ‘game’. This will be explored in 
the following sub section. 
 
The problem of knowing the process 
The families were unused to dealing with solicitors and barristers 
and had expectations about what the crown court would do and 
what would be uncovered. They were disappointed by the process 
and shocked how matters other than the truth were considered as 
important. 
In the following case a wife of the victim was stunned that her 
appearance was important to the legal team (7). The barrister 
asked her to stay for the duration of the court case: 
 
[the barrister] said, “if you want to win it, I think you 
need to stay because… you are our greatest asset 
because you don’t look like you deserve this to 
happen to you….you are an articulate woman, you 
will give good evidence for us…and…the judge will 
feel sorry for you (7). 
 
The barrister asked to see her so he could see what she looked like 
and after meeting her, he agreed to take on the case because of her 
appearance and demeanour. The wife in this case asked: 
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so if I had gone in with a nose ring and umpteen 
tattoos over my body, would I not have deserved it? 
He [the barrister] said, “probably not although you 
probably would have deserved it more. That’s the 
game, isn’t it?” I found that really quite...you’ve had 
all this to deal with and you go to a barrister to see if 
you deserved it or not…I didn’t know what this 
grieving widow was supposed to look like really (7). 
 
The same phrase, “a game” was repeated by the mother in the next 
case. Here her expectations of the legal process were drastically 
different from her actual experience. She described the court case 
as a: 
 
real roller-coaster ride. Never having been in a court 
before, you don’t understand the whole legal process 
and it is very much a game. It’s so obvious now to me 
that it is a game. My faith in British Justice went out 
of the window (6). 
 
The notion of the court being a game was repeated in the quote 
below, where a wife of a victim outlined her reasons for privately 
suing the company, related to what she thought her husband would 
have done: 
 
They reckon that I have got between 75% to 80% 
chance of winning, but 20% chance of losing and if I 
lose, I lose everything. So do I accept the offer which 
is half the value? It’s like the game, Deal or No Deal. 
That is the issue for me…it is not about the money, it 
will be earmarked for the children anyway…I have to 
think, what would [my husband] do…I think that [he] 
would have taken it right to the end. He wouldn’t 
settle out of court, I think he’d go and he would want 
to go if it was me, and it could have been me [who 
had been killed] (7). 
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The truth was relegated in one case where, in spite of indications 
that her son had been a victim of a safety crime, the case had 
“gone so terribly wrong” (10). The lack of evidence and the poor 
case that was brought to court was no match for the high burden of 
proof required in corporate manslaughter cases.  Consequently, the 
family were encouraged to accept a plea bargain: 
 
They said [the company] would plead guilty under 
the Health & Safety at Work Act…They had to have 
our agreement; we had to agree to it. We said that 
“no, the CPS had messed this case up and we were 
not agreeing” (10).  
 
The actions of the CPS had been an obstacle in securing justice 
and because the family did not agree to a plea bargain they were 
threatened: 
 
We were told that if we go on with this and we lose, 
[and they said] ‘which we think you will, your 
granddaughter will get no compensation’ (10). 
 
Threatened with receiving no compensation for her young 
granddaughter, and unable to make the decision alone (her ex-
husband and son’s partner were interested parties), they agreed to 
drop the charges of corporate manslaughter. How the case then 
proceeded was a shock to everyone. The case was not simply 
halted, but the owners were declared innocent: 
 
We went back into court, the jury was brought in and 
it was explained that there had been a change in the 
case… [the lead juror] had to stand up and repeat 
after the judge…that they found these three men not 
guilty on the manslaughter charge…which I thought 
was unbelievable (10).  
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Echoing sentiments made by two of the families at the end of the 
inquest, the mother described how the actions of a juror will 
remain with her. After the ‘not guilty’ verdict was read out, the 
mother of the victim noted: 
 
I will always remember looking at that jury and there 
was one young lad who I would say was about 26, the 
age of my lads and he just looked at us and shook his 
head in disbelief (10).  
 
After this decision, the mother and her son found a number for the 
CCA. They rang them and were put in touch with a solicitor but 
were told that ultimately: 
 
because the judge had closed the case and had got the 
jury to find them not guilty, there was nothing else we 
could do (10). 
 
In terms of corporate accountability, the case had finished and the 
company faced only health and safety charges. The details of this 
are covered in the next section. The mother asked questions about 
why the case had gone wrong but did not receive any answers. 
Hoping that an inquest would give her more information, she 
pursued this retrospectively but was refused on the grounds that 
the case had already faced charges mounted by the police, had 
been heard and then failed at court. Though covered by the Human 
Rights act, she was told that her son’s death “didn’t come under 
that” (10). 
 
After the stress of losing a close loved one, going through the 
bereavement and the upheaval that one family member described 
as like “glass on the kitchen floor, it shatters and you just can’t put 
it back together again” (9), the families had to fight for justice. It 
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was a fight they were ill equipped to win and one they did not 
realise they were fighting until it was too late. Restricted 
financially and provided with limited knowledge, justice for their 
loved one was disabled. The families were witness to the delivery 
of apathetic justice, justice that did not care for the loved ones they 
had lost. In their absence, they had to bear witness to the ‘game’, 
their pain was not alleviated and justice was evaded.  
 
For all but one of the families, both courts failed to deliver justice. 
The final stage for the families and the company was prosecution 
for health and safety charges. Chapter One established the 
weaknesses of regulation and how it fails. The experiences of the 
victims’ families with the HSE will be explored in the following 
section where it will be argued that regulation is another area 
where the truth is suppressed. 
 
Suppression: The Health and Safety Executive 
 
The main body the government created to respond to safety crimes 
is the HSE. As seen in the previous sub-section, a small proportion 
of cases reached crown court, but all cases failed (in the long-
term) to secure justice there. The alternative and most common 
route for justice for those harmed and killed at work is to see their 
employer face prosecution for health and safety offences.  
 
In spite of this being the most well-worn route, families did not 
have any better experiences here, which will be detailed in this 
chapter. The sanctions fell short of any expectations, which were 
echoed by more than one judge when they expressed their “hands 
were tied” (6).  
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A restricted regulatory agency 
The current limits put onto companies do not reflect a world where 
health and safety had “gone mad”. As detailed earlier, families 
were subject to long delays during investigations because the HSE 
were concerned with ‘maintaining continuity’ (1). This meant that 
when staff members resigned or were absent due to illness, the 
investigation was put on hold. The families assumed the HSE were 
spending time building a powerful case against the compnanies, 
mirroring their expectations of the CPS and police detailed in the 
previous chapters. One mother of a victim was given the 
impression the HSE were “onto something” and under their 
instruction did not share details of the case with her own mother 
for fear that “something would be said on the bus” that would 
jeopardise the case (1). This did not come to fruition and the case 
was dropped by the HSE. 
 
Families were told conflicting information. In the following case, 
the family were told the HSE were going to prosecute, then were 
informed it was “not in the public interest” (3). Instead the 
company would be “kept an eye on”, which the family interpreted 
was “all to do with finance” (3). The father was informed his son’s 
employer had been put on probation by the HSE for breaking a 
previous order.  This was the last contact he had and he did not 
know whether they complied. As a consequence, he found himself 
sitting outside the workplace of the company, without being sure 
why: 
 
I don’t know, it’s frustrating because I could see that 
the company were not all cowboys but I can see they 
were run by cowboys, they were cost cutters…they 
sacked a driver a few weeks before [my son died] 
because he had two accidents, and they blamed him 
for both accidents…people were saying it wasn’t their 
fault (3). 
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One family had to call the HSE because following the death of 
their son, they were not contacted. The inspector who called at the 
house expressed to the mother that he thought her son had caused 
his own death because, “he shouldn’t have been doing what he 
was doing” (5). 
 
This was in contrast to another two cases where the HSE inspector 
was described as, “excellent, really good” (11) and in another 
where the inspector was described as: 
 
the most thorough and intelligent man I came across 
in the six years, he was like a rat up a drain pipe, he 
left no stone unturned. He was very professional, 
astute and very thorough and he did everything to the 
letter…in a way he became like a friend, he was 
coming in here for so many years…he could see who 
the guilty party was and he wanted to prosecute (4). 
Both of these cases had the most success in terms of public 
disapproval, as seen in a previous sub-section, one reached an 
unlawful killing verdict at the coroners’ court and the other 
realised a corporate manslaughter verdict in the court (although, as 
noted previously, the charge was later quashed on appeal). 
 
There were cases of inspectors having to carry out a difficult job 
on their own. In one case the inspector was unable to access the 
victim’s body or the scene so she had to persuade an excavator 
driver to operate the machine to facilitate access. The driver was 
“white and shaking all over” because just hours earlier, he had 
witnessed the death of the victim (8). The mother of the victim 
reflected the inspector “had so much to do…she was on her own 
and she didn’t have time to take statements” (8). Consequently: 
 
it took me months to find out all the people who 
should have been interviewed and, in fact, we [had 
been pursuing charges of] Corporate Manslaughter 
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Case three years later before I found out everybody 
who was there who should have been interviewed (8). 
 
The findings of HSE reports are not publicly available and family 
members had to fight to have access. One mother managed to read 
the report because she: 
 
fought like hell and eventually they let me read it at 
the Police Station as long as I didn’t make any copies. 
They wouldn’t let me take photographs or make 
copies of it…It is the law that you are not allowed 
access [to it], I think it is all to do with, you know 
when the Freedom Of Information Act came in, HSE 
Reports were exempt. It is all to protect business in 
case anything that is released in the HSE Report 
could be an advantage to people who are enjoying 
Industrial Espionage (8). 
 
Under resourced, underfunded and mocked publicly (Pearce, 
2008), the HSE was the final stage for many families and the last 
hope they had of justice. The following sub-section will detail the 
sanctions imposed upon a proportion of the companies featured in 
this research. 
 
Restricted punishment 
The case of the family who were told to drop the manslaughter 
charges if they wanted to ensure their granddaughter would 
receive compensation, returned to court to hear the company plead 
guilty to health and safety charges: 
 
their barrister spoke for them, they never opened their 
mouths. The email was mentioned, they said ‘they 
didn’t have the training’ but what training did they 
need to read an email and if they didn’t understand it 
why didn’t they give it to [my son and his colleague]? 
I’m sure they would have understood it. The manager 
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who signed the work permits said he didn’t have the 
training to sign them (10). 
 
As at the inquest and the crown court, the truth continued to be 
selected and utilised in favour of the company. In the case 
mentioned previously, the company received a fine: 
 
£14,000 between three of them for two lives, so it 
was £7,000 each per life between three people, with 
time to pay. Then they asked for their costs to be 
paid. It was a joke. I think their costs were paid (10). 
 
The family who secured an unlawful killing verdict at the inquest 
returned to court to hear charges for health and safety. As detailed 
earlier, the CPS had refused to take the case forward to the crown 
court for manslaughter charges. The hearing for health and safety 
charges took an hour with no jury. The HSE had high expectations 
the fine would be high, “…even [the] health and safety [executive] 
thought three quarters of a million [pounds]” (4). When the judge 
returned, the company was fined £225,000. That year, the 
company in question returned pre-tax profits of £520.4 million 
(Thompson, 2009).  
 
On sentencing, the judge said: 
 
his hands were tied…but he did want it publicly noted 
that their health and safety was far below what the 
public should expect (4). 
 
Similarly in another case in Scotland, the sheriff apologised that 
he could not give a higher fine because the company had entered a 
guilty plea: 
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[He said]…”this should have been in the high 
court”…Fines were £19,000 and £14,000… one of 
the lawyers for [the defence], stood up and said “I 
think you’ll find the discount is higher than that” and 
haggled with the sheriff [who said]…”my hands are 
tied, I have to give them this discount”…there was a 
couple of pals [of the victim] who were really, really 
upset (6). 
 
Another family were expecting the company to receive a high fine 
as the judge had said: 
 
I want to know what the value of your property is 
because this is a serious offence and you will pay 
dearly (11). 
 
At the end of the proceedings, the owner was fined £10,000 and 
ordered to pay costs. The father of the vicitm in this case 
concluded,  
 
I think too many people get away with a fine because 
it was deemed an accident at work and it’s not, it’s 
someone murdered at work. That’s the 
difference…outside of work, you might go to jail for 
murder. If you do it at work there is a big possibility 
that you will walk away from it (11). 
 
The HSE are an agency designed to hear the cases of deaths at 
work and have the power to hold companies accountable. The 
reality is that the HSE as a body offers regulation that is restricted 
and constrained by outside factors such as funding and the 
sanctions it offers are inadequate. 
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The victims are not viewed as victims of crime and as covered 
briefly in previous sub-sections, in their absence, the victims were 
placed immediately under suspicion for causing their own deaths, 
either by committing suicide or at the hands of their own mistakes. 
This narrative was pursued in various ways by state agencies, to 
the distress of the families. The following sub-section will 
document this process, how the victims and the families were 
silenced and what effect this had on them. 
 
Suppressed: the process and its effects on secondary victims 
 
As Chapter One attested, the victims of safety crimes are 
‘problematic’ victims, far from the ideal that has been utilised by 
various governments in the pursuit of harsher criminal justice 
measures. Instead safety victims are portrayed as victims of 
misfortune or victims of their own carelessness. In their absence 
and after their death, the families had to bear witness to this 
deliberate construction as the criminal justice process progressed. 
Their protestations at the questionable portrayal of their loved 
ones were silenced, which was to have a lasting effect on the 
families. Whilst responding to sudden bereavement and the loss of 
a central family member, the families found themselves excluded 
by the criminal justice process (if they entered it at all) and 
distanced as not ‘real’ victims. They were doubly victimised by 
the death and by the legal process and its agents. 
 
As shown in the sub-section above, justice, whilst a priority for the 
families, elsewhere the truth was negotiated, money increased or 
decreased the possibility of making the truth official. The 
seriousness that was attached to the cases was seen in the way the 
families and the victims were treated in court. This will be 
illustrated in the following sub sections. 
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De-humanisation of the victim 
Families related how the court process was an insult to them and 
the family of the loved one that had died.  
 
The [defence] barristers just ran rings around them 
and the witnesses; they said that the witnesses lied on 
the stand so why weren’t they held in contempt? 
…nothing was done. No consideration at all was 
given, not so much to me but two of [my son’s] 
brothers [who] were in that court…they were given 
no consideration, the way they watched me being 
treated (10). 
 
The process permitted the victims to be forgotten in the same way 
the people who represented the company were able to hide as they 
attempted to prove their own innocence. This was extended to the 
explanations the companies offered in the court as to how the 
victims died, which seemed incredulous to the families.  
 
For example, in the following case, the family listened at crown 
court when the barristers for the company tried to plead their 
innocence. They argued it was not an explosion that killed the 
victim but a fall: 
 
In the heat, the fire was so intense in that chimney 
that it melted the metal ropes that held up that cradle. 
How on earth could he [my son] survive that heat and 
be killed from a bang on his head? Do they think we 
were stupid? They said it was a fall because, if it was 
a fire it would [have been caused by the unsafe] 
contents of the chimney (10). 
 
The mother of the victim felt the barristers assumed she was 
‘stupid’ and found it hard to believe such an explanation could be 
offered in court. The court was unable to prove otherwise in this 
case as: 
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those who did the autopsy…were questioned by the 
managers’ barristers…They had done tests on [my 
son’s] lungs [and] liver for drink, if he smoked, no, 
sorry, did drugs but then they lost the organs and no 
other tests could be done as it was pointed out in the 
court case that, if they had done tests, it could have 
shown just what had killed him…They lost them and 
that was it…There was no explanation, we weren’t 
told beforehand, we just heard it in the court like we 
heard a lot of information in the court (10). 
 
The family were not told beforehand that her son’s organs had 
been lost and were unable to find out any other information, no 
explanation or apology was offered to the family. There were 
other occasions when the families felt the process was trying to 
“demoralise” them: 
 
We stayed in because we weren’t part of the jury so 
we could hear the legal argument. Then [we] had to 
be taken out...The Family Liaison Officer said, 
“We’ve got to tell you this, the defence is going to 
bring up the fact that [your son] asked the ambulance 
driver if he was going to die”. We didn’t know that at 
the time. We were upset but were told to be prepared 
for it when it [came] up. We went back into court and 
nobody even mentioned it. It was just another ploy. 
Something to get you out of the room, try and 
demoralise you then bring you back in again (11). 
 
In another case the relatives unknowingly buried their loved ones 
without their hands and organs, which they later discovered had 
been used for teaching (9). They discovered the truth years after 
the event and the mother in this case expressed how she would not 
rest until her son’s body was exhumed. She has doubts about who 
she buried.   
 
When one company was cleared of manslaughter charges because 
the family agreed after being threatened with losing compensation 
(as detailed previously) the company was indifferent to the 
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feelings of the family as exhibited by their actions immediately 
after: 
 
one of [the members of the company] stood in front 
of us, shook his barrister’s hand and said, “thank you 
for getting us off.” That was before they went in on 
the second day to be charged with Health & Safety 
[offences], so basically they weren’t bothered about 
the Health & Safety, it’s nothing. They thanked them 
for getting them off which I find absolutely 
horrendous (10).  
 
When the families attempted to influence the process in some way, 
for example, by challenging officials to ask relevant questions, the 
professionals involved responded defensively and without concern 
for their welfare: 
 
the Crown Prosecutor took us to this room and got 
really nasty…I asked questions…I … said somebody 
was killed on their site three months after [my son], 
“why wasn’t this mentioned?” They looked shocked; 
the Crown Prosecutor…he asked, “Where did you get 
it from?” So [my son] piped up and said, “Off the 
internet last night.” [The Crown Prosecutor] then 
turned to me and said, “We don’t really have to speak 
to you because you are nothing, you are only his 
mother and you are nothing, we don’t have to tell you 
anything” (10). 
 
The family were dismissed by the Crown Prosecutor in the case 
above, when, at the start of the process, the mother had assumed 
they would fight for her son.  
 
Families were discounted in the court process when seats were not 
saved for the families in the courtroom. One mother was only able 
to sit in the courtroom because a police officer gave up his seat for 
her while the victim’s brother and father had to stand outside. 
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Similarly, the position of another family member was controlled 
by the defence: 
 
We were put in the Gallery and his family was in the 
Gallery as well. They were [making] snipes at us and 
our Family Liaison Officer…said to the judge, “look, 
it is not right for this family to be sitting next to 
them”. [We were moved to] the Press Box at the 
front...Then his solicitor complained because we were 
directly opposite the jury and we might intimidate the 
verdict so we had to move. That’s when we realised 
that it was all a game (11). 
 
To see their loved one forgotten in the legal process wounded the 
families. One partner summed up, the families were treated as 
though they were unimportant: 
 
It matters that there was a man in the middle of 
this…[At] every stage of the proceedings the person 
and the families are forgotten, absolutely forgotten, 
the prosecution has got nothing to do with the fact 
that somebody had died [it] became apparent every 
day (6). 
 
The partner of the victim made her feelings clear when she 
concluded her partner “had absolutely no chance in that workplace 
and he [had] no chance in that court” (6).   
 
Aside from the failure of the process to deliver justice, a number 
of families pointed to the mistreatment they suffered when the 
victim, their loved one, was treated inhumanely after their death. 
For example, in the following case the: 
 
QC got up and said, “sir, can we check our records 
because the lady here has lost her only daughter and 
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you’re referring to Mr so perhaps we’ve got a muddle 
up?” He looked down [at the photographs and said], 
“it just looks like a man”. And [the mother had] 
lost…her only daughter…that’s what we were 
dealing with, that’s how he treated us, mistreated us.  
Did he remain in that role?  He’s still in that role 
today (9). 
 
In the same court, the mother illustrated her own frustrations 
believing the official she dealt with had, “no conception of what 
it’s doing to us inside in our heads, in our hearts”. Attempts to 
redress that balance were not warmly received: 
 
[I said]…”my son’s got a name and you’re reading 
out numbers [assigned to him in the morgue], it’s 
hard enough that we’re here…you’re calling them 
numbers,…he’s got a name, he’s not [a 
number]…Well anyway he [the coroner] went back 
in…and he kept looking and kept saying [my son’s 
name] then…he said [addressing me], “well I’ve now 
said your son’s name 12 times, I hope that suffices” 
(9).   
 
The judge had huge power to influence the feelings of the families 
and in the following case, they had a positive impact that 
outweighed any fine: 
 
he twice spoke to us as a family and…kind of 
acknowledged us, actually that’s been more 
assistance than any fine…this one person 
acknowledged [us] (6).   
 
Another family expressed that they wished they had been treated 
better by the head of the court, as they left feeling like they were 
criminals: 
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Just that would’ve helped, I think if the coroner 
hadn’t treated us like we were criminals…and not 
treated us so harshly, which they did, it was harsh (5).   
 
One mother of a victim became increasingly upset by the 
proceedings and how her son had been forgotten in the process. 
She retaliated by printing out photographs of her son with his 
daughter and taking them into the court because: 
 
that was my way of saying, this is a person…they 
have got a face because in the court the person who 
has been killed is not treated as a person…he is a 
person, can you remember him? I will never let you 
forget what you have done (10). 
The victim was not at the heart of the process, as demonstrated in 
a previous sub-section. Aspersions were routinely cast upon the 
circumstances of their death, no matter how obvious the truth had 
seemed. The families were often treated as an inconvenience and 
when they fought against their ‘natural place’, they suffered more. 
They were chastised when they were not silent. The next section 
will detail how the families are shown that their loved ones are 
culpable victims and that any efforts they made to counter this 
were silenced. This was at a great personal cost to the families, 
long after the formal proceedings had drawn to a close.  
 
Implicating the victim in court 
It was common in the cases surveyed, for the victims to be 
implicated in their own deaths and constructed as blameworthy 
and culpable victims. This was played out at the inquest and 
witnessed by the families as they waited for the truth after years of 
delay. 
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People involved in the criminal justice system recognised that this 
could impact on the families, for example, it was recognised most 
keenly by a defence barrister in the following case: 
 
We were stood outside waiting to go into the Court 
Room and one of these manager’s barristers came out 
to us…he said….“This has got no reflection on your 
son but it is the way the trial has got to go…we are 
not blaming your son”. We were taken aback for his 
barrister to say this…we’ll never forget it (10). 
 
As implied by the barrister, for the company to be blame free, the 
blame had to be located as the fault of the victim. For one family, 
the father of a victim reflected that at the inquest: 
 
They made it sound at the inquest that he worked in 
an unsafe way, but in actual fact…he wasn’t a risky 
person, he worked hard, very hard (3). 
 
The victim was forgotten in the process, forgotten or discredited. 
One family obeyed advice by their legal team, which they 
regretted:  
 
I was upset because I asked to be able to read out a 
statement from the family at the inquest but was 
advised not to by our solicitor so I don’t know quite 
why, that is to my eternal regret…solicitor or barrister 
didn’t want us to read it out (1). 
 
The families ended the process trying to defend the loved one they 
had lost. In many cases they were left trying to suggest 
explanations for the actions of their loved ones just before they 
died. In the following case the victim was held responsible for not 
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maintaining the temporary vehicle he had been given. His father 
asserted this was wrong because: 
 
There were even some comments that his original 
lorry was spotless, his cab was like a normal car and 
he’d spend hours [cleaning and maintaining] them.  
He had respect for his vehicle and the one he was 
driving [when he was killed] was a younger vehicle 
but in worse condition (3). 
 
For the court, its officers and the company and its interested 
parties, it was suitable for the victim to be portrayed as risky and 
careless. The families were forgotten and sidelined in the process, 
and whilst this was positive for the company in the short-term, the 
impact of blaming the victim had long-term consequences for the 
families. In the following case, the ex-partner was clearly 
distressed about the way her children’s father had been 
misrepresented in the court and what that meant for her and her 
children: 
 
I didn’t want it to seem like it was all [my ex-
partner’s] fault and that was all we came away with.  
It’s not as bad as somebody committing suicide but 
you would like them to care enough about their own 
life because it’s caring about theirs [the children] 
because what’s been done has hurt them, it’s hurt me, 
it’s hurt them, but it could have come away that it 
wasn’t his fault…it was like they were all trying to 
blame him…because no one wanted to pay out a big 
lump of cash, we didn’t want to blame him for 
another reason, that’s the thing [crying]. But it’s the 
other side, there’s nothing worse than somebody 
trying to say it’s your fault that’s what it felt like and 
it wasn’t like that because you had a bloke that was 
really good, that worked fucking hard and if he 
could’ve done something for you, he would’ve done 
it (2).  
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The families did not want, nor expect to be in the position in 
which they found themselves. They expressed that their grief had 
been compounded by legal processes. One mother turned to her 
son, the brother of the victim and commented, “I have to do 
something here as they are just making my son a nothing” (10). 
The loved one they knew was not the person that they had seen 
created in the court; “That wasn’t a bloke that was seen there that 
day, they were virtually saying he was irresponsible” (2). Instead 
of finding and revealing the truth the court had, as one father 
commented, killed his son over, “Life will never be the same. It’s 
an assassination of that person” (3). The father summed up he 
wanted the court to know what was not being represented, what 
was stripped away, “That was a person that had a life and has left 
people [who] loved him” (3). 
 
Families who fought for information or to alter the trajectory of 
justice were seen as an obstacle to the process of the court. Those 
who refused to be silent were punished. This process and its effect 
will be detailed in the next sub-section. 
 
The treatment of secondary victims 
The majority of families were the only ones who were fighting for 
their loved ones at the court. Given the process appeared to be 
favourable to defending the company, relatives that resisted this 
were not treated well. For example, when families challenged the 
process, when they asked questions, they were unnecessarily 
interfering in areas they had no business in: 
 
I started being…the woman who was ‘awkward’, 
because I was asking questions…I was a nuisance, I 
was interfering, why didn’t I let them go and do their 
job?  I mean we had no rights and it was so wrong of 
me to be emotionally upset. There is still that brick 
wall there…obviously there’s more questions because 
I keep saying why and [the police] say, I shouldn’t 
ask why (5). 
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For one mother, her grief, and dogged pursuit of the truth whilst 
challenging the coroner, was interpreted as pathological: 
 
he [the coroner] told them that I was unhinged and in 
need of hospitalisation…they should completely 
disregard what I was saying, that I was not sane (9). 
 
The families fought for information and to find the answers in the 
processes they found themselves wrapped up in, where their loved 
one, the victim, was the focus but misrepresented. When they did 
not receive the truth or when they were treated unkindly, some 
blamed themselves. One partner linked the lack of truth and the 
way she was treated by the police to her own politeness and 
agreeability: 
 
I went through a stage where I thought that if I had 
been different to the liaison worker, if I’d been nicer, 
I thought if I’d been nicer, would it have made a 
difference?  [Crying] Sorry…I felt terrible, terrible 
guilt as though I hadn’t done [my partner] any justice, 
but I didn’t know what I was supposed to have done 
but I felt as though I should have done [something 
differently] (6). 
 
As the individuals who represented the court were not fighting for 
their loved one, the family members took on the burden and 
reflected this was their last chance to show their loved one was 
loved: 
 
you always think, this is the last thing I can do for 
him...[crying] sorry… It’s hard to say, I think if I 
could go back I think I’d [have been] more, what’s 
the word? More pushy and more aggressive, which I 
couldn’t have done at the time, looking back you 
think you can do things, I think we should have (5). 
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These effects were long lasting, the families took on an 
unreasonable amount of guilt as a result of the legal process they 
had been thrown into. The guilt and pain endured long after the 
formal process had ended and was apparent when I spoke to the 
families, some three years or more after the official process. It is 
impossible to say whether this will dissipate or worsen in the 
decades to come. 
 
The families were vulnerable and had their own lives to continue 
with, lives that had been irrevocably changed. The future was 
challenging anyway due to their bereavement without the 
additional de-humanising process they found themselves a part of. 
One wife was angry about the work she had had to do to pursue 
her case: 
 
nobody knows what pressures are on you and the 
frustration and anger of it all that are on you, nobody 
knows, as far as I’m concerned, me as a widow 
shouldn’t have to do with that, it should be automatic, 
the system is in place that when somebody dies, a 
company has killed them it should be automatic that 
it’s thoroughly investigated, you as a widow 
shouldn’t have to research corporate manslaughter, 
you shouldn’t have to seek the people out and say, 
“hang about now, I don’t agree with this, it should be 
this, this and this” (9). 
 
Family members could not be passive witnesses if they wanted to 
see justice done. Instead, they felt: 
 
like you’ve got to do everything because that’s the 
only way you get closure on it all…[to put] it all to 
bed and know you did your best (2). 
 
The families were doubly disadvantaged. Not only did they not 
have the finances that the companies had, they were emotionally 
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connected to the victim. The absence of that person, that loved one 
in their lives altered their lives and the lives of their families, 
which in every case but one, involved young children. Partners 
were open about the problems they had experienced and how they 
coped with the case: 
 
I had to teach myself how to face every day…I could 
see my teenage daughter was self-harming…because 
she had fallen out with [my partner] the night before, 
I also went back to work after six weeks because we 
needed a wage so I was kind of…off my face (4). 
 
Children who had otherwise been well behaved changed their 
character, which in this case, the mother had to respond to as well 
as having another child and a newborn baby: 
 
Then I had [my son] playing up at school, terrible, 
questioning your authority all the time. He’s the 
oldest and the one affected by it, very affected by it. 
So, I have got him getting into fights at school, not 
doing what the teachers are telling him to do which is 
all out of character. So you are trying to deal with that 
and the new baby. It is just very, very difficult (5). 
 
The companies had a process that was favourable to their status, a 
system that sought to blame the dead victim, money to fight as 
well as the will to do so. In contrast, the families were not seen as 
victims, did not have surplus cash (exacerbated by the loss of the 
breadwinner) and were emotionally wounded. They had to 
respond to their own bereavement as well as the reactions of other 
family members and friends. This made any fight even more 
difficult. The companies did not help with any of these 
consequences, as one mother noted when her daughter who had 
been in the car when her father had been killed, “…they didn’t 
care my daughter was screaming every night, having nightmares” 
(4). 
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The families were silenced by the process and the victim 
forgotten. This made it easier for the companies to evade 
responsibility, responsibility that the family of the victim 
absorbed. Many reflected they should have done more, fought 
harder. This was a burden many of them took on at an impossible 
time in their lives. Whilst companies may have had a ‘close 
shave’, they left the process validated, innocent, and able to 
continue operating. Employees could move and work for another 
organisation, they could still claim to be prioritising safety. The 
families could not. Their lives had been irrevocably altered. 
Fathers were absent, sons were gone and the families had to cope 
with bereavement, the effects of secondary victimisation and an 
injustice many felt they had partly caused.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The families began the process innocently believing they would 
quite quickly discover the truth about what happened to their loved 
one before they died, many wanted to believe it was an accident. 
They thought their priorities would match those of the state 
agencies they were forced into contact with. For some, the faith 
they had in the agencies stopped them from asking questions as 
they waited for the process to reach a logical conclusion. For many 
of them, by the time they realised their faith was misguided, it was 
too late and the (limited) opportunity they had. To challenge or to 
influence the process, had gone. The victims and the families of 
victims were not represented, but suppressed through the official 
processes, starting with the police.  
 
The perception that deaths at work were accidents influenced the 
reaction of the police who, as the first guardians of the scene of 
death, failed to approach it as a scene of crime. The dead victim 
and the families of that worker were not legitimate victims, they 
were disregarded. Without a victim, there was no crime and no 
role for the police to fulfil. The fact that in many cases the police 
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did not subsequently collect evidence doomed any further action 
to failure for the next stage, where the companies faced charges in 
court.  
 
Families were suppressed by the police in a number of ways. The 
rights that the families did have were not always exercised because 
they were not aware, or made aware of them. This later led some 
families to blame themselves. The failure of the police to treat the 
families with care in the initial encounters had a lasting effect on 
some individuals. On occasions, the police worked with the 
companies and made it explicit to the families that what had led to 
the death of their loved ones was accidental. The police were also 
the first official agency to place the victim under suspicion. They 
let the families know the evidence they had, did not necessarily 
discount the guilt of their loved one as the process began. 
 
For the families that had an inquest, the truth continued to be 
suppressed in a number of ways. The families had to cope with 
years of delay as they had no choice but to wait to finally discover 
the truth. They accepted that no one would be blamed, but wanted 
to know how their loved one had died. They were further 
disappointed by the way the ‘truth’ was constructed, selected and 
negotiated. For many of the families, a perpetrator was found, but 
companies were not considered to be criminal, and not held to 
account as the families had expected or had been led to believe 
they would be. The evidence they had was easily defended and 
dismissed in the majority of the cases. Whilst families had been 
optimistic about the presence of a jury, they were disappointed and 
unaware that the coroner held such sway. This was noted when 
witnesses were chosen by the coroner but most keenly felt in the 
summing up and when the jury members were directed to a 
verdict. In the absence of financial resources, the families lacked 
power to challenge any decision and were forced to walk away, 
confused and hurt.  
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Those families that reached court to hear charges of corporate 
manslaughter were in a minority. To get to this stage meant the 
evidence had to be strong enough to pass the CPS and have a 
chance of meeting the high burden of proof that was required. 
Then due to the nature of the judicial system the victim had to be 
implicated in the process in order to make the companies innocent. 
The process permitted the ‘assassination’ of the victim, who in 
their absence was unable to defend themselves. This left the 
families horrified and confused. On reflection, certain family 
members blamed themselves for not doing enough. They 
considered that if they had changed their behaviour, they would 
have been treated better, the truth could then have been uncovered 
and their loved one fairly represented. However, they were never 
going to be legitimate victims, not because of their own actions 
but because of what they could not control, the nature of where 
and how their loved one died. One influence over the case was 
access to money, which none of the families had readily available, 
which was in direct contrast to all of the companies. The families 
reflected they had been in a game where the odds were stacked 
against them. 
 
The companies who faced health and safety charges benefited 
from delays in the HSE investigation and lack of evidence. The 
fines that were given to the companies were small, which the 
judges noted in more than one case. Regulation was restricted, in 
its investigation, power and ability to convict appropriately.  
 
The process the families witnessed, that allowed the companies to 
avoid being viewed publicly as a criminal, relied on the victim and 
the families being de-humanised. They were not considered in the 
process but seen as unimportant and a hindrance if they attempted 
to become involved and influence the process. Whereas the 
company was enabled in rejecting the label of criminal, the victim 
was a culpable victim, worthy of blame, risky and implicit in their 
own death. Instead of being represented, families found 
213 
 
themselves attempting to defend their loved ones in court. Once 
the process was over and had failed to achieve justice, family 
members were affected in the long-term, they felt partly 
responsible and the hurt multiplied because of how their loved one 
had been misrepresented and forgotten. 
 
The obstacles created and developed by the criminal justice 
system meant that justice was unachievable for every family 
detailed in this research. Some of the families felt compelled to 
respond to their sense of injustice. This will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Obstacles faced following a safety crime: Political 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter One demonstrated that victims of safety crime are largely 
excluded from criminological study and that their victimisation is 
rendered invisible. Chapter Three showed how this affects the 
reality the families live through. The social and legal processes 
mean that the families of the victims are not seen as legitimate 
victims and are forced to watch as the system fails. At the inquest, 
in the majority of the cases the death of their loved ones is 
officially recorded as ‘accidental’ and they either do not reach 
crown court or if they do, they do not see justice prevail.  
 
This chapter is focused on how pressure and resistance seeks to 
secure political change. This will be examined through the 
response of the families of victims when they create or join groups 
to support and/or alter the representation and treatment of other 
victims of safety crimes. It demonstrates why and how families, 
and those concerned by this, have mobilised collectively to form 
groups in response to the obstacles they encountered. This 
includes those of suppression and de-humanisation identified and 
explored in the previous chapter. This chapter will examine 
whether this alters their previous near exclusion from the concerns 
of the criminal justice system. The success of each group will also 
be evaluated. 
 
  
215 
 
“How do you get your voice heard?” 
 
The social and legal processes that render safety crime invisible 
were detailed in Chapter Three. The effects on the families were 
touched upon. These effects lasted after the official processes were 
brought to a close, and for many this was the impetus that led to 
individual family members either creating or joining a group to 
support and/or alter the representation and treatment of other 
victims of safety crimes. The long-term effects that the families 
bore will be highlighted below. 
 
Long-term effects on secondary victims 
As discussed in the previous chapter, many of the families felt 
silenced by the legal processes and unable to have a voice. They 
were suppressed and given no place to have their say. Connected 
to their status as losing a person whom they love/loved, who they 
saw unrepresented or blamed in the court as a victim of safety 
crime, they also felt they needed to speak on behalf of their loved 
one. The long-term effects will be examined in terms of 
suppression and de-humanisation in this section.  
 
Suppression occurred in the first instance when the families were 
prevented from putting across views they thought were crucial and 
which were not being represented. In the following case, the 
mother of the deceased found herself speaking out at the inquest 
after her legal representative did not press a point she thought was 
common sense. This was a point that she believed was obvious 
and hoped would exonerate her son who was the victim in the 
case: 
  
You try to say something in court and you’re slapped 
down….[I was told by the coroner that] I’d be put out 
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of court…I didn’t want to miss anything else. It’s 
hard to get your voice heard, how do you get your 
voice heard? (5). 
 
In the case above, the mother tried to express her grief and 
frustration in other ways and to right the wrong of the court. Pitted 
against the potential power of the corporation, she was blocked: 
 
I did write one letter to the [local paper] that they 
wouldn’t print, he [the journalist] said, ‘I’m awfully 
sorry but we’d be libel’…the media are frightened to 
death of upsetting people (5). 
 
The local newspaper was afraid of the financial repercussions of 
publishing the mother’s letter, further silencing her. The court was 
at the end of a long process for many of the families who 
recognised they had no control: 
 
You’re at the mercy of everybody else, you’re told 
when the inquest is going to be, you’re told when [he, 
the victim and their son] can be buried…when you 
can bury that member of your family, you [wait to be 
told] how they died, you have no control, do you? (3). 
 
The families had been unable to find answers to their questions but 
hoped such a formal process would reveal how their loved one had 
died and what had caused it. No family member imagined they 
would be able to return to ‘normal’ life, but they had not 
considered they would come out of the process without the truth 
and feeling worse:  
 
I think this has been the hardest part, I know [now] 
we won’t get the absolute truth, I think I’d held on to 
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that, [that] I’d not get closure but [would get] the 
truth (6). 
 
Secondly, families were not only changed by the deaths of loved 
ones, but affected by the way they were de-humanised, which 
influenced future family life. In the following example, a mother 
had lost her son and was told by another son that he would not 
visit her in England again: 
 
With the court case, the injustice of not getting 
justice, [the victim’s] brother said in the middle of the 
court case, “I am going back to Ireland and I am not 
coming back…my brother was killed, they are 
responsible” (10). 
 
He was disgusted that his brother meant ‘nothing’ to the court: 
 
we’ve waited two years for this court case and now 
they have rubbed [my brother’s] face in the ground. 
[He] doesn’t mean anything in this court, they took 
his life and now they’ve just made him meaningless, 
nothing (10). 
 
There were serious long-term effects the families suffered after 
their cases had finished that were as a direct consequence of their 
experiences in the criminal justice process. People referred to 
other family members and survivors who had been deeply affected 
by the ordeal of the criminal justice process: 
 
I’ve had 9 mothers die of cancer6 after the disaster, 
we’ve had 10 suicides, other premature deaths of 
survivors who have just dropped dead. And I know 
                                                          
6
  One of the mothers, who took part in this research and is featured throughout, died in 2015. 
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it’s from the stress and the deep trauma that they’ve 
gone through and still live through (7).  
 
In this case, the flatmate of the victim died suddenly in his 
twenties in the years that followed. There was an 
acknowledgement that whilst their lives had changed, it was the 
process that had added harm and hurt to the families in ways that 
were not easing with time: 
 
His younger brother…was 11 when [he] died. I’ve 
brought the lads up on my own from them being little. 
[The victim] was always like a father figure to [his 
younger brother] and it hit him really hard…he got 
kicked out of school, his personality changed, he 
became very angry, disruptive. He still won’t talk 
about [him]. [His] older brother, he can’t accept the 
way we were treated as a family and in their own way 
they find it very difficult to cope and it is coming up 
to eight years now. That hasn’t lessened. They still 
feel that (10). 
 
Another mother of a victim thought about the way she had been 
treated by the coroner and stated “I’ll remember [his] name for the 
rest of my life” (5). Many families thought about their own 
experiences but also what it meant for other family members: 
 
[I know] the moment we’re born we’re certain to die. 
I totally accept that at any point any of us could die 
but I can’t get over that [my partner’s] parents who 
brought him into this world, he was a late baby, she 
had him when she was forty odd that they don’t have 
the right to know what took him, or what could have 
been done to avoid taking him (6). 
 
The effects were long-lasting, not only as a result of being 
bereaved but as a consequence of their secondary victimisation. 
Victimisation was exacerbated as families of victims of safety 
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crime because the truth was suppressed and their loved one was 
de-humanised as part of this process. 
 
The families wanted the system changed to show regard for the 
families as suffering and as legitimate victims. They recognised 
that they were treated differently, and with less respect, because 
their loved ones had died in a workplace death: 
 
Basic respect is not there because you are not looked 
on as victims. Would they speak to a family member 
who had lost somebody in an RTA [Road Traffic 
Accident]? No they wouldn’t. That’s when the word 
accident comes in; you are a trouble causer as it was 
an accident. The more you ask questions; maybe they 
are embarrassed as well because I don’t think they 
know how to deal with work place deaths (10). 
 
Families protested that the word ‘accident’ was inadequate, had 
wider connotations and needed to change: 
 
I hate that word, ‘accident’, because an accident is 
something that can’t be prevented. My son’s death 
and a lot of other deaths in the work place could have 
been prevented so therefore it is not an accident. I do 
get angry when I hear people say…“your son had an 
accident at work and he was killed”. No, he didn’t 
have an accident at work. He was killed at work. 
Somebody put money before life and that is why my 
son died and it wasn’t an accident. I do take offence 
when people say that (10). 
 
By the end of the process the families had become experts in their 
own cases. Whilst this was not validated by the court process, or in 
an official capacity, they each had a detailed understanding of the 
difficulties of securing justice following a safety crime.  
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The families made links to the way justice would have to be 
delivered differently to companies, for example, linked to profit 
and power. The wife of a victim in the following quote recognised 
that a fine would hurt companies but that this should be extended 
to cause pain to others who benefit from profit: 
 
[It would have been justice if] somebody [had] gone 
to prison, the directors…and a sensible fine….also 
the assets and the turnover should be looked at and 
the fine has to be based on the turnover, how much 
they make, that’s the only way they are going to 
learn…money, that’s all they’re interested in…You 
should look at the company assets, you can’t tell me 
£225,000 is going to hurt [the billion dollar 
corporation involved in this case], it’s not.  It’s 
billions…I also think the share price should be 
affected as well because the shareholders don’t like 
that either, the share price should be dropped and on 
all their literature it should be stated there they’ve 
been prosecuted for something (4). 
 
All of the families argued that money was a crucial factor that led 
up to the death of their loved one and controlled the process that 
followed. This was set against the needs of the families, the victim 
and future victims: 
 
At the end of the day they’re running a business and 
its money and that’s what they see, no one is in 
business to not make money but they forget about the 
people that are making the money for them.  It will 
continue to happen it doesn’t matter what law comes 
out (3). 
 
The majority of the families saw justice as the passing of a prison 
sentence to highlight guilt, “The length would have been irrelevant 
to me…I didn’t want them accusing [my son] of doing it on his 
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own” (3). One family member drew comparisons to the 
maintenance of vehicles: 
 
You have to have an MOT on your vehicle, so have 
an MOT on the company, it’s going to happen to 
families every single day of the week and it will 
continue to happen until the owners of the companies 
are made to realise the buck stops with them and 
they’re the ones who are going to go to prison, not 
piddly fines, that’s not going to do anything to 
millionaires. It doesn’t because at the end of the day 
your employees are paying the price, “cut jobs, get rid 
of them” (3). 
 
For another mother of a victim, a prison sentence was the only 
way justice could have been achieved because the company knew 
the risk they had subjected her son to, a risk which was taken to 
maximise profit. For her: 
 
It was blatantly obvious they knew what they were 
doing, they read the email. A 12 year old could 
understand the word ‘danger, explosion’, they put 
[the email] in a drawer and hid it. They knew that 
once they signed that hot cutting gear permit and sent 
[my son and his colleague] back in that chimney, they 
knew the possibility of an explosion. 
 
The company involved were sub-contracted and won the tender to 
dismantle the chimney because they had the cheapest quote, 
cheaper by at least £22,000: 
 
 They took a gamble – do we pay £30,000/£40,000 or 
do we carry on with the £8,000? Let’s say there is a 
50% chance there could be, 60% chance there could 
be, 70% chance there couldn’t be, they would take 
that chance…Therefore they should have got a prison 
sentence (10). 
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The subject of money upset family members. Many had an 
extended family who assumed they had received a massive 
amount of compensation. The popularly held perception of a 
“compensation culture” referred to by Chris Grayling, the Justice 
Secretary in 2013 and refuted by Professor Lofstedt (Tombs, 
2016) influenced extended family and friends who were suspicious 
the families had received a huge pay out and that money had been 
hidden somewhere (2). The majority of families received no 
compensation and more than one had to get into debt in order to 
pay for the funeral of their loved one. 
 
When asked what they thought the biggest obstacles to justice, one 
mother of a victim was clear who had blocked justice in her son’s 
and future cases: 
 
The Government. Are they going to bring in stronger 
laws? Accidents do happen at work, we know that, 
we are not saying every single person who has an 
injury or accident at work is through bogus 
employers, we are not saying that…we are saying are 
those, are not accidents that could have been 
prevented. We are up against the Government and big 
corporations (10). 
 
It became apparent that in a number of cases families expressed 
the injustice fuelled them on to personally fight for the changes 
they wanted to see and that this had been helpful to them: 
 
I would have lost it completely, the only way I could 
have survived my bereavement was to hang onto the 
anger of the injustice of it all and start fighting to 
change attitudes, procedures and laws. It became an 
obsession (9). 
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Decisions were made to fight back and to do so to enact justice for 
the loved one who had been de-humanised by the court process. At 
the end of formal proceedings in the following case, the mother of 
one victim: 
 
I decided, they are not going to do that to my son, my 
son is something and I will do something in [his] 
name. We can’t do anything for [my son], we can’t 
bring him back. I exhausted all the avenues but, by 
telling what happened to [him]…then just maybe it 
will prevent other families going through what we’ve 
gone through (10). 
 
Families recognised that their experiences were not isolated and 
that many others had gone through similar emotions and painfully, 
that many others would in the future. They acknowledged “the 
thousands of families who have gone through this, we are not the 
only ones (6).  
 
The formal process had caused additional pain to the families. 
There were similarities in what changes they wanted to see. This 
can be summed up by the one family member who worked with 
other bereaved families as part of a group who campaigned for 
changes to be made. They called for the following:  
 
Full and fearless inquiries, 
Getting an apology, 
Learning the full truth of what happened, 
Being supported through the civil and criminal justice 
systems that ends with an appropriate resolution, 
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Having it understood that commemoration and 
remembering are essential parts of the – lifelong – 
aftermath… Receiving adequate compensation (14). 
 
 
Faced with the large gap between what justice was to the families 
and the reality of their experiences, some families joined with 
people who had been in similar positions. Up to that point, many 
had fought individually and had had no idea what they were facing 
until they were far into the process. By the time they gained 
knowledge that might have helped them fight, it was too late. By 
joining with others, they hoped this could be avoided for future 
victims and families. Their experiences will be examined in the 
next section starting with an overview of what motivated family 
members to create or join with others as part of a group.  
 
A collective response 
 
None of the interviewees had any intentions, prior to the 
experience of losing a loved one, of spending time, money and 
energy in joining a group, but some joined with other families and 
individuals who had found themselves in similar positions. They 
were spurred on by what had happened to them: 
 
[I was] so angry and hurt later…you had the people 
that were supposed to uphold the law, later break 
it….[fighting] was the only way I’d [have] survived 
because if I’d been at home I would have lost it 
completely. The only way I could have survived my 
bereavement was to hang onto the anger of the 
injustice of it all and start fighting to change attitudes, 
procedures and laws (9). 
 
Many family members wanted to use what had happened to them 
for something positive, which was made easier when joined with 
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like-minded people. Two members of one of the groups, studied in 
this research, published a book on its history. In it Eyre and Dix 
(2015) argue that many relatives were: 
 
consumed by a mixture of grief and anger. These 
emotions are inescapable but quickly become 
destructive. The only remedy is to channel them into 
a constructive activity such as a support group (Eyre 
and Dix, 2015: 21). 
 
Many of the families created or joined groups to right the injustice 
they had suffered as a result of corporate killing. This will be 
explored in more detail in the next sub section through an 
examination of four such groups; Families Against Corporate 
Killing (FACK), the Simon Jones Memorial Campaign (SJMC), 
the Centre for Corporate Accountability (CCA) and Disaster 
Action (DA). All of these groups supported and worked to alter 
the representation and treatment for the victims of safety crime. In 
the 1990s and early 2000s, they made up a significant part of the 
corporate accountability movement.  
 
The motivation of the groups 
The various groups family members and individuals went on to 
create or join reflected their desire for justice and what they 
identified as lacking in the social, legal and political landscape. All 
but one of the groups covered in this research began in the 1990s. 
This was at a time when politically, Labour had taken a lead on the 
issue of law and order and had been campaigning from a populist 
stance, claiming to be “bringing power back to the people” (Ryan, 
1999:19) in “a heyday for victim policy” (Elias, 1993: viii). 
Within criminology in the 1980s and 1990s, critical victimology 
began focusing on social change and relieving human suffering 
(Elias, 1986) and the victims of safety crime were incorporated 
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into the study of victims generally (Mawby and Walklate, 1989). 
As discussed previously, the number of disasters in the 1980s and 
1990s were all high profile and such shocking events caught the 
attention of the public (Blumer cited in Haines, 1999). This all 
contributed, bringing the victim and the plight of the victim to the 
fore. 
 
22 years ago, Ann Elvin called for a national helpline for the 
victims of families of those killed at work and set up a national 
support group, although in her book she reflects, “We are so badly 
funded that we can barely run any more” (ibid: 97). Prior to the 
existence of the groups detailed below, there were many 
individuals and interest groups which crossed over and contributed 
to each other. For example, in the early 1990s, David Bergman 
helped Ann Elvin prepare a legal submission after her son was 
killed at work and was contacted by the Construction Safety 
Campaign (CSC). Her campaign was subsequently used and noted 
by the Simon Jones Memorial Campaign. There are many 
similarities between the groups, each will be examined in turn 
below. 
 
Families Against Corporate Killing (FACK) were created through 
another campaigning group. A coordinator at the Greater 
Manchester Hazards Centre brought a number of families together 
who expressed similar sentiments. A founding member of FACK 
contacted Hazards due to a feeling of injustice: 
 
I felt this can’t be right, there’s no justice there at that 
trial…I thought I can’t leave it here, I felt I had to do 
something (11). 
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Founding members were frustrated and shared a belief that they 
themselves and other families were bereaved because of unsafe 
and unhealthy workplaces and that nothing was changing to 
prevent this happening to families in the future. 
 
The Simon Jones Memorial Campaign (SJMC) was slightly 
different from the other groups featured in this research as they 
focused on the single issue of Simon Jones’ case as well as 
working generally on the inadequacy of the law. The Simon Jones 
Memorial Campaign comprised of a small group of around 60 
people, situated across England. Created after campaigns such as 
the Construction Safety Campaign, Hazards and Disaster Action, it 
was focused on revealing the truth and challenging that “profits 
are more important than the safety of…workers” (Burrell, 2004). 
 
Simon was born on September 1st in 1974. He lived in Brighton 
and was a regular visitor to the New Kensington pub, where 
Brighton’s activist community gathered. His parents, Anne and 
Chris worked as teachers and lived in Banbury with his brother, 
Tim. Simon had written for SchNEWS, a Brighton based, free 
weekly newsletter that supports protests and causes which include 
the fight of the Dockers in Liverpool and opposition to the 
Newbury Bypass. Simon was an undergraduate of social 
anthropology at Sussex University and was taking a year out and 
time away from studying. Living without a regular source of 
income, he had been talking about writing a novel and had begun 
sketching out ideas before he signed up to an agency offering 
temporary, casual contracts (Brooks, 2012). 
 
Personnel Selection is a 40 year old recruitment company. 
Advertising “It’s what we do best” (quoted on Personnel Selection 
website, 2015). Personnel Selection create contracts, both 
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permanent and temporary in commercial, industrial and 
engineering and catering sectors. Simon signed up for work at the 
Brighton office and was subsequently sent to Shoreham docks to 
work on a temporary contract for £5 per hour at Euromin Limited.  
 
On the 24th April 1998, Simon found himself working as a 
stevedore unloading a docked ship, moving up and down with the 
tide, under pressure to beat the tide alongside other casually 
employed staff. Low on staff and short on time, they picked two 
banksmen, neither of whom spoke English. Reliant upon non-
universal hand signals to operate the crane to position the grab, it 
was Simon’s job to load the cobbles into bags, which were then 
hooked onto the crane as quickly as possible to empty the ship and 
beat the tide. The crane operating in the hold had been modified 
by the director of Euromin, James Martell. In place of the safe 
lifting hook, which the excavator had been supplied with, hooks 
had instead been welded directly onto the grab forcing workers to 
operate within its jaws. The crane itself displayed a warning sign 
in the cab that prohibited anyone being in the area of the grab 
when it was in use (even prior to the dangerous alteration) but the 
director insisted workers operate with his modification. The crane 
operator was unable to see the operation when the grab closed on 
Simon, quickly causing his death, barely two hours after he had 
arrived at the docks.  
 
The subsequent campaign was created in response to the lack of 
information provided to the family. At the funeral, friends of 
Simon’s began to talk of ‘doing something’ in response. A friend 
who had worked with Simon at SchNEWS (a weekly direct action 
newsletter) had written to the family to ask if they would support a 
campaign, the details of which they were yet to work out because 
as Anne (Simon’s mother) said “they were all in shock as well”. 
The SJMC also responded to the lack of justice and committed the 
campaign to “direct action to ensure that politicians don’t get away 
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with brushing his death…under the carpet7”. (From here until page 
240, extensive use is made of web-based materials. The URLs will 
be presented via footnotes rather than in the body of the text 
itself.) 
 
The desire to highlight the lack of justice also featured in the 
creation of Disaster Action (DA). The Herald of Free Enterprise 
Association (HFA) was a group created by survivors and family 
members of those who had drown so when the liner sunk off the 
coast of Zeebrugge in 1987. Through that group, an invitation was 
sent to other similar disaster groups that had been created in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. Those who received the invitation 
were invited to meet with a view to find out whether one group 
could better encompass and combine all of their aims (Eyre and 
Dix, 2015).  At the first meeting, all of the groups who responded 
found they had a shared experience which echoed that seen in the 
individual cases detailed in the previous chapters. All the groups 
shared:  
 
a total lack of information from official sources, 
complicated problems in claiming compensation and 
a lack of legal guidelines for the establishment and 
management of disaster funds…all added pressure to 
an already intolerable situation. (Disaster Action 
Newsletter cited in Eyre and Dix, 2015: 11). 
 
Pam Dix, founder member and executive director of DA, said in 
their early meetings members experienced, “outrage and 
distress…who despite the difference in the causes shared a 
common experience of a lack of redress” (14). As conveyed 
earlier, the groups brought together as part of DA had shared 
experiences where the families were given little information and 
                                                          
7
 http://simonjones.org.uk/campaign/index.htm 
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had been hurt further by the process. This was summed up 
following the decision to launch DA, in their first pamphlet: 
 
As an umbrella group for these grass roots 
organisations, we’re well aware of the dreadful 
common thread running through these disasters. 
They weren’t Acts of God. 
They needn’t have happened. 
We don’t want anyone else to go through what we’ve 
been through. 
(Disaster Action cited in Eyre and Dix, 2015: 32). 
 
The CCA was different from DA, the SJMC and FACK as it was 
not started by bereaved families but on behalf of them. The 
founder, David Bergman was a prominent campaigner who had 
called for a change in the law from the 1980s. He researched and 
published work with the HFA and DA before creating the CCA in 
1999 (Eyre and Dix, 2015). The CCA aimed to scrutinise official 
bodies and the existing weak laws. 
 
The families became surer of the context and causes that led up to 
the death of their loved one once they joined with others. Injustice, 
anger, frustration and a desire to change were commonly 
mentioned throughout the interviews. The next sub section will 
detail the aims of each group.   
 
The aims of the groups 
In order to reduce the injustice of those involved in a safety crime, 
each group set out clear aims. These will be detailed, in turn, 
below. 
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FACK aimed to “halt complacency about deaths at work8” and 
compelled the government to create laws that held managers to 
account and ultimately deliver justice to those who committed 
crime. Their website stressed they were not about retribution or 
revenge, but law and order, justice, equity, accountability and 
deterrence focusing on those employers who had been negligent. 
 
In addition, FACK aimed to stop workers and members of the 
public from being killed in preventable incidents, acting to direct 
bereaved families to legal help and emotional support. The 
families in FACK voiced their grievance that they were “robbed 
twice”, firstly they had lost people they loved because of the 
failure of employers to obey health and safety law and secondly of 
the justice that should (but does not) come to help them
9
.  
 
FACK saw supporting families as crucial in preventing further 
injustices:  
 
[for those] families who have lost loved ones; they 
can come or ring if they need someone to talk to… 
There is nothing, absolutely nothing. There is nothing 
out there for families where people have been killed 
in the workplace (10). 
 
We want families to be treated with respect and 
dignity, they are victims, recognise families as 
victims (11). 
 
                                                          
8
 http://www.hazardscampaign.org.uk/fack/about/ 
 
9
 http://www.hazardscampaign.org.uk/fack/about/ 
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As mentioned previously, the SJMC was unique in that it was 
created and focused on the case of one individual, Simon Jones. It 
aimed to:  
 
fight for the truth about Simon’s death to be revealed 
and to challenge the profits-before-people set up that 
killed him
10
.  
 
It did not become involved in other cases, although it did focus on 
changing the law that affected other victims of safety crime. 
 
DA described itself as a self-help organisation with a, “needs 
driven, user-led approach that is seen as an addition to self-
support”11. The commonality between the founding members of 
DA was reflected in the principles that were outlined at the launch 
in 1991. Its aims were to:  
 
Encourage all organisations that have a duty of care 
for the safety of people (their customers and their 
employees) to accept that this responsibility resides 
with people at the top…to raise the level of debate on 
the subject of corporate responsibility…for [a] 
change in the law as it relates to corporate 
manslaughter (Maurice De Rohan quoted in Eyre and 
Dix, 2015: 13). 
 
In 1991, DA set out its aims in their launch pamphlet. These aims 
were threefold: 
 
                                                          
10
 http://simonjones.org.uk/campaign/index.htm 
11
http://www.disasteraction.org.uk/guidance_for_responders   
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Accountability…Attempts by the relatives to bring 
companies and individuals to court have been 
thwarted, we believe, because of defects in the 
criminal justice system. Disaster Action will be 
calling for a new legislative structure of corporate 
criminal offences and sanctions. 
Support…Providing support and guidance to 
individuals and groups touched by tragedy is another 
of our aims. 
Prevention…Disaster Action aims to break the cycle 
of tragedy and misery…We believe that these 
changes will encourage a new corporate culture 
(Disaster Action cited in Eyre and Dix, 2015: 39). 
 
DA had a general desire to:  
 
raise awareness and understanding of what it feels 
like to be directly affected by disaster and the 
practical implications in terms of addressing people’s 
needs (Eyre and Dix, 2015: 55). 
 
David Bergman wanted to be more political than the aims of DA 
would allow, which was one of the reasons the CCA was created. 
The CCA aimed to support workers and the public by highlighting 
the inadequacy of law and legislation, changing law to prevent 
future victims, working with victims that were being created and 
ensuring the bodies tasked with responding to deaths and injuries 
fulfilled their roles appropriately. According to the website, the 
CCA was: 
 
concerned with the promotion of worker and public 
safety, focusing on the role of state bodies in 
enforcing health and safety law, investigating work-
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related deaths and injuries, and subjecting them to 
proper and appropriate prosecution scrutiny
12
. 
 
The aims of the groups detailed above shared many similarities. 
Tackling the injustice meant helping future victims in some way 
and affecting the officials tasked with responding to them. How 
the various groups achieved this is documented in the next sub 
section. 
 
Methods of achieving justice 
There were similarities and stark differences between the ways the 
campaign groups achieved their aims. Made up of people who had 
been through unique and distressing experiences, all of the groups 
wanted to support families who were new to the process, offering 
everything from legal advice to moral support. The methods used 
by each will be detailed below, starting with FACK. 
 
As a national campaigning network FACK achieved their aims by 
remaining visible and through protesting. They were funded via 
donations including money provided from two legal firms and 
links with trade unions. Using its website, FACK tried to draw 
attention to their cause by regularly publishing press releases on 
deaths at work to highlight injustice and the inadequacy of the law. 
For example, a FACK member attended a British Safety Council 
meeting to speak about the organisation’s campaign: 
 
I am determined that it shouldn’t happen to anybody 
else. It is based on legislation…there was a man there 
who was in charge of all the HSE inspectors. I asked 
him, ‘how many actual inspectors have you got?’ You 
                                                          
12
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/about/main.htm  
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can expect a visit from the HSE once in a lifetime. 
They still won’t put the numbers up (6). 
 
Making a link between workers and the loved ones they had lost, 
in 2013, FACK protested in Manchester to support workers who 
had been blacklisted, urging the HSE to defend the rights of 
workers who complained about employers. For example, many 
victims of safety crime had spoken to their families about how 
unsafe their workplaces were prior to their deaths. FACK stated on 
their website:  
 
We depend on those brave enough to stand up for our 
health and safety, what a disgrace we don’t have a 
government or HSE that will do the same
13
. 
 
One FACK member actively worked to act for the interests of 
young people to encourage employers to obey the law, training 
and empowering young people to speak up if they were in danger. 
He appeared on TV, radio and in the press to raise awareness of 
the ‘Speak Up’ campaign to raise awareness of deaths at work 
using the NVQ Safety in the Workplace scheme
14
. Another FACK 
member wanted health and safety to be included in education at 
school so: 
 
that before these young kids go out to work, there 
should be some sort of teaching on health and safety 
and their rights (10). 
 
To this end, the FACK member quoted above delivered speeches 
to training providers. She urged them to tell students about their 
                                                          
13
 http://www.hazards.org/blacklistblog/2009/11/20/bereaved-families-support-blacklist-protest/ 
 
14
 http://www.hazardscampaign.org.uk/fack/about/fackupdate08.pdf 
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rights and to emphasise it was their responsibility to keep 
themselves and their colleagues safe and to not be afraid to speak 
out: 
 
So by us at FACK, going around and making our 
speeches, we are trying to get that message across, 
work with us, let’s make a difference together (10). 
 
They continued to raise awareness in workshops they have run at 
the Hazard conferences and appeared on a BBC documentary and 
the radio, especially on Workers Memorial Day.  
 
Similar to FACK, SJMC positioned itself as a direct campaigning 
group, which protested in visible ways between 1998 and 2002. 
Commenting on the first protest on September 1
st
 1998, five 
months after Simon’s death and on his birthday, his mother Anne 
(AJ) observed: 
 
furious with the lack of apparent progress, [a number 
of Simon’s friends] and all the rest of the 
crowd…they all went down and occupied Euromin 
[where Simon had been killed] (AJ). 
 
Aided by access that a worker provided from inside Euromin, 30 
protestors occupied Shoreham docks, raising banners that read 
“Simon Jones RIP” and “Casualisation Kills”. Since they were 
aware that work had not been stopped on the day that Simon had 
been killed in April, they aimed to stop the work on his birthday 
and placed a wreath on the gates. Anne described Simon’s friends 
in the campaigning group as “seasoned campaigners” and as a 
result, they contacted the media beforehand. Two days after 
shutting down Euromin in 1998, campaigners occupied the 
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Brighton office of Personnel Selection hanging banners from the 
windows that read “Murderers”. Political leaflets were handed out 
that asked “why should agencies like this take half your wages 
when you’re doing all the work?” Anne reflected: 
 
Things really took off after everybody occupied 
Euromin [and] Personnel Selection and gave them the 
treatment as well. After it had been on every news 
programme, by six o’clock it was leading the news, 
their protest. So people had seen it all over the south 
of England (AJ). 
 
In 1999, protesters mobilised outside the House of Commons 
whilst other members simultaneously occupied the Department of 
Transport and Industry (DTI) in protest at its failure to regulate 
employment agencies. Leaflets were handed out until the workers 
were evacuated and the police arrived.  
 
The SJMC was very clear that protesting was the best way to 
achieve their aims, given the limited options they had: 
 
As long as this government and its agencies refuse to 
take action against companies that profit from 
casualization at the expense of their workers’ lives we 
will continue, where necessary, to break the law so 
that justice will prevail
15
. 
 
Unlike the SJMC, DA would not become involved in the 
campaigns of other groups, even those it arose from. As Pam Dix 
explained, “DA has been careful to preserve its original mission 
by becoming associated with specific campaigns…rarely” (14).  
                                                          
15
 http://www.schnews.org.uk/archive/news6282.htm  
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Previously, DA did not accept funding from the government. 
However in 2011 it accepted an invitation to apply for a grant 
provided by the Ministry of Justice’s peer support fund. This 
allowed DA to refer victims in need of counselling to a trauma 
care unit (Eyre and Dix, 2015). They received funding in 2008 
from the Department for Culture Media and Sport to research 
disaster funds (ibid.). Despite using government grants, they stated 
“Any future sources of funding for Disaster Action must enable 
the charity to maintain its independence from government or 
vested interest” (ibid.: 2015: 168). Pam Dix explains: 
 
The integrity of our position was crucial and could 
not be compromised. Power also came from our 
determination to stick by the original principles and 
not to seek or accept funding from any source that 
could potentially present a conflict of interest (14). 
 
At the earliest points, DA worked on altering the criminal justice 
system. In 1991, they wrote a submission to the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice as well as to The Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust (Eyre and Dix, 2015). In a submission 
to the Law Commission in 1994, they called for safety crimes to 
be treated differently by the criminal justice system. After the Law 
Commission issued a consultation paper on Involuntary 
Manslaughter in 1995, DA prepared a response, working with 
David Bergman. For this, they worked with other agencies, 
including the HSE and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and 
subsequently one of the members was invited to speak at a Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) presentation 
(ibid.). DA continued to push for a draft bill on Involuntary 
Homicide to go before parliament in the following years.  
 
In 1997 and 1998 DA conducted a survey of the top FTSE 100 
companies to investigate how many mentioned health and safety 
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in their annual reports
16
. After a change in government in 1997, 
DA decided to publish a book on the need for corporate 
accountability in order to renew interest in the Corporate 
Manslaughter bill (ibid.). DA published The Case for Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Violence and the Criminal Justice 
System in 2000. Written by David Bergman, it argued that the laws 
on involuntary manslaughter should be reformed to encourage 
corporate responsibility. It formed part of a submission to Lord 
Justice Clarke’s Public Inquiry into the identification of Victims 
following Major Transport Accidents (Eyre and Dix, 2015).  
 
DA has focused its efforts on other official agencies that its 
members have come into contact with such as the coronial system. 
Desperate for information, loved ones found “key questions were 
being blocked” and instead they became “caught up in the 
personal, political and legal aftermath of disaster” (ibid.: 81).  
 
DA continued to try to influence the coronial system when its 
members participated in a campaign to retain the role of the Chief 
Coroner culminating in a charter published in 2012. This involved 
meetings and work with other charities including the Royal British 
Legion and members of the House of Commons and House of 
Lords. On the need for inquiries, DA took part in a consultation 
that resulted in the House of Lords Select Committee reviewing 
the Inquiries Act 2005, sharing the experiences of the members of 
DA (ibid.).  
 
To continue to contribute positively to the future experiences of 
those affected by disaster, DA made submissions to inquiries such 
as the Identification of Victims following Major Transport 
Accidents (2001).  
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 http://www.disasteraction.org.uk/publications/ 
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Unlike DA, the CCA did work with other groups such as the 
SJMC, for example in 2002 the centre joined the SJMC in a 
campaign that attracted a 100 strong rally through Brighton (called 
‘Life Before Profit – Stopping the Corporate Killers’). The rally 
united a range of campaigners, Simon’s family, the London 
Hazards Centre, and the CCA and representatives of the networks 
that had been created
17
. By that time, Anne Jones was a board 
member of the CCA. 
 
In a similar vein to DA, the CCA advocated and campaigned for 
policy changes on behalf of those killed, injured and suffering 
from an illness as a result of work. According to a case worker this 
involved:  
 
writing to agencies asking for them to change or 
clarify their practice in dealing with bereaved families 
or writing responses to government consultation 
papers about potential changes in the law, or meeting 
with policymakers to press for change (15).  
 
On a day to day basis, the centre utilised the media, “…through 
writing articles, carrying out interviews and updating the website” 
(15). David Bergman regularly wrote articles for the national 
press. The articles used the ongoing research the centre was 
carrying out to highlight the inadequacy of the current law, to call 
for a new corporate manslaughter law and to hold the HSE to 
account.  
 
As the main agency designated with responding to work-related 
deaths, the CCA was in contact with the HSE and regularly wrote 
about the regulatory agency in press releases. The CCA closely 
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 http://simonjones.org.uk/campaign/index.htm 
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monitored the HSE – its day to day activities, press releases and 
the decisions the government made that affected the body; 
decisions such as funding and the number of inspectors in the 
field. The CCA sought explanations when the HSE dropped cases 
the centre was involved with, and publicised any documents 
relevant to the reform of the corporate killing law. They 
encouraged members of the public to use the HSE and informed 
them of what to expect and how to complain effectively. 
 
The following are examples of how the CCA monitored the HSE’s 
daily activities; in 2000 the centre highlighted the low numbers of 
inspectors across England, Wales and Scotland, region by region, 
and contrasted this with how it was impossible for the agency to 
fulfil their responsibilities
18
. In 2002, a press release highlighted a 
fall in workplace inspections and what the consequence of this was 
as a percentage of deaths, major injuries and industrial diseases 
that were not being investigated
19
. In 2003, the CCA published ten 
years’ worth of complaints made about the HSE and concluded 
with advice on how members of the public could complain about 
the HSE as well as other government agencies
20
. Any new 
information relevant to workers and members of the public that 
was given to HSE inspectors was publicised and scrutinised by 
legal experts
21
. 
 
The centre continually used the HSE’s own written policy to 
contrast this with their actions. The CCA made it known whenever 
the HSE attempted to reduce the investigations into workplace 
major injuries and contacted them for clarification on why and 
how this related to their aims
22
. In 2008, the centre criticised the 
                                                          
18
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2001/27Feb.htm 
19
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/14Oct02.htm  
20
http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2003/13jan.htm   
21
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2003/Aug18.htm accessed 29/7/15 
22
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2003/11Aug.htm  
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HSE for failing to fulfil its obligations
23
. In one case in 2004 the 
CCA made public a report the HSE wrote about the inadequate 
health and safety practices of the Scottish Ambulance Service 
(SAS). When the HSE refused to recommend the Ambulance 
Service be prosecuted, the centre took it directly to the Crown 
Office in Scotland. Two years later, when they refused to 
prosecute, the CCA made a statement: 
 
The decision by SAS to make improvements in health 
and safety following the report are very welcome, but 
decisions by public bodies to comply with the law 
that they should have been complying with in the first 
place should not displace the need for criminal 
accountability when serious failures have been 
identified
24
. 
 
They made regular freedom of information requests to interrogate 
the reasoning behind the decisions the HSE made, which enabled 
the centre to access internal audits and statements issued to staff 
by the Chief Executive
25
. In May 2004, they drew attention to the 
fact the HSE had stopped investigating all accidents involving the 
public that were possibly caused by unsafe working practices of 
local authorities, hospitals, prisons and the police, which meant 
they were failing in their statutory obligation (Maguire, 2004). 
 
Debates were as public as possible. In February 2000, David 
Bergman replied to Jenny Bacon, the then director general of the 
HSE to argue against points she had made about their evidence 
based prosecution policy. Bergman used statistics about the 
number of companies that had escaped prosecution because the 
HSE could not afford to investigate:  
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 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2008/apr17hsepress.htm  
24
 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2007/jan22scotambulance.htm  
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 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2005/feb7public.htm; 
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The HSE’s “published prosecution policy” is simply a 
joke…corporations that kill or injure are immune 
from criminal justice simply because the government 
is not willing to fund criminal investigations and 
prosecutions (Bergman quoted in the Guardian, 
2000). 
 
The CCA’s relationship with the HSE was not always a critical 
one; when a HSE report concluded a new corporate killing offence 
would “improve safety and increase accountability”, the CCA 
publicised the report
26
. Reports written by the CCA were timed to 
coincide with national debates and conferences. They questioned 
the moves the government and the Health and Safety Commission 
(HSC) made in relation to policy that would have affected the 
safety and health of members of the public and workers. A report 
Making Companies Safe: What Works? authored by Dr Courtney 
Davis, (then deputy director of CCA) drew upon international 
research to call for an increase in inspection and enforcement 
rather than the move to voluntary guidance and compliance
27
.  
 
The CCA was at the forefront of this assistance, offering 
emotional support as well as being instrumental in pushing cases 
through the criminal justice system. It provided free, independent 
and confidential legal advice and assistance to families bereaved 
as a result of a work-related death. The assistance offered was 
“detailed and comprehensive” and could take “several years” such 
was the nature of the criminal justice response to a death at work
28
. 
Cases which had closed could come into the CCA’s remit for a 
short period of time but those families who contacted the CCA 
soon after the death of a loved one could be pursuing the case for 
years. A former caseworker reflected that as part of the CCA: 
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 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2003/19Feb.htm  
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 http://www.corporateaccountability.org.uk/press_releases/2004/sep12report.htm  
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We were part of a community of justice organisations 
and individuals working together to assist bereaved 
people.  We tried to live the idea of remembering the 
dead and fighting for the living (15). 
 
In order to fight for the living, the centre scrutinised the actions of 
the public bodies. At the time of the launch of the advice service 
for families, David Bergman stated: 
 
Families want to know that the Police, the Health and 
Safety Executive, the Crown Prosecution Service and 
Coroners are fulfilling their investigative and 
prosecution responsibilities. The Centre will advise 
families on what these are and how they can ensure 
that these organisations act in an appropriate 
manner
29
. 
 
Accordingly, the centre offered advice on the roles of the relevant 
agencies that investigated work-related deaths and determined 
whether or not criminal offences had been committed. Working 
with the law as it stood, the case workers at the CCA worked 
through individual cases, interrogating the health and safety laws 
and the offence of manslaughter to see if it could be applied. 
Crucially, this included ensuring any investigation was adequate. 
The caseworkers at the CCA diligently followed the cases to the 
end, for example, they regularly questioned the HSE for 
explanations when cases failed to reach court. For the years that 
they were open, the CCA became an invaluable source of 
knowledge and support to many families via this casework.  
 
Each of the groups chose different methods to achieve their aims. 
FACK protested, sought to raise public awareness, worked with 
unions and supported family members. SJMC was unique in that 
they actively campaigned for justice as Simon’s case was ongoing. 
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DA chose similar methods to FACK, for example, supporting 
family members and raising awareness but clearly stopping at 
protesting and sought to maintain political neutrality. The CCA 
were, as David Bergman intended, more combative than DA, 
working with other campaign groups and directly holding state 
bodies to account.  
 
The groups had varying aims, which all worked in the same 
direction, to change the law, to affect the current law and support 
family members. The following sub section will examine how the 
groups reduce the de-humanisation they themselves had 
experienced and for other families affected by later safety crime. 
 
The effects of creating or joining groups 
In addition to raising funds and identifying crucial contacts, 
families identified the comfort they drew from being around 
people who had very similar experiences to themselves. As 
detailed in Chapter Three and earlier in this chapter, families had 
to deal with sudden bereavement, (often of their children), whilst 
also negotiating a de-humanising legal process. In addition to this 
isolation, many friends from traditional social networks found 
their grief and experience hard to understand. Subsequently, many 
families found they were simply avoided, for example, one family 
felt that after losing their son their world had become smaller and 
it was “just the three of us” (1). No explanations were needed 
when in the company of other families. 
 
Members of FACK highlighted the fact that the: 
 
people in FACK are the only ones who know what it 
feels like to lose somebody under these sort of 
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circumstances so we have a common bond, if you like 
(6). 
 
the members help each other. If you can talk, they 
understand because it has happened to them whereas 
with other people, it is ‘get over it’…you can’t just 
get over it whereas, within the group, we all 
understand that as we have all lost loved ones (10). 
 
In the case of the SJMC, whose aim was to fight specifically for 
Simon, the highly visible nature of the campaign put Simon’s 
mother in contact with a wider network of people:  
 
without the profile of the campaign, I wouldn’t have 
got people to listen to me, because they kept it in the 
public eye, Channel 4 took it up…in 1999 or 2000 
(AJ). 
 
Anne began to receive emails informing her as to how she should 
proceed to find out the answers that had initially mobilised the 
campaign: 
 
[Members of the campaign] were forwarding letters 
and emails to me that they had printed off. All of 
them were saying the same thing, ‘tell her to contact 
Louise Christian’ (AJ). 
 
Louise Christian had worked on a number of high profile cases, 
starting with the Marchioness case and including the Paddington 
Rail Crash and Southall Rail Crash, which made her well placed to 
be taking a safety crime case to court. As a solicitor, money should 
still have been a barrier but this was circumvented as she offered 
to work for free. Louise Christian advised they start raising money 
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in case they lost the judicial review but she advised Anne to find 
money to pay the expenses of the barristers. Anne turned to the 
campaign group and their work to raise funds.  In response, the 
campaign group organised a night at Brighton Town Hall: 
 
[One campaign member] has a habit of knowing 
people and he bumped into someone at a party. I had 
‘phoned him and said we desperately need to do some 
fundraising. He said, “oh, we could do a comedy 
evening”. He got in touch with Mark Thomas and 
Mark said Jo Brand will come as well so we had the 
three of them. That evening raised £10,000…the 
money was in case it [the ruling] went against us 
(AJ). 
 
Anne reflected on how the members of the group affected her, “I 
was getting emotional support, emotional as well as physical 
support from them” (AJ).  
 
The group achieved the seemingly impossible when, (as detailed 
in the previous chapter), the CPS was forced to reconsider the 
decision not to prosecute. The case reached the Crown Court but 
once the defendant, Martell, was cleared of criminal charges, it 
could take the case no further. The group continued to protest 
against the decision until ten years after Simon’s death. 
 
As a member of DA, Pam Dix noted that the experiences the 
families went through were unique and led to unique relationships: 
 
The mutually respectful, trusting relationships with 
members of DA will last my lifetime; some of them 
are people with whom I can discuss the most difficult 
and darkest things without fear of being judged, 
diminished or dismissed…I have gained hugely from 
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knowing that we have been able to make a difference. 
As an organisation that is usually under the radar, DA 
(and I) have to take satisfaction in knowing that we 
were there, that without us the experiences of others 
would have been worse, in catastrophic situations that 
are beyond the imagination of most people…reaching 
towards being humble enough to learn from and listen 
to the experience of others and incorporating that 
learning into our work (14). 
 
This unique experience made the friendships many made stronger 
and members were motivated to fight for change together. 
 
As detailed previously, the CCA was not created by families who 
had been affected by a safety crime, although many did become 
involved, for example, they joined the board. Nevertheless, the 
experience affected the staff members: 
 
I still feel it was a privilege for me to work with 
bereaved families at a very difficult time in their 
lives.  I remain inspired by the strength and dignity I 
observed. I hope that I, alongside my colleagues, 
helped make things less lonely and intimidating for 
families, but I don’t know for sure that that is so (15). 
 
As illustrated above, being a member of a group had unintended 
positive effects for some of those involved. In the legal process, 
the families were silenced and treated poorly, they were isolated 
voices in the court that called for their loved ones to be treated 
justly. Through contact with other families, they found the support 
and understanding that was absent when they were individuals, 
facing the companies. 
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A common aim of the various groups was that all of them wanted 
to and felt they were well placed to aid the future victims they 
knew would be created. As identified and discussed in Chapter 
Three, by the end of the legal process, the families were 
experienced in the nature of safety crimes. Many reflected that 
they wished they would have known more and done things 
differently. Some felt guilt that they had not done enough to 
represent their loved one and had allowed the system to silence 
them. This caused long-term pain. The following sub section will 
explore the ways the groups countered the suppression they had 
experienced. 
 
The successes of the groups 
Whilst the process had ended for the majority of the families, they 
recognised they were in a position to be another family’s expert in 
the future and by offering advice, they could alter the outcome for 
another family. Or, at the very least, they could reduce the 
subsequent guilt they themselves had experienced by raising 
awareness of what the families should expect from the criminal 
justice system and the HSE. The ways each group supported and 
advised families will each be discussed in turn. 
 
Firstly, FACK defended the rights of families, for example, after 
an explosion killed nine in 2004, they fought for the families to 
see Public Inquiry report before any conclusions were drawn. 
They also stated via their website that to treat the incident as a 
‘tragic accident’ would be:  
 
250 
 
a gross misspending of public funds, and a tragic 
wasted opportunity to contribute to a major 
improvement in workplace health and safety
30
.  
 
Families were helped directly, for example, after the death of 
Christopher Knoop, in 2008, FACK held a vigil and supported 
Christopher’s sister outside the court. In this case, North West 
Aerosols Ltd were fined £2 each for two safety offences and £1 
towards costs because the company was not making a profit and 
had been put into liquidation after Christopher’s death31. The 
directors were not charged and following the verdict FACK used 
their website to comment:  
 
We feel that if Directors had positive legal duties for 
the H&S, then the individual Directors of this 
company could have been held to account in court
32
. 
 
Secondly, as a single issue group, the SJMC did not help victims 
of safety crime directly in ways similar to DA or the CCA but left 
a legacy that other groups, such as FACK have found useful. The 
website remains active and spells out to the families and friends of 
victims what they should do: 
 
1 DON’T CALL IT AN ACCIDENT 
2 GET A GOOD LAWYER 
3 KICK ASS 
4 FIND ANY WITNESSES 
5 CONTACT THE MEDIA 
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6 SEE YOUR MP 
7 THEN KICK ASS (PART 2) 
8 CONTACT THE CENTRE FOR CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY
33
. 
 
Thirdly, DA worked in different ways to help the families that 
contacted them. It offered emotional support and was a contact 
many found valuable in terms of being aware of their rights and 
procedures.  
 
DA provided an independent advocacy and advisory service that 
aimed to represent the interests of those affected by disasters. Pam 
Dix explained their focus was based on general principles and that 
they saw it as important to, “…give guidance, rather than advice, 
both to survivors and the bereaved as well as to the responding 
agencies (14)” This included offering views and sharing the 
experiences of members on police family liaison, identification, 
recovery, the viewing and release of bodies, the inquest process, 
death certification, compensation and obtaining disaster funding. It 
provided emotional support for survivors and the bereaved and 
guidance on creating support networks and survivor groups. The 
activities of DA since 1991 worked towards providing, “…non-
judgemental, practical advice based on our personal experience 
remains at the core of what we do.” (Disaster Action cited in Eyre 
and Dix, 2015:114).  
 
DA won various awards after 1991. It won the Society Guardian 
Charity Award in 2004 and the Nationwide Awards for Voluntary 
Endeavour in the adult category in 2005. Maurice de Rohan was 
named the Most Influential Executive in the Business Travel 
Industry in 2008. This was in recognition for his work that led to 
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the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act.  It was 
given posthumously (Dix, 2006). 
 
Fourthly, the CCA helped numerous families with their casework, 
which showed itself to be a popular and effective service to 
bereaved families. It was much larger than had been anticipated, at 
any one time there were 50 cases being processed by the CCA. In 
2007, there were 270 cases on the books, 150 of which were on-
going.  
 
The caseworkers and support from the CCA appeared vital to 
some of the bereaved families, one person widowed when her 
husband died at work said, “What would we have done without the 
CCA?” (2). In feedback to the Centre, a family member involved 
with the caseworkers reflected:  
 
You made me feel so much stronger and able to go on 
fighting for justice. 
 
he [the caseworker] was always ringing us or writing 
us or ‘do you need any more help?’  And afterwards 
he was really nice, he hoped we were ok
34
. 
 
In addition to the emotional support offered to the families, the 
CCA was crucial in pushing the cases forward, increasing the 
effectiveness of the bodies tasked with dealing with their cases. 
One caseworker said: 
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We helped a lot of individuals have a more 
satisfactory involvement in the legal processes 
following their relative’s death.  We helped make 
agencies think about the needs of bereaved people 
when doing their work (13). 
 
Family members whose cases were helped along by caseworkers 
said: 
 
they must be more powerful than they think because 
it started off a wee ripple, I then got a letter from 
health and safety with a name (6). 
 
Part of the skills they offered families were how to obtain 
knowledge about where to go, who to ask and the right questions 
to ask:  
 
I would advise them [bereaved families] to talk [to 
CCA] because that’s the only place there is to go, to 
talk to them first…because you don’t know the 
questions you’re meant to ask at the beginning (2). 
 
This was instructive in increasing the effectiveness of the cases, 
the earlier the caseworkers were involved, the more impact they 
could have. Some family members were more equipped than 
others but even those who accessed the relevant information were 
supported by the CCA: 
 
That’s why we were so grateful to the CCA because 
all of a sudden there was a light at the end of the 
tunnel, someone was going to help us, somebody was 
going to guide us through it to help us with the 
inquest…If it hadn’t been for him or the CCA we 
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wouldn’t have known what to do because there was 
nobody else would tell us what to do (1). 
 
The emotional support the presence of the CCA provided was 
noted as important at the stages where the family members found 
they were being met with dead ends: 
 
I think that first phone call with Maninder I just 
cried…I didn’t know anything; Maninder just 
probably saved my mental health…just 
listening…just letting me [talk]…I was being ‘Mrs. 
Keep everybody together’, so to have an opportunity 
where I wasn’t ‘Mrs Keep it altogether’, Maninder 
wrote letters and there was a list of questions (6).  
 
At the very least, the CCA offered moral support and showed 
relatives the path they could take: 
 
I think I did it for myself in the beginning; it’s just 
their moral support when you’re faced with the police 
and come up with some more questions from a 
different angle you hadn’t thought out.  It carries a bit 
of weight, in a way, that you’ve got other people 
backing you up (4). 
 
The CCA had the knowledge to inform families of procedures 
such as when the cases were going to ‘expire’, which would have 
made any further progress impossible: 
 
Maninder turned around and said because of the time 
limit thing you…should see a solicitor because that 
was stuff they couldn’t do from their side so we 
found a couple of solicitors…(2). 
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As a testament to the difficult work they were carrying out, the 
caseworkers stayed for a long time with the centre, even at the end 
of its operations when hours were cut in an attempt to prolong its 
activities, a board member reflected, “it was incredible that so 
many people stayed so long, as far as they could” (13). When the 
centre closed, the casework ended and in its place, the website 
offered archived information on the obligations of each public 
body from the police to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency with 
a copy of an advice leaflet
35
.  
 
Families were helped by agencies such as the CCA and many were 
concerned about the consequences of its closure: 
 
you can’t let that go, you’ve got to keep going.  It’s 
so frustrating, governments should be funding these 
organisations to help, because it’s the likes of us that 
need the help, the companies will just get the best of 
the best to work for them but we can’t afford a 
barrister, that’s what pees me off. If we were 
millionaires… (3). 
 
Each of the groups documented in this chapter helped families 
who were bereaved and going through experiences they had 
already been through or had knowledge of. In this way, they all 
minimised the isolation and subsequent guilt of the victims that 
came after them. Some groups did more than that, impacting on 
the cases and increasing the likelihood of justice. The following 
subsection will explore the political successes the groups had in 
terms of altering official processes that otherwise suppressed the 
victims and the families. 
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Changing the law 
Chapter Three identified and explored how the victims and the 
families of victims were suppressed.  This suppression attempted 
to construct the victims not as victims of crime, but as victims of 
misfortune. As victims of an accident they were portrayed as risky 
individuals who were doing something they should not have been 
doing. The ways in which the cases were suppressed was enabled 
by decisions made by the government and enacted by the law. 
Consequently, all of the groups were concerned with changing the 
way future victims were treated via the law. They sought to 
change it by firstly being aware of the way it was operating and 
secondly by engaging with the government and pushing for 
political change. From one group to another, this was achieved in 
different ways. 
 
The state was recognised as one of the main obstacles to FACK’s 
success and they consistently sought to apply pressure to enact 
change. They wanted to keep fighting for tougher laws and stricter 
enforcement of those laws as well as higher fines and more 
appropriate penalties for guilty employers. In addition, they fought 
for more funding for the HSE so it could deter and inspect 
employers before the deaths of workers: “Join us and help us make 
work safer and save lives, better safe than a broken heart”36. 
FACK sought a review of the way work-related deaths were 
investigated and the way families were treated. They urged people 
to have more rights at work (for example, safety representation) so 
they could protect themselves against unacceptable risks to their 
lives and health
37
.  
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FACK lobbied for changes to be made to the Corporate 
Manslaughter and the Corporate Homicide Bill 2010 and have 
expressed disappointment that it fell short of what is needed
38
. 
They wrote to ministers and called for public inquiries and 
encouraged anyone to lobby MPs and councillors to support health 
and safety at work. FACK responded to consultations, for 
example, “The Draft Charter for Bereaved People from the 
Ministry of Justice and Directors’ Duties at the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP). 
 
FACK wanted positive legal responsibilities to be introduced in 
the place of voluntary guidance, which they viewed as 
unenforceable. When legal duties were breached such as gross 
negligence, FACK sought custodial sentences for directors. They 
stated in a campaigning leaflet: 
 
We don’t want to see lots of employers in jail because 
that would mean lots of dead workers. We want the 
sanction of imprisonment because this is the highest 
punishment society metes out to wrongdoers, and it is 
clear that current law and enforcement, and voluntary 
duties on directors are not a credible deterrent to stop 
workplace deaths
39
.   
 
A member of FACK stated the necessity of prison sentences for 
the guilty: 
 
We are campaigning for more prison sentences, 
definitely, it is the only way, if you know you may go 
to prison for something, you will say, hang on, I don’t 
want to be in prison (11). 
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Ultimately, FACK wanted the government to listen and as one 
member hoped: 
 
that regulations will be changed and we will become 
stronger. If you take a life or put somebody’s life at 
risk and that person dies, you should be treated within 
the law, like anybody else who takes a life (10). 
 
In 2008, FACK met with Lord McKenzie at the DWP in a call for 
juries to be involved in all work-related inquests in England and 
Wales. In the same year, they responded to consultations, such as 
the Draft Charter for bereaved people from the Ministry of 
Justice
40
. As an example of success, one member stated, “We 
wanted Workers’ Memorial Day to be a National Day and to be 
recognised and we have got that” (10). 
 
As part of the SJMC, Anne Jones worked on the law as it 
developed. Whilst representing SJMC, Anne met with government 
members and was called to a Select Committee on what was to 
become the Corporate Manslaughter law after initially responding 
to the original proposal by the Law Commission. The SJMC 
responded critically to the draft bill for reform in 2005 and also 
consulted the following year with the Macrory Penalties Review 
Team. Anne continually wrote to MPs and the Prime Minister with 
the help of the campaign:  
 
Their energy kept things going. If it hadn’t been for 
their energy, I wouldn’t have started writing letters 
even to my local MP let alone Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown (AJ). 
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During its operation, the SJMC contacted Michael Meacher, which 
led to him expressing support publicly in 1998, when as a result of 
the campaign, he admitted on BBC radio that the government’s 
plans for protecting people at work were ‘not enough’ (Brooks, 
2002). Other visible and influential public figures also took the 
campaign further into the public domain such as George Galloway 
who referred to the group in the House of Commons to highlight 
the human cost of casualization, comparing the campaign to the 
Stephen Lawrence Campaign: 
  
The Simon Jones Campaign hopes to be equally 
successful in ensuring that the truth about 
casualization – that it is killing people for profits – is 
widely understood
41
. 
 
At the formal end of the campaign, the group reflected upon its 
success: 
 
We would like to restate what this campaign has been 
all about – ensuring that the circumstances 
surrounding Simon’s death were put in front of a jury 
and that the truth about casualization was exposed. 
We have achieved this…The Crown Prosecution 
Service have put obstacles and obstructions in the 
path of this prosecution at every turn. The Health and 
Safety Executive have consistently shown themselves 
to be either unwilling or unable to take the necessary 
action against employers to ensure the safety of 
workers
42
. 
 
The group was highly successful at exercising the law as it stood. 
Without their involvement, the case would have disappeared. With 
their involvement, the company involved in Simon’s death went to 
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court and received a Health and Safety fine and a ‘not guilty’ 
verdict that was difficult to understand. They revealed the truth 
about the circumstances of Simon’s death and fought for the case 
to go as far as they could possibly push it. Aware they were unable 
to prevent anything similar happening to another family in the 
future, they purposefully left advice online to help families who 
found themselves in a similar position. 
 
DA focused on changing the opinions of the official agencies who 
responded to corporate crime.  For example, members of DA 
began giving speeches to senior police officers soon after its 
launch. This included advice on how to be more caring and 
compassionate following a disaster. This drew on the experiences 
of members who spoke to police officers about how their contact 
with official agencies had led to further suffering (Eyre and Dix, 
2015). In 1992, Iain Philpott was invited by a Chief Inspector in 
the Metropolitan Police, Moya Heath-Wood whilst she was 
developing the Management of Disasters and Civil Emergencies 
course (MODACE). Moya Heath-Wood later left the Metropolitan 
Police and moved to work with the Red Cross. This led to DA 
contributing to the British Red Cross European Union project in 
supporting individuals in disasters in 2006 (ibid.). Work continued 
with the British Red Cross in 2009 as DA contributed to the 
Informed Prepared Together project where they set out guidelines 
for “the human aspects of disasters” (ibid.:145). The Informed 
Prepared Together project was based in Europe and was the start 
of DA working outside of the UK. Pam Dix participated at a 
workshop in Geneva, which was followed by further seminars at 
The Hague and in Milan (ibid.). 
 
DA specifically dealt more with the emotional after effects, 
notably experiences with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). 
With direct experience themselves, members of DA aimed to 
highlight that their response (campaigning and speaking out) were 
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not atypical of those dealing with trauma and sudden bereavement. 
DA counter stereotypes held that the bereaved are vulnerable and 
unhinged because in the past, members had been targets of 
unwanted psychiatric intervention. The prevention of future 
mental disorders became an important part of the work of DA. In 
acknowledging the “ripple effects of secondary traumatisation 
[caused by] the very systems set up to respond to disaster”, DA 
aimed to reassure individuals their reactions were acceptable, in 
some cases, usual and to inform them that the impact could be felt 
for many years after the initial disaster (ibid.: 73). This was 
achieved via the sharing of experiences of its members, for 
example, a leaflet was produced to: 
 
inform and help those who might go through similar 
reactions…to help friends and family members to 
understand the feelings of those close to them with 
personal experience of disaster (ibid.: 71).  
 
Members of DA worked with the National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE), provided personal testimonies regarding 
the experiences of those experiencing PTSD and were invited to 
speak to those training as mental health practitioners, counsellors 
and psychotherapists (ibid.). Following the London bombings in 
2005, Pam Dix sat on an advisory group that led to the first 
programme ever to screen those affected by disaster and treat 
those in need (ibid.). 
 
Other organisations began to invite DA to share their knowledge 
in “humanising policies and procedures” (ibid.: 46). The activity 
of presenting the experiences of the members to people who were 
likely to be involved in emergency responses was part of DA’s 
aim not to be frontline professionals but to positively influence 
those who were. DA remained in contact with the police and 
following the 2004 tsunami, a Chief Inspector from the 
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Metropolitan Police contacted Pam Dix to ask if the organisation 
would provide advice on matters such as the repatriation of 
survivors and bodies and communication with families and 
survivors (ibid.). They continued to offer bespoke courses on the 
human aspects of disaster. 
 
DA applied pressure to the government to waive the seven-year 
rule to allow interim death certificates to be issued for those 
missing and presumed dead following the 2004 tsunami (ibid.). 
Following the London bombings in 2005, DA persuaded the then 
Secretary of State to create a centre (Family Assistance Centre) for 
those affected. Two members gave oral evidence to the House of 
Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee on DA’s 
thoughts on the 2005 draft of the bill and some of their 
amendments were included in the final bill.  
 
Between 2006 and 2013, DA attempted to address the 
shortcomings of the coronial system and participated in 
consultations on the Draft Charter for the Bereaved in Contact 
with the Coroners’ Service, and Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
(ibid.). As part of a Ministry of Justice consultation with 
stakeholders, DA worked with other groups and made submissions 
which included the recommendation that,  “All coroners must be 
trained to see the bereaved not as a nuisance but as the people who 
have most at stake in the legal process” (ibid.: 89). 
 
There were many changes to DA during the time it was 
operational. Pam Dix sums up that the changes were related to 
“societal expectations” and “figures of authority (14)” She 
explains the DA found that in the 1980s there was a:  
 
263 
 
largely paternalistic approach that basically said ‘we 
know what is good for you’” and over the last decade 
and generation, this has started to change…There is a 
shift towards accepting that the ‘victim’ (a word we 
dislike and feel should really be used for those killed 
in a disaster) has legal and moral rights (14). 
 
DA continued to follow whether guidelines they had a role in 
producing were working effectively. For example, in the case of 
the design of mortuaries, DA fought for the families to be central 
but reflected this has been seen as less important in recent years 
and compromised for cost reasons (Eyre and Dix, 2015). As Pam 
Dix and Anne Eyre stress: 
 
Complacent statements such as ‘Society has changed, 
it could not happen again’ are not good enough: work 
must be done to ensure that this is the case – and 
remains so for the future. (ibid.: 173, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Dix counts its successes as: 
 
the passing of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 
Getting the authorities to recognise that identifying 
and addressing the needs of individuals affected by 
disaster should be at the heart of emergency planning 
and response 
The special relationships and mutual support 
developed through our experience of great adversity 
Creating a real, and lasting, corporate memory of 29 
disasters that would otherwise be missing 
More broadly, recognition of the fact that it is 
beneficial for people to band together if they wish to, 
and to make their own, informed, choices about how 
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they are involved in the aftermath of a disaster that 
has affected them (14). 
 
The CCA also called for the reform of the law, it is significant that 
the life of the centre spanned the proposals and implementation of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007).  
In 1997, the government announced their intention to reform the 
law on corporate manslaughter following years of campaigning by 
various interest groups. At the time of the creation of the CCA in 
1999, the government continued to promise a consultation on the 
law but progress had stalled. Subsequently the centre spent time 
continuing to lobby for reform of the law and was committed to 
the creation of an adequate law. 
 
For ten years the CCA kept up to date with all developments, 
using their website, conferences, press and maintaining contact 
with public bodies and the government. In 2000 the centre 
commented on ‘leaks’ for example when the government 
recommended the HSE would be given authority to prosecute 
companies rather than the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
43
. 
This leaked proposal materialised and the centre wrote to John 
Prescott days later to underline the reasons why this was 
concerning
44
. The centre also opposed the provision that the 
offence was not intended to protect workers and members of the 
public abroad from companies based in Britain. The CCA 
reviewed the election manifesto in relation to corporate 
accountability prior to the election in 2001
45
. 
 
In December 2001, David Bergman wrote in the Guardian about 
the case of Simon Jones and contrasted the number of deaths that 
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had occurred since the government had delayed on promises of a 
corporate manslaughter law: 
 
The government agreed four years ago to reform this 
archaic law and allow a company to be convicted via 
senior managers…During those four years, over 
1,500 people have died in work-related deaths: the 
executive has estimated that if the new offence had 
been in existence at the time of Simon’s death, 
perhaps 40% of these deaths could have resulted in 
prosecutions of companies (Bergman quoted in the 
Guardian, 2001). 
 
In 2002, the CCA publicised that the Home Office had written to 
private companies to seek their opinions on the potential effects of 
reform of the law. They examined the letter for any sign of 
implementation of the law and expressed further concerns:  
 
It is being suggested that in the new offence the 
company’s failures will be measured against 
“industry standards” even if the industry standards are 
inadequate
46
. 
 
The CCA also expressed concern that crown bodies would 
continue to be immune from prosecution, an issue that would 
persist and cause disagreement amongst the campaigning network 
that had been created. The proposal to provide immunity to crown 
bodies would not affect many of the bereaved people the CCA 
dealt with. However, the centre was clear they did not support 
crown immunity and aligned with other groups for whom the 
move would affect, such as INQUEST. The CCA pooled its 
resources and sought legal advice, which they sent to the Home 
Office. It concluded: 
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Any reform to the law of manslaughter must apply to 
all employing organisations – including Crown 
Bodies, and not just companies – in order for the 
Government to avoid being in violation of its human 
rights obligations according to human rights lawyers 
at Matrix. 
 
the CCA has produced a briefing indicating that there 
should not be any practical difficulties in prosecuting 
unincorporated bodies, and indeed the law contains 
provisions for such prosecutions at present
47
. 
 
The CCA and David Bergman consistently featured in the press in 
response to the action and inaction of the HSE and the corporate 
manslaughter law. They watched the Queen’s Speeches for signs 
of reform of the law and examined speeches made by the Prime 
Minister and ministers around criminal justice. In October 2003, 
David Bergman wrote to the Guardian with DA’s Pam Dix to 
highlight the lack of a corporate manslaughter offence. He 
contrasted the lack of laws with a statement of David Blunkett 
where he stated it was a miscarriage of justice when a guilty 
person escapes justice. Together, Bergman and Dix called for the 
then Home Secretary to announce a forthcoming bill in the 
upcoming Queen’s Speech (Guardian, 2002). Since proposals for a 
new law did not materialise in the Queen’s speech, Bergman and 
the CCA were back in the press in July 2003, commenting: 
 
current manslaughter law does not allow the 
prosecution of companies where there is a gross and 
systematic management failure, but where there is 
insufficient evidence to prosecute any senior 
company official individually for manslaughter
48
. 
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After Tony Blair announced at a TUC conference in 2004 the bill 
would go forward, in what could have be seen as a victory, 
Bergman reflected that:  
 
These delays now mean that legal reform appears 
dependent on the Labour government winning the 
next election
49
.  
 
When the draft bill was announced in 2004, the CCA publicly 
posed a number of questions to the government such as whether 
crown bodies would be included and who would investigate and 
prosecute the offence
50
. The centre welcomed the publication of 
the draft bill the following year, repeating concerns as part of the 
consultation process
51
. The concerns were namely about crown 
immunity and were voiced alongside the co-director of INQUEST. 
When the draft of the bill was published in 2006, Maggie Robbins 
(who had taken over as director from David Bergman) 
commented: “We welcome that a bill has finally been introduced 
but feel the bill may be fatally flawed”52. Once again the centre 
sought legal opinion, which they published as the bill was 
discussed in the House of Lords. When the House of Lords 
supported an amendment to ensure the Bill would drop elements 
of crown immunity, the CCA wrote to them and urged the 
government to pass the Bill: 
 
The Bill is far from being perfect in the CCA’s eyes – 
but the new offence represents some improvement on 
the current law
53
.  
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Once the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide bill 
had passed through the House of Lords, the centre welcomed the 
move, “we do think it will increase the chances of greater justice 
and accountability for work-related deaths”54. Soon after, they 
continued to be critical of retrospective clauses which meant the 
law could not be applied for some years, “People have failed to 
recognise the significance of these clauses – and how they will 
delay this offence”55. The CCA closed soon after the publication 
of this press release and consequently the centre has not been able 
to judge the effectiveness of the reformed law.  
 
Whilst the CCA were not consulted directly by the government, 
they persisted in their calls for the law to come to fruition. When 
at times it seemed as though it would disappear altogether, the 
CCA pushed for the government to deliver on promises they had 
made in the shadow cabinet. They also did their best to shape the 
law and to raise its visibility long after the press and the public had 
moved on to other issues. This was a long and protracted process, 
for example, the then deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott 
commented in 2000 that he would “bring in a new piece of 
legislation which will take into account…corporate manslaughter 
arguments” consulting with “all parties that are concerned” (BBC, 
2000). Whilst the CCA did not have a seat at the table, they were 
most definitely a ‘concerned party’ who made their voice heard in 
the newsletters they produced, the conferences they organised and 
the press releases they published. 
 
The CCA published a quarterly newsletter that provided detailed 
and up to date information on safety and law enforcement called 
the Corporate Crime Update (CCA, 2007). This was sent to 
subscribers and handed out at conferences. In the newsletters, up 
to date information about work-related deaths was covered, 
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including criticisms of the HSE, articles written by board members 
and members of the advisory council, statistics on how the fines 
given to companies compared to their turnover and international 
comparisons on enforcement, accountability and sentencing 
(Newsletters No. 23 Spring 2008 and No. 24 Summer 2008). The 
front of each newsletter detailed clearly the number of deaths in 
the three month period the newsletter covered and contained 
further details of each death on the back page.  
 
As noted above, the CCA organised conferences around Britain, 
which brought together ministers, employer organisations, trade 
unions, academics, bereaved families, lawyers and various 
speakers
56
. Bereaved family members regularly attended and were 
able to meet people who could help them, from groups such as 
FACK to meeting suitable solicitors (6). The conferences had 
themes such as ‘Law Enforcement and Corporate Accountability’, 
‘Manslaughter Investigations into Work-related Deaths’ and some 
were held jointly with the Trade Union Centre (TUC) and 
INQUEST
57
. The conferences raised issues, applied pressure, 
hosted debates and provided a platform for the families. 
Organisations such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
and union representatives were invited and able to argue their 
point of view in a public forum along with board members and the 
advisory council of the CCA. The CCA were pivotal at bringing 
groups together at crucial times, for example when the National 
Audit Office (NAO) began an inquiry into the role of the HSE in 
improving health and safety in the Construction Industry, the CCA 
held a seminar and invited trade unions, stakeholders and bereaved 
families to discuss the issues
58
. 
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One of the successes of the CCA lay in their research ability. This 
research was useful to academics who gained access to 
information via the Centre. “It was the key resource for 
investigations by the trade union movement that contributed to 
parliamentary select committees for about 4 or 5 years” (14). The 
accuracy of the statistics that were gathered highlighted the 
inadequacy of the system, for example, the lack of directors who 
were being prosecuted for manslaughter following a work-related 
death
59
. 
 
The daily information recorded by two part time workers into 
deaths at work, happened at a time when the HSE did not publish 
such information. In 2008, the Information Commissioner (IC) 
forced the HSE to provide the CCA with the details of those who 
had died in work-related deaths following the start of an inquest
60
. 
It was a major success that the HSE then began to publish their 
own monthly statistics detailing work-related fatalities. This 
information is now available on the HSE website. As their 
experience with case work grew, the knowledge of the centre 
became “more valuable and expert” (15) and they were able to 
compel the HSE to action: 
 
I think what it was, we had the HSE come down and 
that was due to the pressure from the CCA and we 
had them here and they finally gave us information 
that we wanted to know (3). 
 
As part of advocacy for the families, “the Centre had an impact 
politically”, this became more important in the absence of any 
other provision (15). The CCA responded to government 
consultations, which were published on their website. They 
included the original government document, their own response, 
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what other relevant organisations had to say and the action that the 
government subsequently took. This covered a wide range of 
issues related to workplace safety, from changing the language 
around ‘accidents’ (to ‘incidents’) and to altering the code of 
directors.  
 
The Centre influenced the revision of the Protocol of Liaison in 
England and Wales (1998) in 2002. Prior to its publication, deaths 
at work did not necessarily involve the police as it was seen as the 
HSE’s role to solely investigate. The Protocol of Liaison was 
crucial to bereaved families whose cases would have struggled to 
reach the prosecution stage without a police investigation and the 
evidence needed to convict. Although as this research evidenced, 
the Protocol was not rigorously upheld. 
 
After the CCA began working with the Public Law Project (PLP) 
in 2004, the two organisations offered training for solicitors, 
members of trade unions and advice workers raising awareness of 
the unique issues related to workplace and public safety
61
. This 
was crucial in an area where few solicitors had sufficient 
awareness of safety crime. 
 
The CCA influenced the changes made to the Regulators 
Compliance Code. Unhappy with its tone, the Centre criticised it 
and by keeping the issues public, the government improved the 
code by inputting a new section that stated the HSE can prosecute 
criminal behaviour that threatens genuine business corporations
62
.  
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The CCA responded to proposals by the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC), bringing together the statistics they had 
compiled and concluded with their own recommendations
63
. In 
2005 the CCA investigated proposals made by the Health and 
Safety Commission (HSC) that would have led to deaths of 
members of the public rarely being investigated
64
. This 
information was only uncovered when a caseworker asked the 
HSE why they were not investigating the death of a victim as part 
of their casework
65
. The centre called for advice from two public 
law specialists who deemed the proposals as ‘unlawful’66.   
 
When the role of the Coroner was reviewed in 2002, the CCA 
worked with other groups to ensure the families of victims of 
work-related deaths had the right to an inquest with a jury at a 
time when the Home Office proposed the removal of both
67
. 
 
The Centre was part of the corporate accountability movement that 
led to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 
(2007) “we contributed to the Corporate Manslaughter Act making 
it onto the statute book” (13) keeping it in the public eye and on 
the political agenda when it may have been sacrificed or 
compromised upon (15). The Centre interrogated the law as it 
stood and called for change by focusing on key details. When the 
Centre first opened, it gave evidence to the Environment Select 
Committee in November 1999 on the lack of HSE investigation, 
how this was different between regions and provided a set of 
questions the MPs could pose
68
. They utilised the facts they had to 
ask key questions such as:  
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Only 10% of major injuries investigated result in a 
prosecution. Do you think, in light of all your studies 
that indicate that 70% of workplace deaths are the 
result of “management failure” that in only 10% of 
major injuries investigated, there is sufficient 
evidence to prosecute?
69
. 
 
The Centre was created after the Labour Party had continually 
made a “number of legislative promises in the area of safety and 
accountability”, notably to change the law on safety 
manslaughter
70
. For many involved in the movement, the new law 
was not as effective as hoped, a board member reflected that the 
success of the Centre should not be judged by that law, but that the 
model for achieving justice was still sound (13). 
 
He noted that the families benefitted from the centre but: 
 
so did everyone who was involved in it as a social 
movement…notably, Hazards became a stronger 
force with the unions following the work of the CCA 
(13). 
 
He commented that each group that worked alongside the CCA 
had similar aims and so they strengthened each other and 
increased the likelihood of success (13). The CCA firmly placed 
itself with other interest groups: 
 
we have stood shoulder to shoulder with bereaved 
families, trade unions, and other health and safety 
organisations…As part of a broad coalition 
campaigning for increased accountability following 
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deaths, CCA has never acknowledged any separation 
of these deaths from other occupational fatalities
71
. 
 
Countering political obstacles and suppression of safety crime was 
an ongoing project for all of the groups involved in the corporate 
accountability movement. One of the largest successes most of the 
groups had is in the ways in which they have supported other 
families through the de-humanising process. Rather than being 
isolated and confused, the groups detailed here provided family 
members with a structure of what to expect from the official 
processes and assisted them through it. Rather than being denied 
as secondary victims, they found support through the members 
and/or workers of the groups detailed in this research. 
 
The success that the groups had in countering political obstacles is 
difficult to measure. The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act (2007) was enacted and was influenced by many of 
the groups featured in this chapter. The extent to which it is what 
people had hoped for is doubtful. Their influence on the current 
government depends upon how well placed they are to respond. 
For example, whilst open, the CCA were well mobilised to counter 
the government on a day to day basis. Funding allowed them to do 
this. After the centre shut, any impact on future legislation and 
vital support offered to families stopped. Too many of the groups 
depended upon the actions of the members and devoid of funding, 
it was only the will of individuals that maintained resistance. 
 
All of the individuals in these groups worked for hours, either 
throughout the entire operation of the campaigns or prior to their 
creation. Gaining long term funding is a task that has to be at the 
forefront of any group as families return to lives taken up with 
family and work. As was the case in the CCA, they had a wealth 
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of experience and knowledge but had to close due to issues with 
funding. Whereas other groups, such as Victim Support are co-
opted by the government (Mawby and Walklate, 1989), it is 
inconceivable that any group related to safety crime will ever 
achieve the same status or that this would be conducive to their 
aims. Instead the groups were started by the families of workers 
and depended wholly upon their efforts as they worked through 
their own cases whilst coping with sudden bereavement.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Whereas the previous chapter focused on the ways the families 
were wounded by existing social and legal practices, this chapter 
focused on the ways in which some families altered the ways they 
were harmed following the death of their loved one at work or 
through a work-related activity. Through their membership to a 
group they rejected the suppression and the de-humanisation that 
had been inflicted upon them.  
 
As Chapter Three showed, the social and legal obstacles the 
families of victims of safety crime faced meant that companies 
were exonerated. They were not judged to be criminal, but the 
process that enabled this, hurt the family members both during the 
process and in the years after. The victim was made to be 
‘nothing’ and the voices of mothers, fathers and brothers were 
silenced. The lack of control and suppression of the truth was far 
from the justice the family members expected, deserved and 
needed. 
 
Each of the families knew what would have constituted justice in 
their own cases. There was a large gap between this and what they 
left the process with. They felt most informed and prepared 
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towards the end of their own case and they recognised, whilst the 
experience they had gained could not help them, it could help the 
future victims they knew would be created. The injustice they 
suffered and, in the name of their loved one that had been 
forgotten in the official process, they were spurred on to put this 
knowledge to good use and to fight for change with other families.  
 
Once they connected to others who had been similarly bereaved, 
family members found a number of similarities. Together, the 
plight of the families and their desire for change was strengthened 
and they were driven onwards to address the injustice. Each 
subsequent campaign group had a series of common aims, which 
they approached in different ways. Some campaigned directly 
against the government, whilst others worked with government 
agencies. All attempted to positively change the processes and 
stereotypes they had experienced.  
 
The degree to which success could be measured could be seen in 
three effects. Firstly, the benefits the groups offered to individuals 
righted some of the de-humanisation they experienced through the 
legal process. Secondly, the various groups offered support and 
advice they had found lacking for other families as they began the 
legal process. This minimised suppression of the truth and may 
also have reduced the personal responsibility the families took on 
after justice failed. Thirdly, the groups pushed for political change. 
For some groups, they played a part in the strengthening and 
creation of new legislation, such as the Corporate Manslaughter 
and Corporate Homicide Act. For others, their tenacity was in the 
day to day counter hegemony they offered to the various agencies 
involved in safety crimes. For one group, this ended when the 
funding ran out, leaving behind a wealth of valuable information 
and halting an essential service to the bereaved. The remaining 
groups faced a choice to either work with the government utilising 
funding to continue, or to continue to function on the will and 
effort of families that have been bereaved. It was their choice to 
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continue to dedicate their own time and resources to the movement 
and/or continually recruit new members. 
 
Groups such as these were and are, the main hope for countering 
the suppression, the silencing and de-humanisation of victims of 
safety crimes. The implications of this for the future position of 
safety crime will be the discussed in Chapter Five.   
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Chapter five 
 
 Suppression and challenge 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Three focused on the development of the safety crime 
victim and how they were blocked socially and legally through an 
examination of the experiences of the families. Chapter Four 
focused on the families that created or joined various groups to 
fight for change. This chapter will explore the findings of the 
previous two chapters and revisit the original aims of the research, 
with insights from the literature review.  
 
The discussion that follows will be organised around the original 
research questions: 
1. What social, legal and political obstacles does safety crime face 
that prevent it from becoming defined and treated as a crime? 
2. How are the victims and families of victims of safety crime 
treated by law and key institutions of the criminal justice 
system including an examination of the police, Inquest , Health 
and Safety Executive, Crown Prosecution Service? 
3. What effects does this have on the families of victims? 
4. Under what circumstances do families of victims seek to 
develop more general campaigns, with what aims, and with 
what degrees of success? 
 
 
Invisibility: social and legal obstacles 
 
No crime: the role of the state in official accounts of safety crime 
As discussed in Chapter One, there is now a body of literature that 
reflects the seriousness of safety crime. Research has referred to 
279 
 
cases such as the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise and the 
Paddington train crash. Whilst these cases are better known, many 
more individuals are affected by mundane cases such as those 
featured in this research. Reconstruction of fatality data estimate 
that up to 1,474 individuals were killed at work (or immediately 
after) in the UK in 2014/15 (Hazards, 2016). The cases are almost 
‘routine’ as according to data from Hazards (ibid.) approximately 
four individuals are killed in the workplace or because of work-
related incidents every day in the UK. 
 
The crime that is committed by corporations is not reflected in 
statistics collected officially (Nelken, 1994) and as seen in chapter 
one, where it is counted by the HSE, the official statistics are 
flawed (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). One of the ways safety crime is 
shown to be resistant to detection (Croall, 1992) was in the case 
where the victim was not a worker, but a member of the public. 
Weeks after his death, his wife was informed that her husband’s 
death had been recorded as a road traffic incident (RTI). The wife 
responded with a letter co-written by her father, a retired police 
inspector, to state their objections and outline their reasons as to 
why the case should be subject to a police investigation (4). The 
death of her husband was duly investigated by the police and was 
the only case in this research to secure an unlawful killing verdict 
at the subsequent inquest. Yet it was only included in the HSE 
data and merely reached the coroners court because of the 
undeterred will of two family members. It is impossible to know 
how many other cases of safety crime have been wrongly defined 
and recorded as road traffic incidents, excluded from HSE data 
and not subject to a police investigation. 
 
However the death is counted officially, safety crime affects many 
individuals beyond the 1,474 killed as the event spreads out, 
reaching family members and friends in ways that alter their lives 
irrevocably as Rock (1994) documented in the case following 
homicide. Yet this widespread harm is barely reflected in 
280 
 
criminology or the media. Families in this research were 
previously unaware of the existence and potential of safety crime. 
Fear of crime, defined as the “anticipation of victimisation” 
(Smartt, 2006: 27) has demonstrated how in general, women are 
more fearful than men, the elderly are more fearful than the young 
and that crimes such as robbery and attacks on the person invoke 
more fear than other crimes (ibid.). Fear of crime is felt most by 
those individuals likely to fit into the ‘ideal victim’ mould, which 
does not typically include victims of safety crime (Christie, 1977; 
Whyte, 2007). 
 
Families had not feared for their loved ones at work. For example, 
upon seeing the police officers at the door, more than one family 
member expected their loved one had been in a road traffic 
incident. As Steven Box (1983) noted in Power, Crime and 
Mystification, “There is more to crime and criminals than the state 
reveals. But most people cannot see it” (Box, 1983:15). Families 
were not fearful but happy, proud their loved ones were working 
and earning money. Many referred to what hard workers they 
were, for example, “he was a good worker, I mean we had loads of 
people come forward and say how helpful he was” (5) and 
“someone knew [the victim’s] reputation…he wanted him because 
he was a good worker” (3). Being a worker was a positive act, 
working hard for a living was aspirational and something to be 
proud of. 
  
Unforeseeable and routine  
The trust the families put in the companies was implicit, most did 
not question their loved one would be looked after and not put in 
harm’s way. Companies are inevitably placed in a position of trust. 
One victim was an apprentice who had taken employment as part 
of his college placement. At 18-years old, he was inexperienced 
and the words of his father echoed sentiments previously 
discussed about what it meant to be a respectable worker, “[he] 
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had worked with me for a year before he went into that 
garage…he was a good little lad” (11). Crucially, as a young 
apprentice, his father expressed, “Whatever you asked him to do, 
he would get on and do it. He just wanted to please.” Once put into 
a risky situation, the desire to be a good worker and being keen to 
please as a teenager starting out work, his father recognised he 
“wouldn’t have questioned…if he was told to give this manager a 
hand, he would have gone off and done it” (11). Doing what was 
asked of him and helping his manager who assumed a position of 
trust, led to his death.  
 
One victim did question his employers. On the day he was killed 
he had suspected he and his colleague were not safe and stopped 
the work. He was wrongly reassured and, with his colleague, was 
sent back to his death. The victim had done everything reasonable 
to protect himself but ultimately had to trust his employers in his 
subordinate position as an employee. Another victim was working 
his notice due to his concerns about the lack of regard for safety 
shown by his employer. Companies “affect or…infect” every part 
of our lives” as the costs fall on the most vulnerable (Tombs, 
2015: 18, emphasis in original).  
 
Families might not have feared that harm would come to their 
loved ones at work but after their deaths, all of the families 
reflected that it was not a random event or as a result of 
circumstances that were wholly unpredictable. For example, prior 
to his death, one victim had brought home a piece of paper in his 
wages that provided information about the death of another 
employee in an almost identical incident that was to kill him. The 
two victims who were killed as members of the public were 
involved in an incident that had happened many times before and 
many times since. The two youngest victims were hours and days 
into working on jobs of which they had no prior experience in or 
training for, and the act that killed them both was obviously risky. 
Their deaths then were not ‘acts of God’ but were caused by acts 
282 
 
and decisions taken in the interests of the employers rather than 
the employees (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). The company is 
created to make profit with a “dehumanising structure of 
irresponsibility” that is a “necessarily a-moral, calculative 
rationality” (Tomb and Whyte, 2015: 158). The reasons for the 
deaths could be attributed to a number of decisions taken to create 
short cuts and in order to maximise profit, thereby suggesting 
safety was not a corporate priority. For example, in one case the 
company had successfully won a bid to complete the work for half 
the price of competitors. They were able to slash the bid by 
forgoing the safety of the workers. In another case the director had 
modified the grab himself to make it more ‘efficient’. Such 
decisions were not viewed as criminal by the companies 
themselves and attributed back to the victims. The families had 
been proud of their loved ones for being good workers for the 
companies, above and beyond what was required to receive a 
wage. When those workers became victims, they were only useful 
to the companies as they sought to avoid blame.  
 
Workers in general are largely unaware they are potential victims 
of safety crime, which increases their vulnerability. For example, 
they are unaware that union representation is worthwhile and for 
many, a necessary protection, something groups such as FACK 
have attempted to raise awareness of. This is also one of the 
functions of Workers Memorial Day, which takes place annually 
on the 28
th
 February. When families were faced with the death of a 
loved one, when the trust they put in the companies failed them, 
they expected the state to defend their loved one and to punish.  
 
State intervention is facilitated through its institutions and agents, 
for example, the people who work within the criminal justice 
system and in the case of responses to safety crime, the HSE. The 
way they respond reflects how seriously the state views safety 
crime. The response of those working in the criminal justice 
system featured in this research expressed the view that the deaths 
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of the victims were accidents and not criminal. This was explicitly 
voiced in more than one case and widely unchallenged by the 
institutions themselves. This is an obstacle for families who are 
bereaved as a result of a workplace killing – the construction that 
the death is automatically an ‘accident’ and not criminal. This 
trickled down through every institution the families came into 
contact with. This will be evidenced in the following sections.  
 
Numerous opportunities to reject the label of ‘criminal’ 
The companies rarely considered the thoughts and feelings of the 
families or the victims after the deaths and often acted in poor 
taste, focusing on the needs of the companies. One director 
ordered that work continue around the body of the victim so the 
work would be completed in a timely fashion. He advised 
employees who had witnessed the death of the victim, to wash his 
blood off the materials that were to be sold (Hansard, 3
rd
 March 
1999 col. 1046). A common occurrence shared by the families and 
felt as a great insult was that the employers sent wages to the 
families of their loved ones omitting to pay the victim for the day 
of their death, actively failing to think about the feelings and grief 
of the families. Geis observed that safety criminals are devastated 
when treated like traditional criminals (cited in Gobert and Punch, 
2003). This was reflected in the research when one director reacted 
furiously when the coroner referred to him as partly responsible 
for the victim’s death to the extent that his barrister had to have 
him removed from the court (3).  
 
In the immediate aftermath, some families were dealt with 
respectfully. For example, one family was invited to the workplace 
(10) and another company set up a young apprenticeship award in 
the name of the victim (1). However for the majority of families, 
the conduct of the companies worsened as time passed. Families 
were moved around the court (6), legal representatives were 
thanked in front of the families for ‘getting them off’ (10) and 
284 
 
companies bargained for a reduction in fines that the families were 
already disappointed with (11). Ruggiero observed that “Powerful 
offenders develop their own collective super-ego informing their 
practices, their views, expectations and interactions with others” 
(2015: 53). The powerful offenders in this research were 
emboldened by the court procedures to pursue profit. For example, 
it is standard practice for fines to be reduced following a guilty 
plea and for plea bargaining to take place. When families 
witnessed this, they were disgusted and insulted, partly because 
the fines already seemed paltry to them and to argue over them 
was a further insult. Yet any decision taken by the company not to 
enter into negotiations in the court would have been outside of the 
realms of what the law encourages and expects. Had the 
individuals in the companies chosen not to attempt to reduce the 
fine imposed by the court, they would actively have forgone profit, 
which is against the central goal of any company. It might be 
argued that restorative justice might be preferable in this context. 
However, that is not something raised by any of the victims or 
groups working in the area of safety crimes, nor was it raised by 
any of the families. 
 
Tombs and Whyte note that “corporate executives are unlikely to 
shame themselves for corporate crime or to experience shaming 
through their peers” (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 66). The 
intervention of the process and the professionalism of the court 
(Christie, 1977) appeared to increase ‘cognitive dissonance’ 
(Gobert and Punch, 2003: 29). For example, a director who was 
injured in the incident expressed remorse in the immediate 
aftermath. He had cried and hugged the mother of the victim, 
expressing it was his fault and apologising. This changed by the 
time of the court case when he claimed he had been unaware of 
what the victim had been doing and that his own injuries had been 
caused by trying to save the victim. There was little evidence of a 
corporate conscience that prioritised the wellbeing of employees 
over the need to make a profit. In the cases in this research, the 
actions of the companies in firstly committing the crime, and 
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secondly distancing themselves from the event afterwards, were 
enabled by official processes. Further, in a “society that 
embraces…the increasing commodification of all human 
relationships” the distance the court creates increases the 
likelihood of future occurrences of safety crime (Wright and Hill, 
2004: 117). 
 
In the majority of cases state agencies did not treat the companies 
as criminal. The police officers did not approach the scene of 
death of the victims as they might the suspected scene of a crime. 
Criminal activity was linked to whether there appeared to have 
been any ‘foul play’ and once this had been discounted, the police 
initially withdrew from every case but one. In managing the site as 
an ‘accident’, or a matter for the HSE, a regulatory body, the 
police often blocked opportunities for the deaths to ever be framed 
as criminal, for example, by failing to collect evidence. This view 
was so persistently held by police officers that they overrode their 
own protocol.  
 
The Protocol for Liaison was enacted in 1998 and was in operation 
in all but one of the cases. It applies to “cases where the victim 
suffers injuries in such an incident that are so serious that there is a 
clear indication…of a strong likelihood of death” and compels that 
“Each fatality must be considered individually” (HSE, 1998: 5). 
The police should take a central role and “assume primacy for an 
investigation and work jointly with other relevant enforcing 
authorities” (ibid.: 5). As demonstrated in Chapter Four, the police 
can have a huge impact on the future success of the case in court. 
Two of the companies were treated with suspicion by the police in 
the immediate aftermath. A further two companies were treated 
this way by the police after they were compelled to do so, in one 
case because of an appeal made by the wife and father-in-law of a 
victim and in another case, by a campaigning group set up to 
pursue justice in the name of the victim. 
286 
 
The police are useful for examination as they have increasing 
power over the victim as the case progresses (Davies, 2003). The 
families of victims of safety crime in these cases were not aware 
of their substantive rights and were unable to demand the police 
applied policies rationally (Sanders and Young, 2000). Access to 
the scene was not restricted in three of the cases and individuals 
were able to enter and leave the premises, which meant that the 
victims were not protected. Parents in one case discovered that for 
insurance purposes, two individuals had taken pictures of the 
scene, including their son after his death and had developed them 
at the local chemist (8). This was only revealed to them when an 
employee of the chemists came forward after recognising the 
victim once a campaigning group became active. 
 
Not sealing the scene also meant it was open to manipulation, 
which had the potential to interfere with the facts and the truth. 
When the police set up an incident room months after the death 
and returned to the workplace to collect a key piece of evidence, 
they found it “wasn’t there anymore” (8).  This goes beyond the 
actual scene when part of the evidence needed to convict is in the 
offices of companies. In more than one case, risk assessments 
were lost, one ex-partner of a victim was told by her solicitor that 
this is commonplace (2). Similarly, as covered in Chapter Four, 
many of the families felt documents had been completed after their 
loved one’s death. In many cases, the delayed police involvement 
against protocol meant that statements were taken months and 
years after the death of the victim. Anniversaries, Christmases and 
birthdays passed without any contact from formal agencies. Many 
family members assumed these delays were a sign that a thorough 
case was being put together, some were told (wrongly) this 
directly (1). This suppressed the facts of the situation and was the 
first step in the construction of the event as not criminal but an 
‘accident’ caused by the victim.  
 
287 
 
This research did not explicitly attempt to uncover how the police 
approached the companies in each of these cases, for example, 
whether they approached them as potentially criminal. However, 
the fact that in the majority of the cases the police failed to secure 
the scene to maintain the integrity of any criminal evidence 
portrays that the scene was treated differently to the scene of 
conventional crimes or for example, in road traffic incidents 
(RTIs). In RTIs, the road is shut until the victim has been removed 
and evidence has been collected. It is not unusual in cases of 
safety crime for work to continue around the victim and as 
mentioned previously, work continued around the victim in at least 
two cases. For RTIs, it is the death that triggers an investigation 
before the scene has been analysed, the opposite was true in the 
cases in this research.  
 
Culpable worker, innocent company 
Through a failure to restrict access to the scene of the death and 
therefore to collect evidence for further investigation, the reaction 
of the police indicated to the company that they were not under 
suspicion. The majority of the companies were given the benefit of 
the doubt by the authorities who then began working in co-
operation with them, rather than approaching them with suspicion. 
The companies were given rights by virtue of the prevailing 
discourse. The dominance of this discourse over ruled official 
guidance. After finding an employee had died, the first encounter 
that the companies had with an official body failed to treat them as 
potential criminals. Instead in most cases, the police framed the 
company as incapable of being complicit in the death of the 
victim. This had two main effects.  
 
Firstly, any shame or responsibility the company may have felt in 
the immediacy of the victim’s death was quelled by the reaction of 
the police. The police approached each scene to investigate 
whether there had been ‘foul play’ equating only that with 
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criminality. In the words of David Bergman, an example of ‘foul 
play’ is “whether the deceased worker was pushed from 
scaffolding or into dangerous machinery by an angry workmate” 
(1991: 18). In the majority of cases once it had been established no 
‘foul play’ had occurred, the police left the scene. The open scene 
was an indication from the police that the workplace death did not 
warrant criminal suspicion and confirmed to companies that they 
were innocent of any criminality.  
 
Secondly, the lack of formal action taken by the police in failing to 
seal the scenes and in taking evidence, effectively suppressed 
evidence. The companies were unlikely to take it upon themselves 
to treat their workplaces as potential crime scenes but instead to 
take the opportunity given to them to continue as normal. With no 
evidence, the cases were almost impossible to prove in a process 
that would eventually lead all of the families in this research to fail 
to secure justice in the crown court. With no one held responsible, 
each case became officially perceived as many police had initially 
viewed it: an accident.   
 
The law as ‘lex imperfecta’  
 
Blocked: the inquest 
Although not the place to apportion blame, the inquest was 
approached carefully by the companies who all sought an 
‘accidental verdict’. This was achieved by being selective of the 
truth from the experts chosen to represent them and the evidence 
they presented. Families were surprised that ‘experts’ and ‘facts’ 
which to them had gaps, were often inaccurate, went unchallenged 
and instead became part of the official narrative. In a similar 
manner to the police, some coroners appeared to think what had 
happened to the victim was an accident and focused only on ‘how’ 
the victim died (Bergman, 1991). The lack of evidence was not a 
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barrier in the lead up to a narrative of ‘accidental death’. Many 
coroners accepted the lack of evidence as ‘fact’, worked within the 
self-determined limits of the corporation (for example, accepting 
that witnesses were unavailable) and took the ‘accident’ label, 
which the police had applied and made it official. Coroners 
selected information and witnesses to support this presupposition 
and in doing so, disregarded the families.  
 
Of the seven families that had an inquest, all but two ended with 
an ‘accidental death’ verdict. All of those families felt that this 
was not an appropriate verdict and referred to the truth being 
misrepresented. Evidence in Chapter Four showed how the facts 
were selected and suppressed. Of the two cases to secure an 
unlawful killing verdict, it is difficult to pinpoint with certainty 
how they avoided verdicts of accidental death. However, the 
following peculiarities were noted.  
  
The first case was unique because it had a full investigation by the 
police who went to the headquarters and charged board members 
(after the wife of the victim had appealed the original decision that 
her husband’s death was an RTI). At the inquest, where the wife of 
a victim represented herself, she was able to question every 
witness and prior to the jury’s decision, the coroner did not sum 
up. The wife in this case reflected that she thought that this was 
because the coroner was new. In the other case to secure an 
unlawful killing verdict, the mother of a victim utilised the fact 
that jury members shared toilet facilities with the people in the 
gallery and used this as an opportunity to ensure they were aware 
of the “rules and regulations of what juries can and can’t do” (9). 
This led jury members to assert their rights to the coroner. She had 
taken the decision to do this because she had previous experience 
with the coroner whom she described as 
“unscrupulous…extremely unkind and ruthless”, which led her to 
“fight fire with fire” (9).  
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In both of the cases above, the women intervened in the process, 
they used the rights that existed but were not automatically given, 
rights that relied upon their intervention. Without the intervention 
of the first woman, her husband’s death would have been counted 
as a road traffic incident, it might not have been subject to an 
inquest or certainly an inquest with a jury (Roadpeace, 2009). The 
second woman featured in the previous paragraph had already had 
negative experiences with the coroner and so had taken it upon 
herself to research coroner law. She spotted an opportunity to 
force the coroner to adhere to the rules by affecting the jury. Many 
family members would ordinarily not know how to do this, nor 
have the opportunity to. Further than this, they would not expect to 
have to do this. 
 
Blocked: the crown court 
Not all of the victims featured in this research had an inquest 
because their cases went straight to the crown court. Although this 
is an option, the harms that companies cause are not the focus of 
the criminal justice agenda in general. This can be seen in the 
strategies the government use in order to reduce conventional 
crime. The strategies focus on a particular type of offender and 
offence and crucially on individuals committing crime. The law is 
a significant discourse and although it has continually altered, it 
continues to be presented “as an authoritative, unitary, unchanging 
entity, a neutral, objective tool” (Naffine cited in Bittle and Snider, 
2006: 472). For example, when Tony Blair and the New Labour 
government talked about being ‘tough on crime and tough on the 
causes of crime’ (Blair, 1995), they focused on achieving this via 
policies such as the New Deal, Surestart, OfSTED, the National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal and the Anti-drugs Co-
ordination Unit (Home Office cited in Cook, 2006). These 
measures were not aimed at powerful, corporate offenders but 
relatively powerless, poor individuals.  
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The state discovers many crimes annually, crimes that process: 
 
our contemporary catalog of “monsters,” including 
sex offenders, gang members, drug kingpins, and 
violent-crime recidivists, forms a constantly renewed 
rationale for legislative action (Simon, 2007: 77). 
 
The difference between traditional and safety crime is presented as 
such for good reason, because the “conditions are as they are” and 
demands respect from the wider public (Mathiesen, 1980: 86). 
Relatedly, the government responded to the ‘war on gangs’ by 
using the joint enterprise doctrine. This allowed groups of people 
to be prosecuted when they were not present at the offence but had 
a ‘common purpose’ (Williams and Clarke, 2016). The enactment 
of this law disproportionately affected and criminalised young 
Black, Asian and minority Ethnic men (ibid.). No such law was 
evoked to deal with safety crime. The criminalisation of old white, 
rich men was avoided. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the families of victims were previously unaware 
of the concept of safety crime, in spite of the fact that becoming a 
victim of safety crime is not a distant threat for people, either 
through their employment or as members of the public. It is more 
surprisingly however, that many of the agencies tasked to help 
them were also untrained, unaware and novices in responding 
appropriately. The law in action was continually interpreted by 
officials in the criminal justice system that the family came into 
contact with (Snider, 2003). In the absence of training and 
awareness, many relied upon ‘common sense’ notions and as the 
police officers did, immediately framed the death as accidental. 
The framing of the deaths as accidents and self-caused had 
continued consequences throughout the process that handicapped 
the case from ever achieving justice.  
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This research supports Punch (2009: 66) when he branded the laws 
that relate to safety crime as ‘lex imperfecta’, designed not to 
work. The law is created to exist in theory but not to work 
effectively, so that few companies are ever punished or 
prosecuted. This outcome is not accidental but as a result of a 
number of processes. As a construction, it is designed and enabled 
by the state and fortified with every case that takes that path.  
 
The burden of proof required to prosecute companies is high 
(ibid.), and in this research this was affected by the failure of the 
police to collect evidence. It was coupled with a lack of, or 
delayed, investigation, which fatally affected the likelihood of any 
case. It cannot be known if the cases featured in this research 
should have had justice at the crown court because the 
opportunities for justice were blocked before they reached that 
stage. It was insufficient evidence that stopped the majority of the 
cases from getting to the crown court, according to the CPS. The 
three cases that reached the crown court to hear manslaughter 
charges failed because of the pervasiveness of the narrative that 
workplace deaths are all accidents. This was demonstrated in three 
ways, through the suppression of evidence, the presumption that 
the director was innocent of criminality and the complicated law 
created to respond to safety crime.  
 
Firstly, the families of those whose cases reached the crown court 
had similar experiences to the families who attended the inquest in 
that evidence was suppressed and selected. One of the cases that 
reached the crown court failed because the CPS failed to build a 
strong case. For example, they did not refute the company’s claim 
that no other workers had been killed on the site, despite the 
victim’s brother having discovered that this was a lie following a 
web search. In another instance in the same case, the defence 
attempted to argue the victim had been killed by a bang to the 
head prior to the explosion. The family were incredulous that the 
company were trying to argue this but were unable to counter the 
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claim. The cause of death could not be ascertained because the 
victim’s organs had been lost. Like any other member of the 
public, the family could not have foreseen this malpractice nor had 
they any control over this. Even if they had foreseen it, they had 
no option but to put their trust in the official bodies that ultimately 
failed them and went on to insult them, when challenged.  
 
Secondly, another case failed because the officials first called to 
the scene of death assumed it was an accident and presumed the 
innocence of the company and director. The family had a solid 
case, built by a thorough police team and the CPS and had seen the 
owner of the company convicted and sent to prison. However, on 
appeal three judges acquitted and subsequently released the 
director from prison because officials at the scene did not treat the 
director as a suspect and failed to caution him under (1984). The 
director was told by the appeal judges to leave the official process 
as innocent and with his reputation intact. Since the case had been 
dealt with in court, the family did not have any right to an inquest. 
 
Thirdly, the nature of proving mens rea years after the offence 
proved too large an obstacle to overcome in the final case. This 
was a case that according to the CPS was not initially deemed to 
be strong enough to get to crown court. Through a group started 
by friends of the victim, the family successfully won a judicial 
review that overturned that decision. They reflected they “were on 
a high” (8) and began to gather evidence retrospectively in the six 
months they had prior to the court case. Once again, delays were 
crucial as the length of time between the death of the victim, the 
investigation and the court case was mentioned in the summing 
up, in favour of the director: 
 
Remember the events were a long time ago. There 
may be danger of real prejudice to the defendant. 
Memories fade, and people can’t remember with 
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crystal clarity the events of years ago…The delay of 
three and a half years may affect some witnesses’ 
memory Are they lies, or are they genuine mistakes? 
Remember the time lapse…If there are innocent 
reasons for lies, then you must ignore the lies 
(SJMMC, 2001). 
 
In another case, the report of an inquiry held back from 
recommending any disciplinary action against the person in charge 
because of the amount of time that had elapsed, and on human 
rights grounds (9). 
 
Simon Jones was working at Euromin Limited when he was killed. 
Euromin were/are a supplier of products used in the construction 
industry. Dutch owned, they are the UK operating company of the 
holding company De Hoop Terneuzen BV. Typical of the 
evolution of business in a neo-Liberal, de-regulated dock industry, 
Simon was working three organisations removed from the 
company that would have ultimately paid his wages that day 
(Tombs and Whyte 2007). The owners of Euromin were located 
outside of the UK, which complicated proving mens rea and 
confirmed Gobert’s (2008) statement that only small corporations 
would be held criminally responsible for safety crime. The judge 
was clear about what was required of the jury were they to find the 
director guilty: 
 
If you are not sure of Mr Martell’s guilt, you must 
also find Euromin Ltd not guilty. If you find Mr 
Martell guilty, you can only convict Euromin Ltd if 
you are sure that Mr Martell was acting as the 
company, that is, that he was the company’s 
controlling mind. Ask yourselves if Mr Martell in 
reality embodied the company’s operations at 
Shoreham…For the Defence…argues that Martell is 
not the controlling mind of Euromin; he is simply an 
employee. Euromin is not a one-man company. He 
reports to directors in Holland…Mr Martell speaks 
for the company (this is not to say that he is 
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necessarily its controlling mind; you must decide 
this.)
72
 
 
The law has not developed to overcome the necessity of 
establishing mens rea in the case of safety crime. The proof 
required to establish mens rea was absent in all but one of the 
cases even though half of the cases involved small businesses. The 
one case that met the criteria in court, before being quashed, 
involved the director being onsite and working alongside the 
victim on the job that killed him. There are few cases of deaths at 
work that ever meet this requirement. For example, five of the 
cases involved more than one company, either because of 
subcontracting or agency work. At least three of these companies 
were multinational corporations where the director could be 
located outside of the UK, far away from the scene of death. With 
the emphasis on locating mens rea, victims of safety crime are 
never going to be regarded as victims of real crime, according to 
the law (Wells, 2009).  
 
The cases bore out that the law is about ‘deniability’ (Punch, 2009: 
51), which is easier to achieve for companies. Deniability is 
achieved through suppression of the truth, as detailed later in this 
chapter. Details about the context of the deaths and links to wider 
motives of profit and gaining a competitive edge were often 
suppressed. Relevant details that attempted to illustrate the context 
that led up to the death of their loved ones and connected the death 
to the wider context of profit and gaining a competitive edge were 
suppressed (Pearce, 1990b). In order to reach an official 
judgement of innocence, the truth of the deaths had to be 
manipulated by the companies, which was enabled through state 
processes, from the police to the crown court. The families saw the 
truth denied, altered and suppressed, to suit the needs of the 
companies (Punch, 2009). In the absence of truth, the companies 
were able to control and shape past events in a rush to frame it as 
non-criminal in the eyes of the law (Box, 1983).  
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Law is a powerful discourse and in the case of safety crime, it 
reproduces power (Bittle and Snider, 2006). After the Bhopal 
disaster, the company exercised power over the employees and 
silenced them, before going on to blame them (Pearce and Tombs, 
2012). The company had the money to pay for legal 
representation, power to influence politics and were in a position 
to deflect blame onto those subordinate to them. The companies 
exercised power over the families featured in this research using 
those working within the legal system to deflect criminalisation 
and finances to utilise the legal process. This will be outlined 
below. 
 
Power was wielded by the companies in the cases researched. For 
example, one company threatened a family by stating that if they 
pursued the court case they would lose civil claims for 
compensation for the victim’s young daughter (10). Such 
bargaining tools are unavailable to conventional accused parties. 
The court case was not only stopped but to the horror of the 
family, the company returned to the court to be officially judged as 
‘not guilty’ and the case was duly dismissed from court. The 
company left the court as an innocent party and for that family, in 
spite of protestations after they realised the implications, that was 
the end of the process. The company had successfully negotiated 
its innocence. 
 
Those with power were able to protect themselves, using the law 
rather than being prosecuted by it, for example, in one case, three 
witnesses from three different companies who were involved were 
granted immunity from prosecution. When the family asked why 
this was, they were told it was necessary to “get them on side” 
(10). The families were shocked and stunned by the process, 
unable to explain the processes of the court and unable to 
challenge decisions that were made, they had to witness and play 
no part. On more than one occasion, the family believed there was 
something else going on that accounted for the warm reception 
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that the owners, as the accused, received within the court. One 
mother described it as, “wheels within wheels” (9). Many families 
commented that they were part of an unfair game, one which they 
could not win and which in all cases but one, ended with the 
public proclamation of the innocence of the company. The 
families had a minimal role in the proceedings and as such they 
were: 
 
not always silenced, but…how they are allowed to 
speak, and how their experience is turned into 
something the law can digest and process, is a 
demonstration of the power of law to disqualify 
alternative accounts (Smart cited in Ballinger, 2003: 
221). 
 
Punch observed that because judges have more in common with 
the directors in terms of class in that they benefit from ‘social 
capital’ (Punch, 2009: 51). Though part of normal practice in 
court, one family described how they were shocked the judge gave 
the director a character reference when he was unable to provide 
one himself. This was detailed in the judge’s summing up as 
follows: 
 
You have heard that the defendant is of good 
character, is 59 years old, and has never been in 
trouble. This is evidence which you should consider 
in his favour. He has given evidence himself. His 
good character may mean that he is less likely to 
commit offences.
73
 
 
The good character outlined by the judge was linked to his 
propensity to offend. In addition, the director was distanced from 
the traditional criminal (Punch, 2009) as the judge described how 
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he had “found the police interview frightening and he felt himself 
under pressure”74. 
 
Not readily positioned as criminal, all of the companies involved 
in this research were given opportunities to deflect criminalisation 
and charges of corporate manslaughter. The state allowed the 
companies to avoid viewing themselves as criminals (Gobert and 
Punch, 2003). All of the companies in this research resisted legal 
criminalisation and continued to operate as businesses and as 
employers. Going through the legal process must have been, in the 
very least, bothersome to the companies, but it is questionable as 
to how much it deterred them from taking such decisions 
regarding the safety of their employees in the future. Not forced to 
see the victim and the victim’s family as affected by the decisions 
made, dissonance between the companies and the death of the 
victim was perpetuated (ibid.). Indeed, a death occurred at one of 
the sites and in a similar manner only months after the victim 
featured in this research. 
 
The affordability of justice 
For the families researched, finances were a crucial bargaining 
tool as the companies and the families navigated their way through 
the criminal justice system. Many family members had lost the 
main breadwinner to the incident that claimed the life of their 
loved one, and therefore had to pay for a funeral and a wake with 
little or no compensation. They then faced the legal process and 
found they were in a difficult position of not being able to afford 
legal representation, access to court documents (which 
strengthened their ability to fight) and simple practical 
requirements such as the ability to pay to travel at peak times of 
the day during their working day. This was juxtaposed against the 
company, who had comparatively little difficulty in hiring legal 
representation secured from insurance, getting access to 
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photocopies of court documents and being able to appear in court 
without fearing for their own economic livelihood.  
 
One mother of a victim who attempted to take her case further 
commented: “It’s about what they don’t tell you” (9). When she 
applied for legal aid, she was not aware that this meant any assets 
she had were accessible, this included life insurances, saving 
schemes and her house. She was not told that if she lost her case, 
she would be liable for the charges. Even when she won, she was 
responsible for covering the solicitor’s costs, which amounted to 
£8,500. This would have cost her even more had she not asked for 
the receipts from the opposition’s solicitor who had claimed for 
taxis when he cycled everywhere. She compared herself to the 
position of the wealthy, “I’m absolutely broke, really have no 
money…and yet Maxwells and the Guinness’ have it” (9). 
 
In the Jones’ case too, the family were granted legal aid when they 
raised a judicial review to challenge the decision of the CPS. 
However, they were still required to save and spend money. 
Firstly, they were advised to get funds together in case the contest 
was unsuccessful and damages were sought. They had to fundraise 
to do this, using the connections the friends of Simon had. 
Secondly, they were sent monthly bills, money which they 
reflected, “We were supposed to get that back at the end when we 
won but they never sent it back. Alright, it was a few hundred 
pounds but it would have been useful, we were pretty well on our 
uppers” (AJ). Unions including the T&G and Unison donated 
funds even though Simon wasn’t a member of any union. In 
another case, an ex-wife of a victim had to pay £3,800 for the 
solicitor, which matched the costs of the funeral that had involved 
paying for the travel of family members who lived outside of the 
UK. She expressed, “You get caught in this trap…they should 
have legal aid…for the…person that’s died…to appoint a solicitor 
to represent the person that died” (2). The availability of money 
meant the cases were more likely to succeed and that 
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accountability could be upheld. In the absence of money, the 
families had to get into debt, just to participate in the process and 
meet the minimum requirements of the court. Few had enough 
access to money to push the case further, one ex-wife of a victim 
reflected “To be honest, would we have gone any further? I think 
we would have if we’d had a bottomless purse” (2). 
 
Money was linked directly to power and class. One owner of the 
companies paid for the costs of the funeral of the worker who 
died. When, at the inquest the prosecution attempted to prove the 
victim had died as a result of a mechanical and not operational 
fault, the owner referred to the money he had spent. The father of 
the victim recalled that in court the owner shouted, “I’ve done 
everything for them, I’ve paid” (3). For him, his ability and 
willingness to pay for the funeral led to outrage when his company 
was questioned in court. 
 
Finances affected the families’ ability to disagree with decisions 
that were made about their cases. The ability to circumvent and 
overturn decisions made by the CPS and the courts depended upon 
money. Many families wanted to appeal and change the outcome 
but were forced to walk away, and accept the official judgement 
because they did not have the finances to officially disagree and 
oppose. Mathiesen notes: 
 
The freedom which exists is in principle open to 
everyone. The point is, however, that in practice only 
those who in fact have the resources required to use it 
can take advantage of it…the freedom which exists 
formally is reduced to a freedom for dominant 
interests (Mathiesen, 1980: 113, emphasis in 
original). 
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An example of this was one case where a company (the largest in 
all of the cases) had prepared leaflets ready to distribute at the end 
of the inquest to inform the public of their intent to launch a 
judicial review (4). This was juxtaposed with another family who 
was told launching a judicial review would be ‘foolhardy’ (1). 
Whereas the company could take that decision knowing they could 
afford it, the family knew that taking such action could jeopardise 
their economic wellbeing and the future security of their family. 
The unequal access to justice reflects the lack of recognition that 
safety crime has received in the law, what does exist is symbolic, 
“Even if the law is broken, it is clear whose law it was” (Gusfield, 
1970: 11). 
 
The state and business as inextricably linked 
It is the state that put the company above the victim in the eyes of 
the law yet it was the state that the families turned to for justice. 
They were unaware, or unable to identify, that the state and the 
company were inexplicably linked. State institutions continued to 
present themselves as “independent, free and detached from the 
material conditions to which it actually adjusts” to maintain its 
“matter-of-course authority or prominence” (Mathiesen, 1980: 92). 
To quote Box:  
 
ordinary people [are made] even more dependent 
upon the state for protection against ‘lawlessness’ and 
the rising tidal wave of crime, even though it is the 
state and its agents who are often directly and 
indirectly victimizing ordinary people (Box, 
1983:14). 
 
The belief of the families in the neutrality of the state and faith in 
its ability and willingness to represent their loved one had a 
number of consequences for the cases and the families themselves.  
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Firstly, the families trusted in the process, though they had no 
knowledge of what to expect, they automatically relied upon the 
state to fight for their loved one and to mobilise against the 
corporation. By the time they realised the state was not 
representing their interests, and in many cases not following the 
procedure that did exist, the case had gone too far to be retrieved. 
The majority of the family members blamed and chastised 
themselves for trusting official agencies or not doing more, for 
example, “I put all my faith in our justice system and that was so 
ignorant of me” (10) and even though many realised “there was 
nothing else you could do” (2), the guilt that they felt in hindsight, 
that they ought to have realised earlier and acted differently on 
behalf of their loved ones, remained long after the companies had 
been found innocent. 
 
The criminal justice system plays a crucial part in denying the 
existence and seriousness of safety crime. The victims were denied 
by the state and filtered out of the legal system. Each case in this 
research shared the official judgement that the companies were 
innocent of corporate manslaughter. Cases were acknowledged but 
importantly, they all failed publicly. The failure of each case in the 
legal arena is a success of the criminal justice system in creating, 
rather than reflecting crime (Reiman, 1998). It is crucial that this is 
acknowledged for safety crime when boundaries of offences: 
 
shift according to factors such as media 
preoccupations; prevailing popular or political 
perceptions of social problems, risk and danger; 
availability of resources; bureaucratic and other 
constraints on police and prosecution (Lacey, 1998: 
7). 
 
Were we to rely upon definitions of law, the subsequent lack of 
justice would discount these experiences from ever being relevant 
at all (Tappan, 1977).   
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Emasculated health and safety law 
The ‘war on crime’ has never included families or victims of 
safety crime (Whyte, 2007). The unthinking war imagery that is 
waged on criminals where rationality can be dispensed with 
(Sontag cited in Best, 1999) has however, been declared on red 
tape: 
 
Conservatives in government are winning the war on 
red tape….like the Red Tape Challenge, which has 
now seen over 1,000 regulations scrapped, we’ve 
saved firms £1.5 billion a year…we’ve freed 
thousands of businesses from unnecessary health and 
safety inspections, prevented responsible employers 
from being held liable for those workplace accidents 
that are outside of their control (Hancock, 2014: para 
one).  
 
It is clear what a war on red tape entails, it is the arbitrary 
reduction of regulation that saves businesses money, fewer 
inspections and the assurance employers will not be held liable.  
 
By choosing to respond to safety crimes with regulation and 
policing via regulators, there is an acceptance that these crimes 
require a different, lesser approach (Slapper and Tombs, 1999). 
For example, regulation would never be suggested for burglary. 
Regulatory responses play a clear part in failing to recognise those 
killed as victims of crime. A regulation has been breached and, 
although the consequences are grave, they are far removed from 
the cause and the actions of an offender. The meta-physical gap is 
a significant feature of regulation, the companies might have made 
a mistake but it was just that, an oversight and not a crime (Wells, 
2001).  
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The discourse that the health and safety culture has “gone way 
beyond what was intended” (Grimsby Telegraph, 2014: para 1) is 
pervasive. The government actively support the ‘elf and safety’ 
ideology by decrying the lack of ‘common sense’ as affecting 
responsible employers (James et al., 2012). This is reflected in the 
continuous cuts to funding of the HSE and the reduction in the 
number of inspectors (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). In support of 
enterprise, successive governments have encouraged the use of 
compliance where an increasing number of prosecutions are 
viewed as a bad thing. What the statistics do not show are the 
victims and the families who are affected by this ideological 
assault. For every breach of health and safety and death at work, 
there is a victim created due to weak and non-existent regulation. 
For every victim of safety crime, there is a family who are 
bereaved. These are the individuals whose needs are never 
prioritised and who live with the consequences. 
 
Regulation has been reduced to a symbolic gesture offered to the 
families, a lesser sanction that acknowledges harm has, but should 
not have, taken place (Carson, 1974). For the families in this 
research, formal justice in the crown court failed in all of the cases 
and fines became a consolation prize. The fines were low enough 
to insult the families further, which more than one judge 
recognised. Judges apologised that the fines they handed out to the 
companies were determined by factors outside of their control. 
The symbolic gesture was not adequate enough to show public 
disapproval and its lack of rigour in either deterring or punishing 
the companies, harmed the families of the victims who had died. 
They felt wronged and without any public show of disapproval or 
agreement, many felt isolated further, compounding bereavement.  
 
Regulation was often led by the assessment of risk, the degree to 
which the company had foreseen and acted upon risk. The 
judgment of risk was assessed in the court by the presentation of 
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risk assessments. It was a low threshold that proved adherence to 
health and safety regulations, which was checked after the deaths 
but not interrogated (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). Many of the 
families expressed doubts about either the location of the lost risk 
assessment or whether it had been completed or seen by their 
loved one at all. This paper based proof had little impact on the 
court and was easily circumvented, rendering it a tool only for the 
corporations. For example, training was said to have been done, 
which for one ex-partner of a victim, she was sure it had not (2), 
and it was acceptable for one manager to say that he noted the risk 
assessment in his head (10). 
 
The inadequate responses from the HSE continued in the sanctions 
that were delivered and for some of the families recommendations 
made were mitigated further and produced confusing messages. In 
adhering to regulations, the companies worked within the limits 
that were set for them (Box, 1983). In one example of this, a 
family was told the company did not and would not alter their 
working practices as a result of their son’s death because that 
would mean they were working to ‘best practice’. ‘Best practice’ 
was beyond the statutory duties that were required of them. 
 
The majority of the families acknowledged the health and safety 
inspectors had a difficult job to do, to the extent that one of the 
families spoke to a Cabinet Minister on their behalf (8). 
Companies were able to thwart investigations (Croall, 1992). For 
example, evidence failed to be gathered promptly by the HSE and 
the involved parties refused to give statements when they were 
approached 18 months after the victims’ death (2). Families, with 
grace, considered that old work colleagues of their loved one 
would have nothing to gain from giving statements that may 
implicate their employers. When families found themselves 
waiting over two years, many attempted to ask questions about the 
progress of their cases. Such enquiries were largely met with 
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frustration and their enquiries were dismissed as a nuisance. 
Families in two of the cases spoke very favourably of the 
inspectors assigned to them, describing them as thorough and 
close enough to consider them as a friend of the family.  
 
Of the 11 cases, five ended with fines under the Health and Safety 
at Work Act (1974). Due to the nature of subcontracts, across 
these five cases, ten companies were involved. After bargaining 
for a reduction in sentencing, for example, after companies were 
shown leniency for pleading guilty to health and safety charges, 
the average fine across these ten companies was £34,000. The 
extent to which the fines reflected the seriousness of the death or 
reduced future risk taking is debatable. For example, one company 
who was prosecuted under health and safety offences received a 
fine that was 0.000432% of its reported turnover for 2015 (the 
company was fined a few years earlier). This is the equivalent of a 
person who earns £26,500 per anum being fined £11.46. 
 
Prosecution was seen as a last resort (Hawkins, 2002). Two 
families were wrongly promised that their cases would be heard on 
health and safety offences. One ex-wife of a victim was told by the 
HSE that although they had tried to get more statements, without 
additional evidence from the corporation “they didn’t feel they 
could go any further” (2). The HSE in this case, “apologised for it 
taking so long, but said they’d tried to keep the continuity up” (2). 
One family was informed that a senior figure in the HSE had taken 
the decision not to prosecute because it was “not in the public 
interest” and because he was worried it would cause ‘knee jerk’ 
reactions in companies across the country if they attempted to 
resolve the fault that had killed their son (1). Another father of the 
victim was told the HSE had met with the company, he hoped they 
realised the implication of “how close they came to prosecution”. 
The father of the victim was left to hope the company took safety 
more seriously after his son’s death reflected in “a [safety] record 
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that’s gleaming”. He reflected “…but I have no idea” (3) because 
he had no further contact from the HSE. 
 
In another case that was not prosecuted by the HSE, a health and 
safety inspector visited the home of the mother of a victim and 
informed her that the death of her son was an accident that was 
self-inflicted (5). This immediately and devastatingly for the 
mother, diverted all attention away from the scene of his death or 
the reasons that led up to it (Tombs, 1991). It was common for the 
victim to be implicated in their death, for being risky (2), for doing 
something no one was aware of (3) and for not being 
conscientiousness enough (7). The person who died was treated as 
the main source of risk (Pearce and Tombs, 1989; Tombs, 1991) 
and after their death, the HSE saw raising awareness as the best 
solution, rather than shutting down the companies or imprisoning 
the directors. The truth was suppressed and companies were able 
to “bow out of the scene”, their responsibility fading as the victims 
were implicated in their own deaths. 
 
Not in the public interest 
The main reason given for lack of action was that the cases were 
“not in the public interest”. ‘Not in the public interest’ was a 
phrase often repeated by the agency when questioned by the 
families. What the families desired was against what was good for 
business and therefore, good for the public in general (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2009). Business was good, justice for the families was too 
much of a risk and expensive to pursue when the cases were not 
considered winnable (Hawkins, 2002). There is an irony that the 
lack of immediate involvement of the police and the ability of the 
companies to eradicate, change or conceal evidence leads to 
protracted investigations where the required proof becomes more 
elusive (Croall, 1992). This increases the cost of any subsequent 
investigation and provides enough reason for the HSE not to 
pursue the companies for health and safety offences. The ability of 
308 
 
wealthy companies to use the best legal teams they can afford to 
exploit the ambiguity of the law that relates to safety crime 
offences only increases the costs (ibid.). It is ‘not in the public 
interest’ because the limited powers and finances afforded to the 
HSE by the government are no match for many comparatively 
powerful perpetrators. 
 
The companies were able to continue their business and make 
profits with few negative consequences. There is value in the 
maintenance of what is criminal, and uncovering the truth in 
workplace incidents could harm the company and its ability to 
meet its financial goals and maintain profitability (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2015).   
 
The rhetoric of regulation and ‘red tape’ had a reinforcing effect. 
Regulation has not been prioritised by the government, but 
continually reduced. It is likely the current government will 
continue its neo-liberal campaign in the same manner it did as part 
of the coalition. The symbolic gestures of fines and probationary 
orders that the families in this research were offered may be more 
than families of future victims will see. The way the victims and 
families of the victims of safety crime were treated at every stage 
of the criminal justice system, slowly and incrementally filtered 
them away from justice. As Tombs and Whyte note: 
 
none of the various mechanisms whereby safety 
crimes are rendered relatively invisible are 
particularly remarkable in isolation. What is crucial, 
however, is their mutually reinforcing nature – that 
is, they work in the same direction and to the same 
effect, removing these crimes from ‘crime, law and 
order’ agendas (Tombs and Whyte, 2007: 69, 
emphasis in original). 
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In this way, the criminal justice system enables business goals that 
prioritise profit over the safety of individuals (Slapper and Tombs, 
1999). 
 
The next section will examine the forgotten effects this has on the 
families of the victims. These are ‘unofficial’ accounts, not 
publicly validated, unlike the verdicts given to the companies.  
 
The state as a suppressor 
 
Numerous opportunities to be blamed 
Though the victims had been killed and were not present during 
legal proceedings, the official processes were, on their behalf. 
When the victim is dead and physically unable to make their own 
case, the accounts that remain are:  
 
constructed for a purpose…to diminish the 
defendant’s culpability and inflating that of the victim 
to blur moral differences (Rock, 1994: 25).  
 
For the victims of safety crime, they were implicated in their own 
death. How this happened and the reasons why this continues to 
happen will be explored in this section.  
 
It is by the nature of their death that the victims are unlikely to see 
justice. The victims were in a legitimate place carrying out a 
respectable activity in paid work, and those that had the chance, 
attempted to defend themselves. Yet this status was denied to them 
and when faced with a perpetrator more powerful than themselves 
as a respectable company, they were blamed (Whyte, 2007). In 
their absence, the victims had their motives, reputation and actions 
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questioned. They had chosen to be in that position, and the 
exchange of their labour for wage was a crucial factor (Whyte, 
2007). Rynbrandt and Kramer (2001) make the point that as in 
rape trials:  
 
she [female victim of corporate crime], rather than the 
corporation, is on trial…forced to defend her choices 
and even her reputation (Rynbrandt and Kramer, 
2001:171).    
 
Rynbrandt and Kramer (2001) question whether women who were 
given dangerous silicon implants really had informed consent.  
The same question could be asked of many of the victims in this 
research. More than one was working their notice because of 
concerns about safety and one was on a work apprenticeship, sent 
by his college who were said to have approved the workplace, 
when no one had performed any checks or visited the site. The 
extent to which the individuals made informed decisions about the 
risks is questionable as they were not aware of the risks. Such a 
low burden of proof and risk was required that it barely featured in 
decisions about work. Neither the company nor the individual 
made this a priority, a decision that was supported by the law. The 
need to protect vulnerable young people is pertinent as the current 
government plan to create three million apprenticeships in the next 
five years (Hazards, 2015b). 
 
The process of the criminal justice system and coronial procedure 
led questions to be asked of the families that sought to implicate 
the victims in their own death. For example, families were asked 
whether their loved ones were suicidal or regularly drove their cars 
recklessly. These were standard questions, but unnecessarily 
hurtful and seemingly an irrelevant part of an already complicated 
process which the families had to endure. For many of the cases, it 
was clear what had caused the deaths of the victims. The outcome 
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of this process and line of questioning placed the victim 
immediately in a position of mistrust. Evidence that did not exist 
was sought whereas evidence that did exist in the workplace was 
discarded.  
 
At the Coroners Court, the victims became culpable and were 
positioned at the centre of an ‘accident’ where every person is 
potentially involved (Bittle and Snider, 2006). The powerful 
narrative that a person who is killed at work is the victim of 
misfortune or a result of their own risk-taking led to victims being 
blamed for their own deaths using far-fetched explanations, which 
were considered and not refuted by the court. In the case where a 
victim was killed in an explosion because he had been told the use 
of cutting gear to dismantle a chimney was safe, the defence tried 
to argue he had not been killed by the explosion. They contested 
they had found a plastic lighter at the bottom of the chimney, 
which they suggested the victims had used to dismantle the 
chimney. This was in spite of the fact plastic would not have 
survived the fire and the victims had already left the chimney to 
question the safety of using cutting gear at all. It is beyond the 
limits of possibility that two trained steeplejacks would attempt to 
dismantle a chimney with one plastic lighter between them. As 
Mathiesen notes:  
 
questions to which ordinary people appear as obvious 
totalities, are unravelled into their individual 
conceptual components, and decisions which from a 
popular point of view appear quite unreasonable, are 
made reasonable by the emphasis on the precise legal 
content of the words (1980: 107). 
 
It was far easier for the victim to be blamed after their death than 
to meet the high burden of proof required to blame the company. 
When summing up a case that reached the crown court, the judge 
outlined that the director had “concluded that [the victim] must 
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have put himself in danger” that he “[relies] upon people being 
sensible”. The judge went on to recall “He [the director] says, 
‘How could I know this was going to happen? There was a 
freakish combination of circumstances’”75. The pervasive notion 
that the victim had caused their own death in a random accident 
was enabled by the law and encouraged by those with the power to 
influence (Tombs, 1991). The victim was dead and unable to 
defend their actions and whilst they were de-humanised in court 
by the process that sought to blame them for their death, they were 
not personally harmed by it. Instead, it was the families, as 
secondary victim who bore witness and were de-humanised by the 
official process. 
 
The experience of being invisible: de-humanised 
As in the case of Scraton’s (2009) research, the families of victims 
were tortured by the official process they had no choice but to 
enter. The law did not deliver the truth or justice to them, but 
additional pain and humiliation. The expectations the families had 
of the legal system were crushed by the “theatre of law” (ibid: 
246). What was normal procedure to companies and legal 
professionals was bewildering and confusing to the families in this 
research. Rights that families did have, for example, being able to 
view their loved one at the morgue, were often denied, which led 
families to blame themselves, “I don’t know why I didn’t stand 
there and say I need to see him properly” (8).  
 
As this research evidences, the long-term effects of losing a loved 
one to safety crime were harmful, horrifying and wounded 
families irreversibly. Blaming the victim suited the needs of the 
company where the costs were passed to the families in this way, 
families of victims of safety crime experienced double 
victimisation which was exacerbated as they endeavoured to 
defend the memory of their loved one (Shover et al, 1994). For the 
                                                          
75
 http://www.simonjones.org.uk/trial/judgessummary.htm  
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families, their desires were not linked to recovering financial loss 
or protecting a corporate reputation, but as the last action they 
could take for their dead loved one. One mother articulated (whilst 
very upset) “you’re slapped down…you always think, this is the 
last thing I can do for him… [crying] sorry” (5). The emotions 
they had to deal with as a result of their bereavement were 
amplified as the memory and intentions of their loved one was 
attacked. This supports research that highlighted the way victims 
and families of victims of Hillsborough were denied rights and had 
their reputations attacked (Scraton, 2009).   
 
Denied by officials, the families of the victims chastised 
themselves for trusting the authorities, considering their individual 
case might have ended differently, had they taken more control. 
This added to the frustration, hopelessness and fear victims feel 
following traditional crimes (Spalek, 2006). Any attempts to 
compel officials to act were met with contempt. In almost all of 
the cases, efforts were made by the agencies to silence the 
families, they were encouraged not to ask questions. The state 
agencies put their priorities ahead of the needs of the victims and 
their families (Scraton, 2009). For example, long delays were 
caused by the HSE in the name of continuity. This was not an 
imperative, when police officers go off sick or take annual leave, 
cases are not postponed for two to four years, but for the families 
of victims of safety crime, they had to accept this situation, even 
when attempts at continuity still did not lead to prosecutions for 
health and safety (1). 
 
As in Scraton’s (2009) research on Hillsborough, the quick 
decisions made by state agents caused the families to blame 
themselves for not challenging enough. The state agents may not 
consider the decisions they made once that day is over, whereas 
the families were left to mull them over. When called to account 
for those decisions, officials showed their lack of understanding 
further, unapologetically placing additional blame onto the 
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relatives and discrediting their needs. For example, a mother who 
wanted to touch and see her son after his death was described as 
‘obsessed’ by the coroner (9). The lack of empathy shown by the 
police led to one wife moving house and feeling petrified the 
police would return to her house (7). A brother of the victim said 
he would never return to England after the court made his brother 
‘nothing’ (10). This compounded the problems that came with 
bereavement and sudden death.  
 
The way the families were treated in response to a safety crime 
and the death of the loved one had huge effects that exacerbated 
long term behavioural and emotional consequences (Matthews et 
al, 2011). This was at a time they had experienced a sudden and 
traumatic death and were vulnerable to depression, post-traumatic 
stress and cancer (Kaltman and Bonanno cited in Tombs and 
Whyte, 2006). Being treated poorly by the criminal justice system 
is an injustice that compounds this suffering (Scraton, 2009). 
Similarly to the families of victims and survivors of Hillsborough, 
families were tormented by: 
 
serious questions about the institutional, structural 
and embedded deficiencies in the law and its 
administration (ibid: 246). 
 
The families of the victims desired a guilty verdict, as Scraton 
(ibid.) remarked, regarding the families of victims of 
Hillsborough, not necessarily for punishment but to publicly find 
out what went wrong and to put it right. Every family returned to 
the need for the truth, to know what happened that caused the 
death of their loved one and a reassurance it would not happen to 
another individual and another family. This was intangible 
because official bodies either failed to see the truth as important or 
deliberately complicated it for their own gain. The families found 
themselves fighting to maintain the innocence of their loved ones 
who were judged to be culpable in their absence after their death. 
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They had to navigate the obstacles built into the criminal justice 
system as well as the inhumanity of the company that sought their 
innocence through establishing the guilt of the victim.  
 
As was reflected in Rock’s (1998) findings following homicide, 
the families in this research were manipulated with little regard for 
their emotions or how this manipulation might have a long term 
effect on the relatives. The families were not considered by the 
court, for example, when they were given nowhere to sit in the 
court after waiting years to hear the cases (10). Their loved one 
had already been killed, yet the court, in the word of a bereaved 
father, ‘assassinated’ them (3). It was the family who left the 
process still bereaved, without justice and further wounded. 
 
In terms of Spalek’s (2006) research, there were many 
commonalities. For example, the families of victims were isolated 
from family and peers, one of which imagined they had received a 
large compensation pay-out and were hiding it (2). Illness was a 
common side effect and many of the families were in and out of 
hospital with diseases ranging from stomach problems to cancer, 
which led to premature death. Losing the breadwinner caused 
financial problems, especially when the jobs the victims had were 
labour intensive, paid by the hour and without life insurance. 
Sutherland regarded white-collar crime as more likely to “tear at 
the core of a social system” (Geis and Goff, 1983: x). Findings 
from this research confirmed that the long-term effects were huge, 
exacerbated by the denial of victimhood of the victim and 
families.  
 
The repercussions of a work-related death were long-term as 
children were traumatised and began to struggle at school, families 
thrown into poverty and insecurity. They had to respond to 
bereavement, experience the lack of justice and some took on the 
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responsibility for themselves. “Just like other victims of crime … 
our hearts have been torn out of our chests.  The difference is we 
are not seen as, not acknowledged as, and not supported as the 
victims of crime that we are” (Families Against Corporate Killers, 
2006). Families found their voices restricted and controlled, they 
articulated that they felt disempowered when their opinions were 
not considered and the truth was left unexplored (Williams, 1999). 
In some cases, the families of victims fought back, for their own 
cases and for the rights of future victims. 
 
Invisibility: political obstacles 
 
Collective struggle and refusal 
The pain that the families experienced was unnecessary and cruel. 
In order to save the company from an unlawful killing verdict or 
the directors from a manslaughter conviction, the family had to be 
forgotten. The truth they desired had to be suppressed to find the 
company innocent. This increased the pain they experienced as 
their loved one was misrepresented and blamed. The legal system 
they had expected to represent their interests took control further 
away from them (Walklate, 1989; Christie, 1977). They found 
little comfort in official state processes and many left the legal 
system stunned.  
 
Rather than finding out their experiences were unique, some of the 
families discovered there were many other victims and families 
who had experienced the same or worse. Not all of the families 
affected by safety crime created or joined groups, but there were a 
proportion in this research who met with others to work for a 
common cause to counter the suppression they had experienced 
(Williams, 1999). 
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Many families found the extreme emotions they experienced as a 
result of their grief and anger were too huge to do nothing, that 
they were “inescapable” and left untreated could have “become 
destructive” (Eyre and Dix, 2015: 21). Bereaved families spoke to 
others and campaigned out of a need to refocus their feelings into 
something that would otherwise be unbearable alone. For all of the 
groups, they acted in direct response to the justice system. All felt 
the legal system had not delivered appropriate justice and joined 
with others to change the system for future victims. Had the justice 
system represented their interests, the movements would not have 
been created or would have had very different aims. 
 
The aims of collective action 
The aims of the groups were centred on changing the social, legal 
and political landscape to prevent other people being victims. As 
with support and campaign groups in general, the legal system had 
failed or was failing their loved one, they were under represented, 
which they sought to change (Goodey, 2005). 
 
The aims across all of the groups were very similar. Firstly, they 
saw what had happened to those killed as a result of safety crime 
as preventable and wanted the law to change and to hold 
companies accountable. The groups used collective power to 
define and called on the criminal justice system to respond (Miers, 
2000). Secondly, for many of the groups, this meant ensuring the 
current law that existed worked to its full capabilities. Thirdly, the 
majority of the groups wanted to support families emotionally who 
were bereaved. These three main aims represent what had been 
lacking for the bereaved families. These aims will be examined 
below in terms of the success they had in meeting those aims and 
whether they counteracted the invisibility of safety crime. Every 
group attempted to change the law, to ensure the law that existed 
worked and offered emotional support to the families of victims. 
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Challenging hegemony, changing the law 
Together, the victims of safety crime were isolated and suffered 
the effects very personally (Tombs and Whyte, 2015). They 
remained lone voices that state agencies did not pay attention to as 
one mother expressed “He [an employee of the CPS] was just 
fobbing me off and we knew this” (10). This altered when families 
combined with others who confirmed and legitimised their 
struggle. With others they found themselves in a position where 
they could demand more. A member of one group reflected, “It is 
much easier for the Government to fob off single individuals than 
family groups with a clear and determined purpose” (Dix cited in 
Eyre and Dix, 2014). 
 
Groups such as the CCA, DA and the SJMC were active in the 
1990s when the Corporate Manslaughter Law was proposed until 
it became legislation in 2007. As groups they represented the 
interests of families and friends of victims and survivors, which 
included those created in the high-profile disasters in the 1980s 
and 1990s. These disasters raised public awareness and press 
interest, which the groups responded to and together, as part of the 
corporate accountability movement, called for a change in the law 
(Tombs and Whyte, 2003).  
 
Though promised when Labour were in opposition, the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act (2007)  took 13 years 
to become law, what Tombs describes as a “13-year struggle” 
(2013: 65). During that time government regularly consulted those 
who could be prosecuted by the law such as the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) (ibid.). The groups featured in this research 
existed as a counter to this, even though their views were not 
sought officially. In particular, the CCA followed the law closely, 
writing to the agencies directly, raising issues in the press and 
continually trying to engage the government. The CCA effectively 
pressurised the government often through the HSE, they 
highlighted the truth using statistics and the testimonies of families 
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as well as comments ministers had previously made to attempt to 
hold them to account, for example, David Bergman commented in 
the national press, “The government agreed four years ago to 
reform this archaic law” (Bergman, 2001: para 11). 
 
When the Corporate Manslaughter Law caused conflict between 
groups because of the proposal to introduce immunity for crown 
bodies, groups that included the CCA, worked together. The centre 
sought legal advice and stood in solidarity with other groups rather 
than splintering and dividing the individuals involved. Such 
stances cut across not only individuals, but across groups. 
Together, they were a strong opposition to government and 
business groups who supported de-regulation. For a time they 
challenged companies and government claims of science and fact 
and engaged in crucial counter-hegemonic research that interest 
groups are rarely able to do. Their existence set an alternative to 
dominant narratives that attempted to attack and undermine 
opposition (Snider, 2003). 
 
As part of a dominant group, companies were able to deny facts 
and claim legitimacy over workers and families (Tombs, 1991). 
This was lessened by the visibility of the corporate accountability 
movement who in numbers, called for change and raised 
awareness. The groups were:  
 
knowledges from below…it is the reappearance of 
what people know at a local level, of these 
disqualified knowledges that [make] the critique 
possible (Foucault, 2003: 7/8). 
 
This is drawn in parallel to the testimonies of the families in the 
interviews in this research that “brings into play the desubjugated 
knowledges” (ibid: 11) rediscovering truths that have been lost, 
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truths the victims and families of victims have had to bear. Though 
the state may refuse to acknowledge they exist and resist 
legislation, their appearance and presence countered this. As a 
collective, they were better able to represent the interests of the 
victims that continued to be created through state inaction.  
 
The focus on the experiences of the victims and families of 
victims were “knowledges from below” that fought against being 
“masked” by “systematic organizations” (ibid: 7).  
 
“Recent social movements opposing corporate capital are 
important, and may signify an end to quiescence” (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2003: 64), notably in the ways their existence posit against 
common sense notions that are presented. For example, even 
though the government did not consult the groups featured in this 
research, it was notable that they did not and questions were asked 
about how this could be justified. 
 
The influence of campaign groups has been noted by researchers 
following the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory in Bangladesh in 
2013 where over 1,100 people were killed (Reinecke and 
Donaghey, 2015). In the aftermath, a coalition of groups were 
created that supported the unions. This led to the creation of an 
agreement between brands, unions and the campaign groups that 
should increase the safety of workers, which only came about 
because of “the heat they feel from unions and campaigners” 
(Hazards, 2015: 8). 
 
Ensuring the current law works 
Groups such as FACK and DA operated to ensure the law as it 
existed, worked as intended. By understanding and interrogating 
rights, they attempted to ensure that lack of power of individuals 
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and lack of knowledge of state agents would not lead to further 
injustice. A large part of this was raising awareness of safety crime 
and countering the invisibility many families suffered from. To 
change the construction of workplace deaths as accidents, groups 
tried to be as visible as possible (Williams, 1999).  
 
The most visible group was the SJMC who made activism a 
central part of their campaign, scaling cranes, shutting down major 
roads and handing out literature that attempted to raise awareness 
of recent issues related to safety crime such as the dangers of 
working for a subcontractor. Their visibility was loud and 
expressive at various points, for example, on the victim’s birthday 
when they forcibly shut down the agency and company who 
employed him. In similar ways, FACK campaigned on workplace 
deaths in general. They tried to reach workers, namely through 
encouraging employees to join unions. As part of a group, they 
were doing exactly the opposite of what they had been encouraged 
to do as individuals, remain silent and connect with others. 
 
 
Providing emotional support 
One of the biggest successes the individuals involved in various 
groups had was reducing some of the de-humanisation they 
experienced going through the criminal justice system. Families 
met with other families who had had similar or worse experiences. 
Isolated as individuals, most did not know of anyone who had had 
similar experiences. Many families became excluded from their 
previous lives in numerous ways as their families and friends 
failed to understand what they were going through. The 
opportunity to create or join a group offered the families a chance 
to create new bonds after their lives had been irrevocably changed 
(Williams, 1999). Together they could influence the process in 
ways they were marginalized from previously, “What I have 
gained is a sense of satisfaction for being able to use my own 
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tragic experience to make a difference to the lives of others” 
(Watkins quoted in Eyre and Dix, 2015: 116). 
 
They did not need to explain to the people in the group how they 
felt and were not expected to have moved on. They were not 
judged or silenced by friends who grew uncomfortable, they were 
able to discuss what had happened to their loved ones without 
shame and could share their memories without worry. The families 
found the way their loved one was portrayed in the court was not 
unique, it was not personal to them, it was personal to the nature 
of the crime committed against them. There were other families 
who had all experienced much the same process, which was of 
comfort to some members of the groups but also increased feelings 
of anger and hurt.  
 
Measuring success 
Success is difficult to measure. The members had given up large 
amounts of time, money and their own emotional wellbeing to be 
part of various groups. None wanted to belong to such groups, 
they were compelled to become members because of their 
experiences. Individuals can campaign for years, attract new 
members and grow in influence (Best, 1999) all but one of the 
groups featured in this research are now inactive. 
 
The opposition the groups pose last as long as they are active, 
which causes a problem to long-term resistance. The CCA were a 
force in the ten years they operated, more so as they grew in 
experience. They ran conferences that facilitated a wide network 
of people who connected and shared experiences, creating a 
wealth of information that was not being collected anywhere else, 
including the gathering of information on individuals killed at 
work. Connections with press, the HSE and ministers, all halted 
once they closed and the knowledge and experience of the case 
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workers, who had cases still open of families dealing with 
bereavement, gained employment at other organisations.  That 
niche expertise could never be applied and utilised within other 
organisations as it had been wielded in the CCA.  
 
The SJMC had much success in pushing forward the case of one 
victim, it was because of the collective effort that the case was 
heard in the crown court. It had been taken as far as possible and 
the parents of the victim recognised this when they concluded, “It 
is no surprise that James Martell waddled away; the miracle is that 
he was ever in the dock” (Hodge, 2002: para 18). It was unique 
because it was a highly active group made up of the victim’s 
friends who were of a similar age (in their twenties and thirties) 
and created out of a pre-existing network that the victim had been 
a part of. The members were sure that the victim would have 
approved of their campaigning methods and would have done the 
same in their position. However that level of campaigning would 
have been very difficult to maintain. Being a member of a highly 
active group takes a huge amount of effort, emotionally, 
physically and financially. For some, it delayed grief, one member 
expressed after the SJMC had ended, “Looking back, I wonder if I 
didn’t get much chance to grieve because I kept on fighting…at 
points it was knackering” (Brooks, 2002: para 20). 
 
Disaster Action started every annual meeting with two questions, 
“has Disaster Action met its objectives?” and “Should the 
organisation continue to exist or is it time to call a halt?” (Eyre 
and Dix, 2016: 167).  Presumably the members of Disaster Action 
decided in 2015 that the answer to the second question was “no” 
and the publishing of Collective Conviction in 2014 was a 
significant part of their legacy. Although it may also be the case 
that as with the CCA, that Disaster Action was forced to close, 
they reflect in Collective Conviction that out of 276 funding 
applications, only three were successful. As Dix states in 2015, 
“Disaster Action had accomplished all it could, especially given 
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constraints around volunteers’ time, availability of funding and the 
need for individuals to make changes in their lives” (Dix, 2015).  
 
For members of such groups, this was not an issue of delaying 
‘closure’, families talked about how their lives would never be the 
same and nothing would change that. For example, one father of a 
victim said, “Even when we’re enjoying ourselves…there’s this 
guilt” to which his wife interrupted, “we don’t really ever enjoy 
ourselves, nothing is the same” (The Human Face of Workplace 
Killing, 2010). However, being part of a group does require being 
around other people who are bereaved, other people who have 
been through a de-humanising process and the feelings of anger 
that injustice evokes. For example, one father of a victim said 
whilst he is involved in FACK, his wife has always been reluctant 
to share her feelings and to commit time to such a group in the 
long-term (9). Many, very naturally, move away after a period of 
time. 
 
Those groups which had success in altering procedure could be 
linked to the extent they are connected to the government, as in 
Rock’s (2002) study where the methods of two groups were very 
different. One group in Rock’s (ibid.) research encouraged the use 
of marches whereas one worked with those at the Home Office. In 
the groups in this research, clear differences could also be seen. 
For example, DA maintained neutrality and were invited by the 
government to advise authorities on emergency planning response 
(14). In contrast, the campaigning nature of the SJMC was 
successful and raised visibility of the case of the victim but it also 
meant its members were never going to consult with or act in 
conjunction with the government (nor did they want to).  
 
In different ways, both DA and the SJMC reached the government. 
On a singular issue, the SJMC did so very quickly, for example, 
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on one occasion thirty members of the campaign blocked 
Southwark Bridge in London until the then head of the HSE 
agreed to speak to them
76
. DA were “consulted by the statutory 
and voluntary services on how people’s practical and emotional 
needs can best be met in the aftermath of disaster”, described by a 
retired assistant chief constable “as that of ‘critical friend’” (Eyre 
and Dix, 2014: 141). Whilst both groups had victories, neither 
were able to affect the government to stop politicians “brushing 
away” deaths like Simon’s77 or see “fundamental changes in the 
law and in business attitudes” (Eyre and Dix, 2014: 38). This was 
not a reflection of how hard the groups worked or what they 
sacrificed to support others, but an indicative of the political 
obstacles between a safety crime and justice. 
 
In a newspaper article and their book, members of Disaster Action 
point to a success of the new law governing corporate 
manslaughter. When the Home Secretary introduced the second 
reading of the Corporate Manslaughter Bill in 2006, the passing of 
Maurice De Rohan, was marked (Eyre and Dix, 2014):  
 
The degree to which Maurice de Rohan, [the 
chairman and one of the founders of Disaster Action] 
personally, and Disaster Action as a whole, succeeded 
in influencing government thinking is reflected in the 
remarks made by the then Home Secretary (ibid.: 97). 
 
It is lamentable that what became the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 has been described as a, 
“disappointment” (Gobert, 2008: 413) and “conservative in form” 
and crucially, “unlikely fundamentally to change efforts to hold 
corporations legally to account for workplace killing” (Almond 
and Colover cited in Tombs, 2013: 65). Evaluation of the Act is 
detailed in Chapter One but to add to this, there is evidence that 
                                                          
76
 http://simonjones.org.uk/campaign/index.htm  
77
 http://simonjones.org.uk/campaign/index.htm  
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“one form of liability is being exchanged for another” (Tombs, 
2013: 70) as companies offer to plead guilty on corporate 
manslaughter charges if impunity is granted to individual directors 
(ibid.). Since the act came into force, 21 small companies have 
been convicted, all of whom could have been convicted under 
gross negligence manslaughter (Tombs, 2017b). 
 
The tenacity of the groups and their existence is a threat to social 
order. The extent to which they can have a voice has a positive 
effect on a neo-liberal landscape that puts the priorities of profit 
and enterprise above the lives of individuals. There is no doubt 
that all of the organisations detailed in this research had an impact 
upon this landscape, most notably, whilst they were active. The 
CCA is unable to challenge the HSE, it can no longer draw 
together key actors in the arena of health and safety or support 
family members in their fight for justice. Even though for ten 
years it answered Ann Elvin’s desire for a helpline for those 
bereaved following a death at work, it also ended, just as the 
Relatives Support Group that she managed to create in the early 
1990s did. Currently, there is no number for relatives to call when 
they need help and holding the HSE to account is now reliant upon 
the efforts of individuals working with charities and labour 
organisations such as the Institute of Employment Rights. In spite 
of the fact that “Regulation in the UK is under continued material 
and ideological attack” (Tombs, 2013: 11) the defence mounted to 
halt this has diminished since this research began.  
 
Together, the groups covered in this research were part of the 
corporate accountability movement from 1980 to at least 2010. 
This has countered invisibility and reduced some of the harm 
enacted by the justice system. They have not overcome the huge 
political obstacles, which provided impetus for their creation. 
However, their existence was and is crucial to stand in opposition 
to the dominant discourse and the support they offered survivors 
(in the case of DA) and secondary victims, is incredible.  
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Conclusion  
 
The crimes featured throughout this research had no chance of 
justice. The discourse that a death in a workplace is an accident 
was prevailing and powerful. It affected those working in the 
criminal justice system, from the police to the judges who were 
reluctant to re-frame companies as criminals and not victims of 
misfortune. This research argues that the judgements made or not 
made were not reflections of what happened that caused the death 
of the victims but were instead constructed as ‘accidents’. The 
truth that might have led to a criminal judgement was suppressed.  
 
This research has detailed how this suppression occurred and the 
process of the social and legal obstacles. Obstacles encountered at 
the initial stage, at the hands of the police included a perception no 
wrongdoing had occurred because there was an absence of foul 
play. Because companies are not routinely suspected of 
criminality, the scene did not need to be sealed, evidence collected 
or witnesses cautioned and interviewed. Instead the family of the 
victim were asked about the state of mind of the victim and their 
belongings (such as a car) were seized. Three of the 11 passed this 
stage and had a full police investigation. A further case had a 
police investigation following complaint. 
 
In all but one of the cases, the families who did have inquests, 
waited years until they sat in front of the coroner. Here, the 
families had to defend their loved one against claims that they 
caused their own death, even though they were clearly told that it 
was not the place of the coroners court to apportion blame. Using 
the evidence gathered (or not) by the police and HSE, they had to 
prove the innocence of the victim. Finances were necessary for 
representation at the inquest, to access transcriptions and to be 
present to hear the case at all. In five of the cases, the victims were 
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working away from their home, indicative of subcontract work, 
which meant the inquests took place miles away from the homes 
of the families. The families had to fund travel, overnight stays 
and food, before they even approached paying for ‘extra’ court 
costs. In the majority of cases, the coroner summed up and 
directed the jury on the available verdicts based on their 
interpretation of the narrative. One of the eight cases to be heard at 
the inquest received an unlawful killing verdict, the rest all shared 
an ‘accidental death’ verdict. 
 
The cases that made it to the crown court had to build a case with 
the available evidence strong enough to prove mens rea and actus 
rea. Finances again were needed to pay for transcripts and legal 
representation. It was necessary for the families to arrive early if 
they wanted a seat in the court. As was the case at the inquest, by 
this time, all of the companies were keen to prove their innocence 
by way of establishing the guilt and culpability of the victim. What 
appeared rational was contested if the evidence was not strong 
enough to contradict it. Three of the cases passed the test of the 
CPS to get to this stage (one of them by way of a judicial review). 
None of the cases left this stage with sentences that were upheld. 
Every company in this research was officially judged to be 
innocent of corporate manslaughter. 
 
Five of the cases went to court to see the companies face health 
and safety charges, five of the cases reached this stage and saw the 
company fined for the breach that led to the death of their loved 
one, rather than the result itself. Fines reflected the sentencing 
guidelines and were low and as a consequence, one family was 
offered apologies by the judge. The Sheriff turned to the family 
and said, “…this should have been in the high court”. The wife of 
the victim said the Sheriff, “apologised” before explaining the 
fines he gave out were “the top fines I can give out” (6). The 
process and official guidance had restricted the punishment and 
the Sheriff was only able to informally console the family of the 
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victim. In another example, a father of a victim recalls that when 
the jury returned to give their verdict, two of the members were 
crying “because all they could do was give a verdict of accidental 
death” (3). 
 
Reactions to the verdicts and sentencing were varied, one mother 
of a victim stated, “I will always remember looking at that jury” 
(10), another wife of a victim recalled that upon sentencing there 
was “pandemonium, there’s no other word for it…I just kept 
screaming ‘murderers’” (6). One wife shielded herself from the 
entire process and would not allow her parents to tell her about it 
(7). The majority of the families were not shocked by the time of 
sentencing, they realised the process in the court or at the inquest 
was not going to lead to a favourable outcome for them or their 
loved one who had been killed. Any faith they had, had slowly 
reduced in the period of time between when they were told about 
the death of their loved one and the court case and/or inquest. In 
two out of the three cases which proceeded to the Crown Court, 
the families held out hope of holding the companies to account but 
realised during the proceedings that the sentence was not going to 
‘go their way’. One mother of a victim said, “as soon as I heard his 
[the judge’s] closing speech, I thought we’d lost it” (8). The 
reactions were one of huge disappointment and trying to come to 
terms with what had happened and to wonder if they could have 
done more. More than one family expressed they took comfort in 
the jury members who they felt were “on our side” (5) even if that 
did not affect the overall outcome. The jury members might have 
shown they were unhappy with the verdict they delivered, 
constrained by the system, pushed to deliver someone else’s 
verdict. 
 
More than one family member left the process with the perception 
and utter distress of thinking they had let their loved one down. 
Bereft they trusted the company in the first instance and then in 
the justice system, they cursed themselves for allowing their loved 
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one to be blamed. Incensed and nowhere to go after they witnessed 
that their son who had been killed was treated as ‘nothing’ and 
incredulous when the company expressed joy when legal 
proceedings had ended (10). Their loved one “didn’t stand a 
chance” (10). This secondary victimisation caused long-term pain 
and isolation to the families. 
 
Half of the family members went on to create or join groups to do 
something in the name of the loved one they had lost.  The various 
groups that have been created by families, angry and frustrated at 
their own experiences, were examined. For many involved, they 
were able to remove or remedy some of the obstacles they had 
experienced as individual, bereaved family members. What they 
changed were the experiences of others going through the process, 
for example, reducing their feelings of isolation and guilt, and 
helping them to resist suppression at every stage. To sum up, by 
working in a group, the families refused to become invisible. What 
could not be changed was a sign of what the government permit 
and uphold. Change to address safety crime requires “both 
political will and financial investment” (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 
144), which the government shows no sign of providing. Instead, 
in a neo-liberal market hegemony (Tombs and Whyte, 2003), the 
system delivered to respond to safety crime would prefer to 
“sacrifice rather than realise…the principles of natural justice” 
(Scraton, 2009: 267). What was left - regulation - continues to fail 
to set the standard for justice and the fair treatment for the victims 
of safety crime, their families as secondary victims and in the 
deterrence of future safety crime victims. 
 
Safety crime, as is the case with the presence of economic crime 
on crime, law and order agendas, “requires consistent effort to 
keep it there” (Tombs and Alvesalo, 2002: 29). The groups 
examined in this research put much force and determination into 
doing this. They were consistent at being conspicuous, refusing to 
sit quiet and acquiesce to invisibility, as much as they were 
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nudged by the official response.  The groups were consistent too, 
for the period the groups were active, which for all but one group, 
has come to an end. It is the consideration of this research that the 
groups including those who formed part of the corporate 
accountability movement, could maximise the challenge they 
mount if they could combine with critical criminology and 
victimology (Williams, 1999). There is “enormous positive 
potential” (ibid.: 137) for the movement to continue and the need 
for this has unfortunately only increased in the period since this 
research finished. Health and safety legislation has continued to be 
attacked, work has become more insecure, legal aid has been 
slashed and the groups featured in this research have almost all 
ended. For the movement to continue, it requires the families work 
collectively with each other finding commonalities and with 
critical theorists who have a duty to highlight injustice and push 
for change, as Mathiesen observed, “It cannot take place from the 
writing-desk alone” (1980: 301).  
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis came out of a desire to answer questions that I found 
confusing to me as an undergraduate in 2000 and in the years 
following graduation. As the introduction attested, it was an ‘itch’ 
that could not be ‘scratched’, even as time away from education 
increased. Stories leapt out of the local newspaper, small by-lines 
that reminded me of Sidney Rouse.  
 
Sidney Rouse was described by his sister as “a very friendly and 
homely person” until he “caught the entire blast of a short circuit” 
and died after ten days in hospital when a skin-transplant treatment 
failed (Bergman, 1991: 7). This case returned a verdict of 
‘accidental death’ at the coroners court and the HSE did not 
prosecute. The literature I read as an undergraduate stated that 
little had changed and a lack of official action was still to be 
expected if you were killed at work. It seemed obvious that crimes 
were taking place and also apparent that justice was not being 
delivered. In order to find out why, this entailed entering into the 
study of criminology and specifically, safety crime.  
 
Gap in the literature 
To my knowledge, this is the first PhD thesis, certainly in the UK, 
which accesses the experiences of those bereaved as a result of 
safety crime. This thesis has attempted to attend to this gap by 
generating original qualitative data about their experiences as they 
are processed by the criminal justice system, from the police, to 
the HSE and in the courts.  
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Further, it is the first PhD to examine the origins, methods, aims 
and success of the corporate accountability movement which was 
established in response to corporate killing. Through both 
accessing original qualitative data as well as creating cases studies 
using original, secondary and publicly available sources.  
 
In combination then, this thesis has provided a unique insight into 
the experiences of families of victims as secondary victims, who 
are neither represented nor treated as real victims. It is an original 
contribution to the understanding of the details of the process that 
slowly renders them invisible, the personal consequences of this 
for the families and their collective response. To conclude, this 
thesis has interrogated the extent to which the collective response 
can be successful.  
 
Chapter overview  
Chapter One reviewed the development of the study of crimes of 
the powerful. This demonstrated that criminology has focused on 
‘traditional’ crime and ‘traditional’ criminals. It has been 
“distinctly disinterested” in a criminology that places the state at 
the centre of analysis (Hillyard, 2003: 201). The relatively small 
amount of critical research that does exist has shown this focus to 
be disproportionate, “justified neither theoretically nor 
empirically” (Tombs and Whyte, 2003: 267). The study of white 
collar, corporate and safety crime is recognition of the space 
between crime and what the law recognises and crucially, 
responds to.  
 
Moving to focus on safety crime, researchers have shown that 
crimes committed by companies are widespread and harmful. The 
law has developed, but at a slower rate than the corporation, which 
has evolved dramatically in ways that has made it easier to 
disperse responsibility whilst maximising profit, for example, 
through the increasing use of subcontracts. The inability of the law 
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was demonstrated in a number of high-profile cases in the 1990s 
that repeatedly failed to overcome the barrier of establishing the 
mens rea of a company. As a lesser punishment, companies are 
prosecuted for health and safety offences, in regulation that is 
rooted in consultation and acceptable laws (Carson, 1979).  
 
Political responses have been to agree with, and perpetuate, the 
notion of health and safety as burdensome and requiring de-
regulation. A plethora of research has attempted to counter this 
dominant discourse and call for change in academia and publicly. 
It counters continuous de-regulation as an appropriate course of 
action (Gobert and Punch, 2003; Tombs, 2016). This is crucial for 
the victims of safety crime. 
 
Chapter One also introduced the study of the victim, bringing 
together safety crime and victimology, two narrow, and critical, 
areas of criminological study. The social, legal and political 
conditions are not favourable for the victims of safety crime and 
they are not used to support claims for increased sanctions against 
companies. The victims of safety crime are not ‘ideal victims’ 
(Whyte, 2007; Christie, 1986) and are denied legitimate victim 
status by the state. This leads to emotional, physical and financial 
harm (Spalek, 2006). 
 
Chapter Two outlined a methodological approach to the data 
detailed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. Research that focuses 
on crimes of the powerful does not benefit from a wealth of pre-
existing research methods (Pearce, 2003). Unique difficulties are 
experienced by those wishing to look upwards rather than 
downwards, for example, finding funding and publishing 
potentially liable research. Researchers have overcome such 
barriers, carrying out the collection of quantitative data and 
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compiling case studies (Punch, 1996; Tombs and Whyte, 2007). 
Similar methods were chosen for this research.  
 
In order to give voice to the victims of safety crime, qualitative 
data was sought through semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews became less structured as increasing experience 
allowed the families of victims to control more of the process. 
This led to in-depth data and for the testimonies of the families to 
be the ultimate focus. For the second part of the research, to detail 
the corporate accountability movements, case studies were chosen 
as the best method to observe the history and successes of the 
groups. As a piece of sensitive research, the methods and nature of 
gathering data were considered carefully. The personal impact of 
doing such research beyond the time of the interviews was not 
anticipated, which made it impossible to “keep the social world at 
arm’s length” (Blaikie, 2004: 136). 
 
Chapter Three was the first of the original data chapters that 
demonstrated the social and legal obstacles the families 
experienced as they worked their way through the criminal justice 
system. This chapter looked at the ways the families were 
suppressed by the police, the CPS, the HSE and the courts. Pushed 
towards accepting that what happened to their loved one was 
‘accidental’, the truth was not put at the centre of the criminal 
justice response, but an obstacle that was suppressed. This relied 
upon any dissenting voices being silenced, which wounded the 
families as they left the process.  
 
Those involved in the criminal justice system, from the police to 
the judges in the Crown Court were influenced by the perception 
that a death at work meant it was accidental. It disabled the cases 
from the start, for example, in the failure of the police to caution 
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prospective suspects. This made it close to impossible that the 
families would realise justice. 
 
The truth was a construction, manipulated by the company and 
enabled by the system. The scope for justice was almost 
impossible and showed itself to be reliant upon a huge number of 
variables that inevitably ushered the majority of families out of the 
process. This left them to cope with their grief but also, as a result 
of the process, the families were left with guilt, guilt that they 
should have done more to defend the loved one in response to their 
treatment by the state.  
 
Chapter Four examined the political obstacles the families 
experienced. Many resisted their suppression, as detailed in 
Chapter Three. They had their own ideas about what justice was 
and when this was not met, many focused their anger and 
frustration into the facilitation of various groups. This chapter 
looked at the aims of a number of groups that arose in the 1990s 
and 2000s with the methods they chose to resist.  
 
As part of the corporate accountability movement, groups 
representing safety crime were one set of voices who openly 
countered the pro-business lobbying that attempted to make the 
law more amenable to companies (Tombs and Whyte, 2015). 
Clearly, the interests of business are set in opposition to the needs 
of workers in that giving protection to workers is a threat to the 
function of companies and the powerful. As the force of workers 
has diminished since the 1960s, it falls to the families of dead 
workers and members of the public, to fight. 
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The levels of success they achieved in countering their 
suppression and in making policy change were examined to reveal 
what the government permit for victims of safety crime. The 
corporate accountability movement attempted to engage with the 
government on the issue of safety crime. Their existence was part 
of countering the suppression they had experienced as individuals. 
 
Chapter Five combined the data of Chapter Four and Chapter 
Three with the literature in Chapter One. There is a gap in the 
experiences of victims of safety crime, who in a small area of 
criminal justice and academia, are experts in their own cases. 
Their testimonies are witness to the existence of the victims that 
are continually suppressed and navigated away from the criminal 
justice process. 
 
In the first instance, the strength of the prevailing discourse is 
demonstrated in the ways we do not fear work, but aspire to be 
‘good’ and ‘hard’ workers. This entails obedience, which had a 
negative effect on the survival of more than one victim featured in 
this research. As an employee or a member of the public, trust had 
to be given employers and those delivering services. When this 
trust is broken by the companies, this thesis has demonstrated that 
the consequences are felt by the victims and by their families, 
beyond the effects of immediate and long-term grief. 
 
As the companies rushed to prove their innocence, they did so by 
finding fault in the victim. This was enabled by processes of the 
state, which failed to address the inequality between the victim 
and the perpetrator. Instead this inequality favoured the company 
in the pursuit of justice. Socially, legally and politically, the 
families of victims of safety crime were blocked. 
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Reflections of the research 
This research showed the reality of the families who had been 
suddenly, and needlessly, bereaved. In retrospect, this is a strength 
of the research. The emotions of the families are not encouraged at 
any stage of the criminal justice process, they are actively 
suppressed by official procedures. The interviews demonstrated 
how the families had their life before their loved one had been 
killed and their life after. On every anniversary, birthday, wedding 
and death, the families missed their loved one. Whilst this is part 
of grief in general for many, the anguish the families felt in this 
research was exacerbated from the reactions of others and the way 
they, and their loved one was treated by the agencies who were 
foisted upon them. The semi structured interviews demonstrated 
this secondary victimisation very clearly as the families shared 
their experiences. As the researcher, their words and the way the 
families articulated their painful exasperation is impossible to 
forget. 
 
A weakness of this research is the sampling and that the families 
were selected by the CCA and contacted first by them. As 
explored in Chapter Two, there are various reasons for this. 
However, it does focus on recording the experiences of families 
who had support of the CCA in common. It does not gather, or 
recognise the experiences of families who had no support or 
intervention from agencies. It is difficult to surmise the impact of 
this. It is noteworthy that when less than 20% of the British 
workforce are members of trade unions (B van Wanrooy et al 
cited in Ewing et al, 2016) approximately 1,179 people killed at 
work are unrepresented, every year in the UK. It is impossible to 
determine how many of those families did not feel able to question 
the circumstances that led up to the death of their loved one, how 
many deaths were not investigated at all and how many families 
were suppressed by the process. The change in the law and the 
need for recognition is absolutely crucial for these individuals too.  
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This research focused on deaths at work. It did not research the 
experiences of workers who have received life changing injuries 
as a result of work. In 2007/8, 32,810 fatal and major injuries were 
sustained at work, with a mere 7.3% of those investigated by the 
HSE (Hazards, 2009). With so few being examined, this is another 
group who are harmed by companies, yet remain invisible. 
 
A weakness of this research is the time it took to complete. There 
was never any intention to spend as much time as I did, every 
decision I made, I envisaged would provide more time and each 
time, I was proven wrong. For example, moving into teaching and 
going on maternity leave (twice) definitely did not free up my 
time! As a self-funded, part-time student, writing up became a 
hobby that was not prioritised over the requirements of daily life 
as a mother, teacher and wife. That said, the fact this research 
spans almost ten years meant that interestingly, but also sadly, the 
majority of the groups who were part of the corporate 
accountability movement, closed. This leads to the next point. 
 
The closure of the majority of the groups featured in this research 
means that families who lose their loved ones at work today are in 
a worse position than families ten years ago. Calling the telephone 
numbers of both the CCA and Disaster Action will not lead to any 
kind voice or crucial knowledge, support which was crucial to 
many of the families in this research. When asked what they 
would advise other families to do, an ex-wife of a victim said 
everyone should talk to the CCA (2), another commented “what 
would we have done without the CCA?” (6). The wealth of 
information gathered by the groups who have closed, the SMJC, 
the CCA and DA is available on webpages, but has been limited 
and there is nothing up to date. What has changed, as discussed 
before, is the fact that corporate manslaughter is now a 
recognisable term. This gives the families a discourse to utilise 
and they may not have to grapple with explaining their 
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experiences as families did in the 1980s and 1990s. However, this 
does not mean they are more likely to achieve justice; the same 
obstacles that existed in 2007 still remain in 2017. With regard to 
official legislation, The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act is untested and at this time, has not increased the 
number of prosecutions or severity of sentencing following a 
corporate killing. The Protocol of Liaison in England and Wales 
(1998) was in place before the death of all but one case, yet was 
rarely adhered to. Further research would need to be carried out to 
discover whether this has started happening since 2012. 
 
Safety crime today 
The scope of the company has continued to expand. In the 1990s 
and accelerating after the millennium, the operations of business is 
“represented as a good end in itself” (Tombs, 2017: 41, emphasis 
added). Those involved in business are “seen as positive moral 
agents within our own society” (ibid: 36) and the entrepreneur is 
celebrated as a deserving celebrity, even if, as is the case with 
Richard Branson, they have only been profitable in businesses that 
had government intervention (ibid.). With the expansion of the 
company and its new found status in society, business needs are 
prioritised. For example, when the multi-national corporation 
Siemens, agreed to build a factory in Hull, local politicians and 
media expressed their delight that Hull would be “booming” again 
(Hull Daily Mail, 25
th
 March 2014). It is worth noting that this 
celebration did not come without promises from the state. Siemens 
were attracted to the area because of its location in an Enterprise 
Zone, which entail government promises to provide discounts on 
business rates, simplified local authority planning, superfast 
broadband and tax relief (Hull Daily Mail 24
th
 March 2014). 
Companies and the state are inexplicably intertwined.  
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As much as entrepreneurs have been viewed as the new messiahs 
and business takes on a higher status, there has been an increased 
willingness to question organisations in authority in the last ten 
years. In 2008, the banking crisis led the term ‘banker bashing’ to 
be used publicly (Tombs, 2017: 56). Tax evasion and avoidance 
schemes are common public knowledge with celebrities named 
and shamed in public in published articles such as Payback for 
good: Take That and the other penitent tax avoiders (Usborne, 
2016). In 2013, the BBC noted “the tide of public opinion is 
visibly turning” against global companies including Starbucks, 
Amazon and Google who pay a small percentage of tax against 
huge profits (Barford and Holt, 2013). Although tax avoidance is 
legal, a number of celebrities and companies such as Starbucks 
paid money to HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in response to 
media coverage and widespread public condemnation. Barford and 
Holt note, “10 years ago news of a company minimising its 
corporation tax would have been more likely to be inside the 
business pages than on the front page” (2013: para 6). The public 
are more distrustful and suspicious of companies in some cases. 
 
Trust in institutions has reduced as a result of other high profile 
cases, among them the Stephen Lawrence case and Hillsborough. 
Hillsborough is a: 
 
story of how those in authority sought to cover their 
tracks and avoid blame and responsibility…of how 
ordinary people can be subjected to the insensitivity 
and hostility of agencies that place their professional 
priorities ahead of the personal needs and collective 
rights of the bereaved and survivors (Scraton, 2009: 
17 ).  
 
The public perception of the families and survivors of 
Hillsborough has altered drastically, from the Sun headlines The 
Truth in 1989, which claimed Liverpool fans were to blame and 
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had attacked police as they helped the dying and The Real Truth in 
2012, which publicly apologised and highlighted how police had 
deceitfully blamed Liverpool fans. The public are aware of what 
happened in Hillsborough, informed of the truth by the families 
and the survivors who were denied access to it, suppressed by 
‘official’ accounts.  
 
Rather than being silenced, many of those bereaved work with 
other families in the name of their loved ones and for future 
victims, to prevent similar suffering. The state reassures that 
‘lessons have been learnt’, while the families of victims mobilise 
to try to make that rhetoric, a reality. Their experiences are real 
and their suffering is unnecessary. There are an untold number of 
victims and families who have no idea what has happened to them. 
They have not had the benefit of any support from any 
organisation or met with any other family to share their 
experiences. Those families too, need to have a voice and critical 
criminology and victimology is one way to do this, to make sense 
of their experiences and call for change. Just as feminist 
“principles and ideas and beliefs and commitments have flowed 
out” as a “self-organised politics, taking place from the ground 
up”, interfering with the status quo and bringing about change for 
women (McRobbie, 2009: 2), so can critical criminology and 
victimology for the victims of safety crime. The Hillsborough case 
demonstrated how: 
 
the bereaved and survivors remained resilient, their 
resistance and their determination to honour those 
who died challenging powerful institutions, changing 
history and serving a wider public interest (Scraton, 
2009: 10). 
 
The families had their own thoughts on what should be changed 
with regard to responses to safety crime. Families referred to the 
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lack of awareness on work-related deaths in general, both on the 
part of members of the public and in workplaces, for example, in 
not marking Workers Memorial Day (3). The notion of having a 
person assigned to the families, akin to a FLO was mentioned 
more than once, to guide those bereaved and “point [them] in the 
right direction” (4, 5). Legal aid was referred to as inadequate, as 
one wife of a victim stated, “you shouldn’t have to pay for legal 
representation” (4). Since that time the situation has worsened 
after a cut in spending on legal aid amounting to £350 million 
under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders 
Act. An act which Amnesty International claims has created a 
“two-tier” system, “open to those who can afford it, but 
increasingly closed to the poorest and most in need of its 
protection” (Amnesty International, 2016: 3). One father stated he 
wanted to see companies being forced to adhere to the legislation 
already in place and to lay the burden of proof on the companies to 
prove they are safe (11). 
 
The future of the study of safety crime 
Future research should continue to dispute the processes that make 
safety crime invisible or ‘acceptable’. This could involve looking 
at those individuals who sustain life threatening injuries or trying 
to reach families who have not had any support from agencies. It 
is also not a case of doing anything different, but to pick up where 
the groups stopped and work together to keep challenging 
common sense notions of health and safety. At the start of this 
process, I did not imagine agencies such as the CCA would close, 
which is a great shame for secondary victims, workers and 
members of the public. The work of the various groups needs to 
continue and be built upon rather than being forced to start anew. 
The only way the wishes of the families outlined in the previous 
paragraph can be achieved is through such groups. 
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From contributing to counter-hegemonic groups to supporting the 
families of those affected by safety crime, those working in this 
area are crucial. The support and campaign groups undoubtedly 
have a life cycle as people grow tired or move onto other jobs. But 
it is unfortunately true that victims continue to be made, creating 
secondary victims who are newly angry and willing to devote their 
time and to push for justice. Those families make a real difference, 
to the lives of other family members and in the ongoing pursuit of 
accountability.  
 
Practicing critical academics have two obligations. Firstly, they 
have an opportunity to support such bereaved individuals, directly 
by communicating and working with them in support, or 
indirectly, by writing to counter the invisibility that is pressed 
upon them and revealing the families who never come into contact 
with anyone. The term ‘corporate manslaughter’ is now in the 
public domain, giving the press, but more importantly bereaved 
families, a language and a discourse to navigate through if their 
loved one is killed. A quick search on the internet reveals a world 
the families can enter and be instantly better informed and with 
substantially more knowledge than individuals were thirty years 
ago.  
 
Secondly, and somewhat crucially, academics must work to entice 
the next generation of individuals to engage with students and 
members of the public so they can continue to work for 
widespread change. Creating critical programmes at foundation, 
under and postgraduate levels, participating in media campaigns 
and trade union conferences, in daily interactions to counter 
‘common sense’ notions of health and safety and creating new 
research projects. This must be incessant and ongoing until the 
actors are irrelevant. The families and the academics may change, 
but the cause does not and there is much more to be done until the 
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experiences of the families in this research are not repeated, every 
day in the UK. 
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Appendix 1: Letter sent to participants with pre consent form 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam 
 
My name is Katy Macvay and I am writing to you regarding the research 
project that I am undertaking as part of my doctoral degree at Liverpool 
John Moores University 
 
This research project focuses on the plight of those bereaved following a 
work-related death or where members of the public have died where the 
circumstances raise questions about the working practices of an 
organisation.  It aims to create a picture of what it is like to lose a loved 
one and then to have to work through our current criminal justice 
system. This is reflected in the project’s title, ‘putting victims at the heart of 
the criminal justice system: an investigation of victims’ experiences via a critical 
examination of the social, political and legal obstacles faced following a corporate 
killing’.  By doing this I aim to determine the obstacles to and prospects 
for a more just treatment of the victims of “corporate crime” in general 
and “corporate killing in particular. 
 
At the core of the project is the collection of information and insights 
from those who have experience as bereaved following a work-related 
death or where members of the public have died where the 
circumstances raise questions about the working practices of an 
organisation. Therefore, the project is heavily dependant upon the co-
operation and willingness of people such as yourself to share your 
experiences.  
 
My aim is to collect this information via semi-structured interviews; 
more akin to conversations, these face-to-face interviews are 
nevertheless structured around a number of key areas that I would like to 
discuss with all participants, relating to their experiences around the 
death of their loved one. I appreciate that this is the most sensitive of 
discussions, and I have taken every step, with the guidance of the 
University, to ensure that any interviews are approached and conducted 
in a sensitive and safe fashion. Thus I can be as flexible as possible as to 
where and when this is done and what would be best for you.   
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For the ease of recall and accuracy, I would prefer to tape the interview, 
although this is not absolutely necessary and, if you were unhappy at this, 
I would refrain from doing so.  In the event of recording the interview, 
any such recordings will be anonymised (eg. the labels on tapes will be 
coded) and stored in a locked and secured location in the University for 
the duration of the research; all tapes will be destroyed once the research 
is completed. Your comments will at all stages of the research remain 
anonymous - no one will be able to identify you in my Doctoral thesis or 
in any articles that are to be written about the project. I would also like 
to reiterate that the data gathered from these interviews or any help 
given in the research process will be used STRICTLY for academic 
purposes. Attached to this letter is a copy of the consent sheet that you 
will be asked to sign in the event of agreeing to participate. 
As part of agreeing to be interviewed as part of the research, you have of 
course the right to withdraw from the research at any stage and the 
University stipulates that you should do so, then any data that has already 
been collected will not be included in the final thesis.  Any interviews 
that have been taped or used will be sent to you for your perusal, to 
maintain a high standard of accuracy and ensure that you have not been 
misquoted.  Additionally, you have the opportunity to change or add to 
what you have said at a later date to make sure that you are represented 
correctly.  There will be many opportunities where any concerns can be 
discussed to ensure that should you agree to take part, you are as 
comfortable as possible. 
 
Please see the tear off slip below, which I hope you will complete. As 
indicated there, in the first instance any positive response from you will 
only be the basis for discussing further the logistics, content and conduct 
an interview. Should you choose not to participate, then may I apologise 
in advance for the intrusion of this letter, thank you for your time in 
reading it, and wish you the very best. 
 
Sincerely Yours,  
 
K. Macvay 
 
 
Tear off here 
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Please tick one: 
I do NOT wish to participate in this research project,  
nor to be contacted again about it.   
 ___________ 
I am willing to discuss participation in this project  
 ___________ 
 
If you have ticked the option above indicating that you are willing to 
discuss participation, you may wish to add your contact details (one or 
both): 
Tel.:  _________________________________________ 
E-mail: ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Please return this slip in the enclosed envelope. Or should you wish to 
discuss this further, you can contact me at ADD DETAILS 
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Appendix 2: Consent form at the time of interview 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Name of experimenter:    Katy Snell 
 
Supervisor:     Professor Joe Sim 
     Doctor Janet Jamieson 
     Professor Steve Tombs 
 
Title of study/project:  Putting victims at the heart of 
the criminal justice system: an investigation of victims’ 
experiences via a critical examination of the social, 
political and legal obstacles faced following a corporate 
killing. 
 
Purpose of study:  To conduct case studies in order to 
access the various experiences of victims of a subset of 
corporate crimes, namely safety crimes and, more 
specifically, corporate killings. 
 
Procedures and Participants Role:  To participate in a 
semi structured interview and answer the questions as 
honestly as possible. 
 
Please Note: 
All participants have the right to withdraw from the project/study at 
any time without prejudice to access of services which are already being 
provided or may subsequently be provided to the participant. 
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Consent Slip 
 
I understand that by signing this form, I am agreeing to 
participate in this research project as an interviewee 
under the conditions set out in the accompanying 
letter.  
 
In particular, I understand that any information that I 
provide shall be anonymised; if stored on audio-tape, 
these will be safely secured and, at the end of the 
research, destroyed. 
 
 
 
Signed:     Date: 
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Appendix 3: University Ethics application 
 
APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF AN INVESTIGATION FOR 
TEACHING, TESTING OR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
 
THIS APPLICATION MUST BE TYPED. 
 
In designing a research, teaching or testing project involving human 
subjects, investigators must be able to demonstrate a clear 
intention to benefit society and the project must be based on sound 
scientific principles.  These criteria will be considered by the Ethics 
Committee before approving a project or practical demonstration.   
 
Applicants are strongly advised to contact an appropriate member 
of the Ethics Committee to discuss their project before submitting 
an application. 
 
SECTION A:  THE APPLICANT 
 
A1.Full Name  
& Status (e.g.staff/student) 
 
 
A2.Relevant 
Qualifications 
 
A3.Address for correspondence from the Ethics Committee (it is important that you notify the Ethics 
Secretary of any changes to this information). 
 
 
 
The Laurels 
Barrow Road 
New Holland 
 
North Lincolnshire 
DN19 7QX 
Social Policy and Criminology BA (Hons) 2:1 
Katy Macvay  
Student 
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SECTION B:  THE PROJECT 
 
B1.What is the title of this investigation 
 
  
 
 
B2.Is this investigation (please tick): 
 
a research project?    a teaching exercise? 
  
  
an undergraduate project?   testing on members of the public? 
 
 
B3.Have the full details of the procedure been appended? (please tick)  yes  no 
 
 
B4.Likely duration of project and location of study: 
 
start date     end date 
 
 
location  
 
B5.Does your research involve collaboration with an NHS Trust, participation by a member of Trust 
staff, access to Trust premises or patients, tissue samples or any biological material, or access to 
Trust information in any form including anonymized retrospective data? 
 
Yes   No 
 
01/06 
 
01/12 
  
  
 
Putting victims at the heart of the criminal justice system: an investigation of victims’ 
experiences via a critical examination of the social, political and legal obstacles faced 
following a corporate killing. 
 
 
 
 
  
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If the answer is yes please complete the attached NHS Research Governance Audit Proforma 
 
B6.Brief description of the ethical nature and purpose of investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
B7.Briefly, what benefit to society will accrue from this project? 
 
 
 
 
B8.Specify the particular procedure which involves the subjects participation 
 
 
 
 
B9.Are any novel procedures involved? 
 
 
 
 
B10.State the potential hazards to persons resulting from the project.  Identify the level of risk to 
persons and the precautions to be taken.  (If risks identified a Risk Assessment Form EC7 must be 
included with the application) 
 
 
 
 
 
The benefit that society will accrue from the project will be an awareness of the experiences of 
victims of corporate/safety crimes, an experience that is neglected in comparison to the 
documentation surrounding victims of common crimes, such as violent and acquisitive crime. 
The procedure which involves the subjects participation is the collection of data used for the case 
study, namely the semi structured interviews. 
 
No novel procedures are involved. 
 
No potential hazards will result. 
During this research, willing volunteers will be used during semi structured interviews.  This will depend 
upon recounting their experiences and re-visiting past events, which they may find distressing. 
 
The purpose of the investigation is to gather qualitative information about the person’s experience within 
the criminal justice system following the death of a relative/friend as a result of a corporate or safety 
crime.  Through this, I aim to create a picture I aim to build a picture of victims’ experiences of law and 
the criminal justice system. 
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B11.State the degree of discomfort to persons involved in the project in terms of pain, 
apprehension, stress and disturbance to routine. 
 
 
 
B12. State your experience or that of the investigator/s in this type of investigation 
 
 
 
 
B13. Names and qualifications of personnel who will be supervising the project 
 
 
 
 
 
B14. The Ethics Committee needs to know if similar work has been undertaken before: 
 
B14.1 What other work do you know of that has been done in a similar subject area and how  
    does this relate to your proposed programme? 
 
 
B14.2 Please give a brief description of the parts of your study that will be completely original 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The part of the study that is original is the case study that will study the experiences of the victims 
of corporate killing and the use of the semi-structured interviews with individuals and 
representatives of, and case workers within the organisations that are campaigning in the area.  
This will create a picture of the victims’ experiences of law and the criminal justice system and 
what they wish to happen in the future.  This will be used in addition to interviews with key 
individuals in the institutions that react to corporate crime and contrasted with research already 
completed on the crime, death by drink driving. 
 
 
The recounting of painful past experiences may cause discomfort.  To deal with this, the 
participants will be informed of their right to stop the interview at any time and will be aware of 
what the information they give will be used for.  Care and attention will also be paid to those 
selected for interview and their ability to cope with the questioning. 
The s mi structured interviews will not impact on their daily routine. 
 
 
 
 
I have experience of semi structured interviews from my full-time occupation where I conduct, on 
average, two semi structure interviews per week and have done so for over a year.  I am aware of 
the different types of questioning that can be used and the advantages and disadvantages of semi 
structured interviews. 
Professor Steve Tombs 
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SECTION C:  SUBJECTS 
C1.How will the subjects be recruited? (NOTE: If subjects are to be approached by letter, you MUST 
attach a specimen copy to this application) 
 
 
 
C2.Number and type of subjects likely to be involved 
 
 
 
C3.Age range of subjects to be recruited: 
 
 
C4.Are questionnaires to be used in this investigation? 
 
C5.Have they been validated previously? 
 
C6.If yes, state by whom and when, (if no, you MUST include copies of the questionnaire/s with this 
application) 
 
 
C7.Will pregnant women be excluded? 
 
C8.State whether the subject’s informed consent will be obtained (please tick): 
 
orally:         yes  no 
 
in writing:      yes  no 
 
in the presence of a disinterested third person:  yes  no 
 
C9.If written consent is necessary, please state if form EC3 will be used.  If not you MUST provide a 
copy of the consent form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18+ 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
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Normally, consent should be given in writing and witnessed by a disinterested third party unless the 
applicant can show good reason why this should not be the case.  Consent forms for adults (EC3) 
and for parents/guardian/carers of children/adults incapable of consent (EC4) are available.   
If an alternative consent form is to be used, you MUST attach a specimen copy to this application. 
 
C10.Will the subject be subjected to any x-rays or ionising radiation? 
 
 yes   no  
 
 If yes, how often? 
 
SECTION D: DECLARATION 
 
D1.Notwithstanding the declaration at the end of this form, has each investigator read, understood 
and accepted the Liverpool John Moores University Ethics Committee’s Regulations and 
Guidelines? 
(Please tick)  
 
yes  no 
 
(The World Wide Web address for guidance is: 
http://www.livjm.ac.uk/research_and_graduate/regulations/hum_vols/index.htm) 
 
D2.If the investigation is a research degree project, append a copy of the completed Section 4 of the 
Liverpool John Moores University Research Degree Registration Application 
 
D3.If the investigation is a teaching exercise, append the exact practical schedule as it will be 
presented to the student 
 
D4.If the investigation is a final year undergraduate project, append an exact copy of the project as 
presented to the subject. 
D5.If the investigation is a research project, append an exact copy of the project as presented to the 
subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
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D6.Declaration (to be countersigned by the Director of School) 
 
I declare that the proposed investigation described in this schedule will be carried out only as 
described and that at all times the Regulations and Guidelines of the University’s Ethics Committee 
will be adhered to.  Before any deviation from the investigation described or from the Ethical 
Regulations takes place, the written permission of the University’s Ethics Committee will be sought. 
 
Applicant’s Signature    Director of School’s Signature 
 
 
Date      Date 
 
 
 
The completed form should be returned to the Ethics Committee Secretary, Rodney House, 2nd 
Floor, Liverpool, L3 5UX.  
 
Checklist: Please make sure the following are included in submission 
 Copy of Application Form (EC1) 
 Relevant Consent Form(s) (EC2), (EC3), (EC4) 
 Participant Information Sheet(s) (EC6) 
 Copy of questionnaire (if applicable) 
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Risk Assessment 
Name of experimenter:    Katy Macvay 
Supervisor:     Professor Steve 
Tombs 
Title of study/project:  Putting victims at the heart of 
the criminal justice system: an investigation of 
victims’ experiences via a critical examination of the 
social, political and legal obstacles faced following a 
corporate killing. 
Purpose of study:  To conduct case studies in order 
to access the various experiences of victims of a 
subset of corporate crimes, namely safety crimes 
and, more specifically, corporate killings. 
Procedures and Participants Role:  To participate in a 
semi structured interview and answer the questions 
as honestly as possible. 
Assessment and Mitigation of Risks 
Discussing the death of a loved one with the 
bereaved is of course extremely sensitive, and thus 
the project may entail risks in terms of causing 
distress to interviewees. Relevant considerations 
include: 
 
 the active agreement of participants to be 
interviewed; 
 the fact that the sample is to be drawn from victims 
organisations, thus making it likely that amongst the 
total population of the bereaved from workplace 
killing, participants in this study are those most 
wiling and able to discuss their experiences. 
 
However, it is possible that recounting the 
circumstances of and following the death may cause 
distress. To manage this potential issue, participants 
are: 
 invited to have the interview conducted in familiar 
and secure surroundings, for example their home or 
the home of a friend or relative; 
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 informed that the interview may be conducted in the 
company of a friend or relative; 
 asked as a matter of course to inform someone close 
to them that they are taking part in the interview, 
when and for roughly how long, and to ensure that 
s/he is contactable during the duration and 
immediately after the interview; 
 informed that they may stop the interview, and/or 
cease to participate in the research process, at any 
stage. 
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Appendix 4: Interview Schedule (1) 
 
 
Victim Questionnaire 
 
Aim: - To document and detail the experiences of 
the families and friends of people who are bereaved 
following a work-related death or where members of 
the public have died where the circumstances raise 
questions about the working practices of an 
organisation. 
 
Date: 
 
Participant’s full name: 
 
County of current residence: 
 
County where incident took place (if different from 
above): 
 
 
 
Can you tell me, in your own words, about the 
circumstances of [name/ your loved one's] death? 
 
When did this happen? 
 
Thinking back to then, which of the following official 
agencies did you come into contact with? 
 
a. The Police 
b. The HSE 
c. The Coroner 
d. Hazards 
e. Centre for Corporate Accountability 
f. The Simon Jones Memorial Campaign 
g. Families Against Corporate Killing 
h. Trade Unions 
i. Victim Support 
j. Probation Service 
k. Crown Prosecution Service 
l. MP 
m. Other 
 
If so, what are your views about the nature of these 
contacts?  Including; 
 
 Length of contact 
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 First point of contact (time and why) 
 Frequency of contact 
 Satisfaction of contact 
 
What contact did you have with the company or 
companies involved in the death? 
 
Were you given the opportunity to write a Personal 
Victim Statement?  If yes: 
 
Did you do one? 
 
Did you have any contact with the media? 
If so, which organizations? 
 
Why did they contact you? 
 
Were you satisfied/dissatisfied with the way you/the 
case was represented in the media? 
 
How has this affected yourself and others? 
 
What has been the worst result of this crime? 
 
What would have eased these effects (reference to 
the criminal justice system)?   
 
What successes did you have throughout the 
process? 
 
When were you aware that it was a crime and not an 
‘accident’? 
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What impact did that have on you (including 
emotionally)? 
 
How did your family and friends react to this 
assessment? 
 
What would you change about the process? 
 
What advice would you give to others who may find 
themselves in your situation?  What would you do 
differently? 
 
What would have constituted ‘justice’ for you in this 
instance? 
 
Are you currently involved in any process to achieve 
this? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Schedule (2) 
 
 
Victim Questionnaire 
 
Aim: - To document and detail the experiences of the 
families and friends of people who are victims of corporate 
crime. 
 
General Areas. 
 
 
1. Can you tell me, in your own words, about the 
circumstances of [name/ your loved one's] death? 
 
 
2. Thinking back to then, which of the following official 
agencies did you have contact with? 
(If necessary, prompt: Police, HSE, Coroner, Victim Support, 
Probation Service, Crown Prosecution Service, local MP, Trade 
Union, support or campaigning group (eg. Hazards, CCA, The 
Simon Jones Memorial Campaign, Families Against Corporate 
Killing) 
If so, what are your views about the nature of these 
contacts?  
(prompt if necessary: length of contact, first point of contact 
(time and why), frequency of contact, satisfaction of 
contact) 
 
 
3. What contact did you have with the company or 
companies involved in the death? 
 
4. Did you have any contact with the media? (which, how, why, 
satisfaction etc) 
 
5. Were you given the opportunity to write a Personal Victim 
Statement?  (If yes, explore) 
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6. How has your experience as a victim of crime affected yourself 
and others? 
 
7. What would you change about the criminal justice system 
response? 
 
8. What would have constituted ‘justice’ for you in this instance? 
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Appendix 6 
 
 
 
NUMBER INITIALS AGE AT 
DEATH 
DATE 
OF 
DEATH 
INTERVIEW 
ADDRESS 
JOB DEATH INQUEST 
OUTCOME 
1 JW 20 2003 Nottingham Electrical 
apprentice 
Asphyxiation 2 years 
Accidental death 
2 JD 54 2003 Weston 
Super Mare 
Construction 
worker 
Asphyxiation 3 years 
Accidental death 
3 RC 43 2005 Birmingham Lorry driver Heart attack following asphyxiation 14 months 
Accidental death 
4 KF 37 2002 Penarth Member of the 
public 
Asphyxiation 4 years 
Unlawful killing 
5 SW 45 2005 Ikley Window cleaner Fall from height 7 months 
Accidental death 
6 GM 40 2005 Glasgow Agency driver Impaled 2.5 years 
Narrative determination 
7 BW 53 2006 Darley Dale Volunteer Asphyxiation 7 months 
Accidental death 
8 SJ 24 1998 Sussex Stevedore 
(unqualified) 
Crushed No inquest 
9 SC 26 1989 Hampshire Member of the 
public 
Drown 6 years 
Unlawful killing 
10 CW 23 2002 Hull Steeplejack Explosion, fall from height (no official 
verdict as organs were ‘lost’) 
Not in public interest 
11 LM 18 2004 Cornwall Apprentice Burns No 
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Appendix 7 
 
NUMBER INITIALS POLICE 
INVESTIGATION 
MANSALUGHTER PROSECUTION HEALTH AND 
SAFETY 
PROSECUTION 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT DATE OF 
INTERVIEW 
1 JW No No No No 
CCA contact 
March 2008 
2 JD No No No No 
CCA contact 
April 2008 
3 RC No No No No 
CCA contact 
May 2008 
4 KF Yes (after 
complaint) 
No Yes Joined FACK, not ‘active’ 
WAY 
CCA contact 
June 2008 
5 SW No No No No 
CCA contact 
May 2008 
6 GM No No Yes Yes 
Own campaign, FACK 
June 2008 
7 BW No No No No June 2010 
8 SJ Yes after 6 weeks, 
upon request of 
HSE Inspector 
CPS refused 
Prosecution after 2.5 years, 
following a judicial review. 
Cleared 
Yes Yes 
Own campaign 
Sept 2010 
9 SC Yes Acquitted prior to inquest 
CPS refusal after inquest verdict 
Failed private prosecutions 
No Yes 
Marchioness 
Disaster Action 
 
10 CW Yes Acquitted Yes Yes, Linda is a founder of FACK  
11 LM Yes Yes, guilty manslaughter 9 months 
Acquitted at the appeal after 3 
months served 
Yes Yes, founder of FACK Sept 2010 
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Appendix 8 
 
 
NUMBER INITIALS GROUP INTERVIEW 
ADDRESS 
INTERVIEW 
DATE 
12 LC Solicitor Telephone 
interview 
January 2015 
13 DW CCA Skype interview February 2015 
14 PD Disaster Action Semi structured 
interview 
April 2015 
15 BR CCA Semi structured 
interview 
April 2015 
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